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From the Glorious Revolution To the French Revolutionary Wars; Civil-Military Relations in North-East England During the Eighteenth Century

A Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses civil-military relations in North-East England during an extended eighteenth century that begins with the Glorious Revolution and ends with the outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars. The study will focus on the relationship that developed between soldiers and civilians by analysing a number of themes including recruiting, billeting and garrisoning, the maintenance of public order and the role of soldiers in local crime. By looking at this type of daily interaction it is possible to gain an understanding of how the actions of the army, and the reactions of society, affected civil-military relations. Through this process the study attempts to discover whether the army was prone to lewd and violent behaviour that terrorised local communities and consequently resulted in poor relations with the civilian population. This thesis argues that despite the relative unpopularity of the army, and its occasional involvement in criminal activity and violence against civilian society, civil-military relations in the region were never overwhelmingly frictional or confrontational. The main sources of tension actually arose out of the burden placed on the civilian population by their financial, logistical and constitutional commitments to the army. At the same time the army's role in opposing civil unrest, and enforcing local and central government policy, undermined its relationship with local communities.

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Abbreviations

AFS	*Armed Forces and Society*
AQ	*Army Quarterly*
BIHR	*Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*
BJRL	*Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*
BTRO	*Northumberland County Records Office (Berwick)*
CCRO	*Cumbria County Records Office, Carlisle*
EcHR	*Economic History Review*
EHR	*English Historical Review*
GH	*German History*
HJ	*Historical Journal*
HR	*Historical Research*
HSR	*Historical Social Research*
IRSH	*International Review of Social History*
JBS	*Journal of British Studies*
JMH	*Journal of Modern History*
JPMS	*Journal of Political and Military Sociology*
JRUSI	*Journal of the Royal United Services Institution*
JSAHR	*Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*
LPS	*Local Population Studies*
MA	*Military Affairs*
MM	*Mariner's Mirror*
MRO	*Northumberland County Records Office (Morpeth)*
NH	*Northern History*
PP	*Past and Present*
PRO	*Public Record Office (Kew, London)*
TWAS	*Tyne and Wear Archives Service (Newcastle upon Tyne)*
SR	*Social Research*
WH	*War in History*

Chapter 1

Introduction

'Our God and soldiers we like adore,
Ev'n at the brink of danger, not before,
After deliverance, both alike requited,
Our Gods forgotten, the soldiers slighted.'

Francis Quarles (1592-1644)

I. Opening Remarks

The aim of this thesis is to analyse civil-military relations in the North East of England during an extended eighteenth century, running from the Glorious Revolution to the outbreak of hostilities with Revolutionary France. In particular, it examines the relationships between the region's civilian populace and the military by looking at soldier-civilian interaction, and placing administrative and government structures into a supporting role. Within this framework it will observe a number of activities that brought the army into direct contact with the local population. These include the maintenance of public order, recruitment, desertion, garrisoning and billeting and criminal activity. The thesis will then look at how such interactions impacted on the evolution and maintenance of civil-military relations within the region.

To place the army within the context of British society in the eighteenth century is difficult, and to determine the relationship and reputation it enjoyed amongst the civilian population of England is equally challenging. So much is taken on faith, and so little has been done to accurately measure the validity of these beliefs at the most fundamental levels. Likewise, the eighteenth-century British army has been much maligned by the interpretations of contemporary observers, resulting in a popular stereotype of the army as a dangerous collection of Britain's social flotsam. Did James Wolfe speak the truth when describing his men as 'vagabonds that stroll about

in dirty red clothes from one gin-ship to another...dirty, drunken insolent rascals'?[1] Was the British army nothing more than 'a parcel of mercenaries, fawning, lewd dissipated creatures, the dregs and scum of mankind.'[2] Or was there more to the army and its dealings with British civilian society, and especially the civilians of the North East? If the above observations were true then the very nature of civil-military relations in North-East England would be deeply affected.

While directed at developing an understanding of civil-military relations in a local context, this work is part of a wider scholarly trend that has seen military history regain some of the attraction that it has lost in the previous thirty to forty years. To some extent the emergence of social history as a major force helped to marginalise military history from the mainstream. Lawrence Stone refers to this period as the 'rush to social history'.[3] While he credits this phenomenon with the opening of new fields of enquiry, he also links it to the neglect of other subject areas.[4] Initially, few strong linkages were seen between military and social history, despite the appearance of numerous nascent 'war and society' studies from the early 1980s. Nevertheless, historians from many disciplines have come to recognise that there are strong relationships between military and social history.

These connections became increasingly apparent in the 1980s as studies of state building and the controversial theories of the 'military revolution' and the 'fiscal military state' emerged.[5] Many military, political and social historians are now attempting to shed fresh light on the old interpretations and methodology of military history, while more intensely examining the role that conflict and armed forces played within the societies they served. As a result, experts in this field have realised that war and military matters have far-reaching political, economic, cultural and social

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[1] Quoted in: J.A. Houlding "Fit for Service" The Training of the British Army 1715-1795 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) 268.
[2] Ibid., 267.
[3] 'Introduction' in: Lawrence Stone (ed.), An Imperial State At War. Britain From 1689 to 1815 (London: Routledge, 1994) 1.
[4] Ibid.
[5] The concept of the military revolution was first expressed in 1955 during a lecture by Michael Roberts at Queen's University Belfast. Geoffrey Parker helped to open the debate on the subject. Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); The first large-scale work on the 'Fiscal-Military State' was undertaken by John Brewer, Sinews of Power. War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (London:

implications. Furthermore, the roles of military power and armed forces are becoming central in the debates relating to early-modern state formation and the development of governmental and monarchical authority.

Not surprisingly, recent military history has, in part, been influenced by the approach taken by many social historians. Those analysing war and military affairs are now comfortable focusing on the role of the 'rank-and-file', civilian society and popular institutions within their studies. This 'new history', as Peter Burke describes it, does not rely primarily on the description of 'high politics', the view from above and a focus on the narrative.[6] It contrasts nicely with the 'top-down' approach of some military history, where battles, logistics, organisation and famous military leaders are afforded more attention.[7] As mentioned earlier, this thesis will employ a 'bottom-up' methodology in its analysis of civil-military relations in the North East. It will focus on the role of the army in the daily life of the civilian population.

II. Why A Regional Study?

One might question the merits of conducting a regional study of an institution that is national, and even international, in scope. It might also be asked what benefit can a thesis, which looks at a microcosm of British society, be to the wider debate on the nature of civil-military relations in eighteenth-century England? Importantly, a local study does not necessarily have to justify itself within a national scope, although it is helpful if it does at least lead the reader to ask questions about other regions within the country. An example of this type of investigation is the study of early-modern Whickham by David Levine & Keith Wrightson.[8] These historians use a geographically limited study to analyse the development of a single town during a period of increased industrial and social development. In doing so they highlight what

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Unwin & Hyman, 1988).

[6] Peter Burke "Overture: The New History" in Burke (ed.), New Perspectives on Historical Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[7] A well-known example being Sir John Fortesque, History of the British Army 4 vols. (London: 1899-1906).

[8] David Levine & Keith Wrightson, The Making of an Industrial Society, Whickham 1560-1765 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

may have been a wider trend within the region and nation as a whole. If nothing else Levine and Wrightson exposed a new area for social historians to investigate.

As my research evolved it became apparent that the historical stigmatism, which has labelled the eighteenth-century North East of England as remote and alien from the more developed regions to the south, was simply not true.[9] An increasing body of work has illustrated that the North East was a dynamic region with important economic and military significance for the entire country. In turn, large population centres like Newcastle and Berwick played roles within this peripheral region similar to that played by London in the Home Counties and the nation as a whole. As such they acted as the focal point for regional political and economic business and administrative activity. Furthermore, and as the next chapter will clearly illustrate, the region had a rich variety of characteristics that set it apart from other districts in England.

Another factor underpinning the choice to utilise the North East for this study was the realisation that it provided fresh ground for an investigation into the nature of civil-military relations. In fact detailed historical analysis of this subject, within the context of the North East, is almost non-existent for early-modern Britain. As a topic regional civil-military relations tends to appear as short cameos in texts that deal with the issue in a much wider context.[10] There is also an equally important opportunity to add to the written history of the North East. Much exists but a great deal of it is the product of publications from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which does not approach the topic with modern historical methods.[11] While it would be foolish to dismiss such sources out of hand, there is a need to expand upon the up-to-date research that utilises referenced archival sources. In the past two decades this imbalance has been gradually redressed with the publication of several monographs, and a number of

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[9] Gwenda Morgan & Peter Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law. The Problem of Law Enforcement in North-East England 1718-1800. (London: UCL Press, 1998) 9.

[10] An example of this is John Childs, The Army of William III, 1689-1702 (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1987) 23.

[11] Examples of such works include: John Fuller, The History of Berwick upon Tweed (Newcastle: Frank Graham Ltd., 1973) which was originally published in 1799; Jeremiah William Summers, The History and Antiquities of Sunderland. Vol.1 (Sunderland: Joseph Tate, 1858); and John Sykes, Local Records. Vol. 1 (Stockton on Tees: Patrick & Shotton, 1973) originally published in 1866.

articles dealing specifically with the history of Northumberland and Tyne and Wear.[12] While it appears that the North East is undergoing a revitalisation of its historical popularity, there is still a great deal of room for additional research.[13]

III. The Historiography of Civil-Military Relations

The recent explosion of writing concerning 'war and society' and civil-military relations covers a large time frame, from the medieval period up to the present day. For the early-modern period there are a number of excellent monographs on the subject.[14] While these books are essential to the greater understanding of European developments in this era, far less has been written on these concepts within the context of an individual state.[15] One element of this type of study is the analysis of the army's role in the domestic business of the state, and how that affected its relationship with the general populace. France, Germany and Russia have been the subject of studies focusing on this, but there is room for additional research.[16]

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[12] Examples of recent monographs are: David Brenchley, A Place By Itself: Berwick upon Tweed in the Eighteenth Century (Berwick upon Tweed: Berwick upon Tweed Civic Society, 1997); Robert Colls & Bill Lancaster (eds.), Newcastle upon Tyne: A Modern History (Chichester: Phillimore & Co. Ltd., 2001); David Levine and Keith Wrightson, The Making of an Industrial Society, Whickham 1560-1765 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); McCord, Norman & Richard Thompson, The Northern Counties From A.D. 1000, (London: Longman, 1998) and: Gwenda Morgan & Peter Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law, which is the only major published work on law and order in North-East England during the eighteenth century.

[13] A good illustration of this growing interest in the North East's early-modern history is illustrated by increased postgraduate work in the area. A recent example is: Joanna Bath, Violence and Violent Crime in the North East, c.1650-1720, (Ph.D. Thesis, University of the Newcastle upon Tyne, 2001).

[14] Examples include: M.S. Anderson, War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime 1618-1789 (London: Fontana Press, 1988); Geoffrey Best, War and Society in Revolutionary Europe 1770-1870 (London, 1982); Jeremy Black, European Warfare 1660-1815 (London: UCL Press, 1994). Despite its title this book does deal with the social context to some limited extent; There is also John Child's, Armies and Warfare in Europe 1648-1789 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982); Andre Corvisier, Armies and Societies in Europe 1494-1789 (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1979); Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1987); J.R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620 (London: Fontana, 1985); Frank Tallett, War and Society in Early-Modern Europe 1495-1715 (London: Routledge, 1992); Stephen Wilson, "For a Socio-Historical Approach to the Study of Western Military Culture." Armed Forces and Society, 6 (1980) 527-552.

[15] Alan Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters. The Army and French Society During the Revolution and the Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) and by the same author Soldiers of the French Revolution (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1990); John L.H. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar. Army and Society in Russia 1462-1874 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); Peter H. Wilson, War, State and Society in Württemburg, 1677-1793 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[16] Writing on civil-military relations in continental Europe includes: Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1957);

Unfortunately, similar material on Britain is not abundant, despite being one of the foremost military powers of the period.

To say that there is a complete dearth of material concerning the relationship of the British army and society in the eighteenth century would be misleading. In fact there are numerous studies offering differing approaches in their analysis of the subject.[17] They are supported by a sizeable quantity of material that explores the institution of the British army and the contiguous structural, organisational, operational and political developments that affected it during the eighteenth century.[18] There are also a reasonable number of doctoral and master's theses that look at issues such as recruiting, administration and other related subjects.[19] Therefore, much is known about the way in which the army performed and functioned on the battlefield, how it

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John A Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle. The French Army, 1610-1715 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) as well as "How War Fed War: The Tax of Violence and Contributions During the Grand Siècle, 1610-1715." Journal of Modern History, 65 (2) (1993) 286-310; Peter H. Wilson, "German Women and War 1500-1800." War in History, 3 (2) (1996) 127-160; and by the same author, "Violence and the Rejection of Authority in Eighteenth-Century Germany: The Case of the Swabian Mutinies in 1757." German History, 12 (1) (1994) 1-26.

[17]These include: H.V. Bowen, War and British Society, 1688-1795, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); John Brewer, The Sinews of Power. War, Money and the English State 1688-1783 (London: Unwin Allen Ltd., 1989); Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats. The British Soldier and War in the Americas 1755-1763 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), particularly chapters 2 & 3; John Childs, The Army, James II, and the Glorious Revolution (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980); and The British Army of William III, 1689-1702 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987); Andrew Coleby, "Military-Civilian Relations on the Solent 1651-1689." The Historical Journal, 29 (4) (1986) 949-961; J.E. Cookson, The British Armed Nation 1793-1815. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Arthur N. Gilbert, "Military and Civilian Justice in Eighteenth-Century England: An Assessment." Journal of British Studies 17 (1978) 41-65; Victor E. Neuberg, "The British Army in the Eighteenth Century." JSAHR, 61 (1983) 38-47.

[18] Corelli Barnett, Britain & Her Army 1509-1970. A Military, Political and Social Survey (London: Penguin Press, 1970); Scott Claver, Under the Lash. A History of Corporal Punishment in the British Armed Forces (London: Torchstream Books, 1954); Alan J. Guy, Economy and Discipline: Officership and Administration in the British Army 1714-1763 (Manchester: Manchester University Press); John Hattendorf, England in the War of Spanish Succession. A Study of the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1702-1712 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987); H.C.B. Rogers, The British Army of the Eighteenth Century (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1977); R.E. Scouller, The Armies of Queen Anne. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966); Also by the same author: "Recruiting: A Familiar Problem." Army Quarterly 71 (1955) 105-112, and: "The Mutiny Acts." JSAHR, 50 (1972) 42-45;

[19] Examples include: Keith Bartlett, The Development of the British Army During the Wars With France 1793-1815 Ph.D. Thesis (Durham University, 1998); I.F. Burton, The Secretary at War and the Administration of the British Army During the War of Spanish Succession. Ph.D. Thesis (University of London, 1960); S.D.M. Carpenter, Patterns of Recruitment of the Highland Regiments of the British Army, 1756-1815. M.Litt. Thesis (University of St. Andrews, 1978); James Hayes, The Social and Professional Background of the Officers of the British Army 1714-1763. M.A. Thesis, University of London, 1956; J.L. Pimlott, The Administration of the British Army 1783-1793. Ph.D. Thesis (Leicester University, 1975); G.A. Steppler, The Common Soldier in the Reign of George III. D.Phil. Thesis (Oxford University, 1985); J.R. Western, The Recruitment of the Land Forces of Great Britain

disciplined its men and how regiments were organised, administered and recruited. At the same time less is known about how the British army interacted on a daily basis with the civilian population.

One theme that is popular within many of the studies of war and society (or civil-military relations) within Britain is the description of direct interaction between the civilian and soldier as part of a wider institutional framework.[20] In many ways this follows the premise laid out by Samuel Huntington, that civil-military relations is the principal institutional component of state military security policy.[21] There are numerous examples of this approach to the analysis of civil-military relations. John Brewer's *The Sinews of Power* is one of the most widely known books concerning the role of war and the military in the development of the English state.[22] It is very much focused on the establishment of such relations through an analysis of national economic and political institutions. A more recent example is H.V. Bowen's *War and Society 1688-1815* which, like Brewer, approaches the topic using a macro-economic focus, stressing the effects of the national economy on relations between army and society.[23]

These studies tend to see global, continental and state developments as the driving force behind the formation and maintenance of civil-military relations. Most of these texts recognise such connections as resulting from interactions between local and national governing bodies. For example, Brewer asserts that English foreign policy and concurrent economic developments were central to the development of civil-military relations within eighteenth-century Britain.[24] While this is certainly true, the formation of civil-military relations is not the exclusive preserve of the national government and its agents. Thus, there is a need to address this fact by adopting an alternative methodology that analyses that part that parochial events played in the formation of civil-military relations. This is not abandoning the broader themes and

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1739-99. Ph.D. Thesis (Edinburgh University, 1953).

[20] An Example of a source that relies on a less institutional approach is: Tony Hayter, The Army and the Crowd in Mid Georgian England (New Jersey: Rowman and Letterfield, 1978).

[21] Huntington, Soldier and the State, 1.

[22] Brewer, Sinews of Power.

[23] Bowen, War and Society; A further example is: Dwyryd Wyn Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1988).

issues discussed above, but rather exploring an important 'flip-side' to the evolution of relationships between the army and the people. At the same time it could be said that this thesis is, to a limited extent, separating the distinction between two types of civil-military relations. One is the preserve of government, officers and the formation of state policy. The second, more parochial type, is the relationship focusing on civilians, soldiers and the implementation of state policy upon the domestic population.

There are several works that have attempted to explore this alternative view of the formation of civil-military relations in a comprehensive way. However, these fall largely outside the eighteenth century. For instance Andrew Coleby's 'Military-Civilian Relations on the Solent 1651-1689', which is probably the closest in methodology to this thesis, ends its investigation in the year after the Glorious Revolution.[25] Lois G Schwoerer's *"No Standing Armies!"* has a short chapter on the eighteenth century, but its main focus is on the tempestuous events of the seventeenth century and how they affected public attitudes towards the issue of a standing army.[26] Moreover, there is a greater emphasis on the era surrounding the outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars and the conflicts with Napoleon. This is due in part to the unprecedented scope and complexity of these wars and their massive impact on military organisation.[27] This means that there is an opportunity, if not a need, to explore the nature of soldier-civilian interaction during a formative period in British history.

IV. Themes and Issues.

It is important to consider some of the major themes that will be dealt with in the

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[24] Brewer, Sinews of Power.
[25] Andrew Coleby, "Military-Civilian Relations." Additional examples include: Frederick S. Allen, "Towards a theory of Civil-Military Control in England 1670-1680." Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 40 (1962) 95-102; Silvia R. Frey, "The Common British Soldier in the Late Eighteenth Century." Military Affairs, 43 (1979) 117-131.
[26] Lois G. Schwoerer, "No Standing Armies!" The Antiarmy Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1981).
[27] Again see: Bartlett, The Development of the British Army; J.E. Cookson, The British Armed Nation 1793-1815.

following chapters. One of the principal difficulties in dealing with a subject as complex and inter-disciplinary as this is trying to find a way to analyse and explain topics without unnecessary repetition. Thus, the material within this thesis has been divided into a number of specific thematic topics, such as rioting, crime, desertion and recruitment. However, there are a number of more general themes that place the analysis of civil-military relations in its wider context, helping to establish a general analytical framework.

One such theme is the reliability of the army in a domestic context and in its role as a protector of the government, society and property. For this reason the following chapters use the term 'reliability' not in relation to the army as a war-making entity, but as a tool of social regulation and the keeper of public order. Any discussion of British ground forces on foreign battlefields is best left to the many examples already in print.[28] Therefore, only the reliability of army units operating in the North East will be measured, through the tasks for which it was responsible: anti-smuggling operations, riot control, domestic defence and garrison duty.

Another issue, which will appear throughout this study, is the division and contrast between civil and military spheres of interest and control. Such distinctions may cover a number of related topics including law, administration, the constitution and politics. Many politically influential groups in England feared the growth of absolutism, or at least the development of monarchical despotism. Thus after 1688 Parliament made more vigorous attempts to ensure that many key mechanisms of state control and power were firmly placed in the hands of the civil authorities.[29] Naturally, this included increased control over procedures often thought to be the strict purview of the military such the recruitment and billeting of troops. Despite this the army was left to scrutinise and administer much of its own business including the dispensing of military justice. The way in which these two spheres interacted was essential to the formation of civil-military relations in the North East. For example, the confusion

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[28] A comprehensive treatment is: David Chandler & Ian Beckett (eds.) The Oxford History of the British Army (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

[29] Some see eighteenth-century Britain as a distinctive case in the reduction of military repression by the state. Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power. Vol.II: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 408.

that surrounded the army's obligations under the common law caused some friction between the military and local civilian authorities well into the eighteenth century.[30]

Linked to this is the relationship and jurisdiction between the national government and regional authorities. It is also important from the viewpoint that the co-operation between the centre and provincial elites was the nexus of Britain's maintenance of a constitutional government and its resistance to the growth of military absolutism.[31] As the army was an institution of the British state, bureaucrats in London were its ultimate administrators. On the other hand this study stresses the role of the army within North-East England, where local administration also played a key role. In a country as decentralised as eighteenth-century Britain, day-to-day authority over the army was often left to local magistrates and community leaders. Therefore, the separation of the military between martial and civil authority on an institutional level is mirrored in the shared responsibility of governance at national and county level. The best example of this can be seen in the preservation of public order. Ultimate control over the domestic use of the army lay with the Secretary of State in London. Nevertheless, magistrates were entrusted with direct and complete authority over troops who assisted them in maintaining and restoring order.

The most important of the themes, and one that will be central to the whole focus of this study, is the nature and form of public resistance to the army. When attempting to measure civil-military relations in the way that this thesis does, gauging the level and character of public resistance to the action or inaction of the army is very important. Again, as with the issue of reliability, this reaction was often generated through the role that the army played in the maintenance of public order, and assisting the government's domestic policies, such as tax collection, anti-smuggling operations and impressment. However, unlike the previous topic, this theme is also connected to processes and structures that existed within the army itself, including methods of recruitment, billeting and military justice.

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[30] For more on this see Chapter 5.

[31] Brian Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early-Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 157.

V. Terms of Analysis.

The next task of this chapter is to outline and more clearly define several terms that will be employed in the investigation of the various topics that follow. This is an essential condition as many terms in the writings of the period have ill-defined parameters. Even civil-military relations, the central theme of this work, can be interpreted in several different ways. As mentioned above, many works on 'civil-military relations' or 'war and society' look at the subject from an administrative point of view. In particular, how army organisation related to government control, or how the army affected national and local government structures and relations. For example, Samuel Huntington sees 'civil-military relations' as focusing on the relationship between the officer corps and the state, in its role as the ultimate authority over the army.[32] It is also his assertion that this relationship created the conflict between functional and societal elements.[33] On the other hand John Brewer looks at 'war and society' as the relationship between Britain's ability to carry out its military enterprises and the development of socio-economic institutions to support such endeavours.[34] These included the creation of the Bank of England and a more rigid and invasive tax collection system.[35]

This thesis does incorporate elements of these approaches. However, civil-military relations as it is defined here, refers to the relationship that existed between members of the armed forces and the local population of the North East of England. In other words, it elects to adopt a more parochial viewpoint. Through the analysis of several themes such as law and order, recruitment, desertion, billeting and crime, the inter-relationship of civilians and soldiers is observed to gain some understanding of the nature of civil-military relations in the region. However, it would be wrong to suggest that there is no place for the relationship between elements of the national and local government. Since the army was largely governed and regulated by ministers and senior officers in London it is integral to understanding the way in which the army

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[32] Samuel P. Huntington, Soldier and the State.
[33] Ibid., 3
[34] Brewer, Sinews of Power.
[35] Ibid.

conducted itself in the region. Nevertheless, this is a geographically limited study so such discussions will only be applied as they relate directly to events within the North East.

In terms of setting the chronological boundaries of this study a 'long' eighteenth century has been employed stretching from the Glorious Revolution to the start of the French Revolutionary Wars. There are a number of important reasons for doing this. First, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 marked a turning point in the constitutional history of England. The 1689 Bill of Rights forever altered the constitutional position of the army as much of the control over it was taken out of the hands of the King and placed with Parliament.[36] This gradual "civilianisation" of the military infrastructure, and the constitutional limitations placed on its domestic role, would have lasting effects on civil-military relations at all levels. The outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars in 1793 is a good place to close this study. The turmoil engendered by the fight against the radicalism of the French Revolution, and later Napoleon, represented a period in which the British Army underwent large-scale changes, not only in its size and organisation, but also in its administration and political role. Also, the increasing separation of the army and society in this period, led to a distinct internal evolution within the culture of the army.[37] Furthermore, as mentioned above, the period after 1793 has been covered widely in a number of recent works.[38]

Geographically, the 'North East', as it relates to this thesis, will encompass the present-day boundaries of the county of Northumberland. As a result this study will incorporate those parts of northern Northumberland that, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, belonged to County Durham. This includes the village of

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[36] For the changes in the constitution during and after 1688 see: Sir David Lindsay Kier, The Constitutional History of Modern Britain Since 1485 (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1969); Lois G. Schwoerer, The Declaration of Rights, 1689 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1981); Mark A. Thompson, A Constitutional History of England, 1642-1801. Vol.4. (London: Methuen & Company, 1938); and E.N. Williams (ed.), The Eighteenth-Century Constitution: Documents and Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

[37] For more on this see Chapter 2. Additionally there is: James Douet, British Barracks 1600-1914. Their Architecture and Role in Society (London: English Heritage & The Stationary Office, 1998) 1-2; and chapter 2 of Brumwell, Redcoats, 113-7

[38] The most recent examples include: Keith Bartlett The Development of The British Army; J.E. Cookson The British Armed Nation.

Tweedmouth and some of the country around Berwick and the border with Scotland. The population centres of Sunderland and South Shields; which also belonged to County Durham, are included where they have a direct impact on the events of Northumbria and Newcastle. This is particularly true of civil unrest involving keelmen and miners. Further, Berwick-upon-Tweed is included, despite its relative autonomy, due to its strategic importance to the region, and the presence of a permanent manned garrison within its walls.[39] The North East's importance to domestic defence as well as its remoteness, relatively light population density and distance from the capital makes it a very interesting place to conduct an analysis of civil-military relations.

The term 'army' refers to the regular ground forces of the British military establishment. The militia was essentially a separate military organisation that was set outside the purview of the army, except in times of war, when parts of it were embodied into the regular forces.[40] This work will not seek to exclude the role of the militia but rather it will deal with the two institutions as individual entities. Similar guidelines will relate to the Volunteer Companies, Fencibles and other part-time domestic security forces. The marines, or soldiers destined for the 'sea service', will be dealt with as separate from the regular land army. This approach will be taken despite the fact that the army and navy shared authority over these units at different times in the eighteenth century. Invalids are considered to be part of the auxiliary forces despite their direct connection to the regular military establishment.[41] However, since Invalids were a common feature of the military establishment in the North East, and were made up of former regular soldiers, their role will be incorporated within the discussion of many topics. For example, their role in local criminal activity will be analysed alongside that of regular troops. Bodies of troops such as the artillery and engineers, which possessed some form of autonomy from the army proper, will be mentioned as part of the regular army where it is deemed

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[39] Tynemouth and Newcastle often had detachments of the regular army present, however Berwick is the only centre in the region that was continuously manned by regular troops throughout the century. For more on the distribution of forces in the region please see Chapter 2 below.

[40] The formative work on this subject is: J.R. Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1956). For an example of militia embodiment in action see PRO WO 5/91/89.

[41] Invalid companies were formed from Chelsea Hospital out-pensioners deemed fit for garrison duty.

appropriate. Members of the Board of Ordnance will be included in cases where their actions impacted on the local community in which they operated.

VI. Sources

The wide thematic scope of this thesis has meant that a great variety of archival sources have been consulted at both a national and local level. Not surprisingly their quality and availability are as varied as the topics covered within chapters that follow. The main aim of this brief section is to describe the various merits and problems with these documents. Any specific discussions of archival sources as they relate to particular topics or themes will be dealt with within the relevant chapters.[42]

The most obvious example of the varying quality of archival records can be observed in the holdings of national and regional archives. In the majority of cases the holdings of the Public Record Office in Kew are well preserved and very comprehensive. This is especially true of the War Office papers (WO) and other classes relating to the administration of the army. The correspondence of the Secretary at War is almost totally complete for the entire period covered by this thesis and was widely consulted during my research. Most importantly, the War Office In-Letters (WO1) and Out-Letters (WO4) provide a wealth of information, not only on the national picture, but also on events in the North East. Likewise, the papers associated with the Secretaries of State (SP), and later the Home Office (HO), are very detailed and clear throughout the period. The Calendar of State Papers Domestic (CSPD) was particularly helpful in locating relevant information, especially on the issue of criminals serving in the military. There are some sources, such as those related to the Assizes of the Northern Circuit (ASSI 45), which have suffered from the ravages of time. When they are complete these records provide a detailed and interesting insight into eighteenth-century crime. However, in the early part of the century there are large periods when sources for the North East no longer exist in any meaningful form.[43]

Berwick and Newcastle both had Invalid contingents in garrison during much of the eighteenth century.
[42] For a full reference of the sources referred to below please see Section 1 of the Bibliography.

The main problem in researching the history of North-East England during the eighteenth century is the state of the archival sources in local record offices, and in particular, their lack of depth. This is especially true of the records for Newcastle held at the Tyne and Wear Archives Service (TWAS). While nineteenth-century records are voluminous, large sections of the archival record for the period under study in this work are severely lacking or even completely non-existent. Part of this problem may be due to a historical event discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. In 1740 a serious riot in the city resulted in the Guildhall being attacked and some of the city's records, being destroyed by the angry crowd. Not surprisingly the town records before 1740 are very poor with the exception of those papers relating to the keelmen (394/3-26) and the town's Calendar of Common Council Book (MD/NC/2/4-7). The latter of these gives an insight into the daily issues that occupied the town's leaders. Unfortunately, whilst having complete records from 1699 to 1799, the council books do not go into the type of detail one would like. A serious hole in the Newcastle source material comes in papers relating to the town's quarter sessions. While the Court and Order Books (NCX/CT/1) are in an acceptable condition they provide very little detail of cases apart from names and lists of court and jury members. Most problematic are the papers of the Quarter Sessions themselves (QS/NC/35-104) which are in an advanced state of decay for much of the early part of the eighteenth century. While they improve slightly as the century progresses, the papers rarely provide more than an anecdotal insight into the criminal cases and other business heard in Newcastle's courts. As a result trying to extract any detail from them is extremely difficult.

A similar situation is apparent in other archives throughout the North East, although the problem is generally not as bad as in Newcastle. Again the records from the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries appear to be the worst affected. In most cases the quality of the documentary record improves later into the eighteenth century. Berwick upon Tweed's archives have arguably the best collection of documentary evidence for the period, but there are also large gaps here.[44] In particular, there are

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[43] A more detailed examination of the relative merits of the Assize papers can be found in Chapter 5.
[44] The Berwick upon Tweed Record Office (BTRO) is a branch of the Northumberland Records Office which has offices at Morpeth, Berwick and Gosforth.

considerable sections of the town's guild records (GB1-2) and quarter sessions papers (C8) which are missing, either lost or destroyed with the passage of time. In the Northumberland county archives at Morpeth there are good collections of quarter sessions records for most of the century (QSB) although the detailed records are lacking after 1742. As a result one is forced to refer to the less detailed Order and Indictment Books (QSO, QSI).

Despite these shortcomings there is a respectable amount of existing primary material that was consulted in the researching of this thesis. However, it is important to remember that the condition of the local archival material has impacted upon the chapters that follow. This is especially true of the depth of material available. Ideally one would have wished for a complete and abundant historical record for the region, but this is not possible. Nevertheless, this study does its best to utilise the records available in its analysis of civil-military relations in North-East England between 1688 and 1793.

VII. Outline of the Thesis

The next chapter will aim to place the thesis in a broader context by exploring the social, economic and political conditions within the North East between 1688 and 1793. In addition, it will explore the nature of the administrative and governmental relationship that existed between the state bureaucracy in London and the region's political and legal authorities. Additionally, a brief section will discuss the evolution of the army during this period. In conducting a study that encompasses over one hundred years it is important to acknowledge that the army and its men will have changed during this time. Finally, there will be a discussion of the military presence in the North East during the eighteenth century. This will include, amongst other things, an analysis of troop concentrations and disbursements in the region, as well as a discussion of local military infrastructure. It will also look at how the army's presence in the North East changed during the course of the century.

Chapter Three will focus on the opposing processes of recruitment and desertion. The

initial focus will be on the role that local government had in the recruitment and impressment of social-marginals (vagrants, criminals and debtors) into the armed forces. Furthermore, it will analyse the social cost of recruiting to the region as well as the abuses present within the recruiting system. Beyond this, public resistance to various forms of recruitment, and its effects upon local civil-military relations, will be investigated. This section will observe the public's reaction to recruitment and will question if such resistance differed depending on whether the methods were voluntary or compulsory. In terms of desertion the chapter will focus on the civilian reaction to deserters and the authority's attempts to recapture men who had fled the ranks. There is also a need to discuss whether or not the public actively attempted to assist desertion and tried to protect deserters from recapture.

Chapter Four looks more closely at the army's conduct and role while garrisoned in the region's barracks and civilian billets. It will be important to look at the process and legal framework of billeting to establish what was expected of officers, soldiers and civilian officials whilst in quarters. Following on from this the analysis will be expanded to look at the direct impact that the presence of soldiers had on civil-military relations. In particular, there will be an analysis of how soldiers contributed to bastardy, legitimate births and marriages in the places where they were quartered. Beyond this the origins of tensions between the region's towns and the army will be explored. Next the nature of local public resistance to the billeting process will be discussed.

Chapter Five deals with the subject of crime, criminal activity and its links to civil-military relations. The chapter will attempt to identify the level at which soldiers participated in crimes against civilians and how this may have impacted upon the public's view of the army. The nature and types of these infractions will be dealt with in more detail to establish whether soldiers were prone to particularly types of crimes such as rape and murder. Before this there will be a brief discussion of the characteristics of crime within the North East during the eighteenth century. Furthermore, the evolution of the common law's jurisdiction over soldiers who committed crimes against civilians and private property will be looked at briefly.

Chapter Six deals with a theme that is central to understanding the role of the army in eighteenth-century England, the maintenance of public order. The army was the only true institution of law enforcement in the country for much of this period. Therefore, the chapter will examine the need for the army and militia in this role, as well as the constitutional framework and legal restrictions placed on such duties. There will be a brief discussion of a number of the duties performed under this guise, including the escorting of prisoners and tax collectors, and the combating of smuggling. From here the thesis will discuss what may have been the military's most essential police role, the suppression of civil unrest. Included here is an analysis of the nature and characteristics of civil unrest in the North East. Combined with this is an overview of the procedures and conditions for calling out the troops in such a situation, as well as a look at the jurisdictions of the civilian and military authorities in riot situations. Finally, the region's major riots will be assessed, paying particular attention to the role played by the army or the militia. From this it will be possible to determine the impact that rioting, and anti-riot duty, had on civil-military relations.

Chapter Seven is a brief case study of the themes discussed in other chapters in this thesis, and how they apply to Newcastle and Berwick, during the 1745 Jacobite rebellion. It will show that the sudden influx of thousands of soldiers into the region's towns and hinterlands did not lead to a crime wave, the outbreak of mass hysteria, or even widespread opposition to their presence. Neither did it create any considerable tension between the two groups. Rather the local population did their best to accommodate the soldiers and assist them in their business. However, it will be stressed that this overwhelming goodwill was not the result of the regional population's single-minded love of the army, but rather a symptom of widespread anxiety linked to the threat posed by the rebel army's march south from Scotland.

Chapter 2

Contextual Frameworks:
The Region and the Army in the Eighteenth Century

"Surely this place is ripe for Him who 'came not
to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance'."

John Wesley
Newcastle, 1742[1]

I. Introduction

This thesis is an examination of civilian-military relations in North-East England during the eighteenth century. While both the civilian population and the army were essentially separate entities in their own terms, they existed together as increasingly co-operative parts of the interwoven tapestry of the English state system. As a result, these two seemingly disparate groups exerted a growing level of influence on each other on a number of levels. For this reason it is essential to place the subject matter of this thesis into wider contextual frameworks, and in particular to investigate the various social, economic and political landscapes of the North East. By doing this the reader will better understand the local constructs that exerted influence over the role of the army in North-East society, as well as the course and development of relations between these two groups.

Beyond this it will be helpful to look at the actual physical presence of the army in the region, including the administrative and logistical system that supported it. This discussion will also aim to gauge how the presence of the army changed as the century progressed and whether this had any significant influence on the region. Since the army was an organisation of the central government it is essential to analyse the relationships that existed between the state bureaucracy in London and the political and legal authorities within the North East. At the same time, since this thesis covers

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[1] Geoffrey E. Milburn, The Travelling Preacher. John Wesley in the North East 1742-1790 (Newcastle: Wesley Historical Society, 1984) 9.

a period of 105 years there is a need to investigate how the army changed as an institution during this time.

II. Central and Local Government Relationships

British governance in the eighteenth century was unusual, caught between the modernising influences of parliamentarian rule, and the traditional restrictions of the early-modern European state. While some Englishmen enjoyed a rare amount of democratic freedom and individual rights, real power was still held by the traditional elite, and for much of the eighteenth century the franchise was limited to a minority of landholders and merchants. However, it was also the era of increasing professionalism in the civil service. No longer was the administration of the government left to a small number of politicians. While they continued to hold the majority of important appointments, these men were increasingly supported by a growing legion of paid administrators and clerks. This expanding bureaucracy assisted in spreading the authority of the central government throughout Britain, and facilitated the executive's ability to deploy vast resources in what John Brewer has referred to as 'national aggrandisement.'[2]

In some respects eighteenth-century England can be considered a centralised state. There was no region where the authority of the central government and its representatives was not present. Every county had assize courts, quarter sessions, customs agents, poor law administrators and a host of other legal and bureaucratic state structures. However, this centralisation was not as pervasive as that being exercised in states such as France. Lawrence Stone has argued that while the British state had strong centralising mechanisms, such as a powerful single legislative body, the political authorities in London were increasingly reliant on the co-operation of regional political and legal grandees.[3] By mid-century most regional law enforcement

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[2] John Brewer, The Sinews of Power. War, Money and the English State 1688-1783 (London: Unwin & Hyman Ltd., 1989). Brewer provides an analysis of how military pressures assisted in the creation of a modern state bureaucratic system.

[3] Lawrence Stone 'Introduction.' In: Lawrence Stone (ed.) An Imperial State at War. Britain from 1689 to 1815 (London: Routledge, 1994) 8.

and administration was done by local propertied men and not through officials appointed by London. These parochial appointees helped to run the courts and the constabulary, assisted in the administration of the poor law, oversaw the repair of roads and bridges, and levied rates to meet county expenses.[4]

This movement of responsibility to the regions was not premeditated, but rather evolutionary. Joanna Innes has illustrated that, as the eighteenth century progressed, a reconfiguration of the British government's ministries took place. This had the effect of disengaging these institutions from the traditional machinery of local government.[5] The most important of these was the declining role of the Privy Council, whose role in determining social policy was increasingly devolved to the emerging ministries such as the Treasury, the Admiralty and the Secretaries of State.[6] As a result new central-local interactions developed which left local government in control of many daily social issues such as vagrancy, crime and poverty.[7] This was especially true of the growing importance of local magistrates in the administration of Britain.

More relevant to this study is the role that magistrates and other local leaders played in the domestic operations of the British army. This is particularly true of army and naval recruitment, impressment, riot control and billeting. As the following chapters will illustrate, this role was partly a continued assurance of civilian primacy over the armed forces in a century when the army found it hard to achieve widespread acceptance within society.[8] Parliament was determined that the state would not return to the situation it experienced under James II where the rights of the individual had been gradually eroded in favour of military expediency. In the minds of many Englishmen allowing such a lapse would leave the door to absolutism unbolted. The aftermath of the Glorious Revolution, and the subsequent creation of the Bill of Rights, had fostered an atmosphere in which regional leaders quickly reinforced their

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[4] A very detailed, if somewhat dry, treatment of local government can be found in: Sidney & Beatrice Webb, The Parish and the County (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1906).

[5] Joanna Innes, 'The Domestic Face of the Fiscal Military State. Government and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain.' In: Lawrence Stone (ed.), An Imperial State at War. Britain from 1689 to 1815 (London: Routledge, 1994) 96.

[6] Ibid., 96-8.

[7] Ibid.

[8] The main pillar of this new found control over the armed forces was cemented in the 4th and 6th clauses of the Bill of Rights of 1689; E.N. Williams, The Eighteenth-Century Constitution (Cambridge:

position as the nexus of British domestic political and legislative authority.

Indeed, in terms of local government the eighteenth century was the era of the magistrate. By mid-century these men exercised a great deal of local power and influence.[9] However, it was not their job that assured them prestige and influence, but rather their place in local society which secured their employment as magistrates. While they were not usually members of the political elite they were still men of property or income. Regardless of their social status magistrates, or Justices of the Peace as they were also known, were the men on whom the government in London relied for the transference of Parliamentary and ministerial power to the regions. In many ways they were the agents of the law and local defenders of the constitution. In this role these men were tasked with ensuring that the masses never threatened to overturn the ruling oligarchy. While the magistracy enjoyed a level of parochial freedom to act, their authority was not unlimited. Ultimately, the government in London maintained some control over this dispersed system. Magistrates were answerable to the Court of Kings Bench in London and local political leaders required the permission of ministers before they took action on a number of issues including employing soldiers for riot control. In terms of legal representation, London still tried all serious crimes through the various assize courts that travelled about the country. However, beyond this much of the local business was left to the counties and the centre exercised little co-ordinated oversight.[10]

III Change Over Time: The Evolution of the British Soldier and the British Army

Since this study analyses civil-military relations over a period of more than a century, it is important to observe the ways in which the army changed in this time. The institution that existed in 1688 was noticeably different from that which fought against

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Cambridge University Press, 1960) 28.

[9] The role of Justices can be found in: Norman Landau, The Justices of the Peace 1679-1760 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984). Additionally, a detailed explanation of the role of the Justices in the enforcement of the law can be found in Chapter 5.

[10] Prest refers to Hanoverian administration as 'polyarchic.' Wilfrid Prest, Albion Ascendant. English History 1660-1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 157.

revolutionary France. At the same time there were strong similarities. This evolution affected the role of the army as well as its administration, the constitution of the rank-and-file, and the way it was regarded by society. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to briefly outline the major changes that took place within the army during the eighteenth century. While it aims to be comprehensive it does not aim to deal with every detail of a rapidly growing field of historical enquiry. Rather it attempts to analyse those areas of change that either underline or question popular perceptions of the army.[11]

In terms of constitutional and administrative changes the events of 1688 marked something of a revolution in the way the army was controlled. The removal of James II from the throne finally allowed parliamentarians to create a government that had substantial powers over the monarch. The most important of these changes came with the legislature's enhanced authority over the armed forces. The main pillar of this new control was cemented in the 4th and 6th clauses of the 1689 Bill of Rights. These declared that the new king and any future monarch were forbidden from levying money for royal use without parliamentary control. More importantly they could not maintain a standing army in times of peace without the strict consent of the Commons.[12] It was a basic premise of the revolutionary settlement that Parliament's direct control over the size and pay of the army would help to swing its loyalty away from the monarch. Furthermore, the existence of the army was no longer within the purview of the throne but with the representatives of the body politic.[13]

This increased secularisation of control over both the army and navy can be observed in the evolution of the office of Secretary at War. Although in existence from 1676, it was not until after the Glorious Revolution, and particularly during the reign of Queen Anne that office holders did much to extend the political and administrative authority of the office.[14] This evolution was by no means consistent or rapid and the process of

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[11] Certain changes that are specific to topics within the thesis itself will be dealt with in the chapters that follow.

[12] E.N. Williams, The Eighteenth-Century Constitution, 28.

[13] The monarch continued to exercise a high level of control and influence over the army, especially when it came to foreign policy and tactical matters.

[14] I.F. Burton, The Secretary at War and the Administration of the British Army During the War of Spanish Succession (Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1960); R.E. Scouller, 'Queen Anne's

developing the post of Secretary at War continued ceaselessly throughout the century. In time the Secretary at War became responsible for many duties including the domestic movement of troops, ordering soldiers to assist civilian authorities in riot control and anti-smuggling operations, organising disbursements of army pay, co-ordinating recruitment and disbanding operations, discipline and drawing the annual estimates for the army establishment. Equally important was the fact that the Secretary played a central role in communications with civilians about the conduct of the army.[15] In many ways he was the most important arbiter of civil-military relations in the country and, as will be demonstrated in later chapters, often did much to defuse tensions between the army and civilians. By the beginning of the conflict with revolutionary France the Secretary at War was one of the most powerful and influential members of the military establishment, as well as a full Cabinet minister assisted by a growing staff of clerks.[16]

Another of the evolutionary changes that took place in the army between 1688 and 1793 relates to the type of men who were being recruited into the army. Recent scholarship has suggested that as the eighteenth century unfolded the land forces became increasingly representative of British society. Stephen Brumwell has shown that the composition of the mid-Georgian infantry largely mirrored that of the workforce.[17] It consisted of men from a broad cross-section of working class society, from skilled and semi-skilled tradesmen to agricultural workers, labourers and impressed vagrants.[18] This process seems to have continued for much of the remainder of the eighteenth century. By the time of the French Revolutionary War nearly 80% of the men joining the army in urban areas such as Middlesex had definable trades, while the other 20% described themselves as labourers.[19]

Secretaries at War.' Army Quarterly, 57 (1949) 215-220, and by the same author but very similar: 'Secretaries at War to Queen Anne.' JSAHR, 38 (1960) 3-10.

[15] Examples can be found in Tony Hayter (ed.), An Eighteenth-Century Secretary at War, The Papers of William Viscount Barrington (London: The Bodley Head, 1988).

[16] For an account of the rise of this office after the American War see: J.L. Pimlott, The Administration of the British Army 1783-1793 (Ph.D. Thesis, Leicester University, 1975).

[17] In particular: Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats. The British Army and War in the Americas,1755-1763 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 79; and: "Rank and File: A Profile of One of Wolfe's Regiments." JSAHR 79 (Spring 2001) 3-24, which focuses on the 58th Regiment of Foot.

[18] In 1759 35% of the 58th Regiment of Foot's constituents were labourers or husbandmen, while the majority of the remaining 65% had some identifiable trade. Brumwell, 'Rank and File.' 11-15

[19] Listed trades included weavers, cobblers and tailors. A N Gilbert, 'An Analysis of Some Eighteenth-Century Army Recruiting Records.' JSAHR, 54 (1976) 46.

This evolution of the British army's rank-and-file coincided with the government's gradually declining reliance on army impressment and the recruitment of criminals and debtors.[20] The press for soldiers was utilised quite intensely during the War of Spanish Succession and was an important tool in supplying the army with manpower.[21] However, as the century progressed its use became more sporadic.[22] Impress acts were imposed annually during the War of Austrian Succession and at times during the Seven Years War.[23] However, after 1763 impressment for army service was used just one more time. This final press act came into force in 1779, and when its mandate expired in 1780, army impressment passed into history.[24] This flew in the face of continued and even intensified naval impressment throughout the century. The decline of the army press was the result of a combination of interrelated factors which included a growing antipathy on the part of army officers and the public, as well as a realisation that the return on impressment was poor considering the level of public and political resistance it engendered.[25] It is also possible that the susceptibility of many trades to the continuously precarious nature of the eighteenth-century economy may have contributed to an improvement in voluntary enlistment.[26] In many ways service in the army continued to be a way of escaping socio-economic and domestic problems.[27] Of course demographic growth within Britain played a role, providing a larger pool of men for the various forces to recruit from.[28] Finally, British supremacy at sea, coupled with the defeat of the Jacobite cause in 1745 and reliance on a reformed militia, helped to secure domestic security for much of the period

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[20] A brief discussion of the use of criminals as soldiers can be found in Chapter 3.
[21] Impress acts were put into force in every year from 1704-11. Arthur N Gilbert, 'Charles Jenkinson and the Last Army Press, 1779.' Military Affairs, 42 (1978) 7.
[22] For impressment during the early part of the eighteenth century refer to: Godfrey Davies, 'Recruiting in the Reign of Queen Anne.' Historical Research, 18 (1950) 146-59; Arthur N Gilbert, 'Army Impressment During the war of Spanish Succession.' The Historian, 38 (1976) 38-47; Nicholas Rogers, 'Vagrancy, Impressment and the Regulation of Labour in Eighteenth-Century Britain.' Slavery and Abolition, 15 (2) (1994) 102-13.
[23] Richard Middleton, 'The Recruitment of the British Army 1755-62.' JSAHR, 67 (1989) 226-38.
[24] See: Gilbert, 'Last Army Press.' 7-11.
[25] Ibid., 7-10.
[26] Brumwell, 'Rank and File.' 14.
[27] David Kent, '"Gone for a Soldier": Family Breakdown and the Demography of Desertion in a London Parish.' Local Population Studies, 45 (1990) 31.
[28] For a very detailed analysis of the British population in the eighteenth century refer to: E.A. Wrigley & R.S. Schofield, The Population History of England 1541-1871, A Reconstruction (London: Edward Arnold, 1981).

between mid-century and the Napoleonic Wars.[29]

It is possible that the decline in the use of the 'sweepings of the street' played a role in the growing, if grudging acceptance of the existence of a standing army in the eighteenth century.[30] It is generally accepted that in the late seventeenth century this institution was widely mistrusted and despised. However, as the century progressed society, and many political observers, became more comfortable with its presence.[31] Although this did not eliminate the anti-army rhetoric completely and the land forces continued to cause anxiety in many quarters. This acceptance may have also been due in part to the increasing public awareness of British military organisations.

An ever-expanding wartime army, combined with the growth of the peacetime establishment, more invalid companies and the emergence of a substantial militia force after 1756, meant more uniformed men living within British society. Peak wartime numbers were regularly in excess of 100,000 from the Seven Years War onwards.[32] Similarly, the end of a conflict often saw a small increase in the army establishment from pre-war levels.[33] The home establishment increased from almost 13,000 early in the aftermath of the Spanish war to a more constant 18-20,000 by the 1720's.[34] However, in periods of protracted conflict there could be as many as 40-50,000 soldiers in England, not including an equal number of militiamen.[35] This idea of the increased presence within society rubs against the theories of Ian Beckett who believed that the regular army was generally isolated from the public.[36] This was

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[29] This does not discount the invasion fears that arose during the Seven Years War.

[30] A leading figure in the discussions on the resistance to a British standing army is Lois G Schwoerer, "No Standing Armies!" Anti-army Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1974); 'The Role of William III in the Standing Army Controversy, 1697-1699.' The Journal of British Studies, 5 (2) (1966) 74-94.

[31] This process is discussed in Chapter 3 in relation to the change in public attitudes that enabled the building of a network of barracks in the late nineteenth century.

[32] Schwarz, London in the Age of Industrialisation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 97-9.

[33] The exceptions are the end of the Nine Years War and the War of Spanish Succession. There was also a brief decline after the American war but this quickly rectified itself. The peacetime establishment rose from 18,851 in 1715 to 28,399 by 1749, 31,773 by 1764 and 56,859 in 1792. The figures here are based on the establishments given in L.D. Schwarz, London in the Age of Industrialisation, 97-9.

[34] For the domestic establishment refer to Appendix A.

[35] There are 21 years after 1714 when the home establishment was above 35,000 men (see Appendix A).

[36] For a discussion of the public visibility of the militia and other auxiliary forces see Ian F W Beckett, 'The Amateur Military Tradition in Britain.' War and Society, 4 (2) (1986) 8-9.

certainly not true for many parts of the North East, where for much of the century the presence of soldiers was not unusual.

The lack of separation between soldiers and civilians, due to the shortage of purpose-built barracks, had an important impact on local civil-military relations. Because soldiers spent most of their time in public houses and other billets, and were often in one garrison for a long period of time, their connections with elements of mainstream society were fairly regular.[37] While billeting contributed to the tensions and resentment that temporarily undermined civil-military relations it also engendered growing familiarity with soldiers amongst civilians in certain areas. In France the widespread utilisation of barracks helped to isolate the army from society and contributed to the perception of the soldiery as second-class citizens.[38] However, even in communities where there were barracks, such as Berwick after 1719, the high concentration and almost constant presence of soldiers had a similar effect. Despite this familiarity a soldier's conspicuous uniform and unusual way of life also ensured a continued level of distinctiveness from civilians.[39] In turn this may have contributed to some of the continued problems that existed in the relationship between the army and North-East society.[40]

The slow increase in the size of the British army's peacetime establishment had a further subtle effect. It meant that there was a gradual rise in the absolute number of 'long-service' soldiers in the British Army.[41] While the number of 'professional' soldiers grew, it was limited to those regiments with enough seniority to escape complete reduction after the close of hostilities. Similarly, the growth in the British standing army was never close to the peacetime forces maintained by the major continental armies such as France. Nevertheless, in the context of Britain it was important. The professional soldiers provided the backbone of the standing army. They were more indoctrinated in the culture of military service and identified more

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[37] See Chapter 4.
[38] Colin Jones, 'The Welfare of the French Foot Soldier.' History, 65 (1980) 207.
[39] John Childs, 'War, Crime Waves and the English Army in the Late Seventeenth Century.' War and Society, 15 (2) (1997) 5.
[40] I refer to the characteristics of confrontations between soldiers and civilians. See Chapters 5 and 6 for more detail.
[41] Soldiers serving in peacetime usually enlisted for 'life' and those wartime recruits electing to stay on

readily with the esprit de corps that came with a life in the military.[42] Stephen Brumwell's research indicates that service in the army, either long or short-term, could foster a sense of community amongst the troops based on the idea of 'brother soldiers.'[43] He suggests that this had much to do with the close living conditions and shared experiences of soldiers, which would be particularly relevant in theatres of war.[44]

It is important to reiterate that the growth of the 'full-time' army was laggard and restricted. For much of the century the vast majority of soldiers remained wartime volunteers who enlisted for a contractually limited period of time.[45] As such, the army largely remained a force which John Childs has described as being brave and effective on one hand, but intrinsically amateur and weak on the other.[46] The overwhelming amateurism of the British private soldier meant that a great preponderance of the army failed to subscribe to ideas associated with the profession of arms or loyalty to service. Similarly, most soldiers do not appear to have been motivated by a sense of patriotism.[47] This is borne out by the fact that in large part soldiers who deserted or stood up to army authority did not do so out of regard for their professional integrity or as a form of resistance to an accepted military code.

More commonly, soldiers defied army discipline in defence of their rights, to oppose perceived injustices to themselves, or to bring attention to a breach in their terms of service.[48] The mass indoctrination of men into a cogent British martial culture, and the related patriotic association with company and regiment, was a slow process that had its origins in increased physical separation of soldier and civilian during the years

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after the end of a conflict had long terms of service imposed.

[42] This process was not matched by the growth of a professional officer corps, especially in the reigns of James II and George I & II, although its progress should not be overstated. John Childs, The Army, James II, and the Glorious Revolution (New York: St. Martins Press, 1980) 27, 39; James Hayes, The Social and Professional Background of the Officers of the British Army 1714-1763, (M.A Thesis, University of London, 1956).

[43] Brumwell, Redcoats, 113-5, 119-20.

[44] Ibid.

[45] This tended to be a stated number of years (often 3) or the duration of a war, whichever was less.

[46] John Childs, The British Army of William III, 1689-1702 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987) 37.

[47] This included long-serving soldiers as well. Brumwell, Redcoats, 117.

[48] Ibid., 100-4, 128-136.

after the French Revolution.[49] This process was assisted by a growing interest amongst British authorities to subject troops to stern military ideals.[50] However, this would not become a serious force within the British army until well into the nineteenth century.

IV. The North East in the Eighteenth Century: The Regional Context

The eighteenth century was the period in which the foundations for the future industrial success of north-east England were set. By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the region would become one of the most important industrial areas in Europe. Despite the image of Tyneside as the cockpit of the industrial revolution, D J Rowe has stated that as late as 1750, much of the region was 'sparsely populated, culturally backward.'[51] However, the region appears to have been an eclectic mix of progressive and conservative elements. Parts of the region were very isolated and continued to utilise social and economic structures that harked back to the late medieval period. Transport and communications in these localities remained poor throughout much of the century enhancing the disconnection from modernising influences. On the other hand there were other places, especially those in and around major population centres, which were dynamic, cultured and innovative as well as being economically and socially advanced. Most obvious of these is the city of Newcastle upon Tyne, which at the time was the largest and most prosperous town in the north.[52] Nevertheless, even smaller towns such as Berwick were taking advantage of their location on the North Sea to improve their place in early-modern Britain.

At the centre of much of this growth was the country's insatiable demand for coal. Mining for this resource had been ongoing since at least the thirteenth century and within 100 years the output of local collieries was a significant element of the trade in

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[49] The Pitt barrack-building programme of the 1790's increasingly separated the soldiers from the softening influences of civilian life. James Douet, British Barracks 1600-1914. Their Architecture and Role in Society (London: English Heritage & The Stationary Office, 1998) 1.
[50] Ibid.
[51] D.J. Rowe, 'The North East.' in: F.M.L. Thompson (ed.) The Cambridge Social History of Britain 1750-1950. Volume I: Regions and Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 418.
[52] By the end of the century it would be one of the top ten towns in England. E.A. Wrigley, 'Society

Newcastle.[53] By the eighteenth century this industry had expanded considerably, focused on the Tyne and Wear valleys and their immediate hinterlands. Such was the impact of coal mining on the local area that it was noticed and reported by a number of contemporary sources. So conspicuous was this business that on his epic tour throughout Great Britain, Defoe could not help but notice its staggering scale. While on the road north to Newcastle he viewed 'the inexhausted store of coals and coal pits,' as well as 'the prodigious heaps, I might say mountains, of coals, which are dug up at every pit, and how many of those pits there are.'[54]

The continued health of this industry in the North East became crucial to the well being of London, which by the eighteenth century consumed one-sixth of national coal production.[55] This factor created a strong link between the capital and the rapidly expanding North East.[56] Newcastle, as the powerhouse of the coal trade, saw a huge jump in exports over the century. The coal industry on Tyneside has, unusually for the period, been characterised as a highly centralised and organised sector that relied primarily on 'large-scale productive units.[57] Justification for such a claim can be seen in the scale of coal being shipped from the river. In 1685 235,000 'Newcastle chaldrons' were sent coastwise from the Tyne.[58] By 1780 this number had jumped to 366,000 chaldrons, and at the start of the nineteenth century coastal exports from the Tyne valley hit 585,000 chaldrons.[59] Even more meteoric was the rise of Sunderland as a coal exporting port. While not producing the same amount of coal as her competitor to the north, the growing Wearside town, which had exported only 62,000 chaldrons in 1685, was shipping 322,000 by 1800.[60] It is estimated that the entire North-East region, including County Durham, saw its total coal production increase

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and the Economy in the Eighteenth Century.' In: Lawrence Stone, An Imperial State at War. 78.

[53] David Levine & Keith Wrightson, The Making of and Industrial Society, Whickham 1560-1765 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) 2.

[54] Defoe, A Tour Through the Whole Island of Great Britain. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932) 250.

[55] J.V. Beckett, Coal & Tobacco. The Lowthers and the Economic Development of West Cumberland 1660-1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 38.

[56] It is estimated that by 1826 London was importing 94% of its annual 2,000,000 tonnes from the North East's coalfields. Norman McCord and Richard Thompson, The Northern Counties From A.D. 1000 (London: Longman, 1998) 201.

[57] Levine & Wrightson, The Making of an Industrial Society, viii.

[58] A Newcastle chaldron is equivalent to 53 cwt.

[59] Jeremy Gregory & John Stevenson, Longman Companion to Britain in the Eighteenth Century (London: Longman, 2000) 277.

[60] Ibid.

from 1,290,000 tonnes in 1700 to nearly 4,450,000 tonnes by 1800.[61] By comparison Joyce Ellis has estimated that coal shipments from the Tyne rose from just under 600,000 tonnes in 1699 to over 1,600,000 tonnes by the end of the eighteenth century.[62] If this was true, then by 1800 more that 10% of national coal production, and nearly 36% of North-East production, was emanating from Tyneside.

Supplying the labour for this growing sector of the economy was a large workforce of miners, keelmen and sailors. It has been estimated that in 1800 almost 10% of the 'economically active population' of Newcastle and Durham was engaged in the coal industry or related service industries.[63] At the beginning of the century a population of approximately 1,500 keelmen lived in a close-knit community based around the cramped Sandhill district near Newcastle's busy quayside.[64] The keelmen and miners were a highly motivated and organised labour force. They displayed a level of communal protectionism that one would associate with the more radical elements of twentieth-century trade unionism. Of consequence to this study is the fact that throughout the entire period this characteristic ensured that they played a leading role in much of the popular and labour unrest that gripped the region. Furthermore, the presence of such a large body of trained sailors made the Tyne and Wear valleys a focus for the naval impress service. This meant that interactions between soldiers and those working in the coal industry were regular, confrontational and occasionally bloody.

The coal trade proved to be a powerful economic driver. Therefore, it is not surprising that it helped to create a number of 'spin-off' industries that focused largely on sustaining and supporting the mining and shipment of coal. This can be attested to by the opening of Arthur Byram's Berwick shipyard in 1751 and the establishment of a local branch of George Lock's Newcastle rope-making firm in 1752.[65] Similar

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[61] Nationally coal production was 2,985,000 and 15,045,000 tonnes respectively. McCord and Thompson, The Northern Counties, 199.
[62] Joyce Ellis, 'The 'Black Indies.' The Economic Development of Newcastle, c.1700-1840.' In: Robert Colls & Bill Lancaster (eds.) Newcastle upon Tyne, A Modern History (Chichester: Phillimore & Co. Ltd., 2001) 5. She states that fewer than 4% of the ships clearing customs on the river were not carrying coal.
[63] Rowe, 'The North East.' 424
[64] P.M. Horsley, Eighteenth-Century Newcastle (Newcastle upon Tyne: Oriel Press Ltd., 1971) 228.
[65] David Brenchley, A Place By Itself. Berwick upon Tweed in the Eighteenth Century (Berwick upon

industries prospered in North and South Shields, Howdon and upriver at Newburn. While these enterprises emerged as a result of the coal trade they eventually established themselves as key industries on Tyneside, not wholly reliant on the coal industry for economic security. The reliance of coal owners on the sea stimulated not only the shipbuilding industry but shipping in general. From early in the eighteenth century Newcastle was ranked 4th as a port and commercial centre behind London, Bristol and Norwich. The sheer volume of shipping that was coming in and out of the Tyne attests to this. In 10 days during September 1734, 579 ships sailed into the Tyne and approximately 500 sailed out.[66] Local merchants may have owned much of this fleet. As early as 1709 Newcastle's indigenous business community could lay claim to ownership of 11,500 tonnes of shipping. This represented more than 4% of all national shipping, a figure that was on the increase throughout the century.[67] Much of the trade invested in these vessels was aimed at London, but there were prominent Newcastle merchants who traded extensively with the Baltic and even as far away as the Mediterranean.

The availability of coal also assisted in the expansion of coal-using industries. Ironworks and chemical manufacturing plants in the region all benefited from the readily accessible supplies of coal. The large amounts of sand ballast being deposited in Newcastle helped to create a viable and prosperous glass-making industry.[68] Similarly, salt production emerged as a major regional industry early in the century. In 1716 the 170 salt pans located in North Shields accounted for 15% of national salt output.[69] At the same time the Tyne valley was a major lead-mining centre, while the hinterland around Newcastle was one of Britain's leading iron and steel manufacturing regions. Despite all of this development, there is a debate as to whether the North East was actually industrialising as quickly as the rest of the country. For example, Tyneside was the leading centre for steel in the early eighteenth century, but by 1750 it was on the decline and was quickly surpassed by the

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Tweed: Berwick upon Tweed Civic Society, 1997) 26.

[66] Ellis, 'The Black Indies.' 2.

[67] Ibid.

[68] It is estimated that in the later seventeenth century Newcastle produced 40% of the national output of glass. M. Barke and R.J. Buswell (eds.) Historical Atlas of Newcastle upon Tyne (Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle upon Tyne Polytechnic, 1980) 15.

[69] Ellis, 'The Black Indies.' 7.

emergence of Sheffield. Similarly, the salt industry was experiencing trouble as early as 1730 and was in free-fall decline by the latter half of the century. It is apparent that despite the changes brought about by the emergence of the coal industry the region could not maintain its dominance in certain areas.[70]

As already stated, Rowe has observed that at the beginning of the industrial revolution the region was remote and possessed very poor links with other, more dynamic parts of the country.[71] This may have retarded the industrialisation of the region and prevented the rise of certain 'industrial' manufacturing such as weaving. Regardless of this, the Tyne valley was home to a dynamic economy in the eighteenth century. In fact Joyce Ellis believes that as early as 1700 Newcastle was one of the most advanced economic regions in the country and was among the most important of the expanding sectors in the national economy.[72] She has also argued that despite its importance to the region, Newcastle was not dominated by the coal trade.[73] The evolution of a diverse commercial system, based on sea and coastal trade, influenced future economic development throughout the region. This led to other eighteenth-century commentators making note that the city 'next to Bristol, may be called the greatest trading town in England,' and because of this it was 'large, populous and rich.'[74] In fact during this period Newcastle was widely known for its production of grindstones, textiles and earthenware as well as commodities linked to agriculture such as glue, hides, tallow and butter. Beyond this Newcastle was also becoming an increasingly important export centre for American tobacco brought to Britain through Whitehaven. In a similar way the town also evolved as the nexus for the import and distribution of luxury items and other consumer goods.

While at first one may think that all of this paints a picture of a highly successful and dynamic town, it must be remembered that the local population was still heavily dependent on the rate of trade on the Tyne. Despite the fact that many humble men

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[70] The argument against the region as a cockpit of the industrial revolution can be found in D.J. Rowe's 'The North East.' 418-26.
[71] Ibid., 418.
[72] Joyce Ellis, 'A Dynamic Society: Social Relations in Newcastle upon Tyne 1660-1760.' in: Peter Clark (ed.) The Transformation of English Provincial Towns (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1984), 190-227.
[73] Ibid., 193, 196.

were able to prosper and amass limited amounts of wealth during their lives, Newcastle was known for the large number of poor inhabitants that graced its streets. As Ellis explains, the nature of the local economy had created an uneven distribution of wealth, which meant that some of the lowest sectors of society were extremely vulnerable to the fluctuations in coastal trade, on which a great deal of their employment was based.[75] Regardless of the diversity of Newcastle's economy a reduction in demand for coal in London, as well as bad weather and war, could cause widespread unemployment and serious economic hardship.[76] Related is the fact that much of the river trade, which employed so many people, was seasonal in nature thus exacerbating the financial problems of the lower classes.[77] Further complicating matters, many keelmen were unable to work past the age of forty having been crippled by years of backbreaking labour. This meant that many towns such as Newcastle and Sunderland possessed large numbers of unemployed men who often imposed themselves on the limited resources available from local parish poor rates.[78] The unfortunate result of this widespread poverty was a ready market for lewd and disorderly houses, which in turn bred drunkenness and violence.[79] This was the environment that would greet soldiers when they marched into the region.

The situation in the region's major towns was complicated by rapid increases in their populations. However, this also helped to spur the growing wealth and economic power of the region as a whole. Industrial development and the associated decline of medieval and early-modern cottage industries, coupled with massive enclosure programmes, helped to drive many towards the towns. E.A. Wrigley argues that this trend was further enhanced by the increased efficiency of British agriculture, which freed a greater proportion of its population than its continental rivals to engage in industry and other non-agricultural jobs.[80] In the North East this equated to a marked

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[74] J. Macky and J Brome as quoted in Joyce Ellis, 'The Black Indies' 1.
[75] Ellis, 'The Black Indies.' 13.
[76] Poor winds for sailing in 1740 pinned much of the merchant fleet in the Tyne and helped contribute to the outbreak of rioting in that year.
[77] Ellis, 'The Black Indies.' 14.
[78] This is particularly true of the keelmen in Newcastle where large numbers are listed on the poor rates for the Parish of All Saints in central Newcastle. C.M. Fraser & K Emsley, Tyneside (Newton Abbott: David and Charles, 1973) 63.
[79] Fights and assaults, often caused by drink, were characteristic of Newcastle's unruliness. For more on this please see Chapter 5.
[80] E.A Wrigely, 'Society and Economy.' 76-77. Wrigley estimates that one-third of adult population

increase in the population and geographical size of many towns. As Newcastle and Sunderland quickly became the centres for major industries such as coal, and their ports expanded to cope with the growing coastal trade, so did their populations. Newcastle witnessed a considerable demographic increase during the first three-quarters of the eighteenth century, from just 16,000 people in 1700 to over 33,000 by 1775.[81] Sunderland's expansion was even greater, as its population grew from only 2-3,000 people in 1660 to 16,000 by 1775.[82] This represented an 800% increase in populace in 115 years. Even Berwick, often thought of as a parochial borderlands outpost, experienced a similar trend to the region's larger towns. It had a population of 7,187 in 1801, compared with only 2,400 before 1685.[83]

Such increases in population, while not as extensive as cities like Manchester and Liverpool, were in line with many other English towns such as Bristol, Plymouth and Portsmouth, all of whom witnessed population increases of 100% or more between 1690 and 1792. Of equal importance is the fact that the demographic expansion in these conurbations far outstripped the average national population growth.[84] This emphasises the rapid rate of migration to cities and towns. It has been estimated that in the second half of the eighteenth century 70% of the rise in the overall proportion of Europe's population living in towns was due to the growth of towns in England alone.[85] However, this rapid increase was not mirrored in the hinterlands around the region's major towns. Northumberland had 112,724 inhabitants at the beginning of the eighteenth century but this number had grown by only 15% to 139,011 by the

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was engaged in agriculture by the end of the eighteenth century as compared to two-thirds in France. 76-77.

[81] David Holmes & Daniel Szechi, Age of Oligarchy. Pre-Industrial Britain 1722-1783 (Harlow: Longman Publishing, 1993) 346-9. Please note that the population for 1775 includes Gateshead; The census of 1801 places the population of the city of Newcastle itself at 29,294. M. Barke and R.J. Buswell (eds.), Historical Atlas of Newcastle, 19; Gregory and Stevenson put the population of Newcastle at 15,000 in 1700 and 33,000 by 1801. Gregory & Stevenson, The Longman Companion to Britain in the Eighteenth Century, 290.

[82] Ibid., 290, 349. As is similar to the figures for Newcastle, Stevenson and Gregory have a population of 3,000 in 1650 and 24,000 in 1801.

[83] David Brenchley, A Place By Itself, 5 & 31.

[84] The accepted standard in terms of English population estimates is: E.A. Wrigley & R.S. Schofield, The Population History of England 1541, 533-4. It is estimated that the population in England was 4,896,666 in 1688 but had reached 7,936,885 by the start of the war with revolutionary France, an increase of nearly 62%. For further debate on the interpretation of population numbers and growth in England and Wales during this period see: J. Habakkuk, 'English Population in the Eighteenth Century.' The Economic History Review 6 (2) (1953) 117-133.

[85] E.A. Wrigley, 'Society and the Economy.' 80.

middle of the century.[86] In 1801, when the first census was conducted, Northumberland's population was listed as just 162,115.[87] Therefore, in the eighteenth century the population within the county rose just over 30%, much slower than the national average.[88] If many of the region's inhabitants were moving to Newcastle and similar centres then this may explain the relatively low growth rate in the countryside.

Despite a possible migration to major population centres, and the growing importance of mining and manufacturing, agriculture remained the most significant job sector throughout the region well into the nineteenth century. Even E.A. Wrigley, who champions the idea that there was a decline in the percentage of the population engaged in agriculture, admits that the actual number of men involved in agriculture increased well into the nineteenth century.[89] However, economic development in the eighteenth century pushed changes in the methods and focus of agriculture in the region. There was a gradual move away from subsistence farming towards a more commercial 'capitalist' agriculture.[90] By the mid-eighteenth century the North East had acquired a reputation for progressive agriculture but this process was slow and unevenly distributed.[91] It remained a fact that much of the region was for the most part 'closer to subsistence agriculture' than anything else.[92] Nevertheless, yields increased, especially in robust grain crops not widely utilised in other parts of the country such as oats and rye.[93] This was at a time when yields in traditional grain crops were rising nationally. In Berwick the exportation of agricultural products, first to London and then to the Baltic, became increasingly important to the town's economy as the century progressed. This trade was mirrored in Newcastle, where shipments of grain were not uncommon during the century.[94] Furthermore, the strong coastal coal trade, based as it was on Tyneside, helped to finance a vast return trade in

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[86] D J Rowe, 'The North East.' 422.
[87] Ibid. It is likely that a sizeable portion of this increase was due to expansion of smaller towns such as Alnwick, Morpeth and Hexham.
[88] As mentioned in note 42 above the rise has been estimated at nearly 62%.
[89] E.A. Wrigley, ' Society and the Economy.' 82.
[90] Ibid.
[91] McCord & Thompson, The Northern Counties, 175.
[92] Rowe, 'The North East' 418.
[93] The reliance of the local diet on 'unwheaten' bread may have been one of the reasons for the lack of food riots in the region. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
[94] A considerable number of grain merchants were located on Newcastle's quayside. TWAS 394/15,

foodstuffs.[95] More often than not this helped to balance poor production in parts of the region where subsistence agriculture remained. The combination of innovative farming practices, non-reliance on traditional grain crops, and the strong import market for foodstuffs helped to assure food supplies in Newcastle and the surrounding region.[96]

Religiously, the region was a mix of Catholic and Protestant, with a strong Presbyterian tradition existing in Berwick and its hinterlands. Notwithstanding this blend of beliefs, after 1688 the majority of people stood firmly behind the Protestant succession. James II had been incredibly popular in Newcastle due in large part to his religious principles rather than his religious practices, and his coronation was celebrated widely.[97] It could be suggested that the region's support for a monarch who was closely associated with the spectre of Catholic absolutism could not possibly imply support for the Protestant cause. However, it appears that the initial belief in James quickly diminished once people began to suspect that his tolerance for dissenters might be an attempt to re-establish Catholicism.[98] After the Glorious Revolution there was little widespread support for the Catholic or Jacobite cause and the influence of Papists in the region was in decline. This is reinforced by the fact that there was an almost total lack of support shown by the local population towards the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745.[99] Nevertheless, there were some lingering Jacobite sympathies amongst some of the region's aristocratic families in the early part of the century, but this was crushed in the wake of the 1715 rebellion. Not until the late eighteenth century, with the immigration of sizeable numbers of Catholic Irish to the region, would this branch of Christianity regain lost ground.[100]

Despite a short period in which the Stuart monarchy attempted to increase its influence and royal control in the region, it was the established local elite who held the preponderance of local political power for much of the century. These groups, having

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Papers Relating to the Tyne Keelmen, 24 June 1740.

[95] Ellis, 'The Black Indies.' 6.

[96] How this effected the instance of food rioting will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 6.

[97] R. J. Charleton, A History of Newcastle upon Tyne From the Earliest Records to Its Formation as A City (Newcastle upon Tyne: William H. Robson, 1894) 77

[98] Ibid.

[99] The 1745 rebellion will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.

lost some of their power to James II, managed to regain much of their authority over municipal institutions and the local economy after the Glorious Revolution.[101] As the eighteenth century progressed, and the region moved further under the influence of commerce and trade, so did its politics. For the greater part of the eighteenth century the control of the politics and administration of Newcastle came increasingly under the influence of the rich established merchant families within the town, such as the Blacketts, Fenwicks and the Ridleys.[102] Also many of the members of the town's governing 'corporation' were coal owners or shippers. This created a political culture in which the interests of business were paramount, and the ruling elite could use their power to control or persuade what was often an unruly and demanding workforce.[103] Despite this apparent power, such an environment gave rise to continuous strikes and labour unrest. In Berwick a similar trend was apparent. During the eighteenth century the town was governed by thirty-three men, fourteen of who came from just four prominent local families with considerable business interests in Berwick.[104] Further, decisions concerning the town were often taken through the Guild which was open to all freemen of the town but dominated by the burgesses, who tended to be prominent local merchants and businessmen.

V. The Army's Presence in the Region: The Military Context

The North East, while being mainly rural and sparsely populated, was essential to the defence of eighteenth-century England.[105] This was especially true in the first half of the century when the Jacobite threat to the security of England's Protestant monarchy was very real. During the 1715 and 1745 uprisings Newcastle and Berwick were seen as key to the defence of England in the face of the invading Jacobite armies.[106]

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[100] McCord and Thompson, The Northern Counties, 164.
[101] Fraser & Emsley, Tyneside, 51.
[102] Ibid.
[103] For a discussion of this see Nicholas Rogers, 'Vagrancy, Impressment and the Regulation of Labour,' 102-13.
[104] The families were the Stow's, Forster's, Burn's and Watsons who between them held the mayoralty for 49 years. Brenchley, A Place By Itself, 51.
[105] Even before this, in 1688, James II recognised the need to secure the North East against a possible Dutch invasion. PRO WO 4/1/108, Secretary at War to Duke of Newcastle, 1 November 1688.
[106] In 1745 Newcastle was seen as being so strategically important that Wade's army of nearly 15,000 men was encamped on the town moor. R.J. Charleton, A History of Newcastle on Tyne, 82-85. Other

Historically, the region had always been the first line of defence against invasions from a factious and rebellious Scotland. This is illustrated by the fact that Berwick upon Tweed changed hands 13 times between the English and Scots up to 1482, when it eventually fell into the permanent occupancy of the English.

The violent history of the border region fuelled Berwick upon Tweed's rise as one of the most important early-modern military centres in England. This is demonstrated by the fact that during the reign of Elizabeth the town was afforded vast sums of money to complete its extensive *trace italienne* fortifications. This role was entrenched in the eighteenth century with the construction of purpose-built barracks in 1719, which were used to house the large garrison of troops stationed in the town throughout the century.[107] Not until 1745, when the rebellious Stuart cause was decisively undermined at the battle of Culloden, would the region's strategic importance decline. However, this did not wholly eliminate the military significance of the North East as wartime often brought the fear of invasion.[108] As the eighteenth century progressed, this new security threat was combined with a growing economic significance focused on the vital supply of coal to London and the presence of a vibrant shipbuilding industry. Furthermore, the region's strong ties to river-borne and sea-borne trade meant that it developed a huge reserve of men with vast amounts of maritime experience. As a result of this the city of Newcastle and the districts around it (Sunderland & South Shields) were amongst the country's top suppliers of men for the navy during the century's endemic wars.[109]

The region's military power was focused on three main strategic points. The first of these were the defences at the head of the river Tyne, centred on the dilapidated castle at Tynemouth. This bulwark not only acted as a barracks but also as a key observation

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examples of this role can be garnered from Frank McLynn, The Jacobite Army in England 1745 (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1983).

[107] It has been noted that the barracks at Berwick were the most extensive built in the early half of the eighteenth century; James Douet, British Barracks 1600-1914, 20.

[108] Invasion fears were so strong in 1759 that the government ordered the North Yorkshire Militia to Northumberland to provide domestic security. PRO WO 4/757/109, 3 July 1759.

[109] Pitt's 1795 Quota Act (35 Geo.III, c.9) gave the region (Newcastle, Sunderland & South Shields) the highest naval manpower quota outside of London. Norman McCord, "The Impress Service in North-East England During the Napoleonic War." Mariner's Mirror, 54 (1968) 163; In the short space of time from November 26, 1776 to July 17, 1778 the impress service at Newcastle collected 1,728 men for sea service. PRO ADM 1/1497-1503. Captain's Letters, B Series, 1776-82.

point.[110] Despite its prime location the facilities were heavily outdated and in an advanced state of decay by the early part of the century. As early as 1702 residents of North Shields were complaining of the poor state of Tynemouth's fortifications.[111] However, it was not until the early stages of the Seven Years War that the value of Tynemouth as a location for the stationing of troops was recognised. In 1758 the Board of Ordnance began a programme to improve the fortifications around the old castle and monastery, as well as reconstructing and extending purpose built barracking facilities for 1,000 men.[112]

However, it appears that despite the efforts of the Board of Ordnance the renovated barracks remained poorly utilised. In his 1769 appraisal of the facilities David Wedderburn, a Lieutenant Colonel in the 22nd Regiment of Foot, noted that Tynemouth was large enough to hold an entire regiment, but the 'buildings, the bedding and the other furniture are spoiling for want of being used.'[113] He observed that 'there is no part of Great Britain where a regiment can be in barracks at such a small expense as at Tynemouth' due to the cheap price of coal and other supplies.[114] Just as relevant was the belief that any force could easily 'march from Tynemouth to Newcastle, almost as soon as it is possible to assemble it in this large scattered town.'[115] More importantly the Lieutenant Colonel felt that the soldiers housed under one roof would 'be in better order' than those quartered in the dispersed billets of large towns like Newcastle.[116] This, in Wedderburn's opinion, made Tynemouth an ideal place for a regular garrison. The next year, partly as a result of this report, the War Office agreed that Tynemouth should become part of the regular garrison establishment within the north of England.[117] Therefore, from 1770 it was the intention of the War Office to have at least one full regiment at Tynemouth at any

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[110] Dedicated housing for soldiers was in existence at Tynemouth since at least the late sixteenth century. Douet, British Barracks, 5.
[111] John Childs, The British Army of William III, 1689-1702 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987) 174.
[112] John Sykes, Local Records Vol.1 (Stockton-on-Tees, Patrick and Shotton, 1973) 221.
[113] PRO WO 1/990, David Wedderburn (Lt. Col. 22nd Regiment) to Lord Barrington, Secretary at War, 20 August 1769.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid.
[117] PRO WO 4/83, Barrington to Lord Weymouth, 18 April 1768.

given time.[118]

The fortifications in and around Tynemouth Castle were supplemented by a number of associated military installations. Most important was the Spanish Battery which sat directly at the mouth of the Tyne on the north shore, giving it total command of the approaches to the river.[119] Just upriver from the Spanish Battery, Clifford's Fort offered housing for small numbers of troops. In co-operation these three structures formed the core of Tyneside's defences, and were key to ensuring the safety of one of Britain's most important ports.

The second location was the formidable castle on Holy Island. The strategic importance of this island led to it being targeted and captured by Jacobites in 1715, before being liberated by a combined force of soldiers and volunteers from Berwick.[120] On the other hand it proved to be a convenient place for troops from Europe to land in order to oppose the more threatening Jacobite rebellion in 1745.[121] Similarly, in times of war Holy Island was occasionally used as a place for regiments to embark for service in Europe.[122] Finally there were the impressive fortifications surrounding Berwick upon Tweed which in the eighteenth century was the only heavily fortified town on the East Coast specifically designed to resist bombardment. Unfortunately, like many other key military sites in the region it too was in a considerable amount of disrepair. During the 1745 rebellion Berwick's huge defensive walls were described as 'a heap of ruins' by the man entrusted with its defence.[123] As mentioned previously, the building of the barracks, planned to hold 600 men and 36 officers, reinforced the military importance of this small coastal town after 1719.[124] Beyond these three main sites, sizeable garrisons were regularly stationed in the city of Newcastle while smaller units were billeted in many of

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[118] Despite this there were times during the remainder of the century when, for various reasons, Tynemouth housed less than a regiment.
[119] This fortification was also upgraded by the Board of Ordnance at the same time as the establishment of barracks at Tynemouth; Sykes, Local Records, 221.
[120] BTRO GB/9/1, 9 November 1715. An entertaining narrative of Holy Island's seizure can be found in Sykes, Local Records, 137.
[121] PRO SP 36/72/103, 22 October 1745. In particular five companies of Lord Ligioner's Regiment of Foot, 12 gunners and seven battalions of Invalids.
[122] An example of such orders can be found PRO WO 4/9/35, Secretary at War to Lord Mark Kerr, 13 June 1709.
[123] PRO SP 36/72, Colonel Handasyde to the Secretary of State, 19 October 1745.

Northumbria's towns and villages such as Morpeth, Hexham and Alnwick. South of the river in County Durham, troops were regularly stationed in Gateshead, Sunderland and South Shields.

It is often impossible to state exactly how many soldiers were in any one place at any given time, as garrison levels were rarely consistent. Regiments could spend up to a year in some garrison towns, while others might be in a village or town for a matter of days or weeks. In addition to this, various militia units helped to garrison many of the northern towns from the inception of the Militia Act in 1757. As early as 1759, units of the Yorkshire militia were regularly stationed within major towns such as Newcastle and Berwick. This force helped to provide domestic security, freeing up more regular troops to fight overseas.[125] This meant that at several points during the century, and increasingly more so during the latter stages of the century, the regular forces in the region could be augmented by between 400 and 500 militiamen.[126] At the same time it is important to remember that for a variety of reasons no two regiments ever contained exactly the same number of troops, even if their establishments might be similar on paper.

In July 1735 the numbers of officers and men actually registered in the regiments of foot within Britain varied from the 737 men in Colonel Hamilton's Regiment of Foot to the 850 troops present in Lieutenant General Paston's battalion.[127] One regiment replacing another would therefore certainly mean that the number of troops in that locality would change. Moreover, while it is accepted that there was almost always a company of Invalids at Tynemouth and normally one at Berwick, the numbers of men in these could vary from 52 to upwards of 100. Likewise, from 1768 Newcastle was placed on the list of towns that was to have a permanent military presence as part of the domestic establishment.[128] From this date Newcastle had a more consistent military presence within the town. Finally, regiments were sometimes quickly

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[124] Douet, British Barracks, 20.
[125] Elements of the North and West Yorkshire militia were at Newcastle from 1759 to 1761; Sykes, Local Records, 226, 228, 230.
[126] This is especially true of the early 1790's when the North Yorkshire militia was almost continuously stationed in Newcastle and the surrounding region.
[127] PRO SP 41/9/179, State Papers Military, 1735.
[128] This consisted of one regiment of foot at any given time. PRO WO 4/83/316-19, 327, 343.

marched out of their garrisons to deal with local emergencies such as riots and invasion threats. As such troop levels could vary throughout the year.

Despite this, one can get a general understanding of the distribution of land forces around the region. Table 2.1 is a summation of the army's presence in the region at periods throughout the century when sufficient records are available. It looks at years in which specific numbers of regiments or companies can be traced to the region.[129] The numbers next to the units are approximations based on the figures given in the War Office records for the domestic establishment in that particular year. These numbers are only estimates and do not necessarily represent the fact that during the year some of the soldiers may have been moved from the area or joined by additional troops.

It is possible that there were always troops in many of these places and that their numbers were slightly higher than is estimated here. Furthermore, the table does not include the permanent residents of the various garrisons who include the governor, his aides, gunners and other support staff. For much of the century this did not represent anything more than a handful of men. In 1716 the largest garrison staff was the 12 men stationed at Berwick which included the Governor, Lt. Governor, Town Major, Chaplain, Surgeon, Master Gunner and six regular gunners.[130] By 1793 numbers had changed little with only 15 men staffing Berwick.[131] It must also be remembered that the units at Berwick were responsible for assigning a small detachment of its troops to garrison Holy Island that is not listed separately. Finally, militia units, often present in great numbers in Newcastle and Morpeth during the latter half of the century, do not appear in the table. Despite these omissions the figures provided below allow the observer a decent if somewhat spasmodic picture of troop concentrations in the North East.

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[129] It does not include years when it is known that regiments are present, but the number of companies is unknown. For example it is known that in 1787 the 23rd Regiment of Foot was present in Berwick as one of its soldiers was accused of theft there. However, as the number of troops is not known, the year has been excluded. BTRO C15/16, 29 August 1787.

[130] PRO WO 24/82, Establishments for His Majesty's Guards, Garrisons and Land Forces in Great Britain, 1716.

[131] Ibid., 24/574, Establishments, 1793.

For example War Office papers indicate that eight companies of foot soldiers were stationed in Berwick in 1709.[132] By cross referencing this with the tables for domestic establishments it is possible to estimate that at this time the town was accommodating approximately 664 officers and men.[133] At its lowest point the town had just a single company of invalid soldiers based there, but this was exceptional. In 1719 there was an exceptionally large concentration of troops in the region. This includes a regiment of dragoons at Hexham, three regiments at Newcastle and one regiment of foot at Berwick.[134] Additionally, a company of 56 invalids was stationed at Tynemouth.[135] While it is unlikely that these units were at full strength, nearly 2000 soldiers were stationed in the region during 1719.[136] This is very different from the relatively low numbers of troops in the North East in 1723. Then the garrison consisted of a full regiment of foot at Berwick (655 men) and a single company of 52 invalids at Tynemouth.[137]

Throughout the century the number of soldiers stationed in the region seems to have hovered between 500 and 1,000. However, there are a few instances in which the total rises above this. On six occasions the number of troops in the region greatly exceeded 1,000 men. These are 1719, 1736, 1741, 1746, 1761 and 1783. What is noticeable about this trend is that in most cases the presence of large number of soldiers occurs during the start or end of one of the century's conflicts. During 1719 the War of the Quadruple Alliance was winding down and an unsuccessful attempt by the Spanish to land in Scotland increased security concerns within the region. 1741 marks the period in which the British army was preparing itself for direct intervention in continental Europe and in 1746 large numbers of troops employed in the opposition of the previous years Jacobite rebellions were still present in the region. The Seven Years War witnessed a dramatic expansion in 1761 as well as widespread unrest in the North East, while 1783 represents the conclusion of Britain's disastrous adventure in colonial America.

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[132] PRO WO 4/8/239, Secretary at War to the Governor of Berwick upon Tweed, 9 April 1709.
[133] PRO WO 24/49, Establishments, 1709. In this year a regiment of foot is estimated to have approximately 830 men at full strength (ten companies of 83 each).
[134] PRO SP 41/5/55, List and Quarters of His Majesty's Forces in Great Britain, 9 May 1719.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Ibid., The exact number is 2,043 (four regiments of foot at 445 each + one regiment of dragoons (207) and 56 invalids).

From the numbers in Table 2.1 it is also possible to estimate what proportion of the domestic army establishment was housed in the North East during the century. What is instantly obvious is the proportion could fluctuate greatly throughout the period, but no specific trends emerge. Normally, only 3-6% of the domestic establishment was charged with garrisoning the region, even in a year such as 1740 when serious unrest plagued Newcastle, Gateshead, Durham and Sunderland. At times throughout the century regional troop concentrations could be very low. In 1747, 1748, 1756, 1757 and 1759 the proportion of the domestic army based in the area is less than 20%. Interestingly, these are all years of conflict when the domestic establishment had ballooned through the raising of new regiments and augmentation of existing units. Therefore, in these years the apparent reductions in concentrations are not necessarily representative of a major reduction in the absolute numbers of troops in the region, but of an increased military force within the country as a whole.

Further analysis of Table 2.1 illustrates the fragmented way in which regiments were disposed throughout the region. The breaking-up of regiments into their constituent companies and the spreading of these units about the region was a hallmark of military quartering in the eighteenth century. Dispersing units in this way resulted from the fact that many communities possessed insufficient billets to house whole regiments or even companies. This problem was particularly acute in the first half of the century when permanent barracks were scarce.[138] As the century progressed it was also seen by the War Office as a way to get the best possible geographical coverage for the men it had available. As a result it assisted local and national leaders in their efforts to combat smuggling and public disorder. This scattering approach meant units of a regiment could often be quartered considerable distances from each other in a region that was geographically vast and, outside major towns, sparsely populated. In 1704 Carpenter's regiment had six of its companies split between Berwick, Hexham, Haltwhistle, Beltingham, Newcastle, Gateshead, Hull, Darlington and Stockton.[139] At the same time two companies of Lord Lucas's Regiment of Foot were stationed at

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[137] Ibid., 41/5/185, List and Quarters of His Majesty's Forces in Great Britain, 11 June 1723.
[138] During this time Berwick, Tynemouth and Holy Island were the only barracks between Edinburgh and Hull and Scarborough. Douet, British Barracks, 15.
[139] PRO SP 41/3/15, Quarters of Her Majesty's Forces in England, 24 June 1704.

Berwick while the rest of the regiment was scattered in far flung places such as Tilbury, Sheerness, Carlisle and Hull.[140] In 1759 the War Office issued instructions to 35 infantry and cavalry detachments throughout England, giving them permission to expand their quarters to neighbouring towns and villages such was the need for billets.[141]

It is clear that while the level of military manpower in the region was by no means consistent, the North East often hosted reasonable numbers of soldiers in relation to its population. Similarly, many places in the region had an almost permanent military presence throughout the century. The army was not a curiosity in the region and local inhabitants were used to having soldiers living amongst them. This is especially true of Berwick, which rarely had fewer than 300 troops in it. It was not unusual for soldiers (both regular and invalid) to count for 5% of the town's entire population. However, at times throughout the century nearly 20% of the town could consist of military personnel. This concentration was due mainly to Berwick's unique position as a permanent garrison town. Despite this it is important to remember that Newcastle and Tynemouth were rarely without troops. Tynemouth may have had considerable garrisons if one considers that this village probably had a modest population throughout the period.[142] This was especially relevant after 1768 when the small coastal village officially became a permanent garrison community.

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[140] Ibid.
[141] PRO WO 4/59/249, Barrington to Lt-General Conway, 10 November 1759. Letters were sent to regiments based in Newcastle.
[142] The exact population of Tynemouth is unknown, but it was considerably smaller than Newcastle and Berwick.

Table 2.1: The Known Disposition of the Army in the North East 1704-1793[1]

Date	Location & Approximate Numbers of Men	Total Troops in Region	% of 'Home' Establishment[2]
07/06/1689	2 'Divisions' of Colonel Beveridge's Regiment of Foot at Berwick	Unknown	Unknown
27/07/1704	1 Troop of Dragoons at Berwick (74) 1 Troop of Dragoons at Tynemouth (74) 1 Troop of Dragoons between Hexham, Haltwistle, Beltingham (74) 2 Companies of Foot at Berwick (140-150) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52)	414-424	6.1-6.3%
After 27/07/1704	4 Companies of Foot at Berwick (280-300) 1 Company of Foot at Tynemouth (70-75) 1 Company of Foot at Newcastle (70-75) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52)	472-502	7.0-7.4%
17/07/1705	1 Company of Foot at Tynemouth (70-75) 4 Company of Foot at Berwick (280-300) 1 Company of Foot at Newcastle (70-75) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52)	472-502	4.5-4.8%
After 17/07/1705	1 Company of Foot at Tynemouth (70-75) 4 Company of Foot at Berwick (280-300) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52)	402-427	3.8-4.1%

[1] The dates represent the date given for the source that contains the cantonments of forces in Great Britain rather than the establishment record for that year. The numbers in parentheses are approximations of the number of men present.
[2] This is based on the totals calculated for Appendix A and includes invalid companies.

22/12/1708	5 Companies of Brigadier Wightman's regiment at Berwick until orders to march on this day (400) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52)	452	3.6%
09/04/1709	8 Companies of Foot at Berwick (664) 2 Companies of Foot at Tynemouth (166) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52)	882	7.1%
06/07/1710	Lord Islay's regiment ordered to Newcastle due to riots there (760-870)	760-870	4.8-5.5%
09/05/1719	3 Regiments of Foot at Newcastle (1335) 1 Regiment of Foot at Berwick (445) 1 Regiment of Dragoons at Hexham (207) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (56)	2043	16.4%
11/06/1723	1 Regiment of Foot at Berwick (445) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (58)	503	2.7%
10/06/1725	1 Regiment of Foot at Berwick (655) 5 Companies of Foot at Berwick (325) 1 Company of Invalids at Berwick (52) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52)	1084	5.8%
16/05/1733	5 Companies of Foot at Berwick (350) 3 Companies of Foot at Newcastle (210) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52)	612	3.3%
25/03/1734	1 Regiment of Foot at Berwick (705) – leaves for York in April. 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (56)	761	4.1%
14/09/1736	7 Companies of Foot at Newcastle (490) 1 Regiment of Foot at Berwick (705) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52)	1247	6.8%
29/05/1740	1 Regiment of Foot at Berwick (815) 3 companies to Newcastle during June food riots 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52)	867	3.0%

30/05/1741	1 Regiment of Foot at Berwick (815) 1 Regiment of Foot at Newcastle & Gateshead (815) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52)	1682	4.7%
1745	For a breakdown of forces in the region from late October see Chapter 7.	11,300	22.81%[3]
1746	1 Regiment of Foot at Berwick (711) 1 Regiment of Foot at Newcastle (758) 1 Company of Invalids at Newcastle (52)	1521	3.0%
13/01/1747	5 Companies of Foot at Newcastle (485) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52) 1 Company of Invalids at Berwick (52)	589	1.7%
26/05/1748	5 Companies of Foot at Berwick (310) 3 Companies of Foot at Newcastle (186) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52)	548	1.0%
05/05/1752	5 Companies of Foot at Berwick (405) 3 Companies of Foot at Newcastle (243) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52)	700	3.6%
31/12/1756	4 Companies of Foot at Berwick (324) 2 Companies of Foot at Newcastle (162) 2 Companies of Invalids at Alnwick (104) 2 Companies of Invalids at Morpeth (104)	694	1.7%
01/02/1757	2 Companies of Beauclerk's Regiment of Foot at Berwick (170) 2 Companies of Foot at Alnwick (162) 2 Companies of Foot at Morpeth (162) 4 Companies of Invalids at Alnwick and Morpeth then to Berwick on 16/03. (208)	702	1.4%

[3] This is calculated using the establishment of 49,531 for 1746 rather than the 16,403 men for 1745 as many of these troops were originally not part of the domestic establishment and were brought over specifically for the purpose of fighting the Jacobite invasion. Therefore, in late 1745 the home establishment was expanding continuously as troops arrived in the country.

12/12/1759	3 Companies of Foot at Berwick (250)[4] 1 Company of Invalids at Berwick (52) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52)	354	0.7%[5]
04/05/1761	2 Independent Companies of Foot at Newcastle (McHarg's & Grant's) (228) 1 Regiment of Foot at Tynemouth (1034)	1262	2.27%
20/08/1769	6 Companies of Foot at Newcastle (360) 1 Company of Foot at Sunderland (60) 1 Company of Foot at Tynemouth (60) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52)	532	3.0%
1774	1 Regiment of Foot at Berwick (447) 1 Regiment of Foot at Newcastle (447) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52)	946	5.0%
08/01/1776	5 Companies of Foot at Berwick (338) 4 Companies of Foot at Newcastle (268) 1 Company of Foot at Tynemouth (67) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52) 1 Company of Invalids at Berwick (87)	812	3.8%
10/01/1780	1 Company of Invalids at Berwick (87) 1 Regiment of Foot at Newcastle (687-870) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52)	826-1009	2.3-2.8%
04/04/1783	1 Regiment of Foot at Berwick (687-870) 1 Regiment of Foot at Newcastle (687-870) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52)	1426-1792	2.8-3.5%
10/10/1792	5 Companies of Foot ordered to Tynemouth for anti-riot duty (335) 1 Company of Invalids at Tynemouth (52) 3 Companies of Foot at Berwick (201)	588	2.5%

[4] Replaced by six companies of North York Militia previously stationed at Newcastle.
[5] For this year the home establishment has two levels, 29,652 and 50,332 as numbers of troops in Britain increased. I have calculated the percentage using the second number as the total of 354 represents the military strength in the North East during December of 1759 when the larger domestic establishment was in effect.

11/03/1793	7 Companies of Foot at Tynemouth (350) 2 Companies of Foot at Sunderland (100) 1 Regiment of Dragoons at Newcastle (285) 3 Companies of Invalids at Berwick (135)	870	4.8%

Chapter 3

Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: Recruitment, Desertion and the Press Gang

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'if any servants have severe masters, any children
have undutiful parents, if any servants have too little
wage, or any husband too much wife...'

Sgt. Kite, Act I; Scene I
The Recruiting Officer[1]

I. Introduction.

Like all armies throughout history, manpower was a key element in Britain's ability to fight the endemic wars of the eighteenth century. The regularity of conflict, coupled with the increasing number of bodies required, and the expanding geographical scope of warfare in the period, created a great need for volunteer and impressed recruits. The situation was further complicated by the fact that for much of the century the peacetime standing army was purposefully kept at low levels. This created a furious expansion of forces when conflict did erupt. Considering the substantial numbers of men required for the army, navy, militia and the forces of the East India Company, it was amazing that a country with a population that varied between 4.9 and 7.9 million people during the century, could maintain such a successful and expansive global presence.[2] While some of this progress was the result of large numbers of foreign levies being employed from other European states and principalities, the British army was still mainly reliant on British recruits.[3] Nevertheless, these factors meant that recruiting parties and press-gangs were a regular and intrusive part of life in English provincial towns. As one would expect this was no exception in the North East.

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[1] Peter Dixon (ed.), George Farquhar, The Recruiting Officer (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986).
[2] E.A. Wrigley & R.S. Schofield, The Population History of England 1541-1871, A Reconstruction (London: Edward Arnold, 1981) 533-4. The actual numbers listed in the text are 4,896,666 in 1688 and 7,936,885 in 1793.

On the other hand the propensity of some soldiers to desert their colours could undermine the effectiveness of these very same forces. Desertion was the scourge of army officers and political leaders throughout Europe. One officer in Ireland estimated that as much as one-twelfth of that establishment deserted every year.[4] So serious was the problem that as a military crime it was punishable by death or severe floggings. In some cases a real fear existed that if desertion was not checked it had the potential to seriously jeopardise the cohesion of the armed forces and ultimately compromise battlefield effectiveness. However, it was not just a phenomenon that afflicted units stationed abroad or within theatres of war. Many soldiers fled their regiments while stationed in Britain, creating a great deal of work for local administrators and legal officials. Despite this Arthur Gilbert has illustrated that desertion from regiments in Britain, even in times of war, was much lower than in regiments actually serving overseas in theatres of combat.[5] He also notes that desertion rarely approached the attrition rates that regiments faced from disease, discharges and deaths.[6] Regardless of this desertion was still a serious problem within eighteenth-century England.

This co-existing relationship between the recruitment and desertion of troops was a major component of civil-military relations in the North East. Such activities provide an ideal opportunity to analyse the level of support and resistance that local inhabitants displayed towards various forms of recruiting and to deserters from the forces. As will be shown below, resistance to normal methods of recruitment does not appear to have been widespread. Nevertheless, this did not lead to a flood of men enlisting in the ranks of the army. At the same time opposition increased in local communities when the military and local officials employed coercive methods of recruitment.

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[3] For an analysis on the German levy system see: Peter H. Wilson, 'The German 'Soldier Trade' of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A Reassessment.' International History Review 18 (4) (1996) 757-92.

[4] PRO WO 1/611/1-8, 47, In Letters and Papers-Government Departments, 1787-1793. This was far outstripped by the desertions occurring in 1787 when it was reported that as many 1,200 of the 7,000 private soldiers abandoned their colours.

[5] Arthur N. Gilbert, 'Why Men Deserted From the Eighteenth-Century British Army.' Armed Forces and Society 6 (1980) 558. He states that in 1758 desertion within England accounted for just 3.9%, and in 1759 3.4% of the total establishment.

II. Recruitment and Competition for Manpower in Context.

During the eighteenth century Britain's pool of available manpower was under considerable pressure for a number of reasons. Most importantly, the size of the regular army rose consistently during periods of conflict. At the height of the War of Spanish Succession there were nearly 145,000 men on the army establishment. However, during the early stages of the French wars an army establishment of 337,189 soldiers was required.[7] Even the number of soldiers strictly based in Britain during peacetime went from a low of 7,878 in 1700 to nearly 18,000 in the period immediately before the eruption of the French Revolutionary Wars.[8] This represents increases of 132% and 128% respectively and does not include the massive expansion of the domestic garrison during the century's many conflicts.[9] At the same time the population of Britain increased by approximately 62%.

It is easy to observe that the increasing manpower requirements of the army outstripped demographic growth in the general population. However, these totals do not include the additional pressures created by increases in the navy and the augmented militia that came into existence during 1757.[10] Additionally, these state institutions were forced to compete for men with other smaller forces such as the private army operated by the East India Company. From 1698 the company's new charter empowered it to raise, train and muster a military force to protect its factories and economic interests in India.[11] Although this army remained small for much of the

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[6] Ibid., In 1758 and 1759 these rates were 16.2% and 20.8% respectively.
[7] L.D. Schwartz, London in the Age of Industrialisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 97-9. It must be remembered that a proportion of these men were foreign levies and auxiliaries.
[8] PRO WO 24/23, 549-563, Establishments of Guards, Garrisons and Land Forces, 1700 and 1788-91. For a complete list of the numbers of troops in the country throughout the century please see Appendix A.
[9] For example, during the formative years of the War of Austrian Succession the domestic establishment was between 35,000 and 36,000 troops as new regiments were raised to fight the war. Please see 1741 and 1742 in Appendix A, PRO WO 24/195, 204.
[10] In the same period the men listed as 'bourne' by the navy went from 20,916 in 1701 to 96,000 in 1795, an increase of more than 350%. Schwarz, London in the Age of Industrialisation, 97-99; At full strength the new militia was to consist of 56,000 men.
[11] Huw V. Bowen, 'The East India Company and Military Recruitment in Britain, 1763-71.' Historical Research 59 (139) (1986) 78.

eighteenth century, the increase in military conflict in and around the Indian sub-continent from the 1740's saw the number of men under arms increase from just 3,000 men in 1749 to 26,000 in 1763, and 64,192 by 1771.[12] Despite using large numbers of native Sepoys the East India Company presented a further drain on British manhood. The regular opposition of the British army to bills allowing the Company to recruit at home supports this fact.[13] There was also the additional strain of supplying the Navy. Because it tended to recruit from the seafaring community, this impacted tremendously on coastal ports such as Newcastle, Sunderland, Tynemouth and North and South Shields.

This combination of factors, coupled with the unpopularity of military service, meant that it was not unusual for the army to be well below its optimum strength, both in peacetime and during periods of war. Arthur Gilbert has estimated that in 1779, at the height of the American Revolutionary War, the army was 10,000 men short of its listed strength.[14] To some extent this explains the desperate attempts that the government sometimes utilised to fill the ranks.[15] This great need was reflected in the use of impressment, the hiring of substantial numbers of foreign levies during times of conflict, and the periodic enlistment of debtors and criminals into the ranks.

III. The Structural Framework of Recruiting and Impressment.

The recruiting of the army was a complex process, which was heavily reliant on co-operation between the military and local civil and legal officials. As was the case with most of the army's domestic operations in the eighteenth century, the government in London was keen to ensure that some form of civilian control was exercised over the raising of recruits for both the army and the navy. As has been alluded to in Chapter 2, part of this arose out of the need to protect the rights of the

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[12] Ibid., 78-9.
[13] Ibid., 85-6.
[14] Arthur N Gilbert, 'An Analysis of Some Eighteenth-Century Recruiting Records.' Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research 54 (1976) 39.
[15] So severe was the problem of manpower in North America during the Seven Years War that 131 French soldiers who surrendered at Louisburg were recruited into British regiments there. Stephen

civilian population from possible misdeeds on the part of recruiters. This broad remit meant that local magistrates and other local legal authorities were responsible for the oversight of the entire recruitment process. In this role their presence was required to ensure that every recruit met minimum standards of physical stature as set by the various recruiting acts. At the same time they were expected to witness the taking of oaths which formally signified the recruits acceptance of the army's authority and marked their transformation from civilian to soldier. Magistrates were also responsible for ensuring that recruiters refrained from underhand tactics while conducting their business. In such cases they had the power to conduct hearings into accusations of malpractice in the recruiting process and to release those civilians adjudged to have been improperly enlisted.

The rules and conventions governing the army press were similar to those associated with normal army recruitment. However, in terms of their involvement in impressments, the role of the magistrate was equally important and central to the success of any press. They were part of the impress commissions, which had total control over all aspects of the process. They vetted the men brought in by the press and investigated accusations of wrongdoing. At the same time it was incumbent on the army personnel involved in this duty to maintain close relations with the local political and legal authorities if they hoped to receive the necessary co-operation. In fact a press could not even begin until a local justice of the peace issued warrants to constables allowing them to apprehend men who met the terms of the various press acts.[16] Additionally, the constables or other civilian officers were required to be present during any attempt to press a man into service. For this service the relevant army officer would have to pay the parish or town officials a set amount for every man received.[17] This differed somewhat from normal recruitment practices, which up until the taking of the oath, tended to be a personal interaction between the potential recruit

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Brumwell, Redcoats. The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 60.

[16] For a good discussion of the conduct of army impressment during the beginning of the eighteenth century please see: Arthur N Gilbert, 'Army Impressment During the War of the Spanish Succession.' The Historian 38 (1976) 689-708

[17] Ibid., 690; Brumwell, Redcoats, 63. The rates were 10 shillings for the 1704 Act and 20 shillings in the 1757 Act.

and the recruiting party. During impress operations civilian authority was present at every point of the process.

Successive parliamentary acts permitting army impressment set clear parameters as to what types of men could be seized. A press act was not a blank cheque that allowed officers and local officials to sweep the streets. It was aimed at a very specific demographic group within society and normally those at the lowest rung of the social ladder. It was focused on those members of society who placed a disproportionate economic burden on local society. This included the homeless, the unemployed, debtors and criminals. A typical example of the limitations placed on the army press can be observed in Northumberland's midsummer quarter sessions records from 1707. At these Richard Oriss was presented to the justices and upon examination it was found that 'he hath not any place of billetment and lawful calling or employment nor visible means for his maintenance or livlihood.'[18] As a result of meeting this criterion, Oriss was delivered over to Captain William Wanless of Brigadier Handasyde's Regiment of Foot.[19] Such considerations meant that employed and respectable civilians had little chance of being forced into the ranks of the army, although as will be shown below, this did happen on occasions.

IV. The Recruitment of Criminals, Vagrants and Debtors.

The issue of whether the ranks of the army were rife with criminals and other socially undesirable people has been dealt with briefly in Chapter 2. What that analysis illustrated was that as the century progressed the reliance on impressment declined and as a result, the proportion of criminals, vagrants and debtors also declined. At the same time the army appears to have become more representative of British society. Despite this fact the use of the North East's criminals, vagrants and debtors as recruits can shed light on a number of important interactions in the relationships between local and central government and the army. The opportunity for local officials to sweep the streets and gaols of vagrants and criminals must have proved tempting. It would have

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[18] MRO QSB 26/17, 16 July 1707.
[19] Ibid.

removed many poor and idle souls from the community, reduced expenditure on the poor, and eased recruiting pressures on more productive members of society. On the other hand, hosting an army rife with reprobates and other social-marginals would create considerable problems for civilian and military authorities, possibly even increasing tensions between the army and the local population.[20]

In terms of recruiting criminals, the War of Spanish Succession saw the most intense use in the eighteenth century.[21] It is estimated that in 1708 alone as many as 1,493 criminals were delivered over to 57 infantry battalions.[22] While this may seem like a large number it still accounted for just 1.6% of the 91,188 men on the British establishment.[23] Later in the century the number of pardons related to military service drop considerably. In the 17 years between 1747 and the end of the Seven Years War just 234 men were pardoned, on condition of their enlistment in the military, and all but two of these enlisted after 1755.[24] At its highest level in 1761, 107 men were enlisted into the army representing just 0.10% of the estimated 105,221 men on the army establishment that year.[25] Furthermore, Stephen Conway's study concludes that just 769 criminals were granted similar pardons between 1775 and 1783.[26] These figures represent just 1% of the 73,310 men enlisted for service between September 1775 and September 1780.[27]

More importantly for this thesis, is the fact that an overwhelming majority of convict soldiers were assigned to units serving outside England. Of 26 felons identified as

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[20] The actual issue of the level of soldier criminality will be dealt with in Chapter 5 but this issue has a direct bearing on that discussion.
[21] The major work on this matter is Stephen Conway, 'The Recruitment of Criminals Into the British Army, 1775-81.' BIHR 58 (1985) 46-58. Another brief treatment is J. R. Western, 'Military Service as Punishment.' JSAHR, 32 (1954) 89. I have utilised Conway's sources and methods to expand this analysis to cover the period 1747 to 1763. The detailed results can be found in Appendices B and C.
[22] John Childs, 'War, Crime Waves and the English Army in the Late Seventeenth Century.' War and Society 15 (2) (1997) 9.
[23] This was still only 3.7% of the 40,274 actual 'effective' soldiers in the land forces in 1708. L.D. Schwartz, London in the Age of Industrialisation, 97.
[24] 187 criminals (or nearly 80%) were specifically told to register in army regiments. See Appendix B for an annual breakdown.
[25] PRO SP 44/88, State Papers Domestic-Criminal: Correspondence and Warrants 1761-1767; The establishment level for 1761 is taken from Gregory and Stevenson, The Longman Companion to Britain in the Eighteenth Century (London: Longman, 2000) 196; The numbers given in this volume are identical to those compiled in L.D. Schwarz, London in the Age of Industrialisation, 98.
[26] Conway, 'The Recruitment of Criminals.' 49.
[27] Ibid., 50.

being allowed to enlist in the army between 1704 and 1709, 23 were sent to regiments stationed abroad.[28] Likewise, between 1747 and 1763 nearly 73% of the men who were told to enlist in the army were directed to regiments serving overseas.[29] In total 51 were instructed to join 'any regiment abroad' and the other 86 were sent to Jamaica to join the 49th Regiment of Foot.[30] Conway has shown that a similar percentage (nearly 77%) of those assigned to specific regiments during 1775 and 1781 were sent abroad.[31] This analysis illustrates that criminals accounted for only a fraction of the whole establishment, and just a handful of those actually serving in England at any time during the century.

In a purely local context, it is very difficult to estimate with any accuracy the number of criminals who were pardoned on condition of their enlistment in the army or navy. There is a lack of detailed archival evidence in the region where one could find copies of petitions sent to the Secretary at State, requesting such consideration. Even the vast majority of cases contained in the State Papers Domestic do not list the specific place of origin or residence of the petitioner. For this reason any attempt to build a list of men from the region entering the service is almost impossible. However, the numbers on a national level are so small that only a very tiny number of the criminals could have come from the North East. This could be refined even further when one considers that the region was relatively lightly populated compared to counties to the south.[32]

Despite a lack of evidence pointing to specific criminals being brought into the army, local administrators and legal grandees appeared to have supported the recruitment of vagrants and the unemployed. This was part of a wider trend, particularly in Northumberland, where officials operated an overt policy of trying to rid the county of

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[28] PRO SP 41/3-4. There is no mention of any regiment or general destination for the remaining 3 men.
[29] See Appendix C. These totals include only those men pardoned on condition of joining the Army and excludes those given the choice between the Army or Navy or told to enlist in 'His Majesty's Service'
[30] Ibid., The 49th regiment was the largest single taker of convict recruits, accounting for nearly 63% of all men sent to overseas regiments, and close to half of all the criminals sent into the army during this period.
[31] 58.33% were sent to the West Indies, Africa and India, and 18.94% were transported to units in America. Conway, 'Recruitment of Criminals.' 53.
[32] For a discussion about relative populations in the eighteenth century see Chapter 2.

vagrants, vagabonds, rogues and gypsies.[33] The press of idle and itinerant men was being employed widely from the opening of the eighteenth century. As early as 1705 men who were considered to be 'levyable within the meaning of the act of Parliament' (for the impressment of idle men), began to trickle into the army.[34] On the second day of January 1705 an order went out to Justices asking them to prepare for the onset of the recruiting season, with the hope of filling the ranks of the army before the commencement of the next campaign season.[35] Not long after this, five 'idle' men were seized by constables in Northumberland. Three of these were to be enlisted in the army and the other two as marines.[36] In addition to this a further 30 men had been collected by the petty constables of Glendale near Wooler, but as will be discussed below they apparently escaped their capture and fled for the border with Scotland.[37]

Over the next few days a further eight men from the region were presented to Captain William Carr of the Earl of Orkney's Regiment of Foot.[38] In fact a list within the Northumberland quarter sessions records for early 1705 seems to indicate that by 12 February 1705, Captain Carr may have taken delivery of as many as 66 impressed men.[39] All but two of these, John Tilley and John Angus who went to Colonel Villiers stationed in Tynemouth, seem to have been intended for Orkney's regiment.[40] This indicates a concerted attempt by the authorities of Northumberland to bring the idle population into the army's service. However, it is not clear whether any of these men include the 30 mentioned above who fled their impressment for Scotland. Despite this setback the press seems to have worked well as in 1707 the Secretary at War noted that there were upwards of 140 impressed men awaiting transportation at Tynemouth Castle.[41] Two years later sizeable numbers of vagabonds were being transported 'to the next adjacent constable in Northumberland' for assessment at the

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[33] This attitude towards social-marginals persisted until about 1750. Gwenda Morgan and Peter Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law. The Problem of Law Enforcement in North-East England 1718-1800 (London: UCL Press, 1998) 217.
[34] MRO QSB 21/10, 14 February 1705.
[35] Ibid., 21/7, 2 January 1705.
[36] Ibid., 21/8, 9 January 1705.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid., 21/9-50, 14-27 January 1705.
[39] Ibid., 21/60, 12 February 1705.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Gilbert, 'Army Impressment' 702.

next quarter sessions.[42] After this initial burst of activity there is only sporadic mention of men being impressed into the army during the remainder of the conflict.

This trend continued into the War of Austrian Succession. In the early stages of the conflict archival records show local officials making a concerted effort to move large numbers of vagrants to towns that were staging quarter sessions and assize meetings. Records of the midsummer quarter sessions from 1741 make note of a group of 223 men being transported, during May and July, from Hexham to Carlisle and from Morpeth to Newcastle.[43] Later in the same year there are a number of entries noting the continued transport of large groups of idle men about the county. One of these was the 212 vagrants who were 'conveyed by John Reagan and Michael Anderson from Morpeth to Buxton from Midsummer sessions 1741 to Minters sessions 1741, being 29 miles.'[44]

While it does not specifically mention that these large parties are being moved for the reasons of military recruitment, a series of historical and archival clues makes this a possible explanation for such movements. First, parliamentary legislation passed in 1741 allowed both the navy and army to recruit vagrants into their respective services. Secondly, the conveyance of considerable numbers of vagrants only begins to appear in archival sources with the onset of the War of Austrian Succession. At the same time, the end of the conflict marks an end to records of these sizeable movements. Furthermore, the experiences of other regiments during the century illustrates that significant numbers of men were being impressed in wartime. In 1756 Charles Otway's 35th Regiment of Foot received nearly 500 impressed men, doubling its size before it sailed to America.[45] In this context it seems more believable that the aforementioned numbers may have been impressed men.

Although there are no specific archival examples of men being taken by the army press during the Seven Years War or the American War of Independence, impressment was still being widely used in the region. Orders to the 56th Regiment of

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[42] TWAS MD/NC/2/3/166, 22 September 1709.
[43] MRO QSB 83/13, 15 July 1741.
[44] Ibid., 84/3, 11 October 1741.
[45] Brumwell, Redcoats, 64.

Foot in Newcastle during 1756 explicitly show that this unit was accepting pressed men.[46] Similarly, in early 1757 officers commanding elements of Beauclerk's regiment in Morpeth were ordered to draw their necessary recruits from the increasingly large pool of impressed men being held at Carlisle.[47] So successful had the press been in Carlisle that the commissioners running the operation feared the 'very dangerous consequences from the large number of pressed men [held] there, for they [had] no sufficient place of confinement.'[48] In Berwick the impress commissioners were prevented from meeting as they had been mistakenly omitted from the existing recruiting act.[49] Nevertheless, once this problem had been rectified it did not take long for the press to fill the gaols again. In fact, by late 1757 serious recruitment congestion in the region led the Secretary at War to issue orders stipulating that from 8 December the impressment of men was to stop in all parts of northern England with the exception of Newcastle upon Tyne.[50] This glut of recruits would not last and the use of the army press would be reintroduced intermittently for the remainder of the war.

During the American Revolutionary War the impressment of men into the army was also being used in the region.[51] This is attested to by the orders sent to Newcastle and other towns in December 1779 asking for the impress commissioners to meet in the new year.[52] However, the official end of army impressment in 1780 meant that its impact during this war was much less significant than similar activities earlier in the century. Nevertheless, early in the conflict, the naval impress was also gathering in men at a furious pace. Between November 1776 and mid-July 1778 Captian Bover's press gangs had farmed 1,122 men, representing nearly 65% of all local men enlisted into the navy in that period.[53] This included 193 individuals in one seven day period

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[46] PRO WO 4/1012/25, Secretary at War to Rt.Hon. Lord Charles Manners at Newcastle, 12 April 1756.
[47] Ibid., 4/1012/47, Secretary at War to Officers Commanding the Companies of Lord George Beauclerk's Regiment at Morpeth, 3 February 1757.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid., 4/1012/41, 18 January 1757.
[50] Ibid., 4/1012/87, 8 December 1757.
[51] The first national army impress act was approved by Parliament in February 1779. Gilbert, 'Charles Jenkinson and the Last Army Press, 1779' Military Affairs 42 (1978) 8.
[52] PRO WO 3/26/37, 5 November 1779.
[53] PRO ADM 1/1497-1503. Captain's Letters, B Series 1776-1782. A total of 1,737 men were enlisted in the navy including 526 volunteer seamen, 60 volunteer landsmen and 29 men delivered to the press gangs by the civilian authorities.

between 20th and 27th March 1778 when a 'hot press' led to exemptions being suspended.[54]

Like army impressment, the use of debtors as soldiers appears to have been relatively popular during the earlier part of the century. Parliament first introduced acts for the 'relief of poor persons for debt or debtors' in 1695.[55] This was followed by a more intense utilisation of such legislation during the War of Spanish Succession. These acts allowed male debtors to escape debt and debtors prison in exchange for enlistment in the army or navy. This legislation evolved into an important pillar of army recruitment policy, particularly during Queen Anne's reign.[56] Unlike the impressment acts however, debtors were not compelled to serve in the army or navy. Rather they had to apply to the authorities to be considered under the provisions of the acts. As was the case with criminals, this category of 'offender' accounted for a very small proportion of those entering the army. Geoffrey Davis estimates that criminals in the army outnumbered debtors, and if one considers the numbers of criminals given above, the proportion could have been negligible.[57] This argument is countered by Arthur Gilbert who believes that nearly 60,000 debtors were in the ranks during 1716, as opposed to 2,076 in 1779, although the former total appears a bit optimistic.[58] More noticeably Gilbert's calculations show a similar trend to that of criminals in the army, in that their numbers declined significantly as the century progressed.

The earliest record of debtors going into the army comes in 1696 when seven men were released from Newcastle's gaol to join Sir John Jacob's Regiment of Foot.[59] The next archival reference to the widespread recruitment of insolvent debtors comes during the War of Spanish Succession. In 1702 George Watson, who owed a debt of £13, agreed to join Colonel Sanderson's Regiment of Marines stationed at Hull.[60] At the same quarter session Henry Newton, Robert Amsley and Thomas Hagerston all

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[54] Ibid., 1/1498, 27 March 1778.
[55] John Childs, The British Army of William III, 1689-1702 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987) 114.
[56] For a more detailed study of recruitment from 1702-1714 please see: Geoffrey Davis, 'Recruiting in the Reign of Queen Anne.' Historical Research 18 (1950) 146-59.
[57] Ibid., 150-1.
[58] Gilbert, 'Analysis of Army Recruiting Records.' 42.
[59] Childs, The British Army of William III, 114.
[60] TWAS QS/NC/1/3, 9 September 1702.

agreed to 'go a soldier' in the same regiment.[61] Within two years at least 33 Newcastle men had decided to take up arms rather than be imprisoned for their debts. In Northumberland during 1702, 35 debtors had petitioned the local authorities to join the army since the legislation had come into effect.[62] The real surprise here is not that insolvent debtors were taking the opportunity to eliminate their debts, but rather the ages of some of the men involved. Watson and Hagerston were 31 years of age at the time of their enlistment, while Amsley was 44 and Newton was 46.[63] The latter two recruits clearly did not meet the age limitation set within the act.[64] These individuals illustrate how serious manpower shortages could tempt some officials and army officers to conveniently ignore the height and age limitations placed on recruits by government legislation.[65]

Interestingly, the lists indicate that only two regiments were the beneficiaries of the 33 Newcastle debtors enlisted in the army up to 1704, and of these recruitment was limited to one company in each.[66] Captain George Ord's company in Colonel Thomas Sanderson's Regiment of Marines enlisted 11 men, and Captain Mitchell Mitford's company within Lord Paston's Regiment of Foot took 22 debtors.[67] Unfortunately, sources that record debtor enlistment within Northumberland do not provide similar information and as a result one cannot determine which regiments men were assigned to.[68] However, it would not be overly presumptuous to assume that some, if not a large majority, also went into Paston's and Sanderson's regiment as they were actively recruiting in the region during this period.

The analysis of debtor recruitment highlights another tantalising trend that compliments the enlistment of criminals. This is the large proportion of debtors that appear to have been sent to regiments outside Britain. An order from the War Office giving instructions for the distribution of debtors lists just one regiment known to be

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[61] Ibid.
[62] MRO QSB 17/100-53, 4 July 1702.
[63] TWAS QS/NC/1/3.
[64] The age limit was 40 years of age. Davis, 'Recruiting,' 150.
[65] A discussion on how recruitment standards varied in wartime, as they relate to the army in America, can be found in: Brumwell, Redcoats.
[66] TWAS QS/NC/1/3.
[67] Ibid., 31 May-26 July 1704.
[68] MRO QSB 17/100-53, 4 July 1702.

in England at the time.[69] Ironically, this was Lord Paston's regiment, which was in the process of raising itself in 1704 and had enlisted at least 22 debtors from the region between 1702 and 1704. Beyond this navy ships also took debtors to fill their crews, and as a result, removed them from the country. In 1706 Captain Matthew Teal, 'commander of Her Majesty's Ship Strombolo', received eight such men into his care.[70]

Unexpectedly, the large-scale enlistment of such men into the armed services stops almost abruptly at the end of 1704. In 1705 there is only one enlistment, that of Anthony Cargill who signed with Captain Mitford to escape his substantial debt of £62, 1s.[71] For the remainder of the conflict there is little mention of local debtors entering the armed forces. The same trend is found in Northumberland where the glut of petitioners in 1702 is followed by a few scattered and isolated cases. Furthermore, with the end of the war in 1714, the use of debtors in the army ends and does not reappear in any of the records for the remainder of the century.

V. Recruiting Efforts in the Local Community.

Despite the role of the recruiting officer in bringing units up to strength, the regional communities, and especially the town councils, played an equally important role in the recruiting process. Without a co-operative effort by the civilian authorities the army could not have expected to raise the numbers of men that it did. In effect, local civilian officers assisted the parties of military personnel in establishing their recruiting 'practices'. As has been discussed above sheriffs, justices of the peace and constables performed a number of varied tasks that were essential to the physical procedures of the recruiting process. However, local councils provided another vital piece of assistance that came in the form of financial aid to the army and navy. In a limited way this helped to counter the public's generally unenthusiastic regard for military service.

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[69] PRO WO 4/3/23, Henry St. John to Bench of Justices of Southwark, 23 May 1704.
[70] TWAS QS/NC/1/3. This list of men was originally presented to the quarter sessions held on 24 July 1704.
[71] Ibid., 17 January 1705.

Army service, especially in times of war, was an extremely dangerous occupation that carried with it the undesirable possibility of great hardship, soul-breaking discipline and even death. At the same time there was an extremely good chance that enlistment would result in service far from home and the real chance of the regiment being sent overseas. Another major factor that contributed to poor army recruitment in the eighteenth century was the pay of the private soldier. For much of the period it remained at a constant eight pence per day, despite the spasmodic nature of the economy and inflation during this period.[72] The idea of raising pay and improving the living standards of soldiers was not a major priority.[73] When one considers that in 1710 a labourer in England could command a daily wage of between 14 and 15 pence per day, and a skilled craftsman 20 to 22 pence, the eight pence a day available to soldiers appears paltry reward.[74] This is even more apparent when deductions or 'off-reckonings' are taken into consideration. Thus soldiers remained at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder hovering precariously above 'cottagers, paupers and vagrants.'[75] Nevertheless, it must also be recognised that despite problems with pay, military service continued to be a popular way for men to escape various economic, social and domestic problems.[76]

The army and navy always offered a form of 'signing-on' bonus to all volunteers in the hope that it would encourage enlistment. During times of peace, when the need for manpower was slight, these disbursements were relatively small. On the other hand, during wartime such recruiting money could be considerable. In 1703 the recruiting bonus stood at 40 shillings for every volunteer.[77] Even impressed men were offered money once they had accepted their fate.[78] In itself this might not seem a

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[72] Brumwell, Redcoats, 57-8.
[73] Gilbert, 'Why Men Deserted.' 555.
[74] David L. Smith, A History of the Modern British Isles 1603-1707 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1998) 419. Agricultural labourers in County Durham were earning about six to eight pence per day in the 1750s. David Levine & Keith Wrightson, The Making of an Industrial Society. Whickham 1560-1765 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) 242-6.
[75] As quoted in Brumwell, Redcoats, 58.
[76] Stephen Brumwell, 'Rank and File: A Profile of One of Wolfe's Regiments.' JSAHR, 89 (Spring 2001) 14-5; David Kent, '"Gone for a Soldier." Family Breakdown and the Demography of Desertion in a London Parish.' Local Population Studies, 45 (1990) 27-42.
[77] Geoffrey Davis, 'Recruiting in the Reign of Queen Anne.' 154.
[78] Men impressed in Newcastle in 1705 were being offered 20 shillings if they joined voluntarily once apprehended. MRO QSB 21/59, 27 January 1705.

large sum. However, to many idle farm workers, general labourers and those carrying debts it would have represented a relatively handsome inducement. Regardless, such rewards did little to stimulate interest in military service amongst the civilian population. Aware of this problem, and willing to assist the recruiters, local authorities often used public money or set up subscriptions to offer additional pots of cash to lure potential recruits. These 'bounties' were either advertised separately or as direct supplements to the money already offered to civilians for their enrolment in the forces.

Despite almost constant warfare throughout the early part of the century, the town councils of the North East did little to encourage army recruitment through financial bonuses. This was not true of bounties for naval service, which were in use throughout the period, if not on a consistent or regular basis.[79] Nevertheless, the sheer necessity for men during the Seven Years War meant that the assistance of local communities was required more than ever. Therefore, it is no surprise that the commencement of the Seven Years War in 1756 also saw the beginning of an increase in the issuing of bounties for army service in the region.

Even before the beginning of the European stage of the conflict, Berwick, which earlier in the century had largely refrained from offering bounties, began to advertise such incentives widely. In April 1756 the town council ordered that any men wishing to volunteer for service in Lord Charles Manners' Regiment of Foot for the term of three years, or until the cessation of hostilities, would receive one guinea 'over and above the money given by such [recruiting] officers.'[80] This money was to be paid from the corporation's own treasury. Similar bounties quickly followed in 1757, 1758 and 1759.[81] The 1759 bounty was to be funded through a public subscription of 100 guineas. Specifically, it offered an award of three guineas to any man who was not already enlisted in the militia if they volunteered for service in Colonel John Crawford's Regiment of Royal Volunteers or Colonel John La Fluselle's 66th

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[79] This was due in large part to the strategic importance of the navy throughout the century, as well as the key role that the region's coastal towns played in naval recruiting.
[80] BTRO GB 1/17/215, 8 April 1756.
[81] Ibid., 1/17/215, 265, 426.

Regiment of Foot.[82] As was the case in Berwick, it was not until the Seven Years War that the governing corporation of Newcastle made serious exertions to issue bounty money. However, from this point there is a clear effort by the local leaders to engender much more enthusiasm for joining the army's ranks. From 1759 various endowments were issued and advertised by the corporation in order to assist the recruiting agents based in the town.[83]

In August 1759, in what the corporation termed 'this time of imminent danger', a large subscription was set up at the Newcastle Bank to facilitate the enhancement of the regular enlistment money.[84] Matching the inducement given by Berwick's council, the regulations stipulated that any able-bodied men who enlisted in the 66th Regiment of Foot or in the Regiment of Royal Volunteers, within six weeks of the declaration, would receive two guineas in addition to the normal bounty money.[85] So eager were the local authorities to make a success of the subscription that they ordered the city's chamberlains to place £15 of the town's money into the bank.[86] After this however, army recruitment bursaries disappear from the town's records only to resurface during the American War of Independence. Upon the outbreak of hostilities in the colonies, Newcastle's council once again issued calls for money from the community to bolster recruitment.[87] In 1775 the council even ordered that the town donate £50 to a subscription used to aid soldiers serving in America.[88] Ominously foreshadowing the costly conflict to come, this endowment was also aimed at supporting the families of men killed in action.[89] Such efforts continued late into the war. In the summer of 1782 the corporation supplied 100 guineas to the mayor 'to be applied by him in such a manner as he shall think best, as a bounty to encourage recruits to enter into His Majesty's land service.'[90]

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[82] Ibid., 1/17/426, 4 September 1759.
[83] TWAS MD/NC/2/5, 1743-1766.
[84] Ibid., 2/5/336, 28 August 1759. This imminent danger may have been the threat of invasion.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid., 2/6, 1766-1785.
[88] Ibid., 2/6/240, 20 December 1775.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid., 2/6/369, 13 July 1782.

Recruitment bursaries do not appear to have been used to any great extent before the Seven Years War, and their use ends after the American war. The bounties offered in Newcastle during 1782 were the last of their kind in the region.[91] Even before this date naval recruitment had clearly become the local government's main focus for investment. In Berwick army recruitment bounties disappeared much earlier (1759). These too were largely replaced by inducements to join the navy. However, unlike in Newcastle there was also a concerted effort to supply money to help pay for substitutes for those of Berwick's burgesses who had been balloted into the militia.[92] From 1759 there is only one further attempt to supply the public with money for the army, but it had nothing to do with recruitment. Rather it was similar to the initiative by Newcastle officials to assist men already serving in foreign theatres of war. In late 1793 Berwick's ruling council agreed to create a subscription of £50 which was to be used to buy shoes for soldiers fighting against France on the continent.[93]

Not surprisingly, the relative values of bounties and the number of subscriptions given to the navy were much greater than those gifted to the army. This is to be expected, as the nature of Tyneside's labour pool meant that it would always be more intimately connected with naval service. As Norman McCord has noted, by the end of the French Revolutionary Wars, Tyneside (including Sunderland) accounted for the largest number of naval recruits in the country outside of London.[94] Sometimes these rewards could be very generous, as was the case with the bounty issued by the corporation of Newcastle in 1776. It offered to pay two guineas on top of the £5 for an able seaman and £2, 10s for ordinary seamen being awarded by the navy.[95] This was exceeded by the guild of Berwick who in 1779 generously offered £5, 5s for able seamen and £3, 3s for ordinary seamen.[96] However, the continued presence of press gangs in the region throughout the century illustrates that these generous recruitment bounties were not adequate to feed the Navy's voracious appetite for men.

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[91] This includes the years directly after the outbreak of war with revolutionary France.
[92] Example of these can be found in 1759 and 1785; BTRO GB 1/17/446, 5 October 1759 & GB 1/20/384, 6 May 1785.
[93] Ibid., 1/21/338, 22 November 1793.
[94] Norman McCord, 'The Impress Service in the North East During the Napoleonic Wars.' Mariner's Mirror 54 (1968) 163-180; MRO QRQ 373/1/2-3, Navy Quota Act Returns.
[95] TWAS MD/NC/2/6/258, 29 November 1776.

As the century progressed and the pressures on manpower continued, officials in the region's major towns began to make some effort to assist military recruitment. The relative success or failure of bounties as an inducement for enlistment is hard to measure with any precision. There are no existing records to indicate how many men took up the offer of extra money. Despite the omnipresent need to enhance the financial attractiveness of army service, monetary inducements were not employed widely until after the onset of war in 1756. Unfortunately these bonuses, while helpful, do not appear to have overcome the chronic problems of under-recruitment and the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the region's civilian population to volunteer for military service.

VI. The Social Cost of Recruiting.

Periods of concentrated recruitment could have negative impacts on local communities. These derived from the indirect costs of pulling such a large number of relatively fit men out of the local population. Such costs were not necessarily financial in nature, but often engendered themselves in pleas for money to local governments and the quarter sessions. Men were sometimes taken from their families at very short notice, and in their absence the remaining members of the family unit could suffer severe hardship. Similarly, the death of a husband and father while in service could leave behind an impoverished family struggling to pay for essentials such as food and shelter. Although such hardship appears to have had a deeper effect on the families of impressed men, social deprivation could also be occasioned by voluntary enlistment into the army.

On some occasions these social problems were the result of men absconding from their kin in favour of military service. David Kent has shown that there is a direct correlation between men deserting their families and the periods in which the country was at war. He states that cases of familial desertion rise significantly in times of war, and then drop when peace breaks out.[97] This trend is explained simply by the

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[96] BTRO GB 1/19/309, 28 June 1779.
[97] David Kent, '"Gone for a Soldier"' 30.

fact that during times of war there is an increased presence of recruiting parties in the cities, thus providing the husband with more opportunity to abscond.[98] In effect this offered men who possessed 'the inability to manage their affairs' a chance to escape commitments and other pressures.[99]

Unfortunately, determining the true social impact of recruitment within the North East is very difficult. The lack of a contiguous body of archival information makes any analysis problematic.[100] Records from London appear to be voluminous and well maintained. However, there is little remaining in the local archives of Newcastle, Berwick, or Northumberland relating to eighteenth-century poor law, bastardy and settlement examinations.[101] Additionally, there is little in the way of secondary publications which have managed to preserve the records on the scale of what is available for London.[102] Despite this it is possible, through an analysis of Northumberland's existing quarter sessions records, to shed some light on the nature of the problems that civilians and the local government faced during periods of intense recruitment.

What is important to note is that the majority of existing petitions for relief from military families came during or soon after periods of war. Existing local records do not indicate any applications for poor relief in times of peace that are not directly related to men being recruited or impressed during a period of conflict. A lack of such entreaties during peacetime could be the result of the relaxed and overwhelmingly volunteer based recruitment environment that existed at these times. Sadly, as mentioned above, petitions for the poor relief caused by husbands who abandoned their families in peacetime are largely unavailable in the North East. What archival material does exist indicates that cases were not overwhelmingly concentrated in any

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[98] Ibid., In times of war, desertion of a family in favour of army service could account for as much as 25% of all poor relief examinations, while in times of peace it could be as little as 5%.
[99] Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason (Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Ltd., 1998) 90.
[100] For a general discussion of the poor law in the region see: Peter Rushton, 'The Poor Law, The Parish and the Community in North-East England, 1600-1800.' Northern History 25 (1989).
[101] A similar problem is encountered in Chapter 4, as Newcastle's records for cases of bastardy are extremely poor.
[102] An excellent example of this, and one which I wish historians of the North East had similar access to is: Tim Hitchcock & John Black (eds.) Chelsea Settlement and Bastardy Examinations, 1733-1766 (London: London Records Society, 1999).

particular part of the century, although a small cluster occurs between 1704 and 1713. Similarly, it shows that the impact of impressment may have been a serious problem. Most of the petitions in this period are from families whose patriarch had been impressed. Furthermore, 50% of all petitions throughout the century clearly identify impressment, while only a few specifically mention volunteers.

The case of John, Mary and Margaret Waite is typical of petitions to the local authorities. These three were orphans whose mother had died in childbirth not long after their father had been pressed into the army in April 1707.[103] Luckily for them Jane Harris, a poor woman from Byker, had taken them in but could not support them without assistance from the parish.[104] In the same year it was reported to the local magistrates that Robert Nuthanke of Nafferton had been 'taken away to be a soldier' despite having a young daughter and a heavily pregnant wife.[105] This had eventually led to the woman and her children becoming destitute. At the same meeting of the quarter sessions yet another civilian was pressing the local authorities for charity. Elizabeth Scott reported that she had no income and was unable to support her seven small children since her husband drowned while serving as a Marine.[106] In January 1710 Margaret Steward petitioned the county for financial assistance, stating that she had been reduced to a 'very mean and despicable condition' since her husband had been 'forced illegally away into the Queen's service.'[107]

Likewise Nicholas Whitfield had solicited the magistrates to afford him some financial support. During January 1713 this young man stated to the Christmas quarter sessions that his father had been pressed 'a soldier into our Majesty's service,' while Whitfield was still 'an infant of tender years'.[108] He went on to explain that for the previous two years he had been supported by the charity of Mr Thomas Soulsby of Allendale.[109] However, Soulsby was threatening to turn Whitfield out of the house because he could no longer afford to support him. If this was to happen Whitfield

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[103] MRO QSB 29/12, 7 October 1708.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Ibid., 26/44, 16 July 1707.
[106] Ibid., 26/41, 16 July 1707.
[107] Ibid., 31/23, 11 January 1710.
[108] Ibid., 37/17, 15 January 1713.
[109] Ibid.

feared that he would starve to death.[110] At the 1741 midsummer quarter sessions in Morpeth, Elizabeth Todd, whose husband was recruited as a volunteer into the army in 1737, petitioned the magistrates for financial support.[111] She testified to the fact that she had been left providing for a seven-year-old boy, but believed she could not 'afford to live due to the prices of food and provisions.'[112] Ann Stephens, the wife of a Scottish soldier in Brigadier Handasyde's Regiment of Foot, found herself in a similar situation to that of Elizabeth Todd.[113] She too had been made nearly destitute by her husband's recruitment, having to support three children.[114] At the time of her petition she did not know the whereabouts of her husband. In April 1741 Stephens was apprehended in the parish of Hartbourne as 'a rogue and vagabond' and transported to Castle Garth in Newcastle, her claimed place of legal settlement.[115]

Forced resettlement was not unusual in cases where poverty-stricken military families were asking the town or parish administrators for welfare. In 1709 officials at Berwick reported that Jane Hume, the poor wife of a soldier, had come to the town with a child that had been born at Tynemouth in Northumberland.[116] She was ordered to take the child back 'to the Parish of Tynemouth whence it came.'[117] Similarly, in 1760 Newcastle's quarter sessions ordered the wife and three children of the soldier Michael Anderson to be escorted from their lodgings in Newcastle to their suspected official place of settlement in the parish of Ryton, County Durham.[118] Such was the concern over the potential burden that might be imposed by this family that the officials in Ryton filed a formal protest against this action.[119] Regional administrators were keen to ensure that the families of soldiers who were appealing for support were residents of the immediate locality. When Nicholas Whitfield applied to the Northumberland magistrates in 1713, his sponsor Thomas Soulsby had to confirm that

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[110] Ibid.
[111] Ibid., 83/20, 15 July 1741.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid., 83/27, 15 July 1741.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Ibid.
[116] BTRO QSB 8/1/10, 10 October 1709.
[117] Ibid.
[118] TWAS QS/NC/1/7, 16 April 1760.
[119] Ibid.

the young man was a native of Allendale before his case would be considered.[120] Likewise, if the appellants were found to be outsiders those same authorities were more than willing to return them to their legal place of settlement.[121]

The illegal settlement of paupers, vagrants and their families was a major concern for many local leaders and magistrates. In towns such as Berwick and Newcastle this accounted for a large proportion of court business.[122] Regional authorities were not prepared to spend hard-pressed county and parish funds supporting people who were not native to their particular locality. This attitude appears to have been applied equally to petitions for poor relief from both military and civilian non-resident families.[123] It does not necessarily mean that civil leaders were not aware of, or prepared to help, those affected by conflict.

VII. The Abuses of the Recruiting System.

The eighteenth-century recruiting party had a notorious reputation as being an agency bent on taking men into the army by any means available to them. The example of George Farquhar's play *The Recruiting Officer* stands out in this respect.[124] It would be wrong to suggest that Farquhar's characters, and their evil deeds, were completely the work of fantasy. As was the case with many public shows at the time, this play was as much social commentary as it was entertainment. It must also be remembered that Farquhar actually produced the first draft of this work while on recruiting duty with his regiment in Shrewsbury.[125] Therefore, some of it must have been based on incidents he witnessed in the course of his duties. He wrote of various underhanded

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[120] Although Whitfield applied for assistance at the Christmas sessions in January 1713, Soulsby gave his attestation on Whitfield's residence at the midsummer sessions at Hexham. MRO QSB 37/17, 15 January 1713; QSB 36/20, 16 July 1712.

[121] Numerous examples of this can be found in the quarter sessions records for the town of Berwick upon Tweed, which was particularly fastidious about the removal of paupers, vagrants and morally loose women. BTRO C 8/1-4a, Quarter Sessions Books, 1694-1815; BTRO C 15/14-15, Recognizances, 1702-1799.

[122] Gwenda Morgan & Peter Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law, 20.

[123] Again I refer to the records for Berwick upon Tweed.

[124] Farquhar, The Recruiting Officer.

[125] Ibid., 6. Farquhar was a Lieutenant in Orrey's Regiment of Foot based on the Irish establishment.

methods for getting men to enlist including bribery, drink and flattery, as well as plain trickery and deceit.

If they had been widespread, such abuses would have placed great stress on civil-military relations in the region, such was the distaste for these activities in the general public. Despite instilling considerable powers in the hands of the local judiciary to oversee recruitment it could not stop the misadventures of the recruiting party, and abuses of the system did occur. Powerless to prevent the actual improprieties, magistrates still had the ability to redress the balance. Before any potential soldier was officially enlisted the magistrate could hear complaints and utilise his power to release men from their enlistment if they found that the accepted procedures and guidelines had not been followed.

A popular preconception of recruiting abuse is that of the recruiting officer taking advantage of inebriated men, or getting them drunk, so they were easier to enlist. The historian Arthur Gilbert even supports this image by remarking that some recruiting agents had become very adept at slipping an unsuspecting man the King's shilling while he was drunk.[126] Further, in his defence of the 1703 Press Act, Bishop Burnet stated that the practice of getting volunteers by making men drunk was endemic.[127] The utilisation of alcohol in recruiting was even encouraged by some serving officers according to Geoffrey Davis. He uses the example of Lieutenant-Colonel John Blackadder who publicly stated that liquor was a key factor in good recruiting and believed that 'sobriety itself is here a bar to success.'[128] On the surface it appears that the underhanded use of alcohol to get men to commit to military service was popular. In fact, if one believes the previous statement made by Gilbert, it was practically an art form amongst recruiters. It is hard to imagine that the provision of drink and the manipulation of drunkenness did not play a role in recruitment when one considers that alcohol abuse has been described as an epidemic in the eighteenth-century British

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[126] Arthur N Gilbert, 'Why Men Deserted.' 554.
[127] Geoffrey Davis, 'Recruiting in the Reign of Queen Anne.' 154.
[128] Ibid., 155.

army.[129] Nevertheless, local records indicate that it was overzealous recruiting and impress officers who were the major problem.

The largest block of direct evidence pointing to a substantial level of recruiting abuse comes from the activities of army press officers during the War of Spanish Succession. In this period, when the press acts were used regularly and extensively for the army as well as the navy, there were a considerable number of recruiting irregularities in the area.[130] In some circumstances it appears that a few officers were prepared to push the legal envelope and commit blatantly illegal acts in order to get men into uniform. This is clearly illustrated in the case of Alice Richardson of Newcastle.

In September 1704 she wrote directly to Henry St. John, the Secretary at War, to complain about the impressment of her husband. She stated unequivocally that her spouse had 'been forced into Her Majesty's service,' and made clear reference to the 'several unwarrantable practices of Captain Mitford.'[131] It was noted that Mitford was an officer in Lord Paston's Regiment of Foot and had been charged with co-ordinating recruiting and impressment for that unit.[132] In the same year he had overseen the delivery of a number of debtors and impressed men into his own Company.[133] In fact Mitford was something of a regular fixture on Newcastle's recruitment scene during the period. However, it also appears that he may have been one of the more unsavoury and unscrupulous recruiters in the region.

In 1706 Mitford was once again the focus of another investigation into serious recruitment irregularities, this time in Northumberland. Anthony Forrester testified to the Easter session at Morpeth that a press gang consisting of Mitford, Ralph Watson and another man entered his house in Wylam and violently seized John Bone,

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[129] Paul E Kopperman, '"The Cheapest Pay": Alcohol Abuse in the Eighteenth-Century British Army.' Journal of Military History, 60 (3) (1996) 445.
[130] Army press acts were passed in every year between 1704 and 1711 which represented the most continuous use of coercive army recruitment in the entire century. Gilbert, 'The Last Army Press.' 7.
[131] PRO WO 4/3/73, Henry St. John to Mayor of Newcastle upon Tyne, 27 September 1704.
[132] Ibid.
[133] TWAS QS NC/1/3.

wounding him in the chest in the process.[134] According to the plaintiff, Bone could not have been subject to the army press as he had a legal calling. Forrester stated emphatically that Bone was the manager of his malting house, which was now under threat of closure because of the man's impressment.[135] However, this was not the only problem faced by the recruit and his employer at that time. Forrester had obtained a warrant forcing Watson and Bone to be examined by the justices over this incident, and duly presented it to the Lieutenant. Despite this, Mitford refused to release Bone, fuelling fears that he intended 'to carry away the said John Bone with force and violence out of this country into Ireland or some other place beyond the seas.'[136] Unfortunately, there is no further record of what became of John Bone or his captors, but what this incident illustrates is the lengths that some officers would go to in collecting recruits.

A more ominous irregularity was committed against the husband of Jane Mercer of Belsay. While on his way to Newcastle, he and another man were impressed into the army by two sergeants named Robert Dodsworth and James Johnson.[137] Mrs. Mercer, incensed by the actions of the soldiers, demanded that her husband and the other man be taken before the magistrates in line with the normal practice 'so that they might be examined properly and determined if they fit the category of the said act.'[138] Dodsworth refused to do this. Mercer also testified that Dodsworth had said that the men would go where he went and that 'he would steal them away if possible so as that she [Jane Mercer] should never see them again.'[139] The sergeant appears to have made good his threat as the quarter sessions were informed that since the incident Mrs. Mercer had not seen her husband and had no idea as to his whereabouts.[140] This was precisely the reason why there was a requirement that all impressed men be presented to the local magistrates or press commissioners.

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[134] MRO QSB 24/67, 16 March 1706.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Ibid.
[137] Ibid., 28/66-8, 7 April 1708.
[138] Ibid., 28/66.
[139] Ibid.
[140] Ibid., 28/68.

In March 1757 the Secretary at War, Lord Barrington, was forced to intervene directly in a case at Berwick. The problem began when a local Member of Parliament named Mr Lister wrote to Barrington, also a Berwick MP, stating that the army had impressed one of his tenants, Stephen Booghen.[141] The gentleman pleaded with Barrington to order that the unfortunate man be discharged from the service as he was worth a personal fortune of £200.[142] Despite the misjudgement of the recruiting officer, Mr Lister was not willing to see the armed forces go short of a man, and was agreeable to finding a substitute to replace the loss of Booghen to Beauclerk's regiment.[143] This plea for assistance to the country's most senior military administrator appears to have worked. Lord Barrington, usurping the jurisdiction of the magistrates, wrote directly to the commanding officer of Beauclerk's 2nd battalion instructing that Booghen be released back to his landlord.[144]

The civilian government's limited ability to protect it citizens from illegal impressment is reinforced by the extraordinary case of John Bright. In a petition for financial aid Bright, a resident of Rothbury, revealed how he had been impressed into the army while on his way to his native Holland.[145] The incident must have gone unnoticed and it is possible that he was pressed once he had arrived on the continent. If the press had been conducted legally within England a magistrate would have most certainly prevented Bright's enlistment, as he possessed documented proof that he had a 'lawful calling' which exempted him from the press.[146] This did not happen and Bright was spirited away to serve in a theatre of war where he was shot and suffered several other injuries, resulting in him losing most of the sight in his eyes.[147]

As the above examples illustrate, the power and reach of the civilian authority was not omnipresent, and it was possible for illegal recruiting practices to take place. On rare occasions the very authorities entrusted with ensuring that the process was run in a legal and fair way committed these irregularities. In March 1708 the Secretary at War

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[141] PRO WO 4/1012/65, 12 March 1757.
[142] Ibid.
[143] Ibid.
[144] Ibid.
[145] MRO QSB 39/24, 13 January 1714.
[146] Ibid.
[147] Ibid.

sent a robust letter to the Commissioners of Recruits in Cumberland who had sent two unsuitable pressed men to Newcastle to join a company of Colonel Caulfield's Regiment of Foot.[148] It had been reported that the men were 60 and 50 years of age and were 'both seemingly infirm and unfit for service.'[149] The Secretary at War left no doubts about the official position on such unsavoury practices. He commanded that the Cumberland officials ensure that such men were not entered into service in the future.[150] This case shows that even magistrates and tax commissioners could exceed their mandate from time to time.

It was not simply abuses of the army recruiting system for which army personnel could be held responsible. On numerous occasions throughout the century members of the land forces were drafted in to assist the naval press. As was the case with impressment for the land service, members of the army occasionally committed abuses in the execution of their duties. The clearest example of this occurred in 1706 just north of North Shields. David Thompson of Island Hall testified at the Easter quarter sessions that at around midnight on the 28th of March, Captain George Ord and a number of soldiers had broken into his house brandishing swords and pistols.[151] They violently seized Mr Thompson's servant Phillip Barns, as well as a local skinner named Archibald Ainsley and George Towns, a lame seaman. Most importantly, they had done so without the presence of any civilian authority and without the presentation of the necessary warrant. The impressed men were bound and eventually taken to North Shields where they were placed aboard HMS Dunwick, which was anchored off Tynemouth.[152] So serious was the accusation that a warrant was issued to Captain Ord to appear before the quarter sessions to answer for his actions. Unfortunately, the account of that appearance no longer exists in the quarter sessions records. Nevertheless, it shows how far outside the legal boundaries some officers and men were prepared to go in their recruitment activities. Captain Ord did not

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[148] PRO WO 4/8/182, To the Commissioners of the Recruits in the County of Cumberland, 24 March 1708.
[149] Ibid.
[150] Ibid.
[151] MRO QSB 24/50, 3 April 1706.
[152] Ibid.; and 24/29, 24 April 1706.

suffer any long-term punishment for his actions as the next year he was recorded as having taken delivery of impressed men at Tynemouth.[153]

The abuses that the authorities dealt with were not limited to the methods employed by recruiting parties or press gangs. On rare occasions they were also forced to intervene in complaints about the actual procedures for enlistment. In February 1705 John Henderson, who had been a target of the press, presented himself before the justices as a volunteer.[154] He had done this to avoid being pressed and to gain the benefit of a 40 shilling bounty paid to all volunteers. However, the officer present was loath to grant Henderson his prize, refusing repeated demands for the money owed to him.[155] Somewhat aggravated by the officer's attitude, the magistrate took the view that it was proper that the man not be obliged to fulfil the requirements of enlistment if the army were not prepared to honour their commitments.[156] Henderson was dismissed from service, and absolved not only of his commitments as a volunteer, but also given exemption from any impressment in the future.[157]

What becomes apparent when one looks at the numerous examples of recruitment irregularities in the North East is the concentration of incidents during the early part of the eighteenth century. More surprising is the absence of complaints levelled against what could be described as the 'traditional' recruiting party. There is no mention in local archival sources of men being tricked into enlisting by wily or unscrupulous recruiting officers. Neither are there any cases of men being enticed to sign-up after being supplied with copious amounts of alcohol. This is not to say that such things did not happen, especially, in light of gaps in the region's legal records. Nevertheless, existing archival sources only provide examples of irregularities by the army impress service. In fact a majority of the existing documentation points to repeated irregularities committed by officers involved with the impressment of men during the War of Spanish Succession. Some of the reported transgressions were simply misunderstandings or cases of overzealous behaviour by members of the press.

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[153] Ibid., 26/53, 23 April 1707.
[154] Ibid., 21/9, 20 February 1705.
[155] Ibid.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Ibid.

However, others were simply outright cases of kidnap or blatant disregard for the rule of law.

VIII. Public Resistance to the Recruiting Party and the Press Gang

It would appear that army recruiting parties did not encounter much in the way of widespread public resistance when they 'set out their stalls' in the towns of the North East. On the other hand the army and navy presses were often met with stubborn resistance throughout the eighteenth century.[158] However, resistance to recruitment did not end with the 'regular' service's press gangs. Militia recruiters, who for the most part were members of the regional civilian government, periodically found life as tough as their counterparts in the regular forces. The introduction of a reformed militia in 1757 was met with widespread and often highly organised hostility. In 1760 Hexham witnessed the bloodiest yet most under-reported case of opposition to the Militia Bill.[159] There appears to have been an undercurrent of public angst against forms of compulsive recruitment.

This public anxiety of impressment, and the active and moral opposition it created, was not strictly a product of endemic eighteenth-century warfare. The process of pressing the 'sturdy poor' during the conflagrations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was widespread and caused tension between the military and civilians.[160] This was especially true during the Civil War when public tension increased dramatically as nearly 100,000 men were pressed into service at the height of ploughing seasons.[161] Additionally, people's horses and wagons were frequently pressed into service, often without the necessary remuneration. The dislike engendered by these army presses were alleviated to some extent by the Restoration of

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[158] An example of this widespread resistance can be seen in the orders by the Secretary at War to army commanders in April 1711 instructing them to supply military assistance to 'Civil Magistrates doing their duty in putting the Act of Parliament for Recruiting the Land Forces…' should they meet any 'tumultuous Riots' that may arise as a result. PRO WO 4/12/17, Granville to Sir John Gibson, 7 April 1711.

[159] This incident will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

[160] Alan J Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline: Officership and Administration in the British Army 1714-1763 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985) 4

[161] Ibid.

1660 which aimed to move away from the militarisation of government that was becoming more common on the continent.[162] Despite this it is easy to understand how such strong feelings of antagonism could be easily reawakened when the army reintroduced these vigorous and intrusive methods of recruitment in the early eighteenth century.

Arthur Gilbert has stated that distrust of the army was so widespread that activities such as impressment only helped to fuel civilian resistance.[163] He also claims that the press was so unpopular and ideologically offensive to local officials that they would actively attempt to undermine the process.[164] This could even include influential members of the community attempting to intimidate constables responsible for carrying out the pressing of men.[165] Such was the problem of public resistance to the army press that in 1706 the government gave justices the power to issue a £5 fine to anyone found guilty of disrupting or resisting the impress service. This measure did little to end the chronic interference of the general public and in 1708 the fine was increased to £10.[166] Despite the claim of general antipathy in the nation as a whole, this does not appear to have been the prevailing view amongst officials in the North East. The main resistance to army impressment came from ordinary people, although this was in no way widespread, organised or endemic.

A motivating factor in the public's opposition to the press in the North East can be found in the concentration of attempts to enforce such measures. Press acts were always applied evenly across the country and for this reason the towns and cities of the North East often found themselves simultaneously subject to both an army and navy press. For example, in March of 1756 orders were sent to Lord Charles Manners' Regiment of Foot quartered at Newcastle and Gateshead to 'receive such impressed men as the Commissioners and your Officers shall judge to be such as are intended to be entertained as Soldiers in His Majesty's service.'[167] Even then the men were being recruited to serve as marines, many of whom would spend much of

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[162] Ibid.
[163] Gilbert, 'Army Impressment.' 691
[164] Ibid.
[165] Ibid., 692-3.
[166] Ibid., 693.

their time aboard ships of the Navy.[168] At the same time naval press-gangs were moving into the area in an attempt to bolster manpower aboard the country's fighting ships. The pressures that this created were bound to spill over and ignite some anger.

In the summer of 1704 Robert Bambrough, a constable near Stannington in Northumberland, personally experienced the distaste the public had for the army press. He was given a warrant by three local justices to apprehend John Howe as a likely candidate to serve in Lord Paston's regiment.[169] This was done, and Bambrough took his captive to Stannington for transport to Morpeth, where the man was to be sworn to the colours. Fearing that the recruit might try to make his escape, the constable enlisted the aid of the local population to guard him.[170] Unfortunately, the three men charged with assisting Bambrough in watching Howe flatly refused to 'aid or assist' the constable.[171] As a result the pressed man was able to make his escape.

Many of the attempts to impede the civilian and military authorities in their impress duties were not as passive as the above incident. At the Christmas quarter sessions of 1706, held in Morpeth, a more aggressive episode was reported. A constable by the name of Joseph Reed, and Lieutenant Wilson of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, had encountered stubborn resistance in their attempt to press Mark Charlton. He was an idle man from the village of Gunnerton.[172] Wilson and Reed, accompanied by a petty constable, were prevented from entering Charlton's dwelling as his brother Edward had blockaded himself and Mark in the house. Edward then picked up a large rock and threatened death to either man if they should attempt to take his brother away to the army.[173] At that point a group of women appeared and began to verbally abuse the recruiters. One of them, Elizabeth Crichton, denied that Mark Charlton was an 'idle'

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[167] PRO WO 4/1012/5, Secretary at War to Recruiting Officers, 11 March 1756.
[168] Ibid., 4/1012/25, Secretary at War to Lord Charles Manners Commanding the 56th Regiment of Foot at Newcastle, 12 April 1756.
[169] MRO QSB 21/52, 5 July 1704.
[170] Ibid.
[171] Ibid.
[172] Ibid., 23/27, 16 January 1706.
[173] Ibid.

man as he had been employed as her servant for more than one year.[174] Despite the fact that neither Wilson nor Reed believed this attestation, they were forced to withdraw from the area for fear of their safety, and of inflaming the local population's passions. Interestingly, John Shaftoe, the petty constable who was with them at the time, was charged with failing to execute his office. This may have indicated his unwillingness to assist the constable and the lieutenant in the face of such stern public resistance.[175]

The next month two petty constables from Morpeth were attacked by a group of women who facilitated the escape of a recruit they were escorting to gaol.[176] One of the constables, Edward Brown, was even pulled off of his horse and severely beaten by the mob.[177] The following year an impressed man named Thomas Davis was rescued by another group while he was being conveyed to Captain Ord at Tynemouth Castle. While passing through North Shields the constable attending the pressed man was stopped by a local man named Benjamin Reed, who demanded to see the warrant for the delivery of Davis.[178] After producing the document Reed irreverently declared that 'the majesty was a fool and the Captain [Ord] another and they might both kiss his arse.'[179] At this point Reed refused to let the lawman proceed any further, and under the serious threat of violence from the group of civilians, the constable was forced to leave his captive at North Shields and retreat back to Newcastle.[180]

An even more violent incident occurred in the winter of 1708. Constable William Hudson had apprehended a man he knew had fled to Hexham, who fitted the description of the existing army press act.[181] While conveying him out of the town Hudson was attacked by Elizabeth and Edward Byers who were accompanied by a group of unknown people.[182] The constable was unable to fend off the gang of civilians and the recruit was rescued and spirited away. Only a few months later

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[174] Ibid.
[175] Ibid.
[176] Ibid., 24/72, 20 February 1706.
[177] Ibid.
[178] Ibid., 26/52, 23 April 1707.
[179] Ibid.
[180] Ibid.
[181] Ibid., 29/88, 12 January 1709.
[182] Ibid.

another constable named Thomas Richardson faced a similar fate. While attempting to apprehend James Dalglish under the provisions of the recruiting act he was confronted by a local woman named Mary Ogle.[183] With her accomplices, and a show of physical force, she managed to rescue Dalglish from Richardson's custody.[184]

The hostility of some civilians to the press was matched by the disinterest amongst some military officers for their duties in this area. This seems especially true of wartime impress activities after 1755. After this date there are several communications between the War Office and officers of regiments serving in Newcastle commanding them to ensure that officers attend the meeting of the press commissions. During April 1756 Lord Charles Manner, the commanding officer of the 56th Regiment of Foot stationed in Newcastle, was encouraged by the Secretary at War (Lord Barrington) to ensure that his absentee 'officers do attend the meeting of the Commissioners.'[185] Only a few months later a similar problem arose. In November Colonel Beauclerk's regiment was due to receive a group of pressed men. However, the Secretary at War was forced to write to Beauclerk to report that Newcastle's commissioners had stated that 'their meetings were considered ineffectual for want of officers to receive such men as were ready to be turned over to them.'[186] While there is no conclusive evidence to indicate this to be a general problem it does appear that problems were widespread in Beauclerk's regiment. In addition to the incident mentioned above, the Secretary at War noted that he had received complaints from several commissioners in Northumberland, Westmorland, Cumberland and Durham, where parts of the same regiment were quartered.[187] This warning does not seem to have been widely received. In January 1756 Lord Barrington again wrote to commanders in Newcastle, Durham and 13 other English towns giving them express orders to make it their 'particular business' to ensure that officers attended the meetings of commissioners and accept delivery of the men selected for their regiments.[188]

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[183] Ibid., 30/98, 4 May 1709.
[184] Ibid.
[185] PRO WO 4/1012/25, Secretary at War to Colonel Lord Charles Manner, 12 April 1756.
[186] Ibid., 4/1012/27, Secretary at War to Colonel Beauclerk at Newcastle, 20 November 1756.
[187] Ibid.

This problem appears to have been compounded by the fact that the officers, apart from not always being present, sometimes refused to accept the men given to them when they did attend. Again Beauclerk's officers were at the centre of such a dispute during November 1751, having refused to take the men offered to them by the authorities at Newcastle.[189] There is no reason to suspect that the recruits in question suffered from any dysfunction or ailments as they had been judged fit to serve as soldiers by the magistrates.[190] Nevertheless, the officers made their judgement on the pretence that 'they [the men] did not come up to the Recruiting Instructions given by their Commanding Officers.'[191] This incident may have been the result of the discomfort that some senior officers had with the standards set for impressed men. The reminder to Colonel Beauclerk to ensure that his officers 'accept recruitment standards of the Act and do not give their own instructions, preferences or standards to their officers' illustrates this.[192]

IX. Desertion

As was alluded to in the introduction of this chapter, desertion like recruitment, was an important phenomenon in the eighteenth-century British army. Not only did the army have to make huge efforts to fill the ranks with men but equally strenuous efforts were required to keep those same men from fleeing their units. Every year hundreds of British soldiers abandoned the colours compounding the army's chronic manpower problems. This was especially true in times of war when a vicious circle emerged in which recruits became acutely scarce even as the rate of desertion increased. Additionally, it had serious financial and resource implications, not only for the armed forces, but also for local and central government officials.[193] Officers were forced to replace the natural wastage created by war and disease, while at the same time

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[188] Ibid., 4/1012/37, Secretary at War to Commanders of His Majesty's Regiments, 6 January 1756.
[189] Ibid., 4/1012/27, 20 November 1756.
[190] Ibid.
[191] Ibid.
[192] Ibid.
[193] These costs included the fee for apprehending a deserter, payment for keeping the deserter in gaol, his transportation to his regiment or to London for trial, the time and effort of the magistrates and the quarter sessions court, as well as the significant administration required. This does not account for the resources required for a court martial and the execution of sentence if found guilty.

spending precious resources pursuing deserters in co-operation with local government bodies and legal officials. Regardless of the effort and cost, apprehending those 'absent without leave' did not necessarily mean getting them back. Many were executed, transported, forced to serve in overseas regiments, or even crippled by the harsh corporal sentences imposed upon them. For officers, and especially those in command of a regiment, regular desertions could be financially catastrophic.[194]

The reasons why men deserted the British army in the eighteenth century are as varied as the reasons why other men enlisted. It would be misleading to generalise that the main factor for such behaviour was the overriding need to escape from the brutality and strict discipline of martial life, or a rejection of a military 'ethos' or soldier's 'way of life'.[195] Stephen Brumwell notes that the most frequent reasons for desertion appear to be misjudgement brought on by drunkenness or fear of punishment for some misdemeanour.[196] However, other reasons for desertion are grounded in more practical concerns. For many soldiers escape from the army was often directly linked to a soldier's conception of personal justice, fairness and contractual obligation.[197] Additionally, as mentioned in Chapter 2, many regular soldiers seem to have possessed a keen awareness of the terms and conditions under which they had enlisted and were prepared to defy army authority and discipline in defence of their 'rights'.[198] There were numerous incidents of soldiers deserting as a result of ill treatment, lack of pay, or poor conditions.[199] On the other hand Arthur Gilbert, while sharing some of Brumwell's conclusions, believes that a large number of desertions occurred as a result of impressment or from men being wrongfully recruited.[200] John Childs even believes that the 'prodigious' desertion of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth

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[194] For discussions on the tradition of the officer as stakeholder in the regiment and the financial effect of desertions see: Alan J Guy, 'Regimental Agency in the British Standing Army 1715-1763. A Study of Georgian Military Administration, Part 1.' Bulletin of John Rylands Library 69 (1979/80) 423-53, and by the same author: Oeconomy and Discipline; For a good treatment of the concept of 'Kompanie Wirtschaft', to which regimental economy is closely linked, refer to: Fritz Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1964).

[195] Gilbert, 'Why Men Deserted.' 561. Only 8.5% of all desertion cases tried before the General Courts Martial between 1757-1762 were a result of the fear of military discipline.

[196] Brumwell, Redcoats, 104; Arthur Gilbert supports this conclusion by calculating that 30% of all desertions in Britain during the Seven Years War were the result of drunkenness. Gilbert, 'Why Men Deserted.' 560.

[197] Brumwell, Redcoats, 103-4.

[198] Ibid., 100, 104.

[199] Ibid., 104;

[200] Gilbert, 'Why Men Deserted.' 554-5.

centuries was part of an 'under-legislated society' where people regularly absconded from civilian commitments as well.[201]

A picture of the problem as it existed in the North East can be observed in War Office and local archival records. In only four months between 12 August and 30 November 1757, 162 deserters were caught throughout the country.[202] Ten of these men were caught while in the 'northern district', which included Cumberland, Westmoreland, Northumberland and Newcastle.[203] A similar number of men deserted from regiments actually based in the North East at the time. Six of these came from General Bocland's Regiment of Foot based in and around Newcastle.[204] Another two soldiers were originally members in Holmes' Regiment of Foot also quartered at Newcastle. The remaining two were from Berwick, one from Beauclerk's Regiment of Foot and another from a regiment of invalids stationed in that town.[205] From these records it does appear that soldiers managed to get a fair way from their units before being captured. Only three of the deserters were captured while still within the North East. Joseph Burnell, the enterprising invalid from Berwick, managed to get as far as Birmingham before being caught and handed over to the military authorities.[206]

Further evidence from the records for Berwick upon Tweed illustrates the number of deserters being captured in the region. Between 1766 and 1790, 49 men were presented to the council or were being held in the town's gaol awaiting trial or waiting to be shipped to London for appearances before the General Court Martial.[207] While this may seem a great deal it must be remembered that this represents a 24 year period and in only seven of these years did Berwick's gaols contain more than 2 deserters.[208]

The scale of the problem was not due to a lack of determination on the part of the military authorities to discipline those found guilty of desertion. Punishment was

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[201] Childs, The British Army of William III, 121. He uses the example of apprentices deserting their masters.
[202] PRO WO 4/595.
[203] Ibid.
[204] Ibid.
[205] Ibid., 4/595/52, 31 October 1757.
[206] Ibid.
[207] BTRO C15/15-16, Quarter Sessions Books, Examinations, 1760-89; Please note that there are no documents covering 1790-9 as the next series of papers is C15/17 which covers the period 1800-10.
[208] Ibid., These years were 1769 (4), 1773 (3), 1774 (4), 1779 (4), 1782 (3), 1784 (5), 1785 (5), 1787 (6).

often extremely harsh. Soldiers convicted of desertion could expect to face sentences of between 300 to 500 lashes, although in extreme cases a man may have been sentenced to more than 1000 lashes.[209] Such severe penalties could cripple, maim and even kill men. Surgeons were kept in attendance to judge if the victim could handle more punishment and on occasions convicts were brought out of hospital several times to take the next instalment of their chastisement.[210] Even if they did not die, the soldier's services were often lost to the regiment for a long period of time while they recovered.

There are some indications that the brutality meted out to deserters eased as the century progressed. Court martial records show that the majority of men convicted of desertion between 1729 and 1735 had their sentences carried out as judged.[211] However, over time the proportion of men whose punishments were substantially reduced or completely remitted increased. Of the 129 soldiers tried for desertion between 1746 and 1757, 27 men had their sentences reduced and 50 were pardoned.[212] Even the number of men being executed was in decline.[213] Nevertheless, it was very rare for a soldier to be pardoned outright and all those ordered to die for their crimes were punished one way or another. For example, of the 20 men handed death sentences between 1746 and 1757, 7 were executed while 13 had their punishments pardoned on condition that they served in regiments overseas.[214]

For the unlucky deserters who faced death, many of their executions were carried out in full view of the public. This was done to make examples out of the transgressors and deter further desertion, as much as to actually punish the deserter.[215] A number of these open demonstrations of military justice took place in the towns of the North East throughout the century. In 1746 Alexander Anthony, a soldier in General

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[209] PRO WO 71/20-2, General Court Martial proceedings, 1746- August 1757; PRO WO 71/65, General Courts Martial-Marching Regiments, November 1756-May 1758; PRO WO 71/124, General Courts Martial Proceedings, 1725-40; In 1748 Paul Casteen was given a sentence of 1000 lashes. PRO WO 71/20.

[210] Scott Claver, Under the Lash. A History of Corporal Punishment in the British Armed Forces (London: Torchstream Books, 1954) 18, 68.

[211] PRO WO 71/124.

[212] Ibid., 71/20-2. Of these 30 were pardoned on condition of serving with a regiment in America or the Caribbean plantations.

[213] Again the remittance of the death penalty was particularly marked in wartime.

[214] PRO WO 71/20-2.

Cholmondley's regiment, was shot in front of a large crowd on Newcastle's town moor for deserting and then enlisting in the French service.[216] In the same year an Irishman and Welshman were publicly executed in the town of Berwick for leaving the King's forces and enrolling themselves in the 'Pretender's' army.[217] The next year George Maccan, a soldier in General Guise's regiment at Berwick, was executed by firing squad for deserting on four separate occasions.[218] Not only was the onerous Maccan a serial deserter but he was also described as being 'much addicted to stealing.'[219] William Bland, who had absconded from General Bocland's Regiment of Foot while quartered in Newcastle, was also shot on the town moor in February 1758.[220] It would appear that Mr Bland had deserted in order to rectify the financial difficulties that had befallen his family as a result of his recent impressment.[221] The next year Jeremiah Bell was executed at Sunderland for 'repeated desertion' from Colonel La Faussille's Regiment of Foot.[222] One can only speculate that such public displays only helped to reinforce the army's reputation for brutal justice and discouraged many potential recruits.

While the reasons for deserting were numerous, so was the point in their service when men chose to desert. Some did not even make it to their regiments after having taken the oath of service and accepting the 'royal shilling'. This was especially true of those pressed into service. Arthur Gilbert has estimated that nearly 15% of all men pressed into the army would never reach their regiments, and that a large proportion of these deserted.[223] It seems as though this situation may have lasted throughout much of the century, or at least until the end of army presses in 1779. So bad was the problem amongst pressed men that in late 1779 Charles Jenkinson, the Secretary at War, believed impressed men were untrustworthy and their service should be concentrated in the West Indies where escape was difficult.[224]

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[215] Brumwell, Redcoats, 106.
[216] John Sykes, Local Records, Vol. I (Stockton on Tees: Patrick and Shotton, 1973) 184.
[217] Ibid., 183.
[218] Ibid., 185.
[219] Ibid.
[220] Gilbert, 'Why Men Deserted.' 562.
[221] Ibid.; Sykes, Local Records, 221
[222] Newcastle Courant, 4319, 30 June 1759. Sykes records the date as 25 June 1758 but this seems unlikely in the face of the existing newspaper report.
[223] Gilbert, 'Army Impressment.' 698; and 'Why Men Deserted.' 554-5.
[224] Gilbert, 'The Last Army Press.' 10.

The archival records for the North East record very few impressed men deserting from their regiments or the impress gangs themselves.[225] Those cases that survive tend to be concentrated at the beginning of the century when army impressment was most widespread.[226] There is one extreme example from 1706 when a group of 30 recently pressed men deserted their recruiters en masse at Wooler in Northumberland.[227] The local justices were fairly sure that the men had removed themselves to Scotland they 'being so nigh hand the boundary of Scotland.'[228] Two other examples occurred during 1708 when impressed soldiers by the names of George Ridley and Thomas Reveley escaped from their regiments and, after some local resistance, were apprehended.[229] More men could have been involved as Reveley was part of a group of deserters known to be hiding in the region.[230] Further examples of this activity exist but they will be discussed later as they directly relate to the subject of public support for desertion.

There are also a number of instances where men absconded between the point of recruitment and delivery to their units. Unlike the cases of impress desertions these are spread throughout the century. For example, in 1755 Thomas Crookhall was held for desertion at Cockermouth in Cumberland, and was eventually 'delivered to the officer who enlisted him.'[231] Several decades later William Whitfield deserted from a recruiting party attached to the 1st Regiment of Foot Guards based in Brentford, Middlesex.[232] The enterprising renegade managed to evade the authorities for several weeks before being identified and captured in Berwick.[233] The town's gaol was home to other men such as Whitfield. In 1782 David Martin escaped recruiters from the 3rd Battalion of Royal Artillery while they were in Warkworth.[234] Not long after this Robert Blackadder admitted to absenting himself from the 78th Regiment (while

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[225] There is a possibility that a fuller examination of the WO 4 series (Out-Letters Deserters) may highlight additional examples but for the most part this resource simply lists the deserters name and regiment and/or place of confinement.
[226] The exception to this was William Bland mentioned above.
[227] MRO, QSB 21/8, 9 February 1705
[228] Ibid.
[229] Ibid., 28/30, 19 June 1708; 28/70, 14 July 1708.
[230] Ibid., 28/70, 14 July 1708.
[231] PRO WO 4/594/20, Out Letters (Deserters), 1 November 1755.
[232] BTRO C/15/15, Settlement Records, Examinations, 18 March 1779.
[233] Ibid.

actually based in Berwick) on the very same day he enlisted.[235] Finally, in August 1790, John Newton was being held as a deserter in Berwick after fleeing his recruiting party when it stopped in Newcastle under Lyme.[236]

One interesting trend that arises from an analysis of the detailed records held at Berwick is the propensity of some men to re-enlist themselves in one or more regiments after their initial desertion. Of the 49 men held for desertion in Berwick between 1766 and 1790 eight fit this category.[237] Typical of this type of deserter were two men detained in Berwick during 1766. William Pound had been brought before members of the quarter sessions by another soldier named James Edward, accused of being a deserter.[238] During a voluntary examination Pound admitted that he was 'late a private in 34th Regiment of Foot commanded by Lord Frederick Cavendish.'[239] Further questioning revealed that the deserter had joined that regiment two years earlier but had absconded from his post eight months later. Despite having freed himself from service, Pound decided eight months later to enlist himself again as a private in General Boscawen's Regiment of Foot.[240]

The second man, Thomas Casely, had a history of desertion very similar to that of William Pound. He was also presented to the authorities in Berwick by a fellow soldier, on this occasion a private named John Povey. During his examination Casely described his enlistment as a private in the 1st Regiment of Foot Guards in 1761, and his eventual rise to the rank of sergeant.[241] Regardless of his relative success Casey deserted the Foot Guards in October or November 1765.[242] Not long after he enlisted with Boscawen's regiment while at Gloucester, and was still serving in this unit when he was delivered to Berwick's legal officials.[243] While these are the two most complete accounts, William Pound and Thomas Casely were not alone in their

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[234] Ibid., C/15/16, 7 November 1782.
[235] Ibid., 26 December 1787.
[236] Ibid., 6 April 1790. He deserted from the 3rd Foot Guards after he had been recruited in Manchester during early July 1790.
[237] This represents 16.3% of all men held in this period. BTRO, C/15/15-16, Settlement Records, Examinations 1760-1790.
[238] Ibid., C/15/15, 22 May 1766
[239] Ibid.
[240] Ibid.
[241] Ibid., 9 June 1766.
[242] Ibid.

deception. Two years later George Ross was accused of deserting from the 25th Regiment of Foot.[244] He described how he had deserted from the regiment in 1756, five days after his recruitment, only to immediately enlist with the 71st Regiment of Foot in the Scottish town of Dingwall.[245] However, one man proved to be more brazen than the rest. Thomas Brooks was a marine who had been accused of deserting the Portsmouth Division of Marines.[246] During his examination it became apparent that he had also deserted from the both the 6th and 22nd Regiments of Foot.[247]

While it is almost impossible to say exactly why men would desert and re-enlist there are a number of possible explanations. Stephen Brumwell has indicated that considerable numbers of discharged soldiers volunteered for further service because of necessity, disillusionment with civilian life, or even because they missed the soldier's life.[248] On occasions discharge from the army isolated some soldiers from the sense of 'home' or 'community' that they had become familiar with in their former regiments.[249] There is no reason why this could not have also been a factor for those deserters who later re-enlisted, but proving this is difficult. It is also important to remember, as illustrated earlier, that some desertions could have been the result of dissatisfaction with officers or conditions of service. Therefore, it may be the case that some men deserted and then looked for a 'better' experience in a different regiment. There is also the possibility that repeated enlistment and desertion was the result of unscrupulous or opportunist men using recruitment bounties as a form of income.

It was not only new recruits who deserted when given the chance. In an ironic twist there are a limited number of instances in which soldiers deserted from their regiments while actually serving in recruiting parties. In 1774 John Thomas, a private soldier in the 66th Regiment of Foot quartered at Berwick, was charged with desertion from the 60th Regiment of Foot.[250] As it turned out Thomas had volunteered with the

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[243] Ibid.
[244] Ibid, 25 April 1768.
[245] Ibid.
[246] Ibid, 14 July 1769.
[247] Ibid.
[248] Brumwell, Redcoats, 81-2.
[249] Ibid., 119-20.
[250] BTRO C15/15, 20 April 1774

60th in 1764 and had been shipped to New York where the regiment was stationed.[251] Eight years later he was given the opportunity to return to his homeland as part of a regimental recruiting party. Not wanting to return to the Americas, he deserted three months later while on duty at Exeter.[252] Similarly, in 1786 Joseph Mulley deserted from his post as a drummer in the 23rd Regiment of Foot, while on a recruiting assignment in Morpeth.[253]

For those inclined to desert from the army, serving in a recruiting party must have provided a particularly attractive opportunity. These small groups of men were often based a long distance from their regiments, especially if it was stationed overseas. Additionally, it would have been difficult for officers to keep men from wandering off, as very often they did not possess the resources to continuously guard all members of the recruiting party. This is very different from those who deserted from a regimental encampment or their billets. In these cases there would have been formal patrols and guards, and thus a higher risk of being caught while attempting to escape.

Public support for desertion or deserters was present within the North East although it appears to have been limited in its scope. It tended to manifest itself in two distinct forms. The first of these were attempts by civilians to incite soldiers to give up the British army or to desert and join the enemy. In 1706 an unnamed Newcastle resident was charged with 'soliciting John Phinney a soldier in Captain Hall's Company to desert.'[254] Unfortunately, the reasons behind Phinney's attempt to sow discontent in the soldier's mind are not known, as the details of the case have been lost. While such activity was not foreign to the towns of the region, surviving records indicate that it was not widespread. Much more serious were the attempts by civilians, or enemy agents, to solicit British soldiers away from their colours and into the service of foreign armies. During September of 1739 Robert Given was tried before the assizes with attempting to enlist British soldiers based in Northumberland into the French

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[251] Ibid.
[252] Ibid.
[253] Ibid., 14 January 1786.
[254] TWAS QS/NC/1/3, 4 May 1709.

army.[255] He was accused of giving a sergeant from Colonel Howard's regiment a piece of gold to abandon the King's service and go over to the French.[256]

The second form of support for desertion was the overt public support for, or defence of, soldiers who had already deserted from their regiments. Most commonly civilians protected deserters from recapture by the government authorities. A few went as far as to rescue men who had already been apprehended by local law enforcement officials. In the winter of 1708 a group of men, including local constables and William Leighton, a soldier in Brigadier McCartney's Regiment of Foot, went in search of a fellow soldier by the name of George Ridley.[257] He had deserted from the regiment not long after being pressed. The group soon tracked down and recaptured Ridley near Millcrag. Leighton and his party took him to the house of a local man named Ridley Havelock, where they were refused any co-operation.[258] In the absence of any assistance they carried on, hoping to convey the deserter further. Not long after this the men were stopped on the road by Ann Havelock, Jane and Margaret Ridely (the wife of the deserter and her sister), and six other women including Mary Havelock (wife of Ridely Havelock). Then, in what appears to be an act of familial protectionism, the arresting posse was 'violently assaulted and beat' while George Ridley was rescued and spirited away.[259]

In the same year David Sutton was tasked with apprehending some deserters known to be 'lurking' about the village of Lucker.[260] Sutton and his fellow constables eventually located one of the men, known as Thomas Reveley, and took him into custody. Despite having drawn their swords, a group of the deserter's friends, including six women and three men, attacked Sutton and his colleagues with sticks and rocks, forcing them to retreat. Additionally, the warrants to apprehend other deserters and to impress idle men were confiscated and destroyed by the crowd.[261]

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[255] PRO ASSI 45/21/4/18b, 23 September 1739.
[256] Ibid.
[257] MRO QSB 28/30, 19 June 1708; The annual Mutiny Acts stated that soldiers could only apprehend deserters if accompanied by a constable, peace officer or other civilian official. PRO WO 4/88/293, 25 April 1771.
[258] MRO QSB 28/30, 19 June 1708
[259] Ibid.
[260] Ibid., 28/70, 14 July 1708
[261] Ibid.

During the fracas one of the gang members decried the constables for their actions, stated his disgust at the warrant and expressed utter disdain for the recruiting acts of Parliament.[262] Not only was this an instance of public support of deserters, it also illustrates the contempt and open hostility that some members of society carried for the laws that allowed impressment into the army.

Assisting deserters did not necessarily have to manifest itself in the type of physical or violent opposition that saved George Ridley from recapture. In 1711 John Wilson and Robert Thompson were reported as having absconded from Colonel Kirk's Regiment of Foot.[263] Robert Hart, a Sergeant from the regiment, was sent in search of the men. His investigation led him to Horseley and the home of Thomas Thompson, Roberts' father.[264] In the house, Hart found two coats and a waistcoat of regimental clothes concealed in a firkin. When questioned, Thomas Thompson confessed that he had lent a coat and waistcoat to his son and John Wilson before they had left for Newcastle.[265]

The above examples illustrate the prominent role played by family and friends in the support and protection of deserters. There is an indication that family connections and community support, if available, could be important to individual soldiers in their attempts to avoid capture. Friends, sympathetic bystanders, and especially family members, were prepared to commit themselves to various levels of obstruction in order to aid their kin and friends. This appears to have been particularly common in situations where the soldier had deserted impressment. Civilian acquaintances and family members were prepared to oppose the authorities in order to prevent these men from being returned to a service into which they had been forcefully recruited. The previous examples highlight that such action could be extremely aggressive and even violent. This was especially true when civilians were attempting to prevent the recapture of deserters by the authorities. The characteristics inherent in this type of resistance seem to mirror civilian opposition to the practice of impressment within the region, although the occurrences are much less frequent.

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[262] Ibid., It is almost certain that he was referring to the Army Impress Act of that year.
[263] Ibid., 34/60, 11 April 1711.
[264] Ibid.
[265] Ibid.

X. Conclusion.

Issues concerning recruitment and desertion were central to Britain's ability to prosecute the numerous wars that populated the eighteenth century. Consequently, the mobilisation of manpower was a major component of military activity within the North East throughout the period. Press gangs carrying men off, and recruiting parties beating the drum for volunteers, were common sights in the region.[266] At the same time army officers regularly worked closely with local political and legal officials in order to facilitate the recruitment process and to retrieve deserters. On the other hand, those same magistrates exercised a considerable level of autonomy from the military when arbitrating and investigating recruitment irregularities. All of this activity was experienced by the local civilian population, and as such heavily influenced the course of civil-military relations within North-East communities.

Leaders within the North East appear to have done much to assist army recruitment during the century. During the early part of the century, and in particular the War of Spanish Succession, they played a key role in helping to co-ordinate and collect vagrants and debtors. They were also central to the eventual enlistment of these men into the forces. While on the surface it would seem that the region contributed significantly to these efforts, the lack of depth in local primary sources makes it difficult to determine the exact numbers of men who were pressed into service. Furthermore, local business and political interests were often central in attempts to provide civilians with cash inducements to join the army. Although these did not come into existence until later in the century, and were never as lucrative or common as naval enlistment bounties, they were an important indication of the local elite's support for recruitment.

Although the exact numbers of deserters and impressed men is hard to determine in a strictly local context, gauging public reaction and resistance to these phenomena is

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[266] As noted in Chapter 2 the use of impressment for the army declined as the century progressed but naval impressment continued and even increased in intensity.

much easier. The presence and activities of traditional recruiting parties seems to have generated little in the way of protest, scandal or discord. On the other hand impressment and desertion generated a more passionate and dangerous response in many local communities. This was especially true in the early part of the century when army impressment was at its most intense in the region. On occasion members of the public obstructed constables from carrying out their duties, and even attempted to rescue recently impressed men and captured deserters. It was not unusual for this direct action to manifest itself in acts of violence and intimidation. What is interesting to note is the level of familial and community protectionism inherent in this form of resistance. Those doing the rescuing or obstruction were often directly related or known to the person being rescued or protected.

It is important to recognise that this hostility does not necessarily indicate a rebellious tendency within the local community, nor is it proof of a popular undercurrent of distaste for the army. Rather, resistance seems to have been an attempt by local people to protect associates and family members from being forced into military service and to prevent the recapture of those who deserted after impressment.

Chapter 4

The Impact of Billeting and Garrisons on Civil-Military Relations

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'We have ruined half the public houses on the march; because they have quartered us in villages too poor to feed us without destruction to themselves.'

Lieutenant Colonel James Wolfe
20th Regiment of Foot, May 1756[1]

I. Introduction.

Throughout the eighteenth century considerable numbers of troops were stationed in Britain to provide domestic security.[2] Due to the inadequate provision of purpose-built garrisons the billeting of soldiers upon landlords and innkeepers was a key feature of the 'home establishment'. Certainly, billeting was a major component of the army's garrison planning in the North East, and particularly in the town of Newcastle, which did not have barracks built until very late in the eighteenth century. The garrison experience, and billeting in particular, generated regular contact between soldiers and civilians, as well as officers and local leaders. As such it had huge implications for civil-military relations in the region. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to analyse the influence these contacts had on the army and the communities of the North East.

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[1] Quote taken from: J.A. Houlding, 'Fit For Service.' The Training of the British Army 1715-1795 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) 39.
[2] For a breakdown of the domestic establishment see Appendix A, and for estimated troops concentrations in the North East refer to Table 2.1.

First however, it is important to define the parameters of this chapter. This is particularly true of its approach to the subject of soldier criminality. While crime did occur amongst soldiers in billets and barracks, it will not be discussed at any length in this chapter. Legal issues such as murder, rape, theft and assault will be dealt with in Chapter 5. The only forms of criminal behaviour that will be handled in this chapter are those reliant upon a certain level of extra-curricular and co-operative interaction between the troops and the civilian population. Such crimes, which include bastardy, gambling and illegal drinking, tended not to involve the civilian as 'victim' but more as accomplice or willing participant. Similarly, it will make no attempt to deal with military crimes such as drunkenness on duty, disobeying orders or desertion.

The issue of billeting soldiers proved to be a very contentious one, not just in the eighteenth century, but also in the period well before the Glorious Revolution. English preoccupations with the rights of both the citizen and private property meant that any system requiring the population to house soldiers would lack general approval.[3] This resistance had a long and tested history. In particular, the experience of the Civil War and the period of Cromwell's reign created increased opposition to the process. A high level of trepidation associated with billeting was also linked to the constitutional debate concerning the existence of a standing army.

James II's attempts to establish an expanded standing army, and his tendency to circumvent laws concerning the housing of soldiers, led to the 1689 Bill of Rights stating that the wayward king had disqualified himself from the throne for, among other things, 'quartering soldiers contrary to law.'[4] However, neither the Bill of Rights, nor the formalisation of the Protestant settlement in 1701 could kill off the issue. The debate over billeting and the building of barracks would continue to be a focus of contention for decades to come. In this way much of the 'terror' and fear of the billeting system in the eighteenth century was actually a socio-political residue from the previous century. As the eighteenth century progressed this was eventually

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[3] For a good case study of opposition to billeting in the seventeenth century, and the problems it could cause, see: Lindsay Boynton, 'Billeting: The Example of the Isle of Wight.' English Historical Review 74 (1959) 23-40

[4] The Bill of Rights 1689, as reproduced in: E.N. Williams (ed.), The Eighteenth-Century Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960) 27.

diluted by administrative and constitutional reforms within the army and the government. It was the eventual recognition of increased civilian control over the army, and the settling of the constitutional position with George III's coronation, that led to a marked decline in unease towards the billeting process.[5] Unfortunately, as this anxiety lifted it was replaced by a growing and persistent fear of the cost of establishing barracks.[6] The result was that sheer need, occasioned by a shortage of purpose built barracks, meant billeting was used widely throughout the eighteenth century, not least in the North East.

It has been estimated that at the beginning of the eighteenth century only 5,000 men could be held in military accommodation.[7] Even as late as 1792 barracks existed in just 43 towns, garrisons and fortresses, capable of holding only 21,000 men.[8] This was coupled with the fact that the number of troops needing accommodation rose noticeably during the eighteenth century.[9] Despite such a dearth of facilities a comprehensive barracks building programme was only implemented with the outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars in 1793. This was largely motivated by a new belief that barracks could, as William Pitt put it, 'operate as a preventative to the seduction of the army.'[10] A genuine fear existed that, if not physically separated from civilian society, the army might be infected with a revolutionary zeal similar to that which proved so costly to France's monarchy. By the end of the war with Napolcon, Britain possessed purpose-built lodgings that could hold over 146,000 infantry and artillery gunners as well as an additional 17,000 cavalry troops.[11]

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[5] H.V. Bowen, War and British Society 1688-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 50; James Douet British Barracks 1600-1914. Their Architecture and Role in Society, (London: English Heritage & The Stationary Office, 1998) 43.

[6] Douet, British Barracks, 42.

[7] R. E. Scouller, 'Quarters and Barracks.' Journal of the Royal United Services Institute 98 (1953) 91.

[8] Reginald Hargreaves, 'Bivouacs, Billets and Barracks.' Army Quarterly 85 (1963) 239. Berwick, Tynemouth and the very limited facilities at Holy Island were the only barracks in the North East at this time.

[9] This can be observed by looking at the table of domestic establishments in Appendix A.

[10] As quoted in: Clive Emsley, 'Political Disaffection and the British Army in 1792.' Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 68 (188) (1975) 230.

[11] Hargreaves, "Bivouacs, Billets and Barracks." 239. Ten of these properties were located in the North East at: Newcastle, Chester-le-Street, Morpeth, North and South Shields, Whitburn, Claedon, Fulwell, Monkwearmouth, Sunderland, Tynemouth, Seaton Sluice, Berwick and Holy Island. At their greatest extent the region's new network of barracks could hold upwards of 4,000 men: John R,

Ironically, the continued existence of billeting was due in large part to long-held and widespread opposition to the very barracks that Pitt sought to establish in 1793. It was an ingrained fear amongst many in Britain that sequestering soldiers in barracks would help to detach the army from civilian society, strengthen its loyalty to the King, and thus leave the door to absolutism open. An observer of Berwick's new barracks summed up these sentiments perfectly when he noted that 'English Liberty will never consent to what will be seen as a nest for a standing army.'[12] This observation was made despite the fact that he acknowledged how such buildings 'would be a vast ease to the inhabitants in most great towns if they had them.'[13] The continuation of this attitude was clearly illustrated in 1786 when plans to expand Portsmouth's barracks were defeated in the House of Commons partly because of fears that they would become 'seminaries for soldiers and universities for Praetorian Bands.'[14]

Despite the above comments, such opposition does not appear to have been prevalent in Berwick. The town largely welcomed the building of its barracks from 1717 as a solution to the problems arising out of widespread billeting.[15] Similarly, little opposition was raised over the repair and expansion of Tynemouth's barracks from 1758. The general population appears to have been much less concerned about the constitutional impropriety of barracks, as witnessed by the numerous requests for the building of barracks in places like Chester and Carlisle.[16] Nevertheless, for much of the century consensus on how to house soldiers was difficult to find. Educated political observers opposed barracks, most of mainstream civilian society strained against the costs and inconveniences of billeting, and almost everyone opposed the use of private houses to quarter soldiers. In the end political and economic reality sustained the anti-barrack argument for much of the century, assuring the prevalence of billeting in many English towns.

Breihan, "Army Barracks in the North East in the Era of the French Revolution." Archaeologia Aeliana 5th Series, 28 (1998) 165-75.

[12] As quoted in: Douet, British Barracks, 41.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Richard Glover, Britain at Bay: Defence Against Napoleon 1803-1814 (London: Longman, 1973) 105.

[15] They had been petitioning the government for such a facility from early in the century. BTRO GB 1/15/25, 4 October 1717; GB 9/11/37-8, November 29 1710.

[16] Berwick's application was the only one approved. Douet, British Barracks, 42.

While billets were more abundant than barracks in the eighteenth-century North East, calculating the actual number available throughout the period is hard to determine. Fortunately, a national survey conducted in 1686, which now exists in Public Record Office (War Office) files, sheds some light on the picture during the late seventeenth century.[17] Despite its relatively small population and its remoteness, the region appears to have been well appointed in this area. The survey concluded that there were nearly 6,160 beds available in the four northernmost counties of England.[18] Not surprisingly the largest allocations of space occur in Newcastle and Carlisle with 634 and 413 beds respectively.[19] However, even the most remote communities had space available, if only for a handful of troops. A good example of this is Holy Island, which had just sixteen beds and stabling for 17 horses.[20] As has already been shown, the lack of purpose-built barracks and the geographical spread of available billets led to a piecemeal billeting of soldiers in many areas.[21] Thus, personal contact between soldiers and civilians was not limited to the large population centres. Even small villages like Wooler, Warkworth, Amble and Tweedmouth had some form of experience with the military.

II. The Process of Billeting

The assigning of quarters in a town or village was a process almost wholly controlled by civilian officials rather than military officers.[22] While this framework had been well established by the beginning of this study, it was not until 1703 that justices of the peace were formally empowered with an element of control over the housing of troops amongst the civilian population.[23] It was believed that such a process would help to guarantee the sanctity of private property and the payment of bills. Despite the

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[17] The entire survey is available at the Public Record Office as: PRO WO 30/48, Miscellanea,Various.
[18] Ibid., This includes Westmorland, Cumberland, Northumberland (including Newcastle) and Durham as many of the sites listed are now part of Northumberland County.
[19] Ibid., 30/48/139-43, 33-7.
[20] Ibid., 30/48/139-43.
[21] Refer to Chapter 2.
[22] The drive to increase civilian control of domestic military matters is discussed in more depth in Chapter 2.
[23] William III first issued proclamations making magistrates responsible for quartering soldiers in public houses in 1689. John Childs, The Army of William III 1689-1702, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987) 91.

imposition of strong civilian controls the system was still imperfect, and at times remained highly unpopular amongst the population of the North East.

Before the arrival of a body of troops, local magistrates would normally be advised by army officers that they were to organise and house soldiers. The magistrates, largely in co-operation with a town's constables, were then responsible for dividing the town into troop or company sized districts. While doing this they would have to take into account the number of soldiers to be quartered and the distribution of public houses within the community.[24] Constables were tasked with ensuring that billets were assigned in a manner where distribution was fair and even so an undue burden did not fall on one district or one socio-economic group.[25] Once this process was completed the military officers were then instructed to ensure that their men were housed in accordance with the billets allocated to the regiment by the chief magistrate.[26] Beyond assigning rooms, the justices were charged with setting prices and rates for food, accommodation and other services.[27] Similarly, the magistrates and constables played a key role in the eventual dispersal of the men from their quarters, as well as the often contentious issue of settling accounts with local innkeepers and businesses.[28]

The behaviour of soldiers in public quarters and barracks was strictly governed by military law and codified in the annual 'Rules and Articles' issued every year.[29] These regulations dictated that all soldiers must conduct themselves according to civilian and military laws while in quarters or on the march.[30] They further stipulated that officers were responsible for ensuring that any soldiers causing damage to their quarters, or extorting money or abusing landlords, were brought to justice and reparations made to the injured party from the offender's pay.[31] In addition, orders

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[24] H.C.B. Rogers, The British Army in the Eighteenth Century (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1977) 49.
[25] Childs, The Army of William III, 92.
[26] Ibid., 91. Officers and soldiers could not select their own billets.
[27] Ibid., 92; Douet, British Barracks, 16, 37. These reasonable prices were usually set at meetings of the quarter sessions but in 1690 the new Mutiny Act laid out prices for the whole country.
[28] The payment for quarters and subsistence was the ultimate responsibility of the commanding officers. Scouller, 'Quarters and Barracks.' 92.
[29] Examples of these for most years of the eighteenth century can be found at the Public Record Office under the following reference: PRO WO 72/2.
[30] PRO WO 72/2, Rules and Articles for the Better Governing of His Majesty's Forces, 1722. Specifically Article 28.
[31] Ibid., Article 32.

were issued throughout the century to remind officers and soldiers of their common duty to their hosts, reaffirming the prominence of civilian authority in the guise of the magistrate.[32] They outlined the magistrate's power to investigate and report any infractions by the troops against civilians, while enshrining the magistrate's role as the sole arbitrator of relations between military personnel and civilians.[33] Apart from the obvious necessity of ensuring that discipline and military cohesion did not deteriorate in quarters, the regulations were a way to reassure the public, who were wary of soldiers and the billeting system. Part of the reassurance came in the form of guarantees that quarters and provisions would be paid promptly to the supplier.[34] Again, intent and actual results differed in this respect, as will be observed in greater detail below.

III. Sex and the Soldier: Bastards, Babies and Brides

Sexual politics were a consequence of the military presence in the North East of England during the eighteenth century. The British army was a strictly male preserve and as such the ranks were composed of a mixture of single men, absentee husbands, and married men who were often long distances from their wives and families.[35] There were also those who were fortunate enough to be accompanied by their wives and children.[36] As such, there were a myriad of different relationships, both acceptable and sordid, that developed between soldiers, local women and members of what has been termed the 'Cyprian Corps.'[37] For this reason it is important to observe whether the relations soldiers had with North-East women affected civil-military relations in any meaningful way.

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[32] PRO WO 30/19, A Declaration Requiring All Officers and Soldiers to Observe Strict Discipline and for Payment of Their Quarters, 17 March 1707. In particular, the orders noted that the chief magistrate or other civilian officer would have assurances from the respective officers of the soldiers' good order

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] For a good discussion of men deserting their families in London to join the army see: D.A. Kent, '"Gone for a Soldier": Family Breakdown and the Demography of Desertion in a London Parish 1750-1791.' Local Population Studies 45 (1990) 27-42.

[36] However, this group was often limited in numbers as the army attempted to limit the presence 'camp followers.'

One of the most pressing concerns for local civilian authorities, as well as those commanding garrison forces, was soldier's involvement in bastardy. Such a situation was intolerable for the leadership of any town. Bastard children, and their mothers, were potential burdens upon the meagre social welfare funds available to most communities.[38] Additionally, the issue of morality played an important factor in local opposition to bastardy. This was especially true in Berwick, whose strong Presbyterian principles made such conduct wholly reprehensible.[39] For example, in 1707 Elizabeth Manning of Berwick was accused of 'continuing in the notorious and scandalous sin of fornication,' which resulted in her having four illegitimate children.[40] This dislike of immorality, coupled with the general opposition to economically burdensome bastard children, especially those fathered by a transient military population, was bound to cause tensions in towns with a large and regular military presence.

Berwick, where bastardy appears to have been a particularly serious problem, is a good place to conduct an investigation of this phenomenon. However, there are some issues concerning the records within Berwick that must be addressed before continuing.[41] The main concern relates to the fact that the quarter session papers list many women who appear to be with illegitimate children but are not actually brought before the court. They are simply listed as being an 'inmate' within a house and normally a name is not provided.[42] Such examples cannot be included because there is no guarantee that these women are not named in later quarter sessions examinations. Additionally, in many cases the women concerned have not provided the names or occupations of the fathers, or the authorities did not record it. As will be

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[37] This is a term used to describe the prostitutes of Berwick upon Tweed in: Jack Bainbridge, 'Berwick upon Tweed's Cyprian Corps.' North-East Labour History Bulletin 30 (1996) 37-50.
[38] For more on the implications of the military on local welfare funds, specifically as it relates to recruitment, see Chapter 3. For a discussion of bastardy in the early-modern Durham coal-field refer to: David Levine & Keith Wrightson, The Making of an Industrial Society. Whickham 1560-1765 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) 302-6.
[39] David Brenchley, A Place by Itself. Berwick Upon Tweed in the Eighteenth Century (Berwick upon Tweed, Berwick upon Tweed Civic Society, 1997) 137.
[40] BTRO C8/1, Quarter Sessions Books, July 1694-April 1727; It is suggested that the high level of infanticide in Whickham may have been a result of fear over the severe prosecution for bastardy. Levine & Wrightson, The Making of an Industrial Society, 306.
[41] For bastardy I refer to: BTRO C8/1-4a, Quarter Sessions Books, 1694 to 1793; C15/14-16, Quarter Sessions Settlement Records, Miscellaneous Examinations, 1700-1794.
[42] There is a suggestion that in other regional towns inmates may have been those tried for prenuptial fornication. Levine & Wrightson, The Making of an Industrial Society, 303-4.

explained below, trends in the occurrences of bastardy means that it may be possible that some of these anonymous men could have been soldiers. A further problem arises from the fact that the town's settlement records are very patchy before 1700.[43] Therefore, in order to establish more accurate numbers only those cases where women are listed by name or charged with 'having a bastard child' are included in the following discussion.

It is important to remember that bastardy could be as much a result of failed relationships as couplings between soldiers and prostitutes. It has been shown that illegitimacy rates could be influenced by trends in the economy and even the transient nature of the eighteenth-century labour market.[44] However, David Brenchley has established that the presence of the army in Berwick created an increased demand for 'bawdy houses' and whores that helped to add to the rate of bastardy amongst local girls.[45] Because of this, prostitution was relatively serious problem in the town.[46] This may have engendered itself in the attempts by the town's leaders to suppress and close many of the disorderly houses that sprang up throughout the century. The authorities wanted to avoid exactly what had occurred at the house of Eleanor Mourir who was known to have entertained 'several soldiers and idle women at unreasonable times at night.'[47] As will be noted below this may have also been the reason for the harsh treatment afforded to prostitutes.

The end of the seventeenth century seems to have been the high point for bastard children begotten by soldiers, with the town's records listing numerous women as 'being with the child of a soldier.'[48] In fact between 1694 and 1695 five women were charged with this offence.[49] However, the problem did not end with the turn of the century, persisting at various levels for much of the eighteenth century. During the entire period of this study soldiers and officers of the army and invalid companies

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[43] BTRO C15/14-16.
[44] Levine and Wrightson, The Making of an Industrial Society, 302-4. There is also evidence that large numbers of common-law households may have contributed to illegitimacy rates.
[45] Brenchley, A Place By Itself, 40-1.
[46] Ibid.
[47] BTRO C8/1, 15 June 1705.
[48] Ibid., 21 January 1694.
[49] Ibid., C8/1.

were named as fathers to 14 of the 152 bastards reported to the town's leaders.[50] From these calculations it is apparent that troops stationed in Berwick accounted for at least 9.2% of the total number of bastard children born in the town. This number could be higher if one considers the possibility that in some of the cases where no professions or names are attributed to the fathers, military personnel might have been to blame.

Table 4.1: Bastard Births by Military Personnel in Berwick, 1694-1793[51]

Year	Number of Military Bastards	Type of Soldier
1694	2	Both army soldiers
1695	3	All army soldiers
1734	1	Army officer
1745	1	Army soldier
1751	1	Army soldier
1752	1	Army officer
1757	2	Invalid soldier(1) Invalid officer (1)
1764	1	Army soldier
1769	1	Army soldier
1774	1	Army soldier

The impact that the building of barracks in the town had on bastardy is marked.[52] Before the completion of the barracks in 1719 army soldiers accounted for 5 of the 47 bastards born, or 10.64%. This is slightly higher than the 9.2% of all illegitimate births attributed to soldiers in Berwick between 1688 and 1793. However, the opening of the new barracks meant that the majority of troops were increasingly sequestered from the general public. In the remaining 74 years after 1719 there are 105 women charged with having bastard children, or who make claims to the town's

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[50] For a breakdown of these instances please see Table 4.1.
[51] Sources: BTRO C8/1-4, 4a Quarter Sessions Books July 1694-April 1805; C15/14-16, Quarter Sessions Settlement Records, Miscellaneous Examinations, 1700-1794.
[52] Brenchley, A Place by Itself, 141. He generally agrees although he does not think the difference was significant.

examinations. Just nine of these are directly attributed to military personnel.[53] This represents a modest reduction to 8.6% of the total illegitimate children brought to the attention of the local authorities in this period. While the proportions for the period before and after the opening of the barracks vary to some extent, the difference is not very significant in absolute terms.

A much more noticeable trend, that illustrates the impact of the barracks, can be observed when one looks at the actual intensity of bastardy. While the period 1694-1719 averaged just less than 0.2 military bastards per year, the 74 years between 1719 and 1793 averaged only 0.12 births of this type per annum. In these terms there would needed to have been approximately six more military bastards reported in the latter period to equal the rate of the 25 years before barracks were built. This change is even more marked if one considers only members of the army and excludes the invalids who tended to remain quartered amongst the population throughout the period.[54] The statistics for the period before 1719 remain the same, but in 1719-1793 regular soldiers and officers in garrison regiments were responsible for only 6.6% of all bastards, an annual rate of 0.09 births per year.

From this it would appear that while bastardy continued in the town, the frequency of soldiers' direct involvement in this social problem decreased once they were placed in barracks. Interestingly, the movement of the troops from easily accessible billets to the more controlled environment of the barracks coincides with a general decline in the intensity of bastard births in Berwick as a whole. Again, in the first 25 year period, total cases averaged 1.88 per year while after 1719 that rate fell to 1.41 per year.[55] This statistical trend hints at the possibility that soldiers may have been responsible for some cases where their occupation or identity was not noted in the town's records.

In the majority of cases (85.7%) it was rank-and-file soldiers who were charged with fathering bastard children or those likely to be born bastards. Notwithstanding this,

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[53] See table 4.1 above for all instances of bastardy.
[54] Brenchley, A Place By Itself, 140. Invalids are responsible for two bastard births in 1757.
[55] This includes bastards born to men not listed by name in the town's records.

accusations of paternity were not strictly limited to non-commissioned officers and private soldiers. In 1734 Colonel Hutchinson of the Scots Grays was accused of being the father of an unborn bastard child.[56] Hutchinson refused to accept this charge believing that George Preston, a quartermaster for the same regiment, was the actual father.[57] He stated that Preston was very familiar with the girl, and even accused him of pressing the girl to take drugs in order to terminate the pregnancy.[58] At the same time Hutchinson believed that the woman making the accusations could have been doing so out of convenience. Similarly, during 1752 a local woman named Phillis Brown attributed her illegitimate baby to an officer in General Guise's regiment.[59] Regardless of these isolated cases it is important to note that there is very limited evidence of officer's involvement in Berwick's bastardy problem.

Unfortunately, the detailed accounts from Berwick are not replicated for other regularly garrisoned communities in the North East. Therefore, it is much less clear what is happening with regard to bastard children in other parts of the region. In Newcastle and Tynemouth there is a paucity of source material as complete as the quarter sessions books of Berwick. Most noticeably, settlement records for Newcastle and much of Northumberland (which included North Tyneside and Tynemouth) are almost non-existent before 1800. Nevertheless, it is still possible to get a general, if less lucid view of the situation on the banks of the Tyne. This is done by examining the existing baptismal records for Newcastle's All Saints and St Nicholas's parishes and Christ Church parish in Tynemouth.[60]

In All Saints parish during the years 1688-1724, 1738-46 and 1755-85, there were 114 bastards listed.[61] In the neighbouring parish of St Nicholas, 27 bastards were recorded for the years 1689-1755 and 1774-85.[62] Soldiers were specifically named in only six

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[56] BTRO C15/14, 9 October 1734. The name of the woman is obscured by damage to the document.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
[59] BTRO C8/3, 2 October 1752.
[60] While soldiers were posted in most Newcastle parishes the location and populations of All Saints and St Nicholas meant they bore the brunt of billeting.
[61] TWAS MF/250, Baptisms-All Saints Parish 1688-1785.
[62] Ibid., MF/263-4, Baptisms-St Nicholas Parish, 1688-1755, 1755-1785. St Nicholas parish was considerably smaller and less populated in this period than its larger neighbour.

of the 141 total recorded cases, all of which come between 1708 and 1747.[63] This means that at 4.25% of the total identifiable cases of illegitimate children, All Saints and St Nicholas's parishes had less than half the rate of military bastardy that existed in Berwick.[64] The sharp difference between Newcastle and Berwick could be due to a number of factors. One of these was that, while central to the army's billeting effort in the city, the two parishes were neither as densely nor as regularly populated with troops as Berwick was, particularly in the first half of the century.[65] This may have been assisted by the practice of dispersing sizeable forces assigned to the city between a number of posts including Tynemouth barracks, Gateshead, Sunderland, Morpeth and other surrounding villages. As such, there tended to be fewer soldiers within the more populous central parishes of the city when compared to the permanent garrison at Berwick. Even when Tyneside became a part of the regular garrison rotation in 1770 the troops were mainly housed in the recently renovated barracks at Tynemouth.[66]

The case for Tynemouth is even more extreme than that of Newcastle. Here one can observe no records of bastard children being fathered by soldiers.[67] This absence of soldiers in the first half of the century might be partly explained by the fact that until 1754 baptismal records for Christ Church parish elect to omit the profession of the father. Even after 1754 there are no soldiers or officers connected with the 26 bastards recorded in the parish up to 1792.[68] Equally important, there is no marked decline in the regularity of illegitimate births after the start of major renovations to the barracks at Tynemouth Castle in 1758, or after the buildings came into regular use in 1770.[69] This trend does not fit well with the experiences of Berwick.

The army was involved in cases of bastardy in the North East's smaller rural communities but this never approached the level experienced in larger population centres. In large part this was a result of the relatively light presence of troops in these

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[63] This breaks down to four and two military bastards respectively for All Saints and St Nicholas parishes.
[64] It is important to note that this is in relation to the cases that can be identified.
[65] See Table 2.1.
[66] For more in this see Chapter 2.
[67] TWAS MF/920-1, Baptisms-Christ Church Parish, Tynemouth, 1607-1804.
[68] Ibid., MF/921, Baptisms, 1733-1804.

areas. One of the very few examples of this problem, as it existed in rural Northumberland, came early in the eighteenth century. In January 1712 George Richardson, a soldier who was quartered in the small town of Warkworth, was reported to the Northumberland quarter sessions as having left behind him a bastard child there.[70] This situation was complicated by the fact that the child's mother died after Richardson had left the village with his unit, leaving the child an orphan.[71] As if this were not enough the woman's brother, John Hezellop of Sighill, had illegally seized the deceased mother's possessions that the county magistrates had deemed would be used to 'help for the maintenance of the said child.'[72]

The examples of Northumberland, Newcastle and Tynemouth give the impression that the situation in Berwick was exceptional. While the state of existing archival records affects the above analysis, it is clear that Berwick was experiencing something of a crisis, particularly in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. This might have been the result of Berwick's role as 'the most overcrowded military town in Britain' at a time when quartering in other areas of the region was sporadic.[73] Berwick's large, and often sedentary population of soldiers, coupled with the tight geographical confines of the town, led to an explosion of illegitimate parturition that was reduced only with the opening of a large permanent barracks in 1719. The problem in Berwick is exemplified by the regularity with which women were brought before the town's council and local assize meetings.

At the same time soldiers and civilians do not appear to have been treated in a similar manner. Archival records indicate that soldiers were very rarely brought to task for their role in fathering children outside wedlock. This is not to say that the men were unknown to those in power. In most civilian cases the name of the father was common knowledge to the parish recorder or the authorities presiding over the quarter sessions. However, in Berwick 66% (10 of 15) of the soldiers accused of bastardy are

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[69] Ibid.
[70] MRO QSB 35/15, 16 January 1711/12.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Douet, British Barracks, 42

not listed by name, while in Newcastle parish baptismal records list the names of all six soldiers who were identified.[74]

Surprisingly, punishments handed out to many women found guilty of illegitimate births do not appear, on the whole, to have been severe. This was even the case with women guilty of producing numerous bastards such as the notorious Mary Storey. She was presented to Berwick's quarter sessions with no fewer than five bastard children between 1694 and 1708, the first of whom was from a soldier.[75] Despite her repeated transgressions, the records do not indicate any punishment other than chastisement by the quarter sessions. On the other hand, those found to be having illicit sexual liaisons with soldiers outside wedlock received the most severe treatment, regardless of whether or not they had produced illegitimate children. In July 1764 Anna Moncriese, who had been charged and found guilty of 'living in fornication with a soldier', was whipped from her holding cell in Berwick's tollbooth to the town's Scotchgate. From here she was expelled from the town and ordered never to return on the pain of similar punishment.[76] Similar fates were also thrust upon Anne Cockburn and Elizabeth Elliot in 1707 and 1710 respectively, both of who were accused of being 'taken in bed with a soldier.'[77]

It is possible that these women were part of the town's active sex industry, which local leaders were eager to curb. Prostitutes, and especially those with bastard children, suffered particularly unpleasant fates. In December 1730 a drunken paramour named Margaret MacDonald was accused by the quarter sessions in Berwick of having the illegitimate child of a soldier.[78] She was placed in a set of stocks for one hour and then, with her child in tow, was turned out of the town.[79] As is to be expected, there is no record of any action being taken against the soldier.[80] It is conceivable that MacDonald and others were removed from the town due to the fact that they were not originally from Berwick. Civic leaders would not want to give financial support to the

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[74] BTRO C8/1-4, 4a; C15/14-16; TWAS MF/920-1; MF/263-4.
[75] The years of these births are 1694, 1698, 1702, 1707, 1708; BTRO C8/1.
[76] Ibid., 7 July 1694.
[77] Ibid., 2 February 1707 and 17 July 1710.
[78] Bainbridge, 'The Cyprian Corps.' 38
[79] Ibid.
[80] Ibid.

bastard children of women from outside their jurisdiction.[81] Such was the experience of Jane Hume. She originally came to Berwick with her bastard child who had been born at Tynemouth. In 1709 the town's leaders accused her of prostitution and promptly ordered the woman and her child to return immediately to Tynemouth.[82]

Bastards were not the singular result of relationships between soldiers and women. Marriage and legitimate births were also not infrequent. Douet has noted that the combination of low pay and the sedentary nature of garrison life led many soldiers to 'form local family relationships.'[83] However, as with bastardy, the availability and quality of sources limits one's ability to analyse the true nature of such relationships between soldiers and local women. While it is possible to trace legitimate births and marriages through parish registers, it is very difficult to determine exactly who was from where, as well as who was local and who was not. For example, in Carlisle the registers of St. Cuthbert's parish record that John, the son of Joseph Dickinson, was baptised on 27 May 1752.[84] While Joseph is listed as being a private soldier in General Guise's regiment, the question still remains whether he was stationed in the town or was a local resident who had joined that particular regiment. In this particular case it is easier to draw the conclusion that Dickinson was almost certainly not from the town. The reason for this assertion is based on the fact that four soldiers from the same regiment are attributed with births in Newcastle's St. Nicholas parish in 1752.[85] It is clear that during this period the regiment was stationed in the north of England as part of its garrisoning rotation. Unfortunately, not all cases are as easy to investigate as this.

Another factor complicates matters in this area. During this period it was not unusual for a proportion of the wives of soldiers to travel about the country with their husbands. Apart from their marital role they also provided many services to the company such as cooking, cleaning and repairing equipment and clothes. Lists of married soldiers quartered in Carlisle exist from the latter part of the eighteenth

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[81] For more on this as it relates to recruitment please see Chapter 3.
[82] BTRO C8/1, 10 October 1709.
[83] Douet, British Barracks, 1.
[84] CCRO PR/79/2, 27 May 1752.
[85] TWAS MF/263.

century. These show that an infantry company of 80 to 100 men could have as many as 36 married privates and non-commissioned officers.[86] The number of women accompanying a regiment varied greatly, but as the example above illustrates, at times it could be considerable. It would not be unthinkable that some of these women could become pregnant and give birth while living in a garrison community such as Newcastle or Berwick. Similarly, it is possible that a soldier and his wife might have had their baby baptised in the local parish church. Therefore, entries in the region's baptismal records do not necessarily indicate that the mother is local. This is not to say that one cannot use existing parish records in Newcastle and Tynemouth to find interesting trends relating to births and marriages.

During the period between 1745 and 1747 five of the eight military births in St Nicholas parish in Newcastle were attributed to soldiers in Brigadier Colmondeley's regiment stationed in the city.[87] Likewise, in 1771 and 1772 the fathers of all registered births by army personnel in the baptismal records for Tynemouth's Christ Church parish were members of the 17th Regiment of Foot.[88] Almost immediately after this the baptisms are mainly accredited to the offspring of soldiers from the 19th Regiment of Foot.[89] Again, back in Newcastle, the baptismal records are dominated by troops from the 48th Regiment of Foot in 1781 and 1782.[90] Even in Berwick the trend follows a similar path with the majority of all baptisms related to a single military unit, with the occasional mention of another regiment.[91] This tendency within the records would indicate that many of the recorded births involving the army were attributable to soldiers serving in regiments having marched into the town from outside the region. Unfortunately, the origin of the mother is difficult to determine.

A similar dilemma arises when analysing the marriages of soldiers and trying to determine if they wed local women. Again, one can return to the parish records held in Tynemouth to exemplify this issue. Almost all of these records simply state the

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[86] CCRO CA/2/459,464, A list of married men in Captain Cole's and Captain Earles's Companies.
[87] TWAS MF/263.
[88] TWAS MF/921.
[89] Ibid.
[90] TWAS MF/264.

date of the marriage, the name of the man and woman, and on occasions the man's profession. Similarly, in All Saints parish in central Newcastle the records only provide the individual's names, with a notation next to groom stating 'a soldier.' On rare occasions a regimental designation is entered next to the name of the man, but this is not regular enough to generate any meaningful information. The recorders in the parishes of the North East do not appear to have been as keen to record details as some of their colleagues in other parts of the country. For example, the keepers of Moresby parish near Whitehaven developed an innovation in their records that, while somewhat useful to this study, would have been more valuable had it been standard practice across the Pennines. From 1782 the entry 'from the parish' appears next to some of the groom's names.'[92] This illustrates that in Moresby there were definitely local men who were soldiers marrying local women. Woefully there are only three names on the list between 1783 and 1793.[93] Nevertheless, David Brenchley believes that the high level of military weddings in Berwick reinforces the fact that local women were marrying soldiers from the garrison.[94]

Once again existing parish records show that many marriages appear to be focused around men from particular regiments at a particular point in time. Unfortunately, the best examples are not found in the North East but in Cumberland. The soldiers of General Guise's regiment, who were responsible for the vast majority of military related childbirth in Newcastle in this period, also accounted for ten of the 11 army marriages in the parish of St. Cuthbert's between 8 December 1751 and 1 September 1752.[95] Predictably, after September 1752 the preponderance of marriages belonged to men in Lord Pultney's regiment which was the next regiment to arrive.[96] In Berwick the trend established for Carlisle seems to continue for the early part of the century.[97] Although there is limited information available for Newcastle, existing material points very cautiously to similarities in what was occurring across the

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[91] MRO PR 116, Military Marriages, Burials & Baptisms From Holy Trinity, Berwick-upon-Tweed 1572-1812. Compiled by Frederick Furness, 1991. Copies of this are held at the Northumberland County Records Offices in Morpeth (MRO) and Berwick (BTRO).
[92] CCRO PR/73/7.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Brenchley, A Place by Itself, 141. He says that on average 20-25% of marriages involved members of the garrison. This was eclipsed in the period 1750-4 when they accounted for 32%.
[95] CCRO PR/79/2.
[96] In particular, I refer to the period from 3 December 1752 until 28 April 1753: CCRO PR/79/2.

Pennines. In September 1740 a soldier in Howard's Regiment of Foot named James Chambers is recorded as marrying a local woman in the parish church of All Saints.[98] One month earlier Thomas Milhaven from the same regiment had married the spinster Mary Southerby in the same church.[99] It is known that this regiment was stationed in Newcastle during 1740 to combat the June food riots, and that elements of it remained in the town for some time thereafter.[100] Beyond a few additional examples little can be discerned from these sources.

Regretfully, this shortage of detailed records fails to answer three fundamental questions. Are these local men who have taken the opportunity of a fortunate homecoming to wed their sweethearts? Were they new recruits to a regiment stationed in the town, who were marrying partners before they were to march off on their new careers?[101] Equally, are they soldiers who have come to the region, met a female partner, and then wed before marching on to new quarters? Even Brenchley's conclusion that the high proportions of military marriages indicated relationships between the garrison and local women, while highly likely, is difficult to substantiate elsewhere due to the condition of the records.[102]

Luckily the actual rate of wedlock in the region's towns throws some interesting light on the possible motivation of local marriages involving soldiers. All Saints parish in Newcastle is particularly enlightening. Although these records lack the requisite detail to be of use in other areas, they have a good collection of surviving general material.[103] Furthermore, this parish was the focus of much of the billeting and garrisoning within the city. What is immediately noticeable is that the outbreak of war had a marked effect on the rate at which soldiers appear in the parish marriage registers. Between 1688 and 1738 there are only a handful of soldiers listed in the several thousand marriages for All Saints parish.[104] However, with the onset of the

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[97] MRO PR 116.
[98] TWAS MF/250-1.
[99] Ibid., August 1740.
[100] For more on this incident see Chapter 6.
[101] Could these new recruits be getting married so their lovers could accompany them as soldier's wives when they marched out of the region?
[102] Brenchley, A Place by Itself, 141. Please see above.
[103] TWAS MF/250.
[104] Ibid.

War of Austrian Succession the number of occurrences where soldiers marry increases sharply. Soldiers are recorded in 44 of the parish's 1,182 marriages, representing nearly 4% of all cases of wedlock during the war.[105] Surprisingly, there is not a sudden drop-off of military weddings after that date, but rather a level rate up to the start of the Seven Years War.[106]

Following the trend of the Austrian war, the percentage of marriages again rises sharply between 1756 and 1763. In a period four years shorter than the previous war there were 60 soldiers married in 906 parish weddings.[107] This is an increase to 6.6% of all recorded parish marriages. However, unlike at the end of the War of Austrian Succession the rate of marriage does not remain constant, returning to something similar to that which had existed between 1739 and 1755.[108] Again, with the outbreak of hostilities against the American colonies a familiar course can be charted. In the two years leading up to the war there is only one example of a soldier marrying locally.[109] After 1776 the numbers begin to pick up, with 53 occurring by 1783.[110] This again averages out to 6.6 such unions every year. One would expect a rise in the rate of soldier marriages as a greater proportion of men entered the ranks of the army during wartime. Despite this, the rate of increase in Newcastle is surprising. Again, problems with the source material means it is difficult to determine whether these men where soldiers from outside the region marrying local women or local men who were getting married after enlisting with a regiment based in the region.

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[105] Ibid., 1739-48.
[106] Ibid., 1749-55. More specifically there are 36 marriages involving soldiers out of a total of 810 which equates to an average of 4.4 per year. This is very similar to the period 1739-48.
[107] Ibid., 1756-63.
[108] Ibid., 1764-5.
[109] Ibid., 1774-5
[110] Ibid., 1776-83.

IV. Other Forms of Tension and Conflict

The daily presence of the army in many of the region's towns created numerous political, administrative and logistical conflicts. There are many documented cases in which the army and civic leaders transgressed established legal and relational boundaries in their dealings with one another. However, a great deal of this discord was not linked to the behaviour of soldiers, but to more fundamental issues such as the jurisdiction of garrisons and the rights of officers and men within the town. Tension of this sort was, for the most part, non-violent and non-criminal in nature. Additionally, both the civil and military authorities appeared eager to utilise the various political and administrative channels available to them in order to resolve disagreements and prevent further antagonism.

Berwick, with its unique position as the largest permanent garrison in the north during the eighteenth century, was a breeding ground for such disagreements. With a wide variety of military structures in the town including guardhouses, defensive walls and after 1719, permanent barracks, it is not surprising that many of the conflicts that erupted between the army and the town resulted from issues related to the utilisation and maintenance of military buildings and property.

An example of how the improvement or renovation of the town's defences could cause civil-military conflict can be observed between the summer of 1740 and late 1741. It was at this time that a row erupted in the town concerning the location of the new guard house, ordered built by the Board of Ordnance. In June 1740 a local man named Mr Fenwick protested to the Berwick's guild council about Captain Rouwer who was a military engineer assigned to the town's garrison.[111] The complainant accused Rouwer of illegally seizing a building that belonged to him located on a piece of ground known as Shelly Walls.[112] The guild ordered the mayor and magistrates to draw up a letter demanding an explanation from the engineer. The reply was simple; Rouwer had been given permission from the Board of Ordnance to build a new main

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[111] BTRO B 2/4/33-126, 213, 8 June 1739.
[112] Ibid., 2/4/33, 79, 8 June 1739 and 17 October 1740 respectively.

guard.[113] He had decided the best location for it would be on aforementioned Shelly Walls in the centre of town, where the bowling green house had stood. It seems that the membership of the council did not take kindly to Rouwer's keen sense of initiative and forbade any more building until a committee could be formed to suggest a better place to build the guard. Furthermore, the group was directed to send a letter to their Member of Parliament, ironically the future Secretary at War Lord Barrington, to protest against the situation.[114]

The town did not object to the construction of the new guardhouse but they believed that the Board of Ordnance and Captain Rouwer were being presumptuous. This was exemplified by the fact that the guild was prepared to grant the Ordnance an alternative plot of land on which to build the structure and to cover the expenses for levelling that land.[115] The council wanted to make certain that wherever the guardhouse was built, it was the most convenient location for the town and did not prejudice trade or civic relations. It was not until December of the following year that the matter was resolved when the mayor received a copy of a letter from the Duke of Montague to another Ordnance engineer named Mr. Gatton.[116] The letter commanded Gatton to 'take down the wall on the high street lately built for a guard and to remove the stones and materials to such part of the town as will be most agreeable to the inhabitants.'[117] Montague also ordered the engineer to ensure that any land used for military buildings, including this one, was obtained legally in the future.[118]

This is a good example of the tensions that arose out of the day-to-day business of the military. It also illustrates the way in which problems between the civilian and military authorities could be redressed. The incident itself does not appear to have affected the relationship between the town and the men of the Board of Ordnance posted to the garrison. In fact Captain Rouwer's direct involvement in the controversy over the new guardhouse does not seem to have impacted on his role within the town,

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[113] Ibid., 2/4/67, 2 July 1740.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Ibid., 2/4/126, 15 December 1741.
[116] Ibid., 2/4/125-6.
[117] Ibid. This was eventually the alternative plot of land granted by the guild at a high point on the town's high street. The building still exits there today.
[118] Ibid.

nor on the respect that the council had for his abilities as a military engineer. During the midst of the guardhouse debacle, Rouwer approached the town to suggest that they remove part of a hill near the Shore Gate as it would 'injure the town's defences' should a war erupt with France.[119] Without any mention of Mr. Fenwick's complaint, and the subsequent conflict, the town council agreed immediately to this.[120] In terms of scale, the guardhouse incident of 1740 and 1741 was a minor irritation.

Smaller affairs between the town and the garrison helped to strain civil-military relations for short periods of time throughout the eighteenth century. Again, these tended to revolve around disagreements over the land close to the barracks. In 1758 the garrison's engineer, Francis Gatton, who had been involved in the botched attempt to build the new guardhouse in 1740, was presented to the quarter sessions

> for suffering a large midden contracted by the soldiers of the guard to lie across the conduit at the head of the mainguard opposite to John Howitson's house, and neglecting to carry the same away to the great nuisance of the neighbourhood.[121]

However, the most serious confrontation between the garrison and the town occurred thirty years later, and once again involved military construction prompted by the Board of Ordnance.

In April of 1787 Ordnance engineers began to enclose parts of the parade ground directly outside the front gates of the barracks. Civic leaders were horrified by this unannounced action and 'sensible to their [the town's] title to the parade,' were very fearful that there was a plan to enclose the entire area.[122] At a hastily arranged meeting with Mr. Dowse, who was the senior engineer for the garrison, the mayor demanded that they stop this enclosure until their protest to the Board of Ordnance was dealt with.[123] Unfortunately, Dowse could not see clear to halt the operations,

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[119] Ibid., 2/4/107, 5 June 1741.
[120] Ibid.
[121] BTRO C8/4, 10 July 1758.
[122] BTRO GB 1/20/528, 16 April 1787.
[123] Ibid.

which led the guild council to order that 'the bailiffs do go immediately and pull down such erections as are already or may hereafter be made for the enclosure of the parade.'[124] Such was the serious nature of this action that the corporation indemnified the bailiffs for any action they might be forced to take, and recognised their power to call on any assistance they felt necessary to accomplish this task.[125] This was a clear case of the civilian government taking firm action to enforce its authority within the town in the face of what they felt was a blatant transgression by the military.

Again, as in the earlier incident concerning the guardhouse, the authorities in London took the lead in an effort to contain the situation and maintain good relations with the civic leaders of Berwick. In early May the Master General of the Ordnance, the Duke of Richmond, responded to information provided by Lt. Colonel Dunford, the commanding officer in the North-East district. In a letter to the town council he expressed his distaste at Mr. Dowse's refusal to stop construction long enough to allow the town's concerns to be dealt with in his office.[126] However, he was equally disappointed that the Berwick authorities had acted

> in so violent and precipitate a manner as immediately to take upon yourselves to do yourselves justice when your right (if it is one) could not have suffered by the short delay of writing the letter you had first proposed.[127]

Despite this, and to assure some semblance of political peace in Berwick, Richmond agreed that he would defer to the Crown to establish who actually owned the parade. Should ownership of the parade be awarded to the town, then he agreed to hand it over to their administration. On the other hand, if the crown were to rule in favour of the military, the town would have to immediately repair the damage they had done to the wall. Buoyed by this the council announced the formation of a committee to prove the town's ownership of the land.[128] The subsequent argument that a charter issued to Berwick by James I established their claim to the parade appears to have been

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[124] Ibid.
[125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid., 1/20/534-7, 7 May 1787.
[127] Ibid.

successful. The council's complaint was upheld and the parade was never enclosed.[129] Despite the serious nature of this conflict, it does not appear as though it lingered long in the minds of those parties involved. From the summer of 1787 nothing more was ever heard of the incident in local or military records.

Near the end of the century the garrison's engineers were once again exerting tension on the relationship between the town and the army. In 1791 Captain Caddy, the garrison engineer, had denied soap-boiler David McCoull access to Palace Green where he usually laid his soap ashes.[130] At the same time it became apparent that Caddy had also laid a conduit through the green without the permission of the guild.[131] The corporation was sure, as with the case of the parade enclosure in 1787, that the land was theirs and that the garrison had no right to deny citizens its use or to build on it without their permission. Two weeks later, the commission that was formed to determine ownership of Palace Green reported back stating that the town's charter clearly gave the corporation jurisdiction over that place.[132] Caddy was called before the mayor and informed of this development, at which time he simply agreed to rectify the situation once he was given such orders from the Board of Ordnance.[133]

Not all problems arose from building projects sponsored by the Board of Ordnance. In October 1749 an argument broke out between the garrison adjutant, Major Draper, and Berwick's administrators. Draper ordered that the house on the town's bridge, which was used by the toll collectors, be shut up and attempted to prevent the 'tollers' from using the house unless they agreed to pay a rent to the garrison.[134] The corporation reacted strongly to this development, believing that 'Major Draper [had] no such power.'[135] The leaders ordered the bailiffs to meet with Major Rogers, who was the garrison adjutant in Draper's absence, to resolve this matter. At the meeting the town's representatives demanded that the building be handed back over to the

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[128] Ibid.
[129] Ibid., 1/20/537, 7 May 1787.
[130] Ibid., 1/21/115-6, 6 May 1791.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Ibid., 1/21/119, 20 May 1791.
[133] Ibid., 1/21/123, 10 June 1791.
[134] BTRO C2/4/439-40, 27 October 1749.
[135] Ibid.

civilian authorities.[136] It appears that this was not the last time the house on the bridge would cause a problem. In October 1765 the Grand Harriers complained that the toll collectors were once again being refused the use of the premises.[137] Like the conflict in 1749, the town demanded that Major Rogers hand over control of the house to the town's collectors. Eventually the matter was permanently resolved and no further confrontations occurred. The army recognised that their claim to jurisdiction over the house was tenuous, and control passed back to the town.[138]

Another cause of tension throughout the century that soldiers were directly complicit in was the proliferation of illegal drinking and 'unruly' houses. An example of this activity can be observed in 1695 when three groups of soldiers and non-commissioned officers were apprehended in Berwick charged with retailing alcohol without a license.[139] This appears to have been a fairly widespread operation involving several houses in three different areas of the town.[140] What is interesting is the prominent role of non-commissioned officers in the illegal retailing of liquor. The vast majority of those involved tended to be sergeants with a few corporals and private soldiers added into the mix. Of the 13 military men charged with the offence at Berwick's quarter sessions between 1695 and 1707 all but three were sergeants.[141] The other interesting thing to note is the high level of civilian participation in this illicit trade. The soldiers relied on access to civilian houses in order to function. In 1707 Sergeant Hall was charged with retailing ale without a licence at the home of a Mrs Temple, while in the same year Sergeant Baird and Sergeant Morris were charged with a similar transgression at the homes of local inhabitants.[142] It also appears that family members of the troops got involved on occasions. In 1712 James Suddis was accused of entertaining a sergeant's wife 'who sells ale and beer without a license.'[143]

The town's motivation for cracking down on such activity is rooted in three concerns. The first was that members of the guild, as well as local magistrates, did not want

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[136] Ibid.
[137] BTRO GB 1/18/350, 4 October 1765.
[138] Ibid.
[139] BTRO C8/1, 9 December 1695, 20 January 1696.
[140] Ibid., 9 December 1695.
[141] Ibid., C8/1
[142] Ibid., Undated, 1707.

unregulated alcohol to become readily available to troops. Officers and civilians alike were aware of the problems and dangers this could create. Of equal importance was the economic impact of this underground economy. As will be noted below, for much of the century the alehouses and inns of the town were under considerable pressure by having to house troops. If these same soldiers chose to drink in private houses the publicans would suffer even more.[144] Naturally, this concern was not exclusive to the fact that alehouses 'pay taxes and also quarter soldiers.'[145] The final concern was the knowledge that alcohol played a large role in promoting violence between troops and some civilians.[146]

The building of the barracks seems to have had some effect on such behaviour. After 1719 there is only one case where a member of the garrison was charged with offences related to the illegal retailing of alcohol. This occurred in 1744 when three sergeants in Brigadier General Blakeney's regiment were accused of keeping alehouses without the town's consent.[147] Similarly, the profusion of disorderly houses, while a problem throughout the century, was much more prevalent in the period before the barracks were constructed.

The scale of the military infrastructure and presence of so many troops in Berwick meant that conflict and tension was bound to be a by-product of actions to enhance and maintain the permanent garrison. Such problems arose regularly from the middle of the century but do not appear to have subverted the long-term relationship between town and garrison. Through a combination of conflict management by the authorities in London, and the ability of the town to back up its claims with facts, many of these disputes were resolved quickly and without lasting effects. Even when more obstinate men such as Mr. Dowse caused discord, the central administration seemed able to satisfactorily mediate the situation. The political elite in London were willing to investigate complaints from the civilian population of Berwick. There is little doubt

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[143] Ibid., Undated, 1712.
[144] Ibid., November 1707.
[145] Ibid.
[146] This issue will be looked at in more detail in Chapter 5.
[147] BTRO C8/1, 10 December 1744.

that this was due in part to the central government's need to maintain positive relations with towns such as Berwick, which hosted permanent garrison forces.

V. Issues of Payment and Distribution.

Disagreements over military land use within towns such as Berwick were part of local civil-military relations during this period. However, there was a more serious and persistent source of tension lurking beneath the surface of civil-military relations in the eighteenth century. This chronic problem was the physical and financial burden placed on towns by the billeting process. It was one that would not be resolved as easily as those that dealt with walls and buildings. For much of the eighteenth century it had a lasting effect on relations between garrisoned towns in North-East England and the commanders and administrators of the army. Army personnel largely became unwitting participants in a conflict whose origins and parameters ran much deeper than the simple interaction between soldiers and civilians. For the most part, the army's rank-and-file were victims of the inept system that paid and supported them.

The army insisted that bills for quartering and supply be paid in full or, if this was impossible, that certificates guaranteeing the money be issued by officers.[148] The Rules and Articles outlined certain procedures that were to be followed to ensure that civilian-owned accommodation was paid for.[149] These regulations were often reinforced by royal declarations that reminded officers and men of their duties to pay citizens for food and shelter as well as observe discipline in quarters.[150] Despite such good intentions it was often the administrative hierarchy of the army, as well as their political masters in London, who were responsible for the financial and logistical problems created by garrisons and billeting. As will be discussed below, communities regularly found themselves supporting their garrisons in times of need. Certain sectors of the population, in particular local merchants and innkeepers, incurred long standing debts from loans, or through officers not settling bills for quarters and

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[148] In particular look at Article 30, which deals specifically with paying for quarters: PRO WO 72/2, Rules and Articles, 1722.
[149] Ibid.
[150] An example of this can be found in: PRO WO 30/19, Court Martial Warrants, 17 March 1707/8.

subsistence upon leaving a town. They were widely resentful that the burden of billeting 'nasty, dirty soldiers' was placed squarely on their shoulders.[151] Even as late as 1794 the Secretary at War described billeting as 'an old abuse [whereby] the soldiers of the state were not provided at the expense of the state but at the cost of a particular class of inhabitant.'[152]

Once again Berwick's role as a garrison town meant that in the period before the completion of its barracks large numbers of troops were billeted in the area. As a result it was particularly vulnerable to the inability of regiments to pay for their quarters. This was especially true during the tumultuous period immediately following the Glorious Revolution. The military and political dislocation caused by the events of 1688 meant that bills were left unpaid and the arrears owed to soldiers for pay and subsistence grew at an alarming rate. At the start of 1689 the government had arrears to the army of nearly £80,000.[153] However, the debt quickly increased and by 1 May 1690 money owing had risen to over £194,000.[154] In the North East this crisis engendered itself in the debts owed by the military for quarters and other contracts.

In January 1689 Major Nott, a junior commander in the Berwick garrison, informed the mayor that his unit was in terrible financial troubles, having exhausted their meagre funds.[155] The council quickly endorsed Nott's request for money to erase two weeks of arrears and maintain the soldiers' further subsistence.[156] Without such money the garrison might cease to function in an effective manner. So grave was the situation that the town even intended to express their concern to the King. In a petition they planned to inform him of the state of the garrison and of the debt held by the town from quartering soldiers.[157] The leaders were particularly concerned that they were still owed 'great sums of money' by former garrisons.[158] Additionally, they agreed to express their fears of the consequences for the town, should they not receive

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[151] Childs, British Army of William III, 93.
[152] Douet, British Barracks, 42.
[153] BL Add.MSS 33,049/9, Military Papers of Thomas Pelham-Holles.
[154] Ibid.
[155] BTRO GB 1/13, 4 January 1689.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Ibid.

some remedy from London. The loan and the petition did little to alleviate the immediate financial crisis facing the garrison. Within four days of the first loan the corporation was informed that Nott had requested a further £50 be lent until the officers of the garrison could get remittances from London.[159] Fortunately, an influential Berwick burgess named Mr. Lisely agreed to loan the major the additional £50, with the stipulation that this money was to be returned in three months with 'all requisite interest.'[160]

This response, and those that followed later in the seventeenth century, may have been heavily influenced by the serious disturbances that erupted in the town during the previous month. In December 'several soldiers...assembled themselves together in the public marketplace' where they acted in a 'riotous and tumultuous manner.'[161] The troops had not been paid for some time and were so desperate that they seized free quarters from the townsfolk.[162] The town's leaders knew that if nothing was done to alleviate the pressures caused by the failure of the military finance system there could be a return to this dangerous unruliness.

The unrest of December and the loans that were provided in January only marked the beginning of several years of problems for the town. Stung by repeated requests for financial assistance, and already heavily burdened with military personnel, Berwick's quarters were pushed to breaking point in March 1689. The garrison commander, Sir John Lesley, announced plans to house an additional regiment of dragoons in the town which elicited serious opposition amongst civic leaders.[163] The town's ruling council demanded that the mayor and aldermen inform the colonel of the town's inability to house any further troops. It was seen as their job to prevent additional troops from being sent to Berwick, 'or that some other course be taken to ease the town by quartering them in adjacent towns and villages.'[164] This entreaty appears to have fallen on deaf ears. The next month the council received orders to not only

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[158] Ibid.
[159] Ibid., 8 January 1689.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Ibid., 14 December 1689.
[162] Childs, The Army of William III, 9.
[163] BTRO GB 1/13, 20 March 1689.
[164] Ibid.

accommodate the dragoon regiment but also a regiment each of foot and horse in the town and adjacent areas.[165]

The fears of Berwick's population were soon realised as by late May of that year Lieutenant-Colonel Heyford, the commander of the dragoons in the garrison, had approached the mayor to request funds to support his men.[166] Since the troops had not been paid for over one month Heyford requested, 'that the said soldiers and their horses might have food and maintenance.'[167] Unfortunately, the town could not acquiesce to this request as they felt that such a loan would be too heavy a burden on the local burgesses. Despite this rejection from local leaders the officer was able to secure the necessary funds. Once again a private citizen, this time named Mr. Edward Nealson, lent the town £200 for this purpose upon Heyford's promise that repayment would come from the first money the regiment received.[168] The generosity of the town was further tested by the lieutenant-colonel, when in June his regiment was ordered to march from Berwick, having been relieved by Colonel Beveridge's Regiment of Foot. Repeating earlier requests, Heyford went cap-in-hand to the council requesting an additional £100 to assist him in paying the cost of the troops' quarters, as well as the arrears that they owed the town's inhabitants.[169] Once again the request was denied, and once again Mr. Neaslon came to the rescue agreeing to loan the necessary funds.[170]

This drain on Berwick's resources continued long after the departure of Heyford's dragoons. Many of the succeeding regiments found themselves in a similar position, requiring financial and logistical support from the civilian population of Berwick. For example, during 1690 the lieutenant governor of the garrison requested that the council provide money to support troops whose pay was expected to be two weeks late.[171] In the summer of 1695 the town's innkeepers were again forced to provide money for the upkeep of Colonel Beaumont's regiment for a period of nearly three

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[165] Ibid., 25 April 1689.
[166] Ibid., 20 May 1689.
[167] Ibid.
[168] Ibid.
[169] Ibid., 7 June 1689.
[170] Ibid.

months.[172] To the benefit of the garrison, they were able to pay off one month of arrears in August. However, by September the corporation was complaining that money was still not forthcoming from London to allow the garrison to discharge all of its debt to the town.[173] Despite a very positive letter to the guild from 'one of our Parliamentary burgesses' in November, stating that the government was getting ready to clear the debts of garrisons in England, the town's problems were far from over.[174] Four months later 'the whole body of the guild made a general complaint that by decay of their trade and their long subsisting this garrison for thirty-two weeks, are no longer able to subsist the same.'[175] It was not until early July that Major Moncall of Sir John Jacob's regiment arrived in town with subsistence money to pay arrears and bills up to January.[176] This was not before the resilient generosity of the town was again stretched to breaking point and 60 of the garrison were turned out of their billets onto the streets.[177] This resulted in 40 of these homeless soldiers promptly deserting the regiment.[178]

In February 1697, there were additional complaints about the amount of money owed to the town for supporting the troops in garrison during the previous year.[179] Furthermore, on 11 March 1697 five companies of Colonel Churchill's regiment arrived at the garrison and almost immediately complained about the fact that they had no money.[180] This led to a request that the innkeepers allow the troops credit totalling three shillings per week (two for food, one for drink), until such time as money arrived to discharge the debt.[181] Despite the trouble, inconvenience and hardship that earlier sponsorship had created within Berwick, and the legacy of unpaid debts, the guild seems to have agreed without much argument.[182] As a consequence of their

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[171] Ibid., 19 May 1690. The guild agreed that all people quartering soldiers should provide 3 shillings per week to each soldier in their care, or to find victuals worth 3 shillings per week for every soldier.
[172] George Clarke of Edinburgh, the agent for Colonel Beaumont's regiments, attributed the difficulties to a general shortage of coin in the country that resulted in London having problems paying its bills: BTRO GB 1/13, 5 March 1695.
[173] Ibid., 13 September 1695.
[174] Ibid., 20 November 1695.
[175] Ibid., 5 March 1696.
[176] Ibid., 2 July 1696.
[177] Childs, British Army of William III, 96-7.
[178] Ibid.
[179] BTRO GB 1/14, 25 February 1697.
[180] Ibid., 11 March 1697.
[181] Ibid.
[182] Ibid.

continued support for the soldiers, the following year Berwick's leaders were forced to send yet another petition to London. This time the members of the guild made direct links between the decline of the town's trade and prosperity, and their repeated attempts to help clothe and support resident soldiers.[183]

The army often made attempts to repay loans for subsistence as quickly as possible. Unfortunately, for some in Berwick this did not always prove easy. Often it could be years before such liabilities were paid back by the central government. The day after Christmas 1693 the mayor reported that the governor of the garrison, Richard Levison, had informed him that £200 had been made available by the War Office to pay the town's debts, incurred in assisting troops of Colonel Beveridge's regiment.[184] It must be remembered that this regiment had arrived in Berwick during June 1689. This meant that it had taken nearly four years for those arrears to be cleared. In one extreme case Berwick's leaders were forced to write a letter of protest to their Members of Parliament in 1697 to collect sums owed to them for clothing and quartering a regiment of soldiers in 1677.[185] By 1705 it was estimated that the town was in debt to the tune of £1705 going back to the incidents of 1689.[186] As late as 1719 the guild members were protesting about a £3000 debt for the support of Lionel Waldron's 'Purple' regiment that remained unsettled from 1679.[187] Much of this money was owed to publicans, or had been paid to publicans by the town in order to cover unpaid bills. From 1696 the government attempted to make some reductions in the arrears outstanding to these communities. Orders were drafted instructing all regiments to draw up their accounts for their quarters.[188] The War Office demanded that commanders complete accounts and instructed them to ensure that officers be kept with their units to prevent 'disorders they are informed are daily committed in this country by the soldiers, in the absence of their officers.'[189]

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[183] BTRO B9/1, 9 March 1698.
[184] BTRO GB 1/13, 26 December 1693.
[185] Ibid., 1/14/8, 13 December 1697.
[186] BTRO B9/1, Unpaginated, 3 December 1705.
[187] Ibid., 1/138,155, 2 February 1719.
[188] For an example of such an order, addressed to 'all regiments in England', see: PRO WO 26/7/52, 14 August 1697.
[189] Ibid.

Unfortunately the War Office's attempts to put its own financial house in order did not succeed widely in the North East. During December 1705 the authorities were so heavily burdened that they actually agreed to a plan for magistrates to billet soldiers in private houses.[190] The problem became so acute that in the autumn of 1706 Berwick's mayor dispatched a letter to the town's two parliamentary representatives, Samuel Ogle and Jonathan Hutchinson.[191] It supported the alehouse keepers of the town who were mounting great opposition to him because of the pressures placed upon them by having to quarter soldiers. The letter described how billeting had created 'a great many poor and starving families that are at this instant groaning under their burden of six and eight soldiers a piece.'[192] An important characteristic of this letter is that it represents the first time either the guild or the mayor mentions the need for Berwick to have permanent barracks built within the town. The consistent requests for support by officers, and the growing socio-economic problems caused by mounting public debts, led members of the town hierarchy to express the need for larger purpose-built facilities. Their assertion was that the status quo could not be maintained, and if Berwick were to continue to play host to so many troops some solution was required.[193] In the intervening three years the same concerns persisted, manifesting themselves in a vicious circle. In 1709 the guild described how

> the case of alehouse keepers in town being represented to this guild to be very lamentable with respect to their quartering the soldiers sent here, above what they are able insomuch that several persons that formerly sold ale, on which their livelihood chiefly depended, have been obliged to leave the trade by which those that still use it are daily more burdened.[194]

While David Brenchley believes that these assertions may have been exaggerated it is clear from guild records that the burdens of billeting were having a negative effect on

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[190] BTRO GB 1/14, 30 December 1705.
[191] BTRO B9/1, Mayor to Samuel Ogle and Jonathan Hutchinson, 14 October 1706.
[192] Ibid.
[193] Ibid.
[194] BTRO GB 1/14/175, 28 October 1709.

the town.[195] Despite these problems Berwick never refused to take what they felt was their fair share of soldiers, and there appears to have been little resistance from publicans and innkeepers to the soldiers themselves.[196] This was especially true in times of crisis such as the Jacobite rebellion of 1715 when town leaders agreed to quarter as many troops as General Carpenter required, even offering to place them in private homes and businesses once the public accommodation was full.[197] However, in all of their protests to the government the mayor and burgesses complained that the burden on them was oppressive, especially considering that past debts, such as that from 1679, were still outstanding.

Despite continued complications in getting past debts cleared, the era of almost continuous entreaties by the army to the town for subsistence money appears to have ended with the official opening of the town's new barracks in 1719.[198] Similarly, the complaints against unpaid bills, and the inequities of billeting declined dramatically in this period. This is not to say that the new military quarters put a complete end to the almost parasitic relationship that existed between Berwick and its military population. For instance, as the country quickly mobilised for war in 1757, Berwick found itself inundated with soldiers.

Many of these were stationed in the town to prevent or counter a possible invasion of northern Britain by French forces. The ability of the corporation to quarter more troops was quickly brought into question when the mayor declared that 'all the public houses are full of soldiers and the barracks cannot at present take in more.'[199] The desperate situation resulted in Berwick's officials using questionable billeting practices. The mayor and the bailiffs complained to the guild that 'they have been lately threatened to be sued by several butchers, bakers, meat sellers and others within this borough for billeting soldiers upon them.'[200] These threats do not seem to have had much impact on the mayor and his assistants. In 1763 the country was flooded

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[195] Brenchley, A Place by Itself, 137.
[196] On rare occasions individuals, such as William Richardson, appear before the quarter sessions for refusing to quarter soldiers. BTRO C8/1, 1717.
[197] BTRO GB 1/14/296, 28 October 1715.
[198] This does not include continued attempts by the town after 1719 to recover debts from before this period. BTRO B 9/1/138, 2 February 1719.
[199] BTRO GB 1/17/265, 18 February 1757.

with demobilising regiments returning from overseas. As before the landlords in Berwick complained that the public houses of the town were very poor due to the 'oppression' visited upon them by 'several regiments halting in this town at the same time.'[201] Such was the problem that members of the town's council once again suggested that a proportion of the soldiers who were marching through should be quartered on butchers, bakers and meat sellers 'in order to ease those persons who keep such public houses.'[202]

The hardships that billeting and garrisoning brought to the civilian population were not exclusive to Berwick, although it seems to have suffered disproportionately. On more than one occasion Newcastle found itself at the centre of a dilemma over the pressures of quartering soldiers. At this time Newcastle did not have a permanent garrison like Berwick or permanent barracks like Tynemouth.[203] As a result the town only periodically experienced the extreme financial and logistical pressures created by billeting.

The distribution of military units was an issue that occasionally ignited local passion. The preponderance of these troops were quartered in Newcastle's All Saints and St Nicholas's parishes, placing a significant burden on the inhabitants of these districts. Even when the number of troops in the town was not overwhelming, the distribution of billets was often uneven. Such a disparity was illustrated at the quarter sessions held in Newcastle during April 1704. At this meeting 30 of the town's publicans complained that they were bearing an unfair burden of the quartering.[204] Their main objection was that with over 400 public houses in and around the town, they had had two or three soldiers billeted upon each of their businesses for up to 18 weeks.[205] This had the effect of creating 'great oppression and injury', and they were requesting that troops be more evenly billeted throughout Newcastle and the surrounding area.[206]

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[200] Ibid.
[201] Ibid., 1/18/188-9, 6 May 1763.
[202] Ibid.
[203] PRO WO 1/973/1139, William Whitmore to Barrington, 10 April 1757. These were expanded and improved from 1758 and Tynemouth became a perpetual garrison from 1770.
[204] TWAS QS/NC/1/3, 26 April 1704.
[205] Ibid.

The inadequacies of the army pay system caused problems for local inhabitants during the crisis of 1745. At this time the corporation was forced to lend £600 to Lieutenant Colonel La Rocque's regiment 'being disappointed of money to pay the regiment.'[207] The unusual state of affairs in 1745 contributed to this problem, as thousands of troops poured into Newcastle at short notice to counter the Jacobite invasion of England.[208] Nonetheless, it still remained the case that a regimental commander was forced to go to the town council, cap-in-hand, in order to ensure that his men were fed and bills were paid. In turn the leaders of Newcastle had to lend cash to the troops to ensure their good behaviour, as well as the solvency of the local publicans and innkeepers. On this occasion it made sense to acquiesce to the needs of army commanders. The town's population would need a fed, clothed and housed army should it be required to defend the city against the Jacobite army.

Some of the smaller environs in the hinterland around Newcastle suffered fates similar to those larger towns with permanent garrisons. In the summer of 1704 the inhabitants of Hexham made protests to the Secretary at War concerning a full troop of dragoons that had arrived in the town expecting quarters.[209] While the actual number of soldiers amounted to no more than 100 men with horses, the town felt that they were being forced to take more than their fair share.[210] In some senses this observation was justifiable. The billeting census of 1686 listed Hexham as having only 41 guest beds and berths for 53 horses.[211] It is unlikely that these facilities increased in the intervening 18 years to a point that would allow a whole troop of dragoons to be easily quartered there. The protestations of local inhabitants seems to have been further justified by the response of Samuel Lynn (a clerk at the War Office) to the officer at Hexham.[212] He ordered that at least half of the troop stationed in Hexham should be quartered at Haltwhistle and Beltingham, while also instructing the officer to obey his original orders outlining a similar dispersal.[213] The financial burden of hosting soldiers in the town was once again on the agenda during the

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[206] Ibid.
[207] TWAS MD/NC/2/5/52, 14 October 1745.
[208] This subject is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 7.
[209] PRO WO 4/3/28, Samuel Lynn to the Officer-in-Chief with the Troop at Hexham, 10 June 1704.
[210] This is an estimate taken from the Guards and Garrison Establishments for 1704. PRO WO 24/33.
[211] PRO WO 30/48/139-43.
[212] PRO WO 4/3/28, 10 June 1704.

midsummer quarter sessions of 1761. During this meeting the judges ordered that a local innkeeper by the name of William Lee be paid the sum of £3 6s 3d as compensation for unpaid bills in supplying coals, straw and other goods to soldiers billeted upon him that year.[214]

On rare occasions even Tynemouth, with its barracks, experienced problems supporting its garrison. During January 1704 a company of invalids housed at Tynemouth was due £440 9d for their pay from 26 March to 24 October 1703.[215] It turned out that the inhabitants of Shields and Tynemouth had been supporting these troops at their own expense since 25 March.[216] In a petition to the Lord High Treasurer by local officials it was stated that these 'old and helpless' invalid soldiers were not the only group that had to be supported.[217] They were also supporting 'many families [of the soldiers], who were a great burden to the parish' and were thus 'praying for relief' from the government.[218]

Such was the problem throughout England that in 1756 the government in London created a committee to investigate the numerous complaints about billeting. As was the case in the north, the majority of this disapproval surrounded the expense 'that in consequence of such additional charges many had been obliged to shut up their [public] houses.'[219] Existing records from central government sources reinforce the idea that financial loss was the main fear of local communities involved in billeting and garrisoning. Nearly every one of the 130 assorted petitions from innkeepers across the country, contained in a box of unnumbered War Office papers, focused on the financial burden of billeting rather than the behaviour of soldiers.[220] For example, at the end of May 1760 the innkeepers of Durham complained that in the four months up to that point the Cleveland battalion of the North Yorkshire Militia had been

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[213] Ibid.
[214] MRO QSO 9/470, 15 July 1761.
[215] BL Add.MSS 38,711/10, War Office Correspondence, Vol.18, 1704.
[216] Ibid.
[217] Calendar of Treasury Papers, 87/122, 'about November 16th' 1703/4.
[218] Ibid.
[219] PRO WO 26/35/5-7, 2 March 1756.
[220] PRO WO 40/3. This is a collection of petitions from innkeepers to the Secretary at War between 1759 and 1809.

quartered in the town.[221] They also stated that in that time another 8,000 troops of various regiments had passed through the city.[222] The petition went on to state that this had created a situation in which 'the innkeepers have already suffered exceedingly, in so much that within those few weeks eight or ten persons who kept public houses have been forced to shut up their houses.'[223]

There is little doubt that Durham and other medium-sized towns suffered from the financial and logistical stresses of billeting. However, pressures could reach extremes in smaller, isolated towns located along the army's marching routes. Such was the case in the village of Burton where the inhabitants found themselves in the most unfortunate circumstances. Their main grievance was that the government had ordered them to billet as many as 300 soldiers at one time in a community with only 120 residents and five inns and public houses.[224] The demand they made to the Secretary at War was simple enough, either provide financial relief or remove Burton from the official marching routes.[225] In fact many of the region's small villages felt the burdens of billeting due to their role in supporting the marches of regiments about the county. For example, in May and June of 1689, Colonel Beveridge's regiment stayed overnight in villages such as Kirkby Steven, Bishop Auckland, Alnwick and Belford while on its march to Berwick.[226] This meant that as many as 435 men would have required lodgings for the evening in these places.[227] In 1686 the small town of Alnwick had just 95 beds.[228] Therefore, it is easy to see the pressures that a sudden influx of nearly four times the town's vacancy rate would have on resources even if many of the soldiers were forced to sleep in tents, sheds and barns.

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[221] Ibid., 31 May 1760.
[222] Ibid.
[223] Ibid.
[224] Ibid., 22 March 1800.
[225] Ibid.
[226] PRO WO 5/5/158, Marching Orders 1688-90.
[227] PRO WO 24/9, Guards and Garrisons 1689; PRO WO 5/5/158. The regiment was probably not at its full strength of 876. Additionally the regiment was ordered to march in two divisions, two days apart. WO 5/5/158.

VI. Positive Impacts

The discussion so far has focused on the negative aspects of garrisons and billets. However, there were many instances in which the army played positive roles in the daily life of North-East towns. Soldiers performed duties that were additional to their military role, which directly or indirectly benefited the livelihood of the region. These impacts could be social, economic and even military.

An example of how the army contributed to local infrastructure can be observed in 1765. In late May the officers commanding the garrison at Berwick were given permission to use troops of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers quartered there, and other soldiers from Carlisle and Newcastle, to assist in building a bridge at Coldstream.[229] While the bridge was mainly for military use, its existence could only help to improve the trade and communications infrastructure of the region surrounding the town. Similarly, the repair and construction of military buildings throughout the North East not only assured the continued security of the region but also created a market for local skilled tradesmen and merchants.[230]

Soldiers could also be mobilised to counter threats to civilian lives and property that had nothing to do with violent mobs or invading armies. During July 1750 officers and soldiers of Lord Ancram's regiment were instrumental in helping the citizens of Newcastle to battle a large fire near the Tyne Bridge.[231] So ferocious was the conflagration that it threatened to consume the whole of the Sandgate district.[232] If not for the actions of the local population, in co-operation with the troops, the £10,000 of damage could have been much more serious.[233] Similarly, in March 1773 Berwick's town council expressed their gratitude to Major John Bird, and his fellow

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[228] PRO WO 30/48/139. .
[229] PRO WO 4/77/70-1, Barrington to Officer Commanding H.M. Garrison at Berwick, 29 May 1765. In particular, the officer required a party of soldiers consisting of one sergeant and 12 privates from Newcastle, one sergeant and ten privates from Carlisle, and one corporal and eight privates from Berwick.
[230] Economic and security benefits will be discussed below.
[231] The exact date was July 24th; John Sykes (ed.), Local Records of Northumberland and Durham, Newcastle upon Tyne and Berwick upon Tweed, Vol.1 (Stockton-on-Tees: Patrick and Shotton, 1973) 195.
[232] Ibid.
[233] Ibid.

officers in the 19th Regiment of Foot, 'for their ready and effectual aid and assistance in extinguishing the fire in Church Street, and for their civilities shown to the town.'[234] So impressed was the town that they even agreed to award ten guineas to the soldiers who assisted in putting out the fire, 'as a gratuity for the good behaviour which they showed by their activity and diligence during the time of the fire.'[235] Just four years later, officers and men of the resident Independent Company received the appreciation of the town for assisting in suppressing another fire in Castlegate.[236]

There were tangible economic benefits to having the army in a town.[237] John Childs believes that during the reign of William III many people in garrison towns such as Berwick depended absolutely on the commerce of the soldiers.[238] In fact he asserts that it was this economic link that played a part in the motivation of Berwick's leaders to support financially pressed soldiers in the late seventeenth century.[239] The importance of soldiers to the local economy in Berwick is supported by events in 1768. During this year the garrison was reduced considerably, resulting in a request from the town to have the number of troops housed in the barracks increased.[240] When they had money, there is little doubt that the considerable spending power of large bodies of soldiers was welcomed by local storekeepers and publicans.[241]

The army also required clothing, food, drink and fuel, as well as new and repaired equipment. Much of this was supplied locally.[242] In 1721 Berwick's innkeepers and merchants supplied the new barracks with utensils and cooking equipment.[243] The barracks also required staff such as Mrs Greive, who as 'Barracks Mistress' co-ordinated a team of local women in cleaning and maintaining the facilities.[244] In

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[234] BTRO GB 1/19/85-6, 5 March 1773.
[235] Ibid.
[236] Ibid., 1/19/235-6, 3 September 1777.
[237] Douet, British Barracks, 33.
[238] Childs, Army of William III, 98.
[239] Ibid.
[240] Brenchley, A Place By Itself, 144.
[241] Ibid.
[242] It is important to note that in some English towns large concentrations of soldiers occasionally caused food shortages, prices rises and even riots.
[243] BTRO GB 1/15/100, 24 May 1721.
[244] BTRO B/2/4/481-2, 21 September 1750. Unfortunately, Mrs Greive appears to have been a less than efficient barracks mistress. In this entry she was chastised by the Alderman for failing to keep the barracks fit for habitation by five companies of Colonel Howard's regiment stationed in the town.

addition to this officers often required servants and attendants to maintain their personal belongings and to tend to personal affairs. Furthermore, the building and repairing of military buildings also had a noticeable impact. Most of the contracts to build the barracks at Berwick and Tynemouth went to local merchants, and provided employment to the region's skilled labourers. During October 1717 a local freeman of Berwick named John Tully was given permission to use the town's moor to grow hay for the 600,000 bricks to be used in the construction of the barracks.[245] This must have represented one of the single largest orders given to local bricklayers during the entire eighteenth century.[246] While the above examples concentrate on Berwick they are fairly generic for all towns that had a regular army presence. There is no reason to suggest that other North-East communities such as Newcastle and Morpeth did not benefit the way Berwick did. An experience similar to Berwick's would have occurred in Tynemouth at the time of the expansion and improvement of their barracks and defences in mid-century.

Soldiers also played less obvious, but equally beneficial, economic roles within local communities. This was especially true of invalid troops who tended remain in one place for a long period of time. Due to the easy nature of their garrison duty these troops had much more time for integration with the civilian population. It was not unusual for invalid and even regular soldiers to use their spare time to practice civilian trades or assist local farmers with the harvest.[247] James Douet believes that in England's garrison towns it was commonplace for soldiers to engage in part-time work whether it was legal or illegal.[248] John Childs supports this conclusion believing that 'moonlighting must have been the norm rather than the exception' in garrison towns.[249] For a time the government actually encouraged such enterprise by issuing instructions that 'private soldiers may be permitted to work at their trades, in the several garrisons' about the country.[250] However, as the century progressed, this attitude does not appear to have been universally popular. In 1757 Thomas Clark, an invalid solider resident in Berwick, was presented to the quarter sessions charged with

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[245] BTRO GB 1/15/25, 4 October 1717.
[246] Ibid.
[247] Brenchley, A Place By Itself, 143.
[248] Douet, British Barracks, 39.
[249] Childs, The British Army of William III, 117.

'keeping an open shop' in the Churchgate quarter of the town.[251] He was subsequently ordered to close down his fledgling business.[252] Importantly, this casual labour may have helped to bridge the rift that often existed between the different lifestyles and experiences of civilians and soldiers.[253]

Members of the army were also involved in many of the public celebrations and thanksgiving events that occurred throughout the century. This was certainly true of events that marked the anniversary of a royal coronation or birthday. On 11 June 1735 General Core's regiment was at the centre of the festivities surrounding the anniversary of George II's ascent to the throne. In Newcastle the mayor gave money to the soldiers quartered there who marched and fired their muskets between drinks to the health of the King.[254] At the same time the officers from the regiment were guests at a 'grand entertainment' hosted by members of the council and local grandees.[255] In fact units of the army or the militia were a central part of every major occasion in Berwick and Newcastle throughout the period. Beyond this, officers and enlisted men also demonstrated martial skills and discharged celebratory volleys upon receiving good news from the world's battlefields.[256] This was certainly true during the Seven Years War when a succession of military victories led to public celebrations throughout the region.[257] However, such public demonstrations did not have to revolve around great military victories or regal anniversaries. In 1762 units of the army and militia fired public salutes to recognise Queen Charlotte having given birth to the heir to Britain's throne.[258] These ceremonies saw civilians and soldiers engaged in positive interaction.

The most notable and obvious benefit provided by the presence of the military in the towns and countryside of the North East was the heightened level of security from

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[250] PRO WO 4/1/48, Secretary at War to Sir John Reresby, 1 March 1686.
[251] BTRO C8/2, 18 April 1757.
[252] Ibid.
[253] Childs, The British Army of William III, 117.
[254] Sykes, Local Records, 151.
[255] Ibid.
[256] It has been suggested that as the eighteenth century progressed, the veneration of the army for its military successes increased as part of a slowly emergent British patriotic identity. For more on this issue see: Linda Colley, Britons, Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
[257] Ibid.

internal and external threats. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, troops acted as a nascent police force, subduing smuggling and conveying and guarding prisoners. Furthermore, they assisted in maintaining public order. Although this often brought them into open conflict with some local civilians, their actions helped to maintain order and ensure the economic and social peace of a region often rocked by labour unrest. While this tended to benefit those with interests in the maintenance of the status quo, riot duty was central to the well being of the region. Certainly local leaders in Tynemouth were aware of the military and security benefits of having entire regiments permanently stationed in the castle's barracks.[259]

Most importantly for this strategically important region of England, the garrisons at Berwick, Newcastle and other places countered repeated threats of foreign invasion during the endemic wars of the period. If this benefit was not already obvious to the populace, then the role of the army in the North East during the 1715 and 1745 Jacobite rebellions made it plainly clear. In 1715 the army acted to turn back a threatened invasion from Scotland. Similarly, a party of soldiers from Berwick, assisted by armed townsmen, 'retook Holy Island' from the Jacobite force that had occupied it.[260] The group was rewarded with a gift of the King's share of brandy that had been seized from the ship that had conveyed the invaders to the island.[261] During the rebellion of 1745 thousands of soldiers were stationed in the region and helped, not only to repel the Jacobite invasion, but reinforce the resolve of the local community by providing a sense of security at a very anxious moment. As will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 7, this represented the highpoint of local public appreciation for the army and its soldiers.

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[258] Ibid, 238.
[259] PRO WO 1/990, Lt. Col. David Wedderburn to Lord Barrington, 20 August 1769. They also recognised the financial benefits.
[260] BTRO GB 9/1, 9 November 1715. This is a good example of civilians and soldiers working in harmony when a shared threat arose. This trend will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 7.
[261] Ibid.

VII. Conclusion

The presence of soldiers, whether in permanent garrisons or temporary billets, exposed the population of the North East to a wide variety of experiences with the army. The very nature of the way in which troops were quartered meant that interaction between military personnel and civilians was regular and sustained. Even Berwick, whose permanent barracks reduced the visibility of the forces after 1719, had a strong and lasting relationship with the soldiers.[262] Because soldiers lived within local communities, in some ways they became a part of it. They integrated with, and contributed to the community in a variety of ways. This does not mean that civilians necessarily saw the soldier as one of their own, or as total equals, but rather as a familiar part of daily life.

In any close relationship such as that experienced by the army and civilian society, personal relationships were important. Since the army was a male preserve sexual politics were particularly relevant. Unfortunately, flaws and gaps in the region's archival record for this period mean that little specific detail can be extracted to shed light on the way in which romantic or sexual relations developed between garrisoned soldiers and local women. Marriages occurred, and increased during periods of war, but it is hard to determine specific conclusions from the material available. One thing that does become apparent is the tension and concern that was generated in the garrison town of Berwick by the issue of bastardy. The role of the soldier in this social problem was considerable in the early part of the century, before the building of barracks in 1719 eased the crisis. Whether through legitimate relationships or prostitutes, bastards were both a financial burden and a moral concern in Berwick. While there is evidence to suggest that soldiers were responsible for fathering bastard children throughout the region the problem seems to have been especially troublesome in Berwick.

Apart from bastardy, the maintenance of the region's military infrastructure seems to have generated tension amongst the army and civilians. Much of this was engendered in political conflicts related to the jurisdiction of engineers and officers over public land and the improvement of military buildings. Fortunately, the majority of these disagreements seem to have been solved with a minimal amount of negative residue. Local officials in the region's towns were conscious of their rights and jurisdictions and were not afraid to use the avenues of protest available to them to resolve problems. This was especially true of the leadership of Berwick which had experience

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[262] Brenchley, A Place by Itself, 137.

with this kind of conflict throughout the century. The examples available tend to illustrate that the government in London was also willing to utilise its political power to reinforce civilian authority over the military and contribute to ending these conflicts quickly. The War Office did not hesitate to pull officers and Ordnance engineers into line if it felt that a community's interests had been violated. Ministers and administrative grandees also recognised that the protests of garrison communities needed to be taken seriously if the government was to count on the continued support and goodwill of these towns.

Unfortunately, the central government was unable to deal as efficiently with the problems that arose from billeting and quartering. During the disruption of the Glorious Revolution and the financial crisis of 1696-7, as well as the first two decades of the eighteenth century, the short-comings of the army pay and finance systems placed great pressures on North-East communities. Towns such as Berwick and Tynemouth were often required to subsidise soldiers' living and subsistence costs out of their own pockets. This generated a great deal of anger amongst the local population. However, there is little evidence to suggest that consternation over the financial burden of billeting was directed towards soldiers themselves. Rather the dissent was ultimately placed at the foot of the government in London. Nevertheless, the situation became so desperate on occasions that soldiers eventually suffered at the hands of the local population. Even though a great deal of stress and anxiety swept the North East over this issue, civilians were often prepared to assist the soldiers in a number of ways. Berwick and Tynemouth, with their considerable garrisons and relatively small civilian populations, made great efforts to ensure that money was supplied to subsist and house soldiers in need. Cynically, it could be argued that the motivation for such generosity was fear that a hungry and penniless soldiery could turn on the local population such as they did in Berwick during 1689.[263]

However, there appears to have been a genuine concern on behalf of the civilians to the plight of the soldiers, coupled with a realisation of the impact such situations had on the local economy. John Childs believes that 'common humanity towards the underpaid and starving soldiery, as well as economic necessity, probably lay at the root of the goodwill' shown to soldiers in the late seventeenth century.[264] There is no reason to suggest that this was still not the case in the early eighteenth century. In fact it is surprising that the strain caused by billeting did not produce more lasting and entrenched problems for civil-military relations.[265] Andrew Coleby has argued that

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[263] BTRO GB 1/13. 14 December 1689.
[264] Childs, The British Army of William III, 98.
[265] Ibid., 97-8; Brenchley, A Place by Itself, 140.

the nature of civil-military relations differed between communities that played host to soldiers on a regular basis, and those that were visited by regiments on rare occasions.[266] In particular, he believes that those societies with a permanent or regular military presence were more accepting of the soldiers than localities whose experiences were based on short-term interaction. This may help to explain the level of support afforded to soldiers in need. As the eighteenth century passed the financial problems of the army eased. This seems to have helped alleviate some of the pressure that was underpinning civil-military relations in region's towns. Additionally, the completion of Berwick's barracks in 1719 helped to lessen that town's particular dilemma. Unfortunately, the burden that billeting and the distribution of forces placed on landlords and innkeepers continued unabated into the nineteenth century.

Billeting and garrisons caused a myriad of problems for many local communities, but there were also clear benefits associated with the presence of soldiers. As has already been suggested, many garrison communities had very close economic links to their military populations. The army, for all of its financial problems in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, represented a huge source of public expenditure and created employment opportunities throughout the region. Similarly, soldiers often contributed directly to the local economy by undertaking civilian jobs and engaging in commerce. At the same time the army assisted the civilian population during emergencies such as major fires, and actively participated in many public celebrations and ceremonies. This included celebrations of military victories. Most importantly for the North East was the part that the army exercised in guaranteeing an element of regional security, social peace and protection from external threats.

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[266] Andrew Coleby, 'Military-Civilian Relations on the Solent 1651-1689.' The Historical Journal 29 (4) (1986) 958.

Chapter 5

Men Behaving Badly?
Soldier Criminality and Civil-Military Relations.

'They disturb markets and fairs, rob men on the highway, ravish women, breaking houses in the night and enforcing men to ransom themselves, killing men that have assisted constables that have come to keep the peace.'

Sir Walter Erle, 8 April 1628[1]

I. Introduction.

The issue of interactions between soldiers, the army and civilians in the North East is central to this work. As Chapter 4 has illustrated this intercourse came in a number of ways and exerted a myriad of forces, both positive and negative, upon the relationship that existed between the army and North-East society. However, any discussion of civil-military relations must look at the role of the soldiery in criminal activity in the region. Such was the reputation of the army for involvement in flagitious and anti-social behaviour that it has led many to believe that the army was a breeding ground for unlawful activity. Similarly, the impression that towns hosting regiments were subject to unusually high levels of crime must be addressed. Gwenda Morgan and Peter Rushton indicate that soldiers based in the North East "rapidly became an irritant...and contributed to their share of theft, rapine and homicide."[2] The frequency and pattern of crimes committed by soldiers against the civilian population could weigh heavily on the relationship between these two groups. On the other hand it is equally important to analyse the types of crimes perpetrated against the soldiery by civilians. By doing this it may be possible to uncover some underlying sources of civil-military tensions within the North East.

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[1] Quoted in: Paul Christianson, 'Arguments on Billeting and Martial Law in the Parliament of 1628.' The Historical Journal 37 (3) (1994) 548.

Despite its role in eighteenth-century Britain, and increasing interest amongst historians in the subject of crime, the specific role of the army in crime has had little in the way of detailed analysis. Many studies develop issues of eighteenth-century military criminality in Britain through reference to accounts given by government officials, army officers and other contemporary observers.[3] It is important that these interpretations are subjected to deeper and more complete analysis to see if they truly reflect the reality of the time or represent personalised views of this topic. Some historians including Arthur Gilbert, Stephen R. Conway and John Childs have produced works specifically dealing with the issue of criminality within the armed forces during the eighteenth century.[4] While being important works themselves, many of these studies relate strictly to justice and malfeasance in the army or navy. As such they are not concerned with the wider implications of soldier criminality on civil-military relations or British society.[5] In terms of the specific impact of soldier criminality on civil-military relations in North-East England, nothing comprehensive has been written for the eighteenth century. What treatment has been given to the subject is entrenched within wider studies of regional criminality and localities.[6] To truly understand the impact of soldier criminality on this relationship one must ask several questions of the archival evidence. These include whether the army accounted for a disproportionate number of certain crimes, as well as the type of felonies that

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[2] Morgan and Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law: The Problem of Law Enforcement in North-East England (London: UCL Press, 1998), 202.

[3] Examples of this approach can be found in: Ian R. Christie, Stress and Stability in Late Eighteenth-Century Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Victor E. Neuburg, 'The British Army in the Eighteenth Century.' Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research, 61 (1983) 38-47.

[4] I refer to Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats. The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); John D Byrn, Crime and Punishment in the Royal Navy. Discipline on the Leeward Islands Station 1784-1812 (Aldershot: Scholar Press, 1989); John Childs, 'War, Crime Waves and the English Army in the Late Seventeenth Century.' War and Society, 15 (2) (1997) 1-17; Arthur Gilbert, 'Military and Civilian Justice in Eighteenth Century England: An Assessment.' Journal of British Studies 17 (1978) 41-65 and: 'The Regimental Courts Martial in the Eighteenth-Century British Army.' Albion 8 (1976) 50-66; N.A.M. Rodger, The Wooden World. An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986) and: 'Stragglers and Deserters From the Royal Navy During the Seven Years War.' Bulletin of the Institute for Historical Research 57 (135) (1984) 56-79; Stephen Conway, 'The Recruitment of Criminals into the British Army, 1775-81.' BIHR 58 (1985) 46-58; Silvia Frey, 'Courts and Cats: British Military Justice in the Eighteenth Century.' Military Affairs 43 (1979) 5-11.

[5] Childs and Brumwell link criminality to issues of civil-military relations. Childs, 'War, Crime Waves and the English Army'; Brumwell, Redcoats.

[6] These are: Joanna Bath, Violence and Violent Crime in the North East, c.1650-1720, (Ph.D Thesis, University of the Newcastle upon Tyne, 2001); David Brenchley, A Place by Itself. Berwick upon Tweed in the Eighteenth Century (Berwick upon Tweed: Berwick upon Tweed Civic Society, 1997); Morgan and Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law.

were committed, and how much this lawbreaking mirrored what was occurring in civilian criminal trends?

II. Frameworks, Themes and Analysis

At this point it is important to discuss the way in which crimes and soldiers' criminal activity will be analysed and applied within this chapter. First, all cases of crime have been calculated by the individuals tried for the crime rather than the number of cases brought before the courts. This has been done to show the actual numbers of people charged. Often soldiers and civilians committed crimes, not as individuals, but in a group. This is particularly true of more serious crimes such as assaults and robberies. For example, in 1745 two soldiers were charged with a robbery upon a Mr. Thomas Dodds, and in the following year five women assaulted Ann Rowday in Newcastle.[7] From this it is easy to observe why it is essential to distinguish the individuals involved. Looking strictly at the number of crimes might not express the true level or nature of soldiers' involvement in criminal activity, or its effect on civilians within the local community.

Secondly, certain activity that appears in criminal records, such as regional quarter sessions, has been consciously omitted from the statistics. This has been done due to the fact that their inclusion would not fairly represent the involvement of both civilians and military personnel. For the most part, these infractions include misdemeanours that soldiers were normally not involved in. They tended to be 'quality of life' issues within the town and included things like the illegal setting up of stalls in the streets, the piling of dirt and rubbish before a house, possession of dangerous overhanging walls and chimneys, and letting swine run free in the streets. As such their inclusion would be misrepresentative of the true level of soldier's participation in crime, making it appear less than it should be. In a similar fashion other minor personal crimes such as practising a trade without apprenticeship or

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[7] PRO ASSI 45/23/1/19h-m, 49d-g; Newcastle Courant, 1745; TWAS QS/NC/1/7/24b, Easter Sessions 1746.

illegally using common fields have not been included.[8] The intention of this chapter is to analyse what I consider to be 'mainstream' crimes in which soldiers participated.[9] It is hoped that by adopting this process one can project a more accurate, uncluttered and less subjective analysis of soldiers' involvement in criminal activity. Finally, a crime committed by a soldier is only recorded as such when the source material gives direct indication, through a description of the crime or individual, that the perpetrator is a military person. I have consciously avoided making speculations about whether or not someone 'might be' a soldier if there is no archival evidence to support such conclusions.

There are some problems with trying to gauge the exact levels of crime within the eighteenth-century North East, and many are related to the nature of the archival sources available.[10] There are a number of specific examples at the local and national levels that highlight the problems inherent in this form of analysis. The holdings of the Assizes of the Northern Circuit have, in places, some serious defects.[11] For example, there are no records in the period 1700-6, and this is followed by a seventeen year block (1707-1723) in which only the case records for Yorkshire remain in existence.[12] A similar situation exists for 1725, 1727 and 1730-1733. Additionally the records for 1693-1698 as well as 1724, 1726, and 1728-9 are very weak. This effectively means that with the exception of 1699 there is almost a forty-year period in which the assize records give us little or no detail about crimes in the North East. Further illustrations of this problem can be seen in the quarter sessions holdings of the Berwick Record Office. These records contain major gaps between 1717 and 1740, to the point that there is almost no information for criminal cases.[13] For this reason it is certain that the totals given for crimes committed in Berwick fall short of the actual numbers brought before the court. It is possible to fill in some of these gaps by utilising quarter session examinations, however, after 1772 records of criminal cases

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[8] Although rioting was considered a criminal offence this topic will be discussed in detail in Chapte 6.
[9] These crimes will include murder, theft, robbery, assault, fraud, sedition and rape.
[10] For additional discussion of the problems inherent in calculating and quantifying eighteenth-century crime see: Morgan and Rushton, Rogues, Theives and the Rule of Law, 47-50.
[11] PRO ASSI 45/15/2-38/1, Northern Circuit Assize Records 1688-1793.
[12] It appears as though the records for Northumbria, Cumberland and Westmorland have been completely lost.
[13] These records are: BRO C8/1-4a, Quarter Sessions Books, 7 July 1694 to 26 April 1805.

are limited.[14]

Probably the weakest sets of criminal records are those dealing with the city of Newcastle upon Tyne.[15] The quarter sessions papers, which usually hold the most useful detail of cases, are very discontinuous, including 67 years between 1688 and 1793 where there are no records at all.[16] Unfortunately, even for those years that still remain, the information available is in poor condition with some documents being wholly unreadable. In fact the documents in this class, up to 1742, were so poor that no information could be taken from them.[17] Again, as with Berwick, some of these gaps were filled by using alternative sources, such as quarter sessions order books.[18] These volumes provide lists of all people tried for crimes, including their occupations and the offences they were charged with.[19] However, very often these sources do not include the detail one would like. There are additional resources that can be used to help fill the gaps in the archival record. In particular, local newspapers such as the *Newcastle Courant* and the *Newcastle Journal* are excellent tools for supplementing primary sources.[20] The trials and executions of soldiers charged with crimes were often described within such periodicals, even if no supporting case record remains in national or regional archival sources.

III. Crime and the Rule of Law in the North East.

While this is primarily a study of civil-military relations it is important to briefly put this chapter into a wider context by looking at the nature of crime in the eighteenth century, particularly in the North East. Looking at the trends that dominated civilian criminality during this period will be important when comparing this activity to that undertaken by the British soldiery. It will allow one to determine whether or not

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[14] BRO C15/14-16, Quarter Sessions Records, Misc., Examinations, 1700-1789.
[15] In particular TWAS QS/NC/35-104.
[16] The missing years are: 1688-92, 1696, 1698-1715, 1717-18, 1720-7, 1729-42, 1751, 1754-5, 1757-61, 1763-6, 1769-70, 1781, 1786, 1788-90.
[17] TWAS QS/NC/35-47. Quarter Sessions Papers, 1693-1742.
[18] TWAS QS/NC/1/3-8, Quarter Sessions Order Books, 9 October 1700 to 28 April 1802.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Complete sets of these newspapers are available on microfilm from both the Robinson Library, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, and the Local Studies Section at Newcastle Central Library.

soldiers were disproportionately represented in the crime statistics of the period and whether they were prone to certain types of infractions.

At a regional level the English legal system was presided over by a complex organisation of courts, magistrates and government officials.[21] At the head of this system was the Lord Lieutenant. Appointed by the monarch and generally charged with command over the county's militia, he was also responsible for the appointment of local men to the Commissions of the Peace.[22] Although appointed by the Lord Lieutenant, the Lord Chancellor in London had ultimate control over a region's legal officials, possessing the authority to dismiss any justice believed to be involved in what Norman Landau refers to as 'approbrious conduct'.[23] These justices of the peace, or magistrates as they were also known, tended to be men of some social standing and wealth and were responsible for all aspects of dispensing justice within the jurisdiction of their court.[24] The bulk of their duties did not involve overseeing criminal trials, but focused more on daily concerns such as the granting of licenses to public houses, the maintenance of gaols, the repair of roads and bridges and overseeing petitions to the Poor Law.[25]

The main body through which the justices exerted their power was the Court of Quarter Sessions.[26] It was the primary and supreme authority within the county. This court was not an arbitrary legal body, but rather embraced the key philosophy of trial by jury and was representative of the local legal establishment.[27] The jury was a body of local people whom, more often than not, originated from the skilled trades and the

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[21] For a very detailed analysis of the various county organisations please see: Sidney & Beatrice Webb, The Parish and the County (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1906)

[22] Clive Emsley, Policing and Its Context 1750-1870 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1983) 22.

[23] Norman Landau, The Justices of the Peace 1679-1760 (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1984) 125, 128-9

[24] This was especially true in Newcastle where many magistrates had personal business interests in the coal trade. Morgan and Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law, 200; The jurisdiction of the quarter sessions courts in the North East tended to be an entire county.

[25] The court was also responsible for the annual appointment of constables, petty constables and bailiffs who assisting the justices in carrying out the provisions of warrants, arresting criminals and generally enforcing the law.

[26] As the name suggests the court met four times annually during Epiphany (January), Easter (April), Midsummer (July) and Michaelmas (October).

[27] Normally every justice within its jurisdiction as well as sheriffs, bailiffs, constables, petty constables, and coroners were expected to attend the sessions.

middle classes.[28] Magistrates presiding over the quarter sessions could deal with criminal infractions as varied as theft, assault, vagrancy and poaching, while imposing sentences on guilty parties ranging from fines to public whippings and even transportation.[29] Linked to these proceedings were the petty sessions, also chaired by the justices of the county, but not answerable to any other county court. Unlike the quarter sessions the petty sessions only required the attendance of two justices to make a quorum. The courts were called together to deal with petty crimes and misdemeanours, some poor law cases and other county issues.

While the quarter and petty sessions were the primary instrument of the law within the county, the assize court was a central body, controlled from London, that had wide-ranging powers to deal with criminal trials in the counties. The assizes was the only court operating within the counties which could impose the death penalty or sentences involving transportation for life.[30] Because of this it tended to sit in judgement of the most serious crimes including major assaults, murder, rape and highway robbery. The court was constituted in much the same way as the quarter sessions and local justices and legal officers were expected to attend. The major difference was that the court was presided over by judicial representatives of the King's Bench. Unlike the quarter sessions, the assizes did not associate themselves with a single zone of legal jurisdiction, but rather held responsibility for a specific region of the country. The Assizes of the Northern Circuit, as it was known, was charged with hearing cases within a huge geographical zone that encompassed Newcastle, Northumberland, Cumberland, Yorkshire and Westmoreland.[31] The only places inside this jurisdiction

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[28] The jury lists for the Newcastle quarter sessions of 1744 contain 48 men including 18 merchants, 2 tailors, 4 cordwainers, 1 baker, 1 brewer, 3 saddlers, 2 dyers, 5 smiths, 2 weavers, 4 carpenters and 6 surgeons. TWAS QS/NC/50/2/1-2, Midsummer 1744.

[29] Quarter sessions could not sentence people to transportation for life. This was the strict purview of the assize courts. The decisions of the sessions could be reviewed and overturned by the judges sitting on the King's Bench in London.

[30] Records of the assize courts for the entire county can be found at the Public Records Office. The relevant records for Northumberland are: PRO ASSI 41, 42, 44, 45.

[31] The rotation of the assize court normally took it from Yorkshire to Newcastle (where Northumberland's assizes were also held) and finally to Carlisle (for Cumberland and Westmorland). Morgan and Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law, 19.

that were exempt from the power of the assize courts were Durham and Berwick upon Tweed.[32]

This surprisingly representative judicial system supported what Douglas Hay has referred to as 'one of the bloodiest criminal codes in Europe.'[33] Death was a common punishment for relatively minor offences, and in the period after the Glorious Revolution parliament passed so many capital statutes that soon every type of theft and malicious damage could be punished by death. Hanging was a popular punishment for serious crimes such as murder, rape and theft, while whipping was commonly used for misdemeanours. Most executions and whippings took place in public where large crowds often came to watch.[34] Surprisingly, these types of punishments appear to have been used sparingly in the North East. There were just 73 known executions in the region (including Berwick) from 1718 until the beginning of the nineteenth century, while Northumberland normally witnessed one whipping every one or two years.[35] The endemic use of transportation after 1718 was another form of violence, this time psychological, which uprooted the criminal and sent them to an unknown and often harsh life in the American colonies.[36]

Naturally, criminal activity was not uniform throughout the century as it evolved and changed, influenced as it was by economics, politics and shifts within society itself.[37] For example, it has been observed that thefts increased at times when the supply of key foodstuffs was limited and subject to drastic price inflation.[38] This is certainly

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[32] Durham had its own assize court due to its role as a 'County Palatinate'. A royal charter of 1604 gave Berwick control over its own legal affairs allowing quarter sessions courts wider judicial powers, roughly equal to the of the assize courts. David Brenchley, A Place By Itself, 69, 79-80

[33] Douglas Hay, 'Property, Authority and the Criminal Law.' In: Hay, Linebaugh, et.al., Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (London: Penguin Books, 1975) 19.

[34] While meant to be a deterrent to crime the actual effect on public criminality is debatable. Between two-thirds and four-fifths of all whippings in the North East were public in the eighteenth century. Morgan and Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law, 134.

[35] Ibid., 135, 140.

[36] Ibid., 61, 73, 154. At Newcastle's assizes transportation accounted for half of all convictions for theft.

[37] A good example of this can be found in the debate surrounding the nature of violence in early-modern society. Susan Dwyer Amussen, 'Punishment, Discipline, and Power: The Social Meanings of Violence in Early-Modern England.' Journal of British Studies 34 (1995) 1-34; J.A. Sharpe, 'The History of Violence in England: Some Observations.' Past and Present 108 (1985) 206-15; Lawrence Stone, 'Interpersonal Violence in English Society 1300-1980' Past and Present 101 (1983) 22-33.

[38] Douglas Hay, 'War, Dearth and Theft in the Eighteenth Century: The Record of the English Courts.' Past and Present 95 (1982) 128-9.

true of Northumberland during the period of dearth around 1756, when thefts increased by 40 % during the year.[39] J.M. Beattie supports this argument when he highlights the fact that property crime appears to have declined during times of war as huge numbers of men were enlisted into the army.[40] Similarly, crime rates seem to have increased at the end of conflicts as thousands of men were discharged from the army.[41] While it is possible to detect national and even regional trends in statistics for property crime, similar tendencies might not be present in infractions such as rape, assault and murder. These were crimes of passion and tended not to be affected by wider social, economic or political influences.

The North East shared many common traits with the rest of the country when it came to criminal activity. Most importantly was the fact that trends in crime, and especially those related to property crimes, followed national variations. Nevertheless, recent historiography has suggested that the region was, in many ways, more law abiding than other areas of the country.[42] With the exception of a few unusual years, there is no evidence to suggest that crime rates in the region were ever going to threaten the fabric of society. The rate of reported crimes for Berwick was extremely low with only 415 people coming before the town's quarter sessions between 1694 and 1793.[43] Similarly, existing records for the city of Newcastle show 2,829 crimes being tried before various courts between 1700 and 1793.[44] Minor thefts and assaults made up the bulk of illegal activity in the region. Assault accounted for 43% of crimes in the entire region, while theft was the most common infraction representing almost half (48%) of all crimes brought before the courts.[45] Together these account for approximately 90% of all the criminal activity dealt with by the assizes and regional quarter sessions. At the same time very serious crimes such as rape and murder

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[39] MRO QSO/9.
[40] J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England 1660-1800 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1986) 215. In particular he identifies troughs in the years 1739-48, 1756-63, 1776-82, 1793-1815.
[41] For discussion on this see Childs, 'War, Crime Waves and the English Army.' The role of the disbanded soldier in crime within the North East will be dealt with in greater detail below.
[42] Morgan and Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law. This is the only large-scale study of crime in North-East England during the eighteenth century.
[43] A detailed breakdown of criminality can be found in Table 5.2 (Section V) below.
[44] For crimes in Newcastle see Table 5.3 below. It is likely that flaws in the records mean this number is much higher.
[45] See Table 5.2.

proved to be exceptionally rare.[46] In Northumberland, Newcastle and Berwick criminal records uncover only 81 cases of murder, attempted murder or manslaughter and just 37 incidents of rape.[47]

IV. A Conflict of Interest: The Army and the Jurisdiction of Common Law.

Before looking specifically at soldier's criminality in the North East it is important to observe the legal context in which such transgressions took place. During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries a distinct jurisdictional separation between the civilian and military criminal codes evolved. This development had an important effect on civil-military relations. The land forces continued to possess their own laws and judicial systems, in the form of martial law and the court martial. However, the army found itself increasingly answerable to the common law that protected civilian society and property. Offences committed against civilians, or those that broke the common law, gradually became the responsibility of civilian courts. At the same time, crimes committed against army personnel or military regulations were still to be dealt with in the court martial system.

Before William III's ascension to the throne there had been a mixture of confusion and outright ambivalence towards a system that placed soldiers on trial in civilian courts. However, this was not due entirely to the failings of the government in London. As early as the 1670's administrators such as the Duke of Monmouth were issuing orders to officers demanding that troops under their control, accused of crimes against the populace, be delivered over to the civilian authorities for trial.[48] Some officers were not sure what crimes this covered, while others simply refused to accept having their soldiers tried by civil courts. Many military leaders believed that common law courts were unfair and prejudiced against the army. The problem

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[46] These categories also include attempted rape, attempted murder and manslaughter.
[47] See Table 5.4: Soldiers As a Proportion of All Crimes (All North East) 1688-1793, and Table 5.2: Soldiers as a Proportion of All Crimes: Berwick, 1688-1793. A more general discussion of crime in eighteenth-century Berwick can be found in: David Brenchley, A Place By Itself
[48] Calendar of State Papers Domestic (CSPD) Charles II, 124, April 17 1679. In particular, this order is for the delivery of four soldiers to the mayor of Southampton who have been accused of a robbery and assault on three customs officers in Titchfield.

became so widespread that, as Sir Francis North noted in February 1681, a 'great observation is made that the soldiers pretend to be exempt from the civil magistrates.'[49] This confusion was exacerbated by the actions of James II.

In 1685 James II, ignoring the advice of the Secretary at War, William Blathwayt, felt it necessary to have all legal business involving the army referred to a weekly court martial held at Horse Guards in Whitehall.[50] The Judge Advocate General, George Clark, concluded that in doing this James had altered the accepted legal status of the army.[51] In turn this facilitated the belief amongst some officers that they were beyond the jurisdiction of the common law and thus distinct from civilian society.[52] It also added fuel to the accusation that James was attempting to protect the army from civilian control and bring it into his sphere of influence.

The confusing distinctions between the civilian and military law were legally clarified after the Glorious Revolution with the passing of annual Mutiny Acts and Articles of War. In the tradition of the 1688 revolution these rules unambiguously outlined the jurisdiction that the civilian legal authorities had over the army in terms of trying alleged crimes. It specifically noted that soldiers guilty of crimes against civilians or private property should be delivered 'to the Civil Magistrate so soon as applied to.'[53]

This position was further reinforced when parliament issued legislation in 1719 establishing that soldiers were to be punished under the common law for crimes against civilians or their property.[54] It also went on to state that soldiers could not be liable for any subsequent punishment by a court martial for the same crime, save being cashiered from the service.[55] This helped to entrench the supremacy of civilian law over the martial legal code in cases where military personnel perpetrated crimes against the public. It also had the effect of removing the blanket of secrecy

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[49] CSPD, Charles II, 182-3, February 25 1681.
[50] John Childs, The Army, James II, and the Glorious Revolution (New York: St. Martins Press, 1980) 91.
[51] Ibid, 91-94
[52] Ibid.,
[53] PRO WO 72/2. This particular extract was taken from Article 16 of the 1721 Articles of War.
[54] Mark A. Thompson, A Constitutional History of England, 1642-1801, Volume 4 (London: Methuen & Company, 1938) 296.
[55] Ibid.

surrounding the trials of soldiers that had existed in the closed-off world of the court martial. Now civilians could hear and read accounts of the crimes that soldiers exacted upon the population.[56]

Despite the existence of such legislation, jurisdictional wrangling between civilian governments and the military continued long after these laws were in place. Luckily the problem does not appear to have been an overtly serious one in the North East, and the post-revolutionary clarification seems to have been largely obeyed. Nevertheless, in Berwick the question of jurisdiction was subject to occasional confusion well into the eighteenth century. In April 1731, a serious dispute arose between officers of Lord Cadogan's regiment in the garrison and the leaders of the town over the legal status of soldiers who had committed crimes against civilians. The mayor of Berwick reiterated the powers of the magistracy to arrest and try soldiers in common courts.[57] However, the officers concerned pretended 'that the civil magistrates have not a power to call before them any of the soldiery in case of offences…without an application first made to the commanding officer.'[58]

Such were the negative feelings engendered by this conflict that officers of the garrison were accused by the town's businessmen of attempting to influence soldiers not to buy goods from the burgesses who had supported the mayor.[59] Since it appeared that the town was to suffer as a result, and that the garrison would not back down, it was agreed to send a letter of petition to London.[60] However, in an attempt to end any further conflict the mayor called a meeting between himself and the officers of the garrison a few days later. At this parley the mayor informed them of the town's letter to the government in London.[61] This seems to have tipped the scales in favour of the mayor and his followers. Almost immediately the officers agreed that they 'would no longer insist upon it that the civil magistrate had no power over their

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[56] Reports of the trials, sentencing and executions were often reported in the major newspapers of the region. These are mainly the Newcastle Courant and the Newcastle Journal.
[57] BRO GB 1/16/88, 24 April 1731.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid., 1/16/89, 28 April 1731

soldiers in criminal matters without the concurrence of their officers'.[62] They also made a further concession that they would 'give out orders to their soldiers that they might be at liberty to spend their money in what houses they saw fit.'[63] It seems that the threat posed by the letter to London was enough to make the officers give up their resistance before incurring the wrath of the government and the War Office. Whether this sudden change of heart is a sign of complicity by Cadogen's officers is not known.

V. The Usual Suspects? Trends in Soldier Criminality Within Civilian Society.

Like their civilian counterparts, members of the army were involved in a wide variety of criminal activities. Soldiers committed rapes, participated in killings, stole animals and other goods, and engaged in fraud such as illegal coining and bigamy. It is not really the variegated talents of the army's criminals that are of interest to this study. However, it is necessary to analyse where troops tended to focus their iniquitous energies to see if these men were prone to particular forms of criminality. These trends may provide an insight into the effects that nefarious soldiers had on the relationship between the army and the civilian populations of North-East England.

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[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.

Table 5.1: Soldiers as a Proportion of Identifiable Crimes, Northumberland, 1688-1793[64]

Crime	Soldiers	Total Crimes	% Soldiers	% Civilians
Assault	9	1110	0.7%	99.3%
Theft[65]	4	1173	0.4%	99.6%
Rape[66]	1	16	6.3%	93.7%
Robbery[67]	3	130	2.3%	72.8%
Sedition	0	5	0.0%	100.0%
Murder[68]	3	34	8.8%	91.2%
Fraud	0	68	0.0%	100.0%
Totals	20	2536	0.9%	99.1%

Table 5.2: Soldiers as a Proportion of Identifiable Crimes, Berwick, 1688-1793.

Crime	Soldiers	Total Crimes	% Soldiers	% Civilians
Assault	3	230	1.3	98.7
Theft	4	122	3.3	96.7
Rape	1	7	14.3	85.7
Robbery	0	18	0.00	100.0
Sedition	0	0	0.00	100.0
Murder	3	8	37.5	62.5
Fraud	0	30	0.00	100.0
Totals	11	415	2.7	97.3

Table 5.3: Soldiers as a Proportion of Identifiable Crimes, Newcastle, 1700-1793

Crime	Soldiers	Total Crimes	% Soldiers	% Civilians
Assault	5	1130	0.4%	99.6%
Theft	16	1484	0.7%	99.3%
Rape	0	14	0.0%	100.0%
Robbery	16	41	39.0%	61.0%
Sedition	2	8	25.0%	75.0%
Murder	8	39	20.5%	79.5%
Fraud	2	113	1.8%	98.2%
Totals	49	2829	1.7%	98.3%

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[64] Please note that the following tables do not include miscellaneous or unknown crimes committed by soldiers or civilians. For a complete list of all soldier crimes please see Tables 5.5 & 5.6.
[65] This charge includes any cases of stealing private or public property from a house, store, market stall or other buildings. It also includes crimes where the theft was committed after a forceful entry.
[66] This category also includes attempted rapes.
[67] Robbery refers to the taking of money or private property directly from one or more persons rather than from a house or store. It may also include an assault of the victim(s) with the aim of taking their property. A similar distinction between robbery and theft is employed in: J Bath, Violence and Violent Crime in the North East, 271.
[68] This also includes attempted murder where it is specifically stated in the court records.

Table 5.4: Soldiers as a Proportion of Identifiable Crimes (All Regions), 1688-1793.[69]

Crime	Berwick		Newcastle & Northumb.		Crime Totals		% of Totals	
	Sold.[70]	Total[71]	Sold.	Total	Sold.	Total	Sold.	Civ.
Assault	3	230	14	2240	17	2470	0.6%	99.4%
Theft	4	122	20	2657	24	2779	0.7%	99.3%
Rape	1	7	1	30	2	37	5.4%	94.6%
Robbery	0	18	19	171	19	189	11.6%	88.4%
Sedition	0	0	2	13	2	13	15.3%	84.7%
Murder	3	8	11	73	14	81	17.2%	82.8%
Fraud	0	30	2	181	2	211	0.9%	99.1%
Total	11	415	69	5365	80	5780	1.4%	98.6%

Table 5.5: All Crimes Committed by Soldiers (All Jurisdictions), 1688-1793[72]

Crime	Newcastle	Northumb	Berwick	Total
Assault	5	9	3	17
Theft	16	4	4	24
Rape	0	1	1	2
Robbery	16	3	0	19
Sedition	2	0	0	2
Murder	8	3	3	14
Fraud	2	0	0	2
Unknown	2	0	2	4
Total	51	20	13	84
% Total	60.7	23.8	15.5	

Table 5.6: Soldiers' Crimes by Rank, 1688-1793.[73]

Crime	Private	N.C.O.	Officer	Totals
Assault	16	0	1	17
Theft	22	2	0	24
Rape	1	0	1	2
Robbery	18	1	0	19
Sedition	2	0	0	2
Murder	10	1	3	14
Fraud	2	0	0	2
Unknown	4	0	0	4
Totals	75	4	5	84
% of Totals	89.3	4.7	6.0	

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[69] These totals include records from all regional quarter sessions as well as the Assizes for the Northern Circuit.
[70] All crimes attributed to soldiers
[71] Total of all crimes in this category including civilians and soldiers
[72] This includes any crimes for which the category is unknown.
[73] This is calculated by individual soldiers tried rather than number of crimes committed.

Table 5.7: Soldiers' Crimes In War and Peace.

Dates	Event	Crimes	Date	Event	Crimes
1688-1697	War	7	1739-1748	War	9
1698-1701	Peace	0	1749-1755	Peace	10
1702-1713	War	2	1756-1763	War	15
1714-1717	Peace	1	1764-1774	Peace	17
1718-1720	War	1	1775-1783	War	12
1721-1738	Peace	2	1784-1792	Peace	8

Table 5.8: Sentences of Soldiers Tried for Crimes, 1688-1793.

Sentence	Number	% of Total
Acquitted	14	16.6
Death	5	5.9
Whipped & Drummed Out of Regiment	5[74]	5.9
Guilty but No Sentence	5	5.9
Transportation: i) 7 Years ii) 14 Years iv) Life	5 0 0	5.9 0 0
Death but Reprieved to Transportation	4[75]	4.7
Guilty but Pardoned	2	2.4
Gaol (1 Year)	1	1.2
Unknown Result	43	51.2
Total	84	99.7

An analysis of regional criminal records and those of the assize courts highlights the level of army involvement in regional criminality. Of all the crimes that fall into the categories used in Table 5.4, 80 (1.4%) were committed by men specifically noted as being soldiers, militiamen or invalid troops in the North East.[76] The total number of crimes by soldiers in the region is actually slightly higher at 84, but four of these violations (two each in Newcastle and Berwick) cannot be classified so they were not included in the calculations in Table 5.4.[77] Nevertheless, these missing figures have little impact on the overall representative percentages of army crime within the region. In terms of individual population centres, a similar trend emerges. Soldiers make up 1.7% of the total crime in Newcastle and less than 1% in the county of

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[74] Three of the punishments were for the same theft. Two of the whippings were of 400 lashes and the third was 800 lashes, Newcastle Courant, 2932, 3 March 1750.
[75] Two transported for seven years and two for 14 years.
[76] See above.
[77] Table 5.6 lists all crimes, even those that cannot be categorised, for the entire region.

Northumberland.[78] Berwick has the highest rate of soldier criminality accounting for 2.7% of all violations.[79] It is immediately noticeable that these figures, although not complete, illustrate the level to which troops were involved in local crimes. It does not appear that soldiers were disproportionately responsible for crime in the North East. This is supported by recent scholarship that suggests the rate of criminal activity by soldiers was probably comparable to civilians of the same social status.[80]

It is interesting to note that in absolute terms there is a similar trend present in crimes committed by both civilians and soldiers.[81] Crimes that are most numerous amongst civilians tended to be most common for the army as well. For example, in civilian society theft is the most numerous violation followed by assault, fraud and robbery.[82] At the same time soldiers most frequently perpetrated the crimes of robbery, theft and assault.[83] There are only two serious exceptions in this model. The first is that fraud, while being the third most popular civilian crime, is very rare amongst the rank and file of the army with only two cases recorded.[84] In terms of robbery the opposite is true. In civilian society it ranks only fourth in the number of cases reported, but it is the army's most numerous offence.[85] Despite these two examples, the top five crimes in both the civilian and military populations match up four out of five times, if not in the exact same ranking. While this indicates some synergy in criminal trends between civilians and soldiers, looking at the rate of military crimes as a proportion of all regional criminality, highlights some intrinsic differences. It is these distinctions which paint an interesting picture of the nature of soldier criminality and its impact on North-East society.

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[78] See tables 5.1 and 5.3 above.
[79] See table 5.2.
[80] John Childs, 'War, Crime Waves and the English Army.' 7. He also notes that 'unless drunk or provoked, soldiers were not demonstrably more lawless than other social groups.'
[81] Table 5.4
[82] 42.7% of all civilian crimes were thefts and 48% assaults.
[83] Assault accounted for 21.25% of crimes committed by soldiers, while theft represents 30%.
[84] These include one count of counterfeiting and one of bigamy. PRO ASSI 45/23/4/11b-h, 10 January 1748 and PRO ASSI 45/34/4/220, 5 April 1783, respectively. Bigamy has been included in this category due to its fraudulent nature.
[85] Of crimes committed by soldiers, robbery was 23.75%, while it only represented 3.26% of civilian cases.

As was mentioned earlier, theft was the second most frequent crime amongst soldiers. However, when participation in this category is measured as a proportion of all thefts in the North East, it represents a minuscule 0.7%. In these terms theft comes second to last as a contribution to all crimes in the region. At the same time offences such as robbery and murder not only play a major role in the actual numbers of crimes tried but also a much greater part in terms of their proportionality within society. For example the number of soldiers tried for murder and manslaughter was just 14 but accounted for 17.2% of all such infractions committed in the region. Similarly, soldiers committed 11.6% of all robberies.

There is one final consideration to be made when looking at wider trends within solider criminality. While the absolute number of crimes committed by soldiers was low, as measured by the number of soldiers charged, the number that were found guilty was even less. Of the 44 trials of soldiers uncovered for the century, where the verdict of the court can be traced to surviving records, 14 were acquitted outright.[86] This represents almost 32% of such cases, and more than 16% of all crimes where soldiers were charged, regardless of outcome. It would also appear that soldiers found guilty of serious crimes were afforded the same consideration as civilians when it came to the remission of sentences. Nearly half of those originally sentenced to death had that judgement reduced to transportation of either seven or fourteen years. Likewise, two men found culpable by the courts received pardons from the crown for their transgressions. One of these was a bigamist named William Younge, and the other was John Brown of the 70th Regiment of Foot, found guilty of murder in 1776.[87] Unfortunately, it has been difficult to determine the fates of nearly half of the soldiers put on trial due to gaps in the historical record. For this reason it may be that conviction rates were higher.

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[86] See Table 5.8.
[87] PRO ASSI 45/32/2/34-7, 27 June 1776.

VI. Theft

While soldiers accounted for a tiny proportion of thefts in North-East society, numerically it was the most common crime committed by the army. This reinforces the prominent role that theft played in the criminality of the civilian population. Furthermore, the vast majority of cases involved the stealing of small amounts of personal or household goods such as clothes, cloth, silver spoons, pocket watches and small trinkets of little value.[88] One can clearly observe this by analysing the records of soldiers tried for their involvement in thefts.

The first instance appears in 1688 when Charles Ross was brought before the assizes.[89] After this there is a large gap with no mention of another case until 1733.[90] However, from this date there is a regular supply of records illustrating soldier's involvement in thefts. In 1749 an unnamed private was tried for stealing spoons, and during March of 1750 two soldiers from General Ancram's regiment were judged guilty of stealing a small amount of goods from a shop stall in Newcastle.[91] Just one month later Lord Ancram suffered another loss when George Porter was sentenced to 800 lashes and drummed out of the regiment for a like offence.[92] Two years later Richard Knowles was accused of breaking into several shops and stealing numerous items including 14 shillings in coin and several pairs of shoes.[93] Similarly, in Newcastle during 1755 a private and a grenadier from Folliet's Regiment of Foot were arrested and tried for breaking into shops and taking away five shirts, trousers, stockings, one waistcoat, some aprons and five pairs of shoes.[94] Soldiers also faced

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[88] In 1784 three privates from the 68th Regiment of Foot were accused of stealing a pocket-watch from Michael Thwaites of Coxlodge, where they were billeted at the time of the theft: PRO ASSI 45/35/1/149-50.

[89] PRO ASSI 45/15/2.

[90] William Johnston was sentenced to seven years transportation for burgling a Newcastle shop. Newcastle Courant, 433, 12 august 1733. This gap in the records may be due in part to the gaps in the assize records in this period.

[91] Newcastle Journal, 527, 10 July 1749; Newcastle Courant, 2932, 22 April 1750. Both were given 400 lashes and drummed out of the regiment.

[92] Newcastle Courant, 2932, 22 April 1750.

[93] PRO ASSI 45/24/4/80-2, 7 April 1752.

[94] Ibid., 45/25/4/48, 16 October 1755.

the courts in Newcastle and Berwick during 1762 and 1764 respectively.[95] Certainly, theft seems to have been a fairly regular offence throughout the century.[96]

In the summer of 1765 clothing played a central role in a richly detailed theft trial. During August, Robert and Elizabeth Hall of Newcastle testified how they had found a consignment of their clothing in the possession of two soldiers from the 6th Regiment of Foot then stationed at Newcastle.[97] The stolen goods included five linen shirts, six linen shifts, one linen sheet, a waistcoat and two tablecloths.[98] The soldiers were exposed by Elizabeth Cook, another local resident, who had heard of the theft and became suspicious when some of the soldiers came into her shop trying to sell several shifts of linen.[99] At first both soldiers denied the charge stating that they had found a bundle containing these goods in a ditch at Gateshead while picking nettles.[100] Later, one of the thieves, Paul Bampton, confessed that he and Daniel Parnell had passed the clothes on a washing line while walking from Gallowgate to the Town Moor.[101] The same evening the two soldiers returned to the house where they stole the goods. In 1775 William Clapham and Thomas Stanford were charged with stealing two pairs of leather shoes worth ten shillings.[102] Other items found on the person of Stanford included a piece of leather garter, four large buckle brushes and a number of pins.[103] Both of these incidents highlight the low intensity inherent in the majority of thefts committed by soldiers in the North East.

Theft of physically large items, or those of great value, was very rare but it did occur. The largest item recorded stolen by soldiers was livestock, but this was just a single case. In 1766 Richard Furber and three other accomplices, all of the 7th Regiment of

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[95] In 1762 Private William Vasey of the 32nd Regiment of Foot was sentenced to seven years transportation ASSI 45/26/6/48g-l; Newcastle Journal, 1212, 14 July 1762. In 1762 Thomas Fitzgerald of the 25th Regiment of Foot was tried at Berwick for stealing a silver watch. BTRO C15/15, 19 April 1764.

[96] Beyond those mentioned above, trial records or newspaper reports exist for 1765, 1766, 1768, 1775, 1778, 1784, 1787, 1790.

[97] The complete account of this case can be found in PRO ASSI 45/28/1/1b-g, 5 August 1765.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Ibid., 45/28/1/1f.

[101] Ibid.

[102] BTRO C 8/1, 24 April 1775.

[103] Ibid., 19 April 1775.

Foot, were tried for stealing sheep from a field near South Gosforth in Newcastle.[104] However, it was never their intention to transport the animals any great distance. The thieves not only took the sheep but they also killed and butchered them, most likely for personal consumption or to sell on.[105] In terms of money there is only one case in which a soldier is accused of stealing currency in any great amount. In 1768 a recruiting sergeant named Miller 'late of the town and county of Newcastle upon Tyne' was charged with stealing a bag of money from the barroom of a local publican.[106] The bag contained the sum of £44, 8s , a small fortune in the eighteenth century.[107]

A soldier's lifestyle made the theft of large items impractical, as he was too exposed to the scrutiny of his officers and comrades. Soldiers possessed little privacy, and as such they were unable to conceal large or overtly valuable items. At the same time a soldier on the march would not be able to transport a physically cumbersome item. This may be part of the motivation for sticking to small pieces that they could exchange for cash, food or drink, or retain as personal possessions. Furthermore, theft tended to be opportunistic in nature and limited to taking property that was readily at hand, as can be attested to by the small number of soldiers charged with house-breaking.[108]

On a few occasions soldiers not only committed thefts but they also seem to have supported and facilitated such criminal activity. Ann Lee and Hannah Steel were accused of stealing £7 in silver and one shilling in gold from a public house in Newcastle's Sandgate.[109] Testimony to the assize court indicates that they were in a room in the house, with a soldier named Francis Ansell, when the money went missing.[110] During their testimonies both Lee and Steel admitted to the theft, but Steel stated that she immediately passed the loot to Ansell.[111] Likewise, in 1780 an unnamed soldier was accused of creating a distraction that allowed his acquaintance

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[104] PRO ASSI 45/28/1/43b-m, 26 July 1766.
[105] Ibid., 45/28/1/43e.
[106] Ibid., 45/29/1/122, exact date unknown.
[107] Ibid.
[108] In 1755 two privates were charged with breaking into a Newcastle shop. PRO ASSI 45/25/4/48.
[109] Ibid., 45/25/3/65a-b, 9 April 1755.
[110] Ibid., 45/25/3/65a.

Elizabeth Bell to steal a watch and 15 guineas from Peter Nasehill.[112] In her confession Bell testified to the fact that the soldier, a sergeant from the 25th Regiment of Foot, had not taken part in the theft. Instead, he made a great amount of noise when he came crashing into the room, giving her the time to take these items.[113]

VII. Violent Crimes: Rape, Robbery, Assault and Murder

An interesting and somewhat worrying trend is the soldier's apparent propensity for criminal activity that contained an element of violence. While violent crime makes up a large proportion of the total number of civilian crimes (48%) it represents 65% of violations by soldiers.[114] The two most serious violent crimes are murder and robbery, and these represent the fourth and second most common soldier crimes respectively. As mentioned above, while the absolute numbers of offences may have been low, soldiers tend to be disproportionately represented compared to civilians.[115] Soldiers accounted for nearly 17% of the individuals charged for murder and 12% of those tried for robbery in the North East. This situation is even more pronounced when one looks at the individual communities concerned. Troops stationed in Newcastle for example, make up more than 20% of murder trials, while those in Berwick represented in excess of 37%.[116] This is vastly out of proportion to other crimes such as assault and theft, and is extremely high if one considers that such activity far outstripped the relative presence of army units in the region.

In terms of robbery these percentages are as high as 46% in Newcastle, but are surprisingly rare in the jurisdiction of Northumberland (2.3%) and non-existent in Berwick (0%). This differs greatly from the observations of Joanna Bath who notes that the absence of military men from robbery in the period 1650-1720 is surprising.[117]

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[111] Ibid., 45/25/3/65b.
[112] Ibid., 45/34/1/7, exact date unknown, 1780.
[113] Ibid., 45/34/1/8.
[114] An interesting treatment of the phenomenon of violence and violent crime in North-East society can be found in: Bath, Violence and Violent Crime.
[115] Records exist for 14 soldiers involved in murder and 19 soldiers committing robberies.
[116] See Tables 5.2 and 5.3 above.
[117] Bath, Violence and Violent Crime, 276. Her conclusion is that robberies may have been limited due to the tighter controls placed on the army.

In fact the first recorded account of robbery in my analysis does not occur until 1745.[118] A major factor behind this trend could be the nature of robbery. As has been discussed previously the charge of robbery, as defined in this chapter, relates to crimes in which one or more people are stopped while going about their business and forced to part with their possessions. In some respects this could be thought of as being similar to 'highway robbery', although this definition is wrought with Victorian notions of romanticism. The heavily travelled but fairly isolated spaces around Newcastle, and in particular the Town Moor and Shields Road, offered a fertile area in which to engage in such activities. This is not to say that robbers were not beyond committing such crimes in crowded areas. In August of 1770 a new recruit in the 17th Regiment of Foot was accused of robbing a fellow soldier at knifepoint in the middle of a Newcastle street.[119]

Unlike Newcastle, Berwick was a garrison town, which after the completion of its barracks in 1719 did not rely heavily on billeting to house soldiers. As a result the troops were mainly kept within the walls of the town and normally secured in purpose-built accommodation. This seems to have assisted in preventing soldiers from taking advantage of the region's isolated roads for the purpose of robbery. Northumberland, on the other hand, was a rural area possessing few major population centres but profuse with solitary areas that provided the perfect environment for committing robbery.[120] This may be one of the reasons behind the high number of civilian robberies in the region.[121] However, garrisons in this area tended to be much smaller and more dispersed than those at Tynemouth, Newcastle and Berwick so there were fewer soldiers available to commit such crimes.

Of the ten cases of robbery listed in the records eight were clear cases of 'highway' robbery while the other two occurred within the confines of Newcastle's city walls.[122] Additionally, of these ten cases half were committed by more than one soldier. It is

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[118] The case of George Dowdy. PRO ASSI 45/23/1/19h-m
[119] Ibid., 45/29/3/136c-e, 20 August 1770.
[120] The major towns of Northumberland were Hexham and Morpeth.
[121] There were 130 men tried for robbery in Northumberland while there were only 18 in Berwick and 41 in and around Newcastle.
[122] There were 19 soldiers tried for these crimes. Cases for robbery exist for 1745, 1748, 1756, 1759, 1770, 1773, 1776, 1780, 1781 and 1788.

possible that the group characteristic common in robberies by soldiers was related to the communal nature of a soldiers' life. Whether committed by a group, or by an individual, robbery of this kind tended to be inherently violent. The crime was one of compulsion where soldiers forced individuals to relinquish their personal possessions, often through the use beatings, knives, swords and pistols.

The intrinsic violence of robberies can be illustrated in the vicious treatment meted out to a young Newcastle woman in 1756. During September she was attacked by a pair of soldiers while on the road across Gateshead Fell. The men were attempting to steal her clothes, but unable to do so they threw the woman into a nearby open coal pit that was nearly 20 yards deep.[123] She was only rescued after lying in the pit for seven days.[124] In 1759 two soldiers robbed William Maddison of Byker near the Turnpike Bridge on the Shields Road.[125] One of the soldiers struck the victim on the head with the butt of his sword. Once on the ground the man was beaten severely, before having his pockets searched for loot.[126] Later in the century Andrew Mackenzie and Bernard Reay, two privates stationed in Newcastle with the 70th Regiment of Foot, subjected their victim to brutal violence.[127] On 8 January 1776 the two soldiers approached George Temple, a bricklayer from North Shields, who was making his way to Newcastle along the high road from North Shields. Reay and Mackenzie stopped Temple, and with their bayonets in hand, demanded his money.[128] When the man would not immediately comply he was beaten, cut and thrown to the ground, at which point the two soldiers emptied his pockets of two pence and a silver watch. As if this were not enough, they removed Temple's breeches and dragged him down the road, before throwing him into a ditch.[129]

All of the above examples are of soldiers robbing in pairs. However, soldiers were not just brazen and violent when they attacked travellers in numbers. Evidence of this can be found in the testimony given by Joseph Hall, a private of General Guise's

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[123] John Sykes, Local Records of Northumberland and Durham, Newcastle upon Tyne and Berwick upon Tweed, Vol.1 (Stockton on Tees: Patrick and Shotton, 1973) 202.
[124] Ibid.
[125] PRO ASSI 45/26/3/60b-c, 18 April 1759.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid., 45/32/2/103-5, January 1776.
[128] Ibid.

regiment.[130] In August of 1765 he went out on a highway near Newcastle (probably the Shields Road) with the intent of robbing people there. When a post chaise drove by he jumped out in front of it and fired his pistol at the driver in an attempt to stop the carriage. Fortunately, the gun misfired and the ball missed the driver, but the blast damaged his face.[131] Later, when Hall was apprehended by two men near Three Mile Bridge, he shot at them as well, but again the pistol misfired.[132] Such was the blatant disregard for life displayed by Hall that he was actually charged with attempted murder and sentenced to death for his crimes.[133] Similarly, John Grey of Morpeth described how he was robbed by a lone soldier on the highway between Alnwick and Morpeth.[134] During the robbery William Tennant, a private of the 25th Regiment of Foot, savagely beat Grey for no apparent reason to the point that the man feared he would be killed.[135]

As noted previously, robbery was not strictly limited to the isolated roads and byways of the region. Robbery could happen within the walls of a major population centre such as Newcastle, although incidents of this are rare. The first recorded case occurred in early August 1760 when Charles Stacey and John Portsmouth, both privates in the Royal Volunteer Regiment of Foot, attempted to rob two gentlemen and two ladies on the common footpath in the yard of St. John's church.[136] Stacey attested to the fact that he and some comrades had been drinking in the Bull's Head public house on Newcastle's Westgate Road. [137] On their way home at about 11 p.m. he and Portsmouth were accosted by the two gentlemen, James Clark and George Errington. Stacey admitted that he had knocked Errington down in the melee, but that they were not there to rob.[138] However, James Clark testified that the two soldiers approached the group and assaulted him. One of the soldiers, most likely Stacey,

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[129] Ibid., 45/32/2/105.
[130] Ibid., 45/28/1/28b-e, 5 August 1765; Newcastle Journal, 1369, 12 August 1765.
[131] Ibid., 45/28/1/28b, 5 August 1765.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Ibid., 45/28/1/28e.
[134] Ibid., 45/34/2/70, 6 December 1780. The crime took place on 2 December 1780.
[135] Ibid.,
[136] Ibid., 45/26/4/59j-l, 4 August 1760.
[137] Ibid., 45/26/4/59j.
[138] Ibid.

stood back to draw his sword, at which time Clark fled.[139] The soldier pursued him for a while but then gave up his chase and returned to the churchyard.[140]

Errington describes how the two soldiers threw him to the ground and beat him as they demanded money. When they realised Errington had none they fled.[141] It turns out that Stacey had been so afraid of being caught and tried for this crime that he absented his unit when they marched out of the town, and had actually been apprehended as a deserter in the first instance.[142] In the second and only other recorded incident of robbery within a northern population centre, a local yeoman by the name of William Mackie was accused of brandishing a knife to a soldier named Joseph Ward and robbing him of 14 pence after drinking with him in a pub.[143] What is interesting about this case is the fact that Mackie was described as 'a recruit of the said regiment.'[144] The fact that he was listed as a yeoman in the court records would indicate that his enlistment took place not long before the robbery, and possibly before he had been officially enlisted as a soldier.

It may appear that some cases of robbery were opportunistic, but in reality many soldiers planned to go out and commit these crimes. In 1756 soldiers agreed to meet on Newcastle's town moor and rob anyone who came across them.[145] In a similar fashion, William Henderson of the 19th Regiment of Foot, testified that one of his colleagues had planned to go robbing.[146] On the evening of 18 April 1759, Henderson was approached by Private James Barber who suggested that the two of them should leave their quarters and head to the Shields Road to rob people who came across them.[147] Several years later a private soldier by the name of John Smith stated how his accomplice James Quinton had first made the proposition that they go to the moor 'to try [and] get some money', a clear reference to robbery.[148] Further evidence exists

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[139] Ibid., 45/26/4/59k.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Ibid., 45/26/4/59l
[142] Ibid., 45/26/4/59j
[143] Ibid., 45/29/3/13c-d, 20 August 1770
[144] Ibid., 45/29/3/13d.
[145] Ibid., 45/26/1/56g, 28 December 1756
[146] Ibid., 45/26/3/60/b, 18 April 1759.
[147] Ibid.
[148] Ibid., 45/31/1/277, 16 February 1773.

which gives the impression that some soldiers had a familiarity with this crime. On a few occasions in the eighteenth century it emerges that individuals or groups of soldiers committed robberies on more than one occasion. In some instances the soldiers took on the appearance of a criminal gang, supplementing their meagre wages through this practice.

In August of 1757 three privates were tried for robbing 'a man [James Robson] on the Shields Road near the Easburn Bridge of a silver watch and four shillings and seven pence' during December 1756.[149] The soldiers had stopped him on his horse and threatened him with bayonets until he handed over the booty.[150] As the justices took statements from the accused soldiers it became apparent that this had not been their only dalliance with such criminal activity. One of the soldiers, William Horton, admitted that Robson had been only one of a number of victims whom he, Joyce Garth and Samuel Plant had robbed north east of the town.[151] Just the previous Saturday evening (11 December) the three had stolen six shillings from another man near the Turnpike Road leading across the Town Moor.[152] A few days before this they took three pence and a penknife from a woman walking on the same road going through Heaton towards North Shields.[153]

Pervasive and unprovoked violence, as well as a general lack of empathy towards their victims, is fairly typical of robberies committed by soldiers in the North East. The traditional image of gentlemen robbers such as Dick Turpin is a popular myth engendered by Victorian romanticism. Almost every robbery executed by members of the armed forces included direct assaults, or brutish and realistic threats of it. These actions were normally taken with the assistance of military props such as bayonets, swords and even pistols. Furthermore, most soldiers were so bold that they often committed these crimes while dressed in their regimental uniforms. In fact it is because soldiers were so conspicuous that the victims were often able to identify their attackers. One of the many examples of this is the case of Joyce Garth, who robbed

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[149] Ibid., 45/26/1/56e, 27 December 1756, Notes for the entire case are contained in papers 56b-k
[150] Ibid.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Ibid.
[153] Ibid.

James Robson in December of 1756, and who was identified by his uniform, despite trying to conceal it beneath a large grey coat.[154]

While robbery made up a large share of the total number of crimes committed by soldiers, as well as a high proportion of such crimes, murder was even more problematic. This was, and still is, the ultimate violent crime. As has been alluded to earlier the ratio of murder, attempted murder and manslaughter for which the army was responsible far exceeds that for robbery. Between 1688 and 1793 nine cases were tried, involving 14 soldiers.[155]

In May 1752 a brawl between a member of General Guise's Highlanders and a group of Newcastle men led to the death of a local civilian at the hands of a soldier. At about 10 p.m. a group of men became involved in an exchange of words with Ewan Macdonald, a recent recruit to Guise's regiment, who was billeted in a Bigg Market public house.[156] The argument grew into a brawl. At some point the men left the pub but Macdonald followed them out into the street. The soldier grabbed one of the men, a cooper by the name of Robert Parker, and 'wickedly stabbed him with a knife in the neck, in so desperate a manner that he [Parker] died immediately.'[157] If this were not enough Macdonald returned to the public house and broke another man's arm before being carried off to the guard-house by a file of musketeers.[158] Eventually, Macdonald was convicted of 'wilful murder' and was executed on Newcastle's town moor on 28 September 1752, aged just 19.[159]

The most detailed archival records that exist for such a murder case surround an incident during the summer of 1767. Late one night in August two local men named Michael Addison and John Hutton were walking home from a public house in Newcastle's Bigg Market when they were attacked without provocation by three

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[154] Ibid., 45/26/1/56f, 27 December 1756.
[155] Four murder cases (seven soldiers), two attempted murder (four soldiers), three manslaughter cases (three soldiers).
[156] Sykes, Local Records, 202.
[157] Ibid.
[158] Ibid.
[159] Ibid., 202-3. His body was taken to the Surgeon's Hall and 'dissected and anatomised.'

drummers of the 4th Regiment of Foot.[160] In the ensuing melee Hutton was struck, and slumped to the ground. Addison and some other onlookers dragged the unconscious man back to his home where he later died.[161] The surgeon who attended the victim stated to the court that he believed that the man's skull had been 'fractured from one ear to the other' and that he died as a result of these injuries.[162] Naturally, the drummers' recollection of the events was slightly different. One of the party, John Bowden, stated how he and his three comrades had been drinking in a pub named the Flying Horse near the Quayside. As they were making their way up to the 'high part of the town' they passed the two civilians, whom he describes as being drunk, and words were exchanged.[163] Hutton then pushed one of the drummers, named William Pearce, who responded by striking the civilian on the head before walking off.[164] There is little to indicate that the drummers knew they had played a role in the man's death as the original complaint filed against the four men was for common assault.[165] It was not until later that they were charged with Hutton's murder. Therefore, it is not surprising that under the circumstances the men were found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to be branded for this crime.[166]

In this incident soldiers and civilians came into confrontation with one another, which in turn led to violence that resulted in the death of a civilian. This is a rather interesting trend that runs through a number of murder, attempted murder and manslaughter cases in this period. It also points to the dangerous mix of soldiers, civilians and alcohol.[167] Another such incident took place in the early morning of 26 June 1776 in Newcastle's Sandgate district. John Brown, a private with the 70th Regiment of Foot, was involved in a disturbance that left a man dead, and himself facing trial for murder.[168] A civilian witness named Robert Clark stated to the court that he was in a public house in the Sandgate area when he heard a commotion coming

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[160] PRO ASSI 45/28/3/128-138, 17 August 1767.
[161] Ibid., 45/28/3/128.
[162] Ibid.
[163] Ibid., 45/28/3/129.
[164] Ibid.
[165] Ibid., 45/28/3/128.
[166] Ibid.
[167] It helps to reinforce the stereotypical role of drinking and drunkenness in the daily life of soldiers. For more on this see: P.E. Kopperman ''The Cheapest Pay' Alcohol Abuse in the Eighteenth-Century British Army.' Journal of Military History 60 (3) (1996) 445-70.
[168] The papers for this case can be found in: PRO ASSI 45/32/2/34-7, all 27 June 1776.

from the street outside.[169] When he looked outside he saw two soldiers in the street, one with a drawn sword in his hand. Clark described how the soldier with the sword, most likely John Brown, proceeded to strike a woman and a man with the weapon before running away.[170] Unfortunately, Clark's account is not of great value as it does not mention what precipitated the incident.

On the other hand Barbara Forester, a local resident, expanded on what Clark had described. She attested to the fact that she was awoken between 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. by the chaos on the street outside. Looking out of her upper floor window she observed two civilian men from a larger group grabbing the smaller of the two soldiers, throwing him to the ground and subjecting him to a fierce beating.[171] Another witness, Robert Mackenzie, gives a much clearer picture of the events in question. Like Forester, he was awoken by the noise in the street and observed the whole incident from his window. Mackenzie states that he saw a group of drunken keelmen arguing with, and verbally abusing the two soldiers, the taller of whom he identified as Brown.[172] Feeling threatened by the men, Private Brown told them to 'stand-off', which they refused to do. To protect himself and his comrade he drew his sword, and when the keelmen fled he gave chase.[173]

While he was away a small number of the men returned, and proceeded to beat the smaller soldier, as alluded to by Barbara Forester.[174] When Brown returned the keelmen followed and resumed the taunts and threats of physical abuse. Again he brandished his sword and gave chase to the civilians. Tragically, on his way back from this latest pursuit Brown bumped into an innocent bystander named John Moncaster. Mistaking him for one of his comrade's assailants, Brown struck the man over the head with his sword, killing him.[175] In this case it does not appear as if the

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[169] PRO ASSI 45/32/2/34.
[170] Ibid.
[171] Ibid., 45/32/2/35.
[172] Ibid., 45/32/2/36. This is the testimony of Robert Mackenzie.
[173] Ibid.
[174] Ibid.
[175] Ibid., 45/32/2/36-7.

court was willing to take the taunting and assaults into account as Brown was found guilty of murder.[176] Luckily for him, however, he was later pardoned for his crime.

These deadly confrontations were not limited to the large population centres such as Newcastle. In 1759 death was once again the consequence of fighting between civilians and soldiers, and once again alcohol was involved. However, unlike other previous incidents, it did not involve private soldiers or drummers but officers from Berwick's garrison. In the late evening of 12 May, Lieutenant Henry Goddard was on his way down Church Street when he was approached by a local resident named Thomas Smith while. Without any provocation Smith knocked Goddard's hat off of his head.[177] When the officer expressed his displeasure at this Smith struck him in the face. Almost instantly two other men, who appear to have been associates of the attacker, set upon the lieutenant.[178] Witnessing the incident, a drummer named John Burke ran into the Ewe and Lamb public house in Church Street screaming 'murder', alerting the soldiers inside.[179]

It was at this point that several men, including a sergeant by the name of Copperthwaite, spilled out of the pub to assist Goddard. Unfortunately, Thomas Smith was slain in the resulting melee, possibly by Sergeant Copperthwaite, who during the brawl had run up and felled Smith with a blow to the head.[180] However, the exact details of who killed the civilian remain unclear as the sergeant clearly states in his testimony that when he emerged from the pub Smith was already lying prostrate in the street.[181] More importantly, it must be recognised that this was not a premeditated killing by soldiers. Rather, it was a fight started by civilians that led to the unfortunate death of Thomas Smith. Evidence of its accidental nature is reinforced by the fact that Lieutenant Goddard requested a surgeon to help the injured man, and immediately reported the whole incident to Major Beauclerk, the

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[176] Ibid., 45/32/2/37.
[177] BTRO C15/14, 13 May 1759.
[178] Ibid.
[179] Ibid.
[180] Ibid.
[181] Ibid.

commanding officer of the garrison.[182] Subsequently, both Copperthwaite and Lieutenant Goddard appear to have been acquitted of Smith's murder.

In 1761 John Ince, a soldier in General Lampton's Regiment of Foot, found himself charged with manslaughter in similar circumstances.[183] The soldier was in the yard of his billet in Morpeth exercising his officer's dogs when the landlord's father, John Watson, walked up and fiercely struck one of the dogs across the back.[184] When challenged by Ince about his actions, the old man became irate and began to hit the soldier with a stick. A struggle ensued in which Watson fell over and Ince appears to have kicked him while he was on the ground.[185] The fight continued inside the house with Watson continuously hitting the soldier with the stick and demanding to know why Ince had thrown him to the floor and struck him.[186] The landlord's servant, Elizabeth Robinson, testified that after the scuffle eventually petered out Watson went upstairs to his bed where he was reported to have vomited and died within an hour.[187] There does not appear to have been any malicious intent on the part of Private Ince whom several witnesses saw laughing at the old man and treating the incident like a game. This is supported by Robinson's statement in which she described how

> the soldier threatened to lay him [Watson] aback of the fire but this examinant is in the belief that the soldier said these words to lay the old man's passion and out of no ill intention that the soldier said so to hurt him or do him any harm.[188]

It would seem that many cases in which soldiers were charged with murder or manslaughter share a common theme. With the exception of the fore-mentioned soldier who was charged with attempted murder while robbing a post chaise, few seem to have premeditated their crimes or killed out of uncontrolled frenzy. There is

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[182] Ibid.
[183] PRO ASSI 45/26/5/50a-e, 17 July 1761.
[184] Ibid., 45/26/5/50a
[185] Ibid., 45/26/5/50b.
[186] Ibid.
[187] Ibid.
[188] Ibid., 45/26/5/50d.

some indication that one of the murders committed earlier in the century may have been malicious but the evidence is not wholly conclusive. In late November 1755 an anonymous soldier was charged with the murder of a Newcastle pitman named William Methuen. The account in the *Newcastle Journal* reports that the man was bayoneted to death.[189] However, apart from this isolated incident, the available evidence suggests that a majority of the cases for murder, manslaughter or attempted murder seem to have arisen out of random confrontations between soldiers and members of the public. Exactly who incited these affrays is not always clear, although in two of the cases described above it highly likely that civilians were the instigators. John Childs has noted that the relative unpopularity of the army in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries meant that the public sometimes baited and taunted soldiers, who tended to react violently.[190] It is not impossible that this, combined with alcohol, was behind many of these incidents.

It is necessary to look at other forms of violent crime such as assault, in order to observe if there is a common theme in the way soldiers and civilians interacted. Importantly, it must be remembered that the term 'assault' in this study refers to incidents in which soldiers laid hands on, or beat civilians. Any assaults that led to the death of a civilian, and those that were committed during robberies, are categorised separately and dealt with above. Assaults, fights and other physical confrontations accounted for more than 20% (12 cases involving 14 individuals) of all infractions by soldiers. However, they represented less than 1% of all assaults in the region once civilians have been factored in.

One of the most serious attacks linked to a soldier occurred late in the seventeenth century. During October 1697 the master gunner of Tynemouth Barracks, Michael Heweth, was accused of severely beating Mary Upshalon of Killingworth while she worked in a field near Wallsend.[191] Not only did he subject the woman to a fierce and unprovoked thrashing, he allegedly ordered his servant, Thomas Man, to drive over

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[189] Newcastle Journal, 864, 29 November 1755.
[190] John Childs, 'War, Crime Waves and the English Army.' 5.
[191] MRO QSB 9/21, 6 October 1697.

her with a horse.[192] This charge was brought despite the support of Henry Villiers, the governor of Tynemouth Barracks, who attested to the fact that he 'had [Heweth] under [his] command this twenty years and never knew him to carry himself uncivilly.'[193] An equally intense and unsavoury assault occurred nine years later to another woman from the area around the barracks. In May of 1706 Jane Pickering was subjected to a severe beating from David Scotland, a gunner from Clifford's Fort.[194] This does not appear to have been the first time that Scotland had attacked people associated with this woman. It was reported by Samuel Penny, Pickering's master, that not long before this assault the gunner broke through the doors of his house and then verbally and physically assaulted him.[195] When asked by Penny why he had done this Scotland arrogantly replied 'that he [Scotland] was a young man [and] as he [Penny] was old he would beat out his brains.'[196] The gunner's violent tendencies surfaced again in the month that this trial took place. On 9 July a yeoman from Tynemouth Castle went into Clifford's Fort where he was confronted by Scotland who

> without provocation in a furious manner fell upon him and beat him both with head, hands and feet, and swore that if he had his bayonet he would stab him to the heart.[197]

By their very nature assaults were violent, but few were carried out with the intensity and malice displayed by David Scotland and Michael Heweth. Scotland's case seems to be particularly unusual and one that was related in part to his seemingly disturbed personality. While dramatic, the above examples are exceptional when taken within the context of the general trend for assaults.

More typical was the case of the aptly named Cornelius Bashford, a private soldier in Major Robert Dalziel's regiment. He was accused of trying to wound a man with his sword during a disturbance outside a Newcastle public house owned by Cuthbert

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[192] Ibid.
[193] Ibid.
[194] MRO QSB 24/39-46, 17 July 1706.
[195] Ibid., 24/39
[196] Ibid.

Lambert.[198] His comrade, Sergeant John Roberts, attested to the fact that at about 2 a.m. there was a noise at the window of the pub at which point Bashford disappeared outside. Roberts followed the soldier outside, where he saw Bashford, sword in hand, arguing with a drunk man named John Rea.[199] Sometime during the confrontation Rea was wounded, and publicly accused Bashford. If a wound was inflicted on the civilian then it could not have been too serious as the soldier only faced charges for assault. In 1693 Thomas Carr of Northumberland described how William Wake and two other unidentified soldiers attacked him on Morpeth Bridge while he was on his way to Newcastle. Wake accused Carr of being an 'affidavid man saying that he would be revenged upon him for it.'[200] He also challenged Carr to draw his sword, but before he could do so Wake and his accomplices seized the man and delivered a severe blow to his head. They then threatened to do harm to all of his friends and family before fleeing the scene.[201]

In the second half of the century Lieutenant Saville of Lord Beauclerk's regiment was tried for assaulting a Newcastle man, Edward Purchase, with his sword.[202] However, the trial papers show a different story that led to the lieutenant being acquitted of any wrongdoing.[203] The officer had been drinking heavily with Purchase and another man named Rickerby at an inn. All three men were considerably drunk at the time of the incident. During the evening Saville exited the room, leaving his sword on the windowsill.[204] By the time he had returned, Purchase had been stabbed with the sword and suspicion naturally fell on Saville. Luckily a series of relatively sober witnesses, which included three employees of the inn, told of how there had been no quarrel or violence between the officer and Edward Purchase.[205] It turned out that while Saville had been out of the room Rickerby had picked up the sword and began playing with it and it was then that Purchase was stabbed.[206] It would appear that no

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[197] Ibid., 24/46
[198] PRO ASSI 45/20/1/99, 5 May 1735.
[199] Ibid.
[200] MRO QSB 6/2a, 20 October 1693.
[201] Ibid.
[202] PRO ASSI 45/26/2/95b-g, 24 July 1758.
[203] Ibid.
[204] Ibid., 45/26/2/95b.
[205] Ibid., 45/26/2/95c-g.
[206] Ibid.

charges were laid against Rickerby, as in his testimony Purchase admitted that he was too drunk to remember anything, but regardless did not believe 'the said wound was given through any quarrel, malice or evil intent whatsoever.'[207] The reason why Lieutenant Saville had been tried is unknown. However, this case and that of Bashford reinforce the dangerous combination of drink, violence and weaponry that appears to have typified many assault and murder cases involving soldiers.

A problem exists with analysing rape as a crime in that there are very few cases in the existing records for the region. Members of the army were only ever charged in two incidents. In fact only two men were convicted of rape in the region between 1718 and 1800.[208] Such low numbers may have been due in part to the difficulty that many women had in proving rape and gaining credible witnesses. Likewise, many women were subjected to intense prejudice when complaining of rape.[209] This may have influenced the fact that the two military personnel tried for rape accounted for a disproportional 5.5% of rapes regionally. The two incidents were isolated, taking place 40 years apart, in two towns separated by a great distance. The first rape occurred in Berwick during early May of 1751, when a private soldier named Joseph Scott was found guilty of illegally 'gaining carnal knowledge' of a local woman named Mary Moscrop.[210] The court ordered that Scott be returned to his place of origin before being transported to the place of his execution scheduled for 20 August 1751.

The second case occurred near the end of the century. In August of 1791 John Quinn, a lieutenant in the 37th Regiment of Foot stationed at Tynemouth Barracks, was tried for raping Elizabeth Wilkinson of North Shields.[211] It was alleged he had locked the girl in his room at the barracks before forcing wine into her mouth, dragging her onto the bed by her throat and raping her twice.[212] After this he cruelly offered Elizabeth five shillings for her torments and threatened to have her arrested and sent to Scotland

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[207] Ibid., 45/26/2/95g.
[208] Morgan & Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law, 56-7.
[209] Ibid.
[210] BRO C8/3, 23 July 1751.
[211] PRO ASSI 45/37/2/141-4, 20 August 1791.
[212] Ibid., 45/37/2/144.

if she told anyone.[213] At the trial Wilkinson's employer testified that upon inspection Elizabeth appeared 'assaulted and bothered' after the reported incident.[214] Based on this information Lieutenant Quinn was arrested by a constable from North Shields, but he escaped while being transported to Morpeth.[215] Despite the offer of a £5 reward and a description of the crime being published in the 'Hue and Cry' it appears that the officer was never re-apprehended.[216]

VIII. The Other Side of the Coin: Soldiers as Victims.

Earlier it was noted that much of the violence resulting in civilian deaths was a consequence of confrontation between soldiers and civilians. These run-ins were irregular incidents, and soldiers were not always the instigators. On occasions the troops were forced to defend themselves against aggressive civilians. This points to the fact that a portion of soldier criminality was the result of action instigated by civilians. At the same time soldiers could also be the direct target of civilian criminal activity. This came in many different guises, from the innocuous, to more serious instances in which troops were subjected to unprovoked attacks.

Such was the experience of Private Harguy of General Blakeney's regiment stationed in Berwick. On his way home to the barracks late on the evening of 19 November 1740, local mason Alexander Brown set upon him.[217] So intense was the beating that Harguy feared he would lose his life. Fortunately for him, a crowd of local people and some soldiers from the guardhouse came to his aid and apprehended Brown before he could inflict any serious damage.[218] There is no mention of the reason behind the assault and no motive can be discerned. To all intents and purposes it seems to have been a random attack. In 1758 Private William Delany from the 64th Regiment of Foot was stabbed in the groin by a local man named Edward Riddle.[219]

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[213] Ibid., 45/37/2/143.
[214] Ibid.
[215] Newcastle Courant, 5976, 23 April 1791.
[216] Ibid.
[217] BTRO C15/14, 24 November 1740.
[218] Ibid.
[219] PRO ASSI 45/26/2/77c-e, 24 July 1758

Unlike the beating of Harguy, this stabbing arose from a very brief confrontation on a Newcastle street. Delany described how he was walking along the street when Riddle stabbed him for no reason. On the other hand Riddle claims to have been walking peacefully down Newgate Street when two soldiers knocked him down in passing.[220] Like so many of these cases it is often hard to determine who actually initiated the confrontation that led to the assault.

In late July 1777 a militiaman in the North Yorkshire Regiment, named Mark Hudson, was confronted with a similar situation while on duty in Newcastle. He was on guard at the lodgings of Ralph Milbank, colonel of the regiment, and stated that he heard a man scream for help.[221] Hudson ran to the sound and saw Herbert Kent, a private in the Northumberland Militia, lying on the ground being beaten by five or six men.[222] Attempting to do his duty and keep the peace, as well as assist his comrade, Hudson fixed his bayonet and approached the group of men. When he demanded they desist from their actions the men grabbed Hudson, threw him to the ground and beat him before stealing his weapon.[223] The private was quite fortunate that he did not suffer much worse considering they had possession of his bayonet and musket. It would appear that Hudson had been the unfortunate victim of circumstance. Again, the reason for the group's assault on Herbert Kent is unknown.

Such mistreatment of soldiers did not always manifest itself physically, and at times troops could face serious verbal abuse. Some of this torment coincided with events in which the army or militia had been in widespread confrontation with the civilian population. The assault on the militiaman in 1777 occurred at a time when the military was assisting local authorities with a particularly fierce naval press on Tyneside and Wearside.[224] Similarly, the Hexham militia riots of 1761 appear to have contributed to a serious verbal assault against soldiers in the town. Not long after the deadly riot several people heard a local man named William Alnwick publicly

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[220] Ibid., 45/26/2/77c
[221] Ibid., 45/33/2/35, Information of Mark Hudson a private soldier from the North York Regiment of Militia, 27 July 1777.
[222] Ibid.
[223] Ibid.
[224] Records of this press can be found in: PRO ADM 1/1497-1504, Captain's Letters, B Series, 1776-85; ADM 1/1611-2673, Captain's Letters, Various Series, 1746-1795.

damning the king 'and all his soldiers.'[225] Not content with this outburst, Alnwick then ran into one of the town's lodging houses and threatened to burn all of the soldiers to ashes.[226] This led to nervous members of the garrison informing the town guard who took the precaution of apprehending the man.[227]

In 1702 Robert Cook of Berwick threatened to kill Sergeant Stark of the garrison there. After paying a six shilling fine he was eventually released by the authorities.[228] More ominously, in 1712 local inhabitants Peter How and Ralph Bolton were tried for uttering seditious words that they hoped would 'raise differences twixt town and garrison' in Berwick.[229] For reasons not present in the documentary evidence, these two men were prepared to take extensive risks in order to upset the relationship between the army and the town. These incidents are unusual and their motivation is not clear since the existing records do not go into great detail. However, the 1702 incident came at a time when tension between Berwick and the garrison was high due to the pressures being exerted on the town by intense billeting.

On occasions incidents against soldiers could come in interesting and unusual forms. In November 1741 a number of soldiers stationed in Berwick were subjected to sexual molestation by a local baker named John Rule. John Oxley, a private in the garrison, described how he met Rule at his bakery and later met him in the Black Box public house where they enjoyed a number of drinks together.[230] On their way home at the end of the night, Rule began to fondle Oxley and enquired as to the soldier's willingness to partake in 'sodomitical' practices.[231] Further evidence against the baker was provided by Sergeant Francis Compton, who told of how he was privy to Rule's passion for men in uniform. On the previous Wednesday, while patrolling the town's ramparts, he was approached by Rule, who began making pleasant conversation with him.[232] Soon after this Rule put his hand 'upon this examinants

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[225] PRO ASSI 45/26/5/1a-b, 16 April 1761
[226] Ibid.
[227] Ibid., 45/26/5/1d, This is the testimony supplied by David Berry of the Royal Forresters, 16 April 1761.
[228] BTRO C/8/1, 20 April 1702.
[229] Ibid., 1721.
[230] BTRO C15/14, 20 November 1741.
[231] Ibid.
[232] Ibid.

privates on the outside of his breeches.'[233] Fortunately, Compton managed to extract himself from the situation without recourse to any physical violence. Surprisingly, Rule was not being tried for his actions towards these two soldiers. Oxley and Compton were actually providing supporting evidence against the man for another crime. This was an earlier, more serious sexual assault on Thomas Winter, who was also a soldier in the garrison. Rule was said to have 'beat, wound and ill-treat [Winter] with an intent to that most horrid detestable and sodomitical crime...called buggery.'[234]

The important point to take from these examples, both civilian and military, is the fact that soldiers were occasionally subject to hostility and violence. More importantly, the occurrence of such confrontations appears to have been irregular and apparently random. At the same time many of the incidents occurred at times when the army was involved in operational duties against the local population, such as anti-riot duty and supporting naval impressment. As such these situations do not point to a widespread undercurrent of violent hostility towards soldiers based in the North East. However, it must also be recognised that many of the accounts do not have enough detail to shed light on the exact causes of the confrontations.

IX. The Problem of Disbanded Soldiers.

One area where historians argue that military personnel had a direct impact upon society was the extent to which disbanded soldiers participated in criminal activity at the end of wars. As has been mentioned above, Beattie argues that the end of a war brought a sudden increase in the number of people being charged for property crimes.[235] He also directly links this to the fact that soldiers accounted for much of this criminal activity, stating that the 'large numbers of disreputable men' who entered

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[233] Ibid.
[234] BTRO C8/2, 18 November 1741; BTRO C15/14, 20 November 1741.
[235] Beattie, 'Crime and the Courts', 226, 228.

the army became unaccustomed to ordinary labour and were unwilling to take it up again when they returned home.[236] Similarly, Tobias Smollet observed that

> all the gaols in England were filled with the refuse of the army and navy, which having been dismissed at the peace [of 1748], and either adverse to labour, or excluded from employment had naturally preyed upon the commonwealth.[237]

This sentiment is reinforced by Douglas Hay, who believes that many soldiers returning home from wars had little option but to steal and engage in other criminal activity to support themselves.[238] Certainly, the examples he provides seem to support this supposition. Hay explains that in the immediate aftermath of the Seven Years War.the rate of criminal convictions in the country almost quadrupled.[239] This was followed by a halving of the conviction rate during the American War of Independence and a five-fold increase at the outbreak of peace.[240] It has also been observed that crime rates after the Nine Years War may have been influenced by the mass discharge of men from the army. However, there is a note of caution in this analysis, which notes that the perceived high level of crime by ex-soldiers remains in debate.[241] For example, it is hard to discern whether fear of a crime wave was behind the decision by Newcastle's leaders in 1699 to make £16 11s 7d available to disbanded soldiers.[242] Nevertheless, there is little doubt that disbanded soldiers played some role in the fluctuation of crime rates throughout the century.

On this point David Brenchley states that there is no evidence in Berwick to back up claims, such as those made by Beattie or Smollett, that the end of wars created massive increases in crime.[243] In fact, he believes that his evidence for theft, which

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[236] Ibid.
[237] Ibid., 226.
[238] Douglas Hay, 'War Dearth and Theft in the Eighteenth Century: The Record of the English Courts.' Past and Present 95 (1982) 138-140.
[239] Ibid., 143.
[240] Ibid.
[241] Childs, 'War, Crime Waves and the English Army.' 17.
[242] TWAS MD/NC/2/3/179, 27 September 1699.
[243]Brenchley, A Place By Itself, 206

was the largest post-war crime, points towards the fact that Berwick did not follow this wider trend.[244] By looking at the quarter sessions and assize records for the year in which peace broke out, as well as the years immediately before and during the century's wars, one can observe the relative validity of Brenchley's thesis. Table 5.9 notes that during the Seven Years War and the American War of Independence, similar trends emerge. At the end of both conflicts the crime rate remains fairly constant with the preceding years. The lack of crimes between 1760, 1761 and 1779 can be attributed to a general lack of archival records rather than a massive fall in crimes. In both cases the actual rate of crimes is noticeably less than when they reached their wartime peak. Whether this has anything to do with the fact that war took so many disreputable men out of local society, who failed to return, is impossible to say.

Table 5.9: Cases of Murder, Rape, Theft and Assault by Males.1756-64, 1775-84.[245]

Seven Year War				American War of Independence			
Year	**Crimes**	**Year**	**Crimes**	**Year**	**Crimes**	**Year**	**Crimes**
1755	29	1760	4	1775	45	1780	20
1756	30	1761	0	1776	38	1781	21
1757	35	1762	18	1777	34	1782	27
1758	37	1763	22	1778	34	1783	30
1759	27	1764	24	1779	16	1784	28

The impression that disbanded soldiers did not necessarily account for large proportions of local crime is given further weight by the archival sources.[246] In all of the records available for the region only four of the people charged with crimes are alluded to as having been recently demobilised from the army. Similarly, unless they are listed as 'old soldiers' it is nearly impossible to determine if other men charged with crimes around the close of wars had military experience. Making such suppositions is dangerous.

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[244] Ibid.

[245] BTRO C8/3-4a, Quarter Sessions Books, 1755-84; BTRO C15/14-16, Quarter Sessions, Misc. Examinations, 1755-84; PRO ASSI 45/25/3-27/2 & 32/1-35/1, Assize Records for the Northern Circuit 1755-64, 1775-84; TWAS QS/NC/1/7-8, Newcastle Quarter Sessions Books, 1744-1793.

[246] These usually contain some record of the criminal as an 'old soldier' or a 'recently discharged' soldier. This is especially true of the Northern Circuit Assize records.

In October of 1689 two Irishmen named Geddy Murfew and Jeremiah Lion were arrested and examined near Dublin, charged with assaulting a blacksmith in the village of Brampton.[247] Their statements reveal that the two men had been soldiers in Ireland and had been brought over to England in 1688. It is likely that they were Catholic Irish soldiers imported by James II to oppose the landings of William's forces. This is alluded to by the fact that the argument that led to the assault started after Geddy Murfew publicly declared himself for James.[248] During the tempestuous period immediately following the Glorious Revolution their unit was disbanded, and Murfew declared that he 'had been a beggar upon the country ever since the late King went away.'[249] On their way back to Ireland they passed through the village where the incident took place.

In 1784 Duncan Wright was sentenced to death and executed for his involvement with a 'house-breaking' gang operating in Durham and Tyneside.[250] The condemned man had been a veteran of the 73rd Regiment of Foot, which had been disbanded in July of the previous year. It appears that since that time he had turned his hand to theft, robbery and other anti-social activities.[251] Such was the reputation of Wright and his accomplices that the court described how he had 'belonged to a gang which has long pestered this neighbourhood', and how community leaders were deeply indebted to the local magistrate, Sir Henry George Liddell, for his arrest.[252] John Whitfield was also a former soldier from Colonel Hale's Regiment of Light Dragoons.[253] Like Wright he took the skills learned as a trooper and utilised them in his new career as a highway robber. The authorities seized him after he wounded a man during an attempted robbery on the highway between Carlisle and Hexham.[254]

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[247] PRO ASSI 45/15/4/63-5, 25 October 1689.
[248] Ibid., 45/15/4/65
[249] Ibid.
[250] Newcastle Courant 5268, 17 August 1768. He was killed at a public mass execution held in late August.
[251] Ibid.
[252] Ibid.
[253] PRO ASSI 45/29/2/90-2, 1769.
[254] Ibid., 45/29/2/91.

X. Conclusion

This chapter has looked at the criminal activity of soldiers in the North East during the eighteenth century. In doing so it has highlighted a number of interesting characteristics and trends. When considering this it is important to take into account the large gaps in the assize and quarter sessions records. It is possible that the fragmentary evidence has hidden additional examples of soldier's transgressions against the law.[255] Importantly, an attempt has been made to fill these holes, as much as possible, by looking at other sources such as local newspapers and town council records. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the impact that this problem has on the study of crime in the North East during the early-modern period.

Discerning long-term trends or 'change over time' in soldier criminality throughout the century is difficult. This is due in part to the aforementioned gaps in the archival records. For example, the amount of criminal activity recorded during the early part of the eighteenth century is very low, but this is a consequence of the poor state of records before 1740. Similarly, it may appear that soldier crimes increase in regularity as the century progresses, however, this is due in part to the increased survival of criminal and trial records, as well as better record keeping. Despite the vagaries of source material there are no extended periods when a crime does not appear in the archival records or the local newspapers. In addition to this there do not appear to be any periods when crimes by soldiers are concentrated. Those records that do exist are spread fairly evenly throughout the century. At the same time the involvement of militiamen in local crimes increases from 1760 when militia battalions began playing a more prominent role within the North East.[256] Also surprising is the fact that the building of the barracks in Berwick and their expansion at Tynemouth does not seem to have done much to curb the offences of soldiers. There is only one surviving trial record for Berwick before the opening of the barracks in 1719, and crime in Tynemouth, while limited, occurred throughout the century. Concurrently, the role of

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[255] At the same time the gaps in the records would result in missing civilian crimes.

[256] Units of the militia, particularly the North Yorkshire Militia, were present in the region almost constantly after 1760. For more on the subject of the militia see: Robert Bell Turnton, The History of the North York Militia (Stockton on Tees: Patrick and Shotton, 1973); J.R. Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1956).

invalid soldiers within Berwick meant that they were much more prominent in crime statistics than in other regional population centres such as Hexham, Newcastle and Morpeth.

The surviving evidence points to the fact that the role of the soldier in the region's criminal activity was not overly significant. The general impression for much of the period is one of the army contributing its fair share of offences within the North East. However, at no time in the century is there an indication that the rate of this criminal activity persisted at disproportionate levels for extended periods.

Determining trends in the characteristics of soldier's crime is slightly easier than predicting tendencies in the rates of offences. Immediately apparent is how soldiers exhibit some strong similarities to civilians in their choice of crimes. This is particularly true of the large numbers of thefts uncovered. Theft was the most common civilian crime, as was the case with army personnel. Despite this the contribution of soldiers to the overall rate of theft was low due to the sheer number of civilian thefts. The same holds true of assaults, which were common in both civilian and military criminal statistics. More importantly, there is an ominous feature of solider malfeasance that differs noticeably from trends found in the types of offences committed by civilians. Existing records highlight the propensity of soldiers to involve themselves in crimes that exhibit a high level of violence. As a result soldiers appear to have committed a disproportionate level of offences such as robbery and murder. These extremely violent crimes account for over 41% of all soldiers tried before the region's courts.[257] When combined with charges of assault and rape, violent crime was a factor in 65% of the 80 trials involving soldiers during this period. This compares with 48% of civilians brought before the courts.

One may ask why soldiers would be so prone to rob. This may be explained by the poverty of soldiers, the isolation that the region provided, and the access men had to weapons. A different characteristic emerges when one looks at the motivation of soldiers to commit murder and assault, which is directly linked to issues of civil-

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[257] This is 33 (19 robberies and 14 murders) of 80 soldiers tried for the categories of crimes present in Table 5.4.

military relations in the region. The majority of charges for assault, murder and manslaughter found in the records arise from fights and confrontations between groups of soldiers and civilians. Very often these deadly affrays were fuelled by alcohol and regularly started in or near drinking establishments late in the evening. This is not surprising considering the reputation of the army for drinking and the amount of time that billeted soldiers spent in public houses. Joanna Bath has noted that alehouses focused aggression to outsiders and that drinking could escalate tensions and prejudices towards physical conflict.[258] Similarly, Chapter 2 has noted how the poverty of Newcastle's keelmen assisted in breeding a culture of drunkenness and violence. Any conclusion as to who was responsible for starting most of this trouble is normally hard to discern. However, some very detailed court records, combined with decisions to acquit or sentence soldiers, help to highlight the fact that both soldiers and civilians were to blame. Nevertheless, it is apparent that soldiers were often easily led into confrontations with civilians and tended to react with a disproportionate amount of force. This could be the reason why so many civilians were killed in these fights.

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[258] Joanna Bath, Violence and Violent Crime, 193.

Chapter 6

Public Order, the Army and Civil-Military Relations

'No matter whether their coats be red or brown, they had been called in aid of the laws, not to subvert them or to overturn the constitution, but to preserve both.'

Lord Mansfield, Lord Chief Justice
House of Lords, 19th June, 1780.[1]

I. Introduction.

One of the army's most important roles during the eighteenth century was that of policing and the maintenance of public order. Its involvement in the curtailment of smuggling, collection of taxes, escorting of prisoners, and the suppression of rioting in the North East affords a unique insight into the nature of regional civil-military relations. Despite traditional fears of the standing army, local leaders relied more heavily on the armed forces as the eighteenth century progressed. In an atmosphere of increasing trepidation over possible revolts, outbreaks of repeated unrest, Jacobite threats, and the need to guarantee the revenue of the nation, the army became a centrepiece of domestic state policy. Although not strictly a tool of social control, the army, and increasingly the militia, evolved into a force that could stand between factious mobs and the ruling oligarchy. At the same time it helped to safeguard the trade and revenues essential to the survival of a state frequently at war.

On a more elementary and parochial level these duties formed an important constituent of the military's relationship with the North East's citizenry, bringing the common soldier face to face with civilians. Naturally these tasks were often characterised by varying levels of tension and confrontation between troops and ordinary people. Another consequence was that the contact between the two groups was often very intimate, and the implications long-lasting. Additionally, the army often found itself encroaching into situations where perceptions of the civilian's

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[1] Quote taken from Parliamentary History, Vol 21, 1780-1, p.690. Here Lord Mansfield was supporting the use of large numbers of troops to quell the 1780 Gordon Riots.

actions differed depending on what side a person was on. What the authorities believed to be criminal, disruptive and rebellious activity was often seen by the 'mob' as legitimate action focused on achieving goals important to their wellbeing. For example, participation in, or support for, smuggling was often deeply ingrained in local economies. At the same time rioting often embraced issues that were very important and personal to the local inhabitants. These included the supply of food, protection of wages and working conditions and freedom from government coercion such as selection for militia service.[2] Therefore, the actions of the military were bound to have a direct and tangible effect upon civil-military relations in the North East.

The role of the army as a de-facto police force throughout the eighteenth century arose from the fact that Britain largely retreated from the idea of regular and structured state policing. Many were willing to risk the dangers of popular insurrection and a lack of formal public policing in order to prevent a return to Stuart or Cromwellian centralism, or even the establishment of Bourbon style despotism.[3] Nevertheless, as the century progressed increasing numbers of political leaders began to gradually but reluctantly acknowledge the benefits of policing. It was not until the nineteenth century, long after the establishment of police offices at Middlesex in 1792 and Wapping in 1798, that large towns and cities would possess an effective method for maintaining public order and internal security other than the military.[4] Berwick was the exception to this rule in the North East, when in 1710 the town council created a force of eight watchmen to patrol the town at night.[5] Regardless of this, the army played a vital role supporting national and local authorities, helping to augment their ability to enforce English common law, government policy and local interests.

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[2] The issue of public resistance to recruitment and impressment is dealt with in Chapter 3.

[3] Walter James Shelton, English Hunger and Industrial Disorders (London: Macmillian Press, 1973) 102.

[4] Clive Emsley, 'Detection and Prevention: The Old English Police and the New 1700-1900.' Historical Social Research 37 (1986) 73-4.

[5] David Brenchley, A Place by Itself. Berwick upon Tweed in the Eighteenth Century (Berwick upon Tweed: Berwick upon Tweed Civic Society, 1997) 205; Joanna Bath, Violence and Violent Crime in the North East, c. 1650-1720. PhD Thesis (University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 2001) 291.

Beyond combating smugglers and rioters, soldiers performed a whole battery of mundane and less essential duties. Within the region's towns this included posting guards at town gates and patrolling the streets at night. Similarly, officers and soldiers were regularly involved in other operations that supported the daily operations of the state administration, but did not involve widespread maintenance of public order. Soldiers were used extensively to escort pay wagons and tax collectors, convey civilian and military prisoners, protect the mail and assist the officers of customs and excise in the suppression of smuggling.[6] Other tasks were less regular and only undertaken when a specific situation arose. This was the case in 1709 when troops in Berwick and Tynemouth were ordered to enforce quarantines on ships arriving from the Baltic, where an outbreak of plague had occurred.[7]

II. Smuggling

The army, although involved from the early eighteenth century, was not thought of as the obvious choice for anti-smuggling duties.[8] Due to the limited finances available to fund such operations there could be little in the way of a full-time force of professional civil servants to do this job. As a result the posts of Riding Officers, who controlled the anti-bootlegging operations of a loose organisation of land guards, tended to be filled by local apothecaries, brewers and other small businessmen. Unfortunately, the land guard and riding officers proved to be largely impotent in the face of widespread and organised smuggling. Chronic corruption and incompetence further hindered their performance. Some were not beyond falsifying records, confiscating 'stolen goods' for personal use, misappropriating funds and even working with smuggling gangs, procuring money and their own personal safety in return for

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[6] James Hayes, The Social and Professional Background of the Officers of the British Army 1714-1763 M.A. Thesis (University of London, 1956) 21; John Childs, The British Army of William III, 1689-1702 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987) 178.

[7] PRO WO 4/9/206-7, 1 October 1709. This was an extremely severe plague which killed one-third of the population of East Prussia, as well as hundreds of thousands of Poles and Danes.

[8] As early as 1699 the Commanders of Customs submitted a request to the Treasury for funds to establish such a guard for north-west England covering the coast from Beaumaris to Carlisle. Calendar of Treasury Papers, Vol.65, p.16, 12 December 1699.

safe passage.[9] Those who had not been bought or directly threatened into complicity often refused to confront the larger operators for fear of reprisals. In 1746 General Hawley expressed frustration at the fact that Sussex customs officers were afraid to do their duty 'upon account of the insolence of the smugglers, and apprehension of being abused by them.'[10] Under such circumstances the government was forced to look towards more effective, well-armed and centralised methods to assist in the fight against this troublesome banditti.

From the time of their widespread implementation in support of customs officers, anti-smuggling operations accounted for a sizeable portion of the home establishment's duties. It has been calculated that between spring 1737 and spring 1743 General Handysyde's 16th Regiment of Foot spent close to 17% of its time engaged in such operations.[11] Similarly, between spring 1738 and the summer of 1742, the 23rd Regiment of Foot under Colonel Peer allotted nearly one-quarter of their time to patrolling the coast searching for bootleggers.[12] While this may not seem substantial it must be remembered that both regiments were in billets or on the march for almost two-thirds of the time.[13] Therefore these anti-smuggling duties represented one of the most intensive 'active' duties for soldiers stationed on, or near, Britain's coasts.

The reason for this is simple. Throughout the eighteenth century illegal importation of goods into England was a serious matter for regional leaders and the London government who relied on excise taxes for a large portion of their revenue.[14] The high level of bootlegging can be observed in the fact that during 1784 it was estimated that

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[9] Frank McLynn, Crime and Punishment in Eighteenth-Century England (London: Routledge, 1989) 190.

[10] PRO PC 1/5/111/5-7, 5 December 1746.

[11] J.A. Houlding, 'Fit For Service' The Training of the British Army 1715-1795 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) 1-2.

[12] Ibid. The exact percentage is 23%.

[13] Ibid.

[14] From 1700-1800 the amount of national income raised through customs duties was substantial, ranging from as high as 28% (1715-1740) to a low of 20 % (1740-1755). These numbers are averages centred on 5 year periods. Geoffrey Holmes, The Making of a Great Power: Late Stuart and Early Georgian Britain 1660-1722 (Harlow: Longman Publishing, 1993) 433; Geoffey Holmes & Daniel Szechi, The Age of Oligarchy. Pre-industrial Britain 1722-1783 (Harlow: Longman Publishing, 1993) 369.

only one-third of the tea consumed in the country had been legally imported.[15] Witnesses appearing before parliamentary committee's on smuggling estimated that more than 3,000,000 pounds of tea had been smuggled annually into the country in the first half of the century. This accounted for more than three times the amount imported legally.[16] Furthermore, Paul Muskett has estimated that between 1723 and 1733 close to 251,320 pounds of tea and 652,927 gallons of brandy had been seized in Kent and Sussex alone.[17] If Samuel Wilson's estimate that 'not one pound in twenty of run tea is seized' is near the truth then the effect of smuggling must have been considerable.[18]

Despite a vast coastline dotted with small coves, beaches and mudflats, the level of smuggling in the North East was considerably less than that afflicting other regions of England such as on the south coast. The reasons for this are twofold. The first factor is the relative remoteness of England's northern counties from the ports of France and Portugal, from whence the vast majority of smuggled goods in England originated. It was simply easier to smuggle large consignments across the narrow English Channel and land them only a few miles from the densely populated areas in and around London. The second reason for the smaller scale of smuggling in the region has something to do with the relatively small and dispersed rural populations of the northern counties. Thus the market for smuggled goods was modest and large organised operations were generally unnecessary. A further reason why this activity may not have been widespread was due to the presence of two armed excise cutters stationed on the Tyne.[19] These acted as serious deterrents, and few were brazen enough to try landing contraband in the region. Finally, a dearth of evidence, rather than an actual absence of activity, may be a contributing factor. Records for the city of Newcastle are erratic and there are no entries that directly refer to smuggling on any

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[15] Frank McLynn, Crime and Punishment, 179.

[16] Commons Journal, Vol.XXV (1745-50), 104-5; Cal Winslow, 'Sussex Smugglers' in: Douglas Hay et al., Albion's Fatal Tree. Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1975) 124-5.

[17] Paul Muskett, 'Military Operations Against Smuggling in Kent and Sussex, 1698-1750.' Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 52 (1972) 101.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Gwenda Morgan & Pete Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law. The Problem of Law Enforcement in North-East England (London: U.C.L. Press, 1997) 60.

scale to 1793.[20] Berwick upon Tweed is also unusually weak in this area, with just a single customs book from 1760 surviving in its archives.[21]

Most of the available evidence for the region points to piece-meal smuggling with few large organised gangs like on the south coast. For example, in 1699 Thomas Bolton was charged with smuggling small amounts of salt into the region.[22] Similarly, in 1778 William Lawson of Sunderland was arrested and impressed into naval service upon confirmation that he was involved in smuggling between Berwick, Scotland and Gottenburg in Sweden.[23] The records indicate that Lawson was a small, opportunistic operator rather than a member of a widely known smuggling gang.[24]

This is not to say that on occasions bootlegging could not be substantial and even highly organised. In 1784 the Commissioner of the Excise at Bishop Auckland in County Durham complained that 'smuggling is carried out in that part of the Kingdom to a very great degree', especially from Scotland.[25] Similarly, the customs agent at Whitby expressed his concerns when he observed that smugglers on the neighbouring coast 'carry on their pernicious practices in a very daring manner, landing their goods under the protection of a numerous body of men armed with firearms and bayonets.'[26] It was the smuggling of liquor, and in particular brandy, that seems to have been the most serious affliction in the region throughout the eighteenth century. It was also the type that appears to have attracted the organised criminal syndicates.[27]

The severity of illegal spirits was apparent from the beginning of the eighteenth century. In 1702 William Wood of Morpeth had 132 bottles of illicit brandy taken from him by excise officers.[28] While this only equates to approximately 30 gallons it was still a sizeable quantity for a single man to have in his possession. During April 1721 it was declared to the quarter sessions in Northumberland that 'several great

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[20] This is: TWAS MD/NC/2/7, Calendar of Common Council Book, Newcastle.
[21] David Brenchley, A Place By Itself, 29.
[22] MRO QSB 11/44, April 1699.
[23] PRO ADM 1/1498, 1 March 1778.
[24] Ibid.
[25] PRO WO 40/26, Commissioner of Excise to Sir George Younge, 12 March 1784.
[26] Ibid., 26 November 1794.
[27] The popularity of smuggling liquor appears to have been a national problem.

quantities of brandy and wine are very often unlawfully run in several parts along the coast in this county to the great prejudice of His Majesty's Customs.'[29] This was the fault of a gang who were smuggling brandy around Killingworth.[30] Two customs men who encountered these smugglers reported that the leader, Robert Motlay, was supported by so many accomplices that they could not apprehend him at that time.[31] Additionally, a local man who testified to the quarter sessions explained how he was asked by Motlay to carry two half-anchors of brandy from North Shields to Killingworth. Upon his arrival he met with another six men carrying the same amounts, indicating the scale of the operation.[32] The largest single impoundment mentioned in archival sources occurred in the last year of this study. In 1793 customs officials seized 22 barrels of spirits from smugglers heading from the Northumberland town of Bulmer to the West Coast.[33]

On one occasion local officials appear to have uncovered an extensive arms-smuggling ring. In 1703 a man named Henry Mohill was apprehended near Tynemouth when he was caught in possession of sword blades and firearms.[34] During his interrogation it became apparent that the man had brought the weapons over from Rotterdam with the intention of selling them locally.[35] Soon after this another individual was arrested after more blades were found in his North Shields home, while a group of fishermen handed over thirty sword blades which they had found hidden on the beach near North Shields.[36] It became apparent that this operation was more insidious than Mr Mohill was willing to admit. On 8 January 1703 Colonel Villiers, the commander of the barracks at Tynemouth, was instructed to employ his men to 'seize and secure' the captain of the ship responsible for delivering the weapons, as well as capture and detain 'the Scotch and Irish soldiers which were on board her.'[37]

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[28] MRO QSB 17/2, 4 July 1702.
[29] MRO QSB 55/116, 19 April 1721.
[30] Ibid., 55/116-9, 19 April 1721.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid., 55/117.
[33] Newcastle Chronicle, 1494, 16 February 1793.
[34] MRO QSB 20/15, 12 January 1703.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid., 20/16, 12 January 1703.

Importantly, this represents the first recorded case of the army being employed to deal with smuggling in the region.

Soldiers in the North East do not appear to have been employed in the suppression of smuggling to the extent that they were in Yorkshire or the south of the country. While there is little doubt that they played a role in such activity, explicit mention of these duties is limited in local and central records. There are just two entries in existing regional sources which clearly mention soldiers assisting excise officers in their duties. During the first year of the eighteenth century a customs officer named Joseph Simpson threatened to call on the assistance of dragoons when resisted by two men thought to be smuggling corn.[38] Additionally, there was the previously mentioned incident in 1703 when the garrison at Tynemouth was asked to combat the illegal importation of arms.[39] However, there appears to have been more need or willingness to employ soldiers in combating bootlegging later in the century. For example, during 1793 the commanding officer of the 57th Regiment of Foot at Tynemouth barracks was asked to provide 20 private men and one subaltern to quarter at Hartlepool for anti-smuggling duties.[40] This represents the first serious request for soldiers during the century, but marks the start of a series of orders carrying on into the nineteenth century. Despite this, the situation in the North East never resembled the south coast where 'a guerrilla war between the smugglers of Sussex and Kent and the officers of government' existed.[41]

III. Military Intervention: The Law, The Constitution and The Government.

It is important to briefly discuss the constitutional and administrative framework in which the army and militia worked while on riot duty, if one is to gain a true appreciation of how this role affected civil-military relations in the North East. From early in the century the government in London stressed that the military forces

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[38] MRO QSB 13/67, 17 July 1700.
[39] Ibid., 20/15-6, 12 January 1703.
[40] PRO WO 5/68/341, M. Lewis to Commanding Officer 57th Foot at Tynemouth Barracks, 23 January 1793.
[41] Winslow, 'Sussex Smugglers' 119.

available for fighting tumults were to be placed strictly under the control of civilian authorities.[42] In part this arose from the time of Charles II and James II when these monarchs used the army to enforce government orders and to reinforce their position within the state.[43] As a result the central government, in the form of the Secretary at War and Secretary of State, exercised a surprisingly small amount of this direct power over the army in this respect. Their main duty was to permit military units to march to the scene of a riot in order to assist the regional authorities there, once those authorities had sent written requests to London. Only when riots erupted in London and the immediate region, and threatened them directly, did ministers and senior administrators become fully involved.[44]

Like so many other aspects of the military's involvement in the North East the real power over the use of military force against rioters was left in the hands of local magistrates.[45] As a result, for most of the eighteenth century justices of the peace had the power not only to shape the judicial institutions in their localities, but also to exert a great deal of influence over the course of events during riots.[46] The piece of legislation that allowed the local magistracy to deal with unrest in their geographical jurisdiction, and employ military force if deemed necessary, was the Riot Act of 1715.[47]

This was one of the first laws enacted by the new Hanoverian regime, and was strongly influenced by the need to allay fears engendered by the threat of disaffected and rebellious Jacobites.[48] This document gave legal definition to what constituted a

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[42] This is part of the wider issue of the relationship between central and local governments and the gradual acceptance of a standing army. For more on this see Chapter 2.

[43] Stanley H. Palmer, 'Calling Out the Troops. The Military, the Law and Public Order in England 1650-1850.' JSAHR 56 (1978) 201.

[44] Examples of this include the Gordon Riots of 1780, as well as the 1765 weaver's riots which menaced the Houses of Parliament. Christopher Hibbert, King Mob. The Story of Lord George Gordon and the Riots of 1780 (London: Longman's Green & Company 1958); Sir John Fortesque (ed.), The Correspondence of King George the Third. From 1760 to December 1783 Vol.I (London, 1927) 94-7.

[45] Magistrates were also responsible for overseeing recruitment, impressment activities, billeting and matters concerning crimes committed by soldiers against civilians.

[46] Norma Landau, The Justices of the Peace 1679-1760 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984) 278.

[47] 1 Geo.I, st.2,c.5.

[48] Richard Vogler, Reading the Riot Act. The Magistracy, the Police and the Army in Civil Disorder (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991) 1.

riot and when such an event was taking place. The act itself deemed any 12 or more people gathered together in an unruly fashion to be a riotous assembly. If this crowd did not disperse within one hour of the act being read publicly by a magistrate, the members of the mob were considered to be committing a felony under the common law, and thus open to prosecution. In declaring rioters criminals the Riot Act gave justices the freedom and legitimacy to use more extreme methods to control public order. Because of this a magistrate could order the arrest of the rioters, call upon the army or militia to intervene on his behalf, and even order them to fire on non-compliant civilians. A further implication was that soldiers were 'indemnified' for any injury, death or damage that might arise as a result of their actions.[49] Similarly, by making rioting a statutory offence, the Riot Act allowed a punishment of death to be inflicted on civilians found guilty of rioting.[50]

While the Riot Act gave local judicial authorities the power to deal with unrest, the process of getting the assistance of the army in such cases was less straightforward. From the time of the Glorious Revolution up to the middle of the eighteenth century, the ability of magistrates to call on the services of the army was governed by a lengthy and inefficient procedure. Regional authorities had been obliged to send a formal application for military assistance to London. There it was considered, and if approved, marching orders were issued to the detachment nearest to the unrest. This worked well in the southern counties because of their immediacy to the capital. However, for the counties on the northern periphery replies to successful applications could take more than a week to reach troops, and longer for those troops to arrive on the scene.[51] For instance, on 23 June 1710 the authorities in Newcastle had appealed to the Secretary of State for troops to help calm local unrest, but the first units did not arrive in the city until the second week of July.[52]

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[49] Gilmour, Riots, Risings and Revolution. Governance and Violence in Eighteenth-Century England (London: Hutchinson Publications, 1992) 140.

[50] Sir Charles Grant Robertson, Select Statutes, Cases and Documents to Illustrate English Constitutional History, 1660-1832 (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1904) 196.

[51] The issuing and re-issuing of orders by the Secretary at War during the riots of 1740 led to troops arriving in Stockton on Tees almost 20 days after the start of disturbances there. PRO SP 36/50/425-31, SP 36/51/28, 61-92; Tom Sowler, The History of the Town and Borough of Stockton on Tees (Stockton on Tees: Teesside Museums and Art Galleries Department, 1972) 114-16.

[52] PRO SP 34/12/141, 170, 23 June 1740 and 11 July 1710 respectively. The exact date of the troop's arrival is simply stated as the Saturday before the 11th of July.

It was not until the middle of the century that there was a rationalisation of this complex system. Reacting to the widespread rioting of 1755 and 1756, Lord Barrington, the Secretary at War (1755-61 and 1765-78), introduced a number of changes that assisted in reducing the time it took to get troops to the scene of a disturbance.[53] Barrington realised that procedures must be simplified in order to facilitate the more efficient dispersal of troops to areas experiencing uprisings.[54] His first act was to eliminate the Secretary of State from the decision-making process. Barrington's next innovation came in the face of the tumultuous food riots of 1756. The Secretary at War understood all too well that such unrest could quickly spread from one place to another and that quite often officers believed that orders to suppress riots in one place did not give them the power to do so in neighbouring jurisdictions.[55] Thus he began the precedent of issuing general orders to units to assist magistrates whenever called upon to do so. This new measure persisted for the remainder of the century, illustrated by the fact that in 1766 he ordered the 1st Dragoon Guards at York to be ready to answer any 'application being made to you by the civil magistrates' for assistance during unrest.[56]

With these gradual changes to official policy the magistrates had, by 1768, established what Vogler calls their 'unfettered personal right to call upon and deploy the military forces of the crown' without prior sanction of parliament, or other central or local institutions.[57] Now the bureaucrats in London, through the issuing of these standing orders, became little more than a legitimating body for the use of the military and the ultimate check against the misuse of the army in this role. Because of this, justices could exercise much more personal power over the decision to use troops, as they no longer had to rely on the verification of London. In its place the common law, as well as the complex reality of local relationships faced by the magistrates, helped to temper any real attempt at the over-enthusiastic use of military force against the civilian population.

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[53] Because of this, many serious riots had gone unchecked while orders were sent to army units.

[54] Tony Hayter (ed.) An Eighteenth Century Secretary at War. The Papers of William Viscount Barrington (London: The Bodley Head, 1988) 214-16.

[55] Ibid., 215

[56] PRO WO 40/17, Barrington to Officer Commanding 1st Dragoon Guards at York, 29 January 1766.

As mentioned earlier, the army was placed strictly under the aegis of civilian authority when it was assisting local officials. Similar to anti-smuggling operations, troops were held responsible for their actions under the common law. As such, officers or soldiers could quickly find themselves being charged with assault, manslaughter or even murder if their behaviour was deemed excessive. It was made clear to all those involved in such business that their job was to preserve the public peace and not to 'repel force with force unless it shall be found absolutely necessary, or being thereunto required by the said civil magistrates.'[58] This created a situation in which officers would often refuse to act until they received specific authorisation from the magistrate.[59] Even then a lack of official guidance and explanation of the various powers and jurisdictions within the Riot Act caused a great deal of confusion and concern about who could act and when. In 1740 William Williamson, a Durham magistrate, expressed his quandary as to whether he possessed the power to order the troops to fire, despite the officers declaring that they were prepared to do so on his command.[60] Similarly, these problems occasionally led to uncertainty amongst officers as to what the army could and could not do to disperse crowds.[61] No doubt this was due in part to the fear of being held responsible for deaths and injuries if the army was deemed to have reacted with indiscretion.

This uncertainty increasingly engendered itself within the army as a clear distaste for anti-riot duties.[62] Some of this negativity arose from a genuine feeling of unease at using soldiers against British civilians. Many political leaders in the capital shared this attitude. Lord Barrington, the Secretary at War, publicly derided riot duty as 'a most odious service which nothing but necessity can justify.'[63] Many in society echoed these sentiments believing that using military power to suppress riots was not

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[57] Vogler, Reading the Riot Act, 12.
[58] PRO WO 5/48/276, Secretary at War to Officer commanding forces at Newcastle upon Tyne, 13 March 1761.
[59] PRO SP 36/51/28-9, William Williamson to Lord Bishop of Durham, 10 June 1740.
[60] Ibid., 36/51/92, William Williamson to Lord Bishop of Durham, 15 June 1740.
[61] Tony Hayter, The Army and the Crowd in Mid-Georgian England (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Letterfield, 1978) 30.
[62] Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats. The British Soldier in the Americas 1755-1763 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 56.
[63] PRO WO 4/83/316-17, Barrington to Lord Weymouth (Secretary of State), 18 April 1768.

in the spirit of the English constitution.[64] In the late summer of 1765 Lord Barrington reinforced this point in a communication to the leaders of Newcastle. In it he reminded them of the dangers of using the military too often to disperse crowds. Barrington noted that 'frequent use of soldiers to suppress civil commotions has an evident tendency to introduce military government, than which there cannot be a more horrible evil in a state.'[65] Regardless of such feelings from all sectors of society the army, and increasingly the militia, continued to be used in this way well into the nineteenth century.

If a magistrate were able to calm the crowd then usually the involvement of soldiers would not be required. But if the crowd became restless then the simple presence of the army might be enough to prevent or curb violent tendencies. This occurred during the 1740 riots in Newcastle where an initial outburst of destructive violence was ended by the arrival of troops. However, in cases where the unrest of the mob grew and began to show increased signs of violence, the military might be called on to take a more active role, as was the case in Newcastle during 1710 and Hexham in 1761. According to Tony Hayter this role falls into four main functional categories: control, defence, limited offence and unlimited offence.[66] These categories ranged from simply being present in the area where the crowd was (control), to unfettered engagement of rioters with swords and muskets (unlimited offence).[67] While it is clear that Hayter's typology accurately describes the various modes in which forces responded to riots, it is important to recognise that these categories are not totally exclusive to each other, and that there was often transition from one to the next.

For example, near Berwick in 1756 a unit of invalid troops initially accompanied magistrates to help control rioters.[68] When the mob became unruly the soldiers moved to 'defence', protecting themselves by firing over the rioter's heads while

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[64] Hayter, The Army and the Crowd, 11-12

[65] PRO WO 4/379-81, Barrington to Matthew Ridley, Williams Lambe and Sir Walter Blackett, 26 August 1765.

[66] Hayter, The Army and the Crowd, 167-182.

[67] A good example of the use of limited and unlimited offence against rioters is illustrated in the 1780 Gordon Riots. Christopher Hibbert, King Mob.

[68] PRO SP 36/136/162-3, Justices and Mayor of Berwick upon Tweed to William Pitt, 28 December 1756.

beginning a limited retreat.[69] When it became clear the crowd was not going to back down the invalids escalated to meet their force with direct musket fire that wounded at least one man.[70] Similar, but more tragic, was the way in which militia units acted in Hexham during the riots there in 1761.[71] The militiamen were clearly there in a defensive role to protect the town hall and those drawing the militia ballot. As the crowd became more aggressive and unruly, eventually attacking the troops, the latter responded with 'limited' offence, killing a number of the rioters.[72] Despite these examples, unlimited offence was never used by the regular army, militia or invalids while on riot duty in the North East.

IV. The Characteristics of Rioting in the North East.

Rioting was endemic in many parts of eighteenth-century Britain. In fact Roy Porter described it as being 'as English as plum pudding.'[73] George Rudé has estimated that there may have been as many as 275 disturbances of the peace in the sixty-five years between 1735 and 1800.[74] In the North East there were 12 serious outbreaks of unrest during the period of this work, as well as a number of smaller, scattered incidents.[75] However, at no time during the eighteenth century did this rioting come to embrace a revolutionary ideology that would threaten to overturn the established order in Britain. The vast majority of rioters were only interested in achieving limited goals. Moreover, rioting in this period was more ritualistic than overtly rebellious. Common elements such as processions, speeches and petitions permeated most gatherings and added a certain amount of legitimacy to the actions of the crowd.

These disturbances focused on what Ian Gilmour refers to as 'defensive aggression' aimed at obtaining limited goals such as cheaper food prices, improved employment

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[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

[71] This event will be discussed in more detail below.

[72] A brief and narrative account of this riot can be found in: H.T. Dickinson, 'The Hexham Militia Riot of 1761' Bulletin of the Durham County Local History Society 22 (1978) 22-6.

[73] As quoted in: Mark Harrison, Crowds and History: Mass Phenomena in English Towns 1790-1835 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 22.

[74] George Rudé, The Crowd in History 1730-1848 (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1964) 35-36.

contracts or freedom from impressment.[76] Developing this theory, it could be logically argued that most rioting in the eighteenth century was a conservative and reactionary response to unusual or immediate changes in socio-economic norms, rather than a long-term development of radical or revolutionary fervour. This conceptualisation of mass action is supported by many post-war social historians such as George Rudé, E. J. Hobsbawm, R. B. Rose and E. P. Thompson.[77] The experience of the North East supports this interpretation of Gilmour's thesis in that all the tumults in the region were aimed at the satisfaction of local grievances by local groups. Furthermore, these incidents occurred in response to quickly developing local stimuli, even if these were triggered by wider national concerns.

The riots that took place in northern towns during 1689, 1740, 1756, 1765 and 1791 were, in whole or in part, concerned with obtaining affordable foodstuffs. Disturbances occurring in 1710, 1738, and 1783, and in parts those of 1765 and 1793, focused on working conditions. Smaller tumults in 1768, 1760 and 1769, as well as that of 1793, focused on issues as disparate as sailors wages and the opposition to naval impressment. These eruptions of public anxiety had one thing in common; at their core they placed an emphasis on indigenous concerns. Even the Hexham riot of 1761 had elements of local interest at its heart. It was an attempt by workers from Newcastle, Gateshead and Northumberland to oppose a widely distrusted and nationally imposed militia balloting system. However, it made no attempt to expand its strategic aims beyond protecting local people.

The literature concerning rioting in the region under study is considerable.[78] However, much of this writing does not put the role of the army into a wider socio-

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[75] Section V below will deal with those riots in which the army or militia were directly involved.
[76] Ian Gilmour, Riots Rising and Revolution, 245. For further discussion on the debate over the organisation, composition and motivation of crowds see: Mark Harrison, Crowds and History; Christopher Hibbert, King Mob, 61ff; George Rudé, The Crowd in History; E.P. Thompson, 'The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century.' Past and Present 50 (1971) 77-136.
[77] A general discussion of their ideas can be found in: Harrison, Crowds and History. More detailed treatments for the eighteenth century are located in: Rudé, The Crowd and History; E.P. Thompson, 'The Moral Economy.'
[78] This includes: H.T. Dickinson, 'The Hexham Militia Riot.'; Joyce Ellis, 'Urban Conflict and Popular Violence. The Guildhall Riots of 1740 in Newcastle upon Tyne.' International Review of Social History 25 (3) (1980) 332-49; and to a lesser extent 'A Dynamic Society: Social Relations in Newcastle upon Tyne 1660-1760.' In: Peter Clark (ed.) The Transformation of English Provincial Towns

political context nor does it comment on its impact upon civil-military relations. Rather, it sees the army as a functional component of a largely socio-economic problem.[79] This is not to say that there is a total dearth of material in this area. Some authors have dealt directly with the role of the military in the suppression of civil unrest, but not specifically in the north.[80] Despite this there is a need to mesh the discussion on northern rioting with the material concerning the involvement of the military. This will show how such events affected the development of civil-military relations.

First however, one must take a look at the characteristics of rioting in the north to observe whether or not it is similar to, or distinct from, other regions of the country. Like smuggling in this period, rioting in the north of England differed from experiences in central and southern parts of the country. The most notable difference is the relatively low number of food related disturbances. Rudé has stated that of the 275 riots he had uncovered between 1730 and 1800, almost two-thirds were related to the issue of comestibles.[81] This does not fit well with the situation that existed in the north. Newcastle upon Tyne did not experience its first true food riot of the century until 1740, when much of the region was enflamed by high prices and shortages. Between this date and the outbreak of the French Revolutionary War the city witnessed just two additional food-associated tumults in 1765 and 1791, the latter of which was very limited in scope. Similarly, Berwick upon Tweed faced only two disturbances related to the price of foodstuffs, the first being a very limited period of unrest in 1689 and the second in 1756. In all, subsistence riots accounted for just 40% of all disturbances in the region between 1688 and 1793.

(London: Hutchinson and Company Ltd., 1984) 190-227; Norman McCord, 'Some Labour Troubles of the 1790's in North-East England.' International Review of Social History 13 (1968) 366-83; Morgan and Rushton, Rogues Thieves and the Rule of Law, in particular chapter 9 'Law and Order', 191-214.

[79] This is certainly true of Joyce Ellis, 'Urban Conflict and Popular and Violence.' as well as H T Dickinson, 'The Hexham Militia Riots.'

[80] Examples of such work include: Anthony Babington, Military Intervention in Britain. From the Gordon Riots to the Gibraltar Incident (London: Routledge, 1990); Clive Emsley, 'The Military and Popular Disorder in England, 1790-1801' Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 61 (1983-4) 10-21, 96-112; Tony Hayter, The Army and the Crowd; Stanley Palmer, 'Calling Out the Troops.'; Richard Vogler, Reading the Riot Act.

[81] Rudé, The Crowd in History, 35-6.

Much of this was due to the agricultural productivity of the region and the reliance of the population on non-traditional grain products such as rye and oats that were not widely consumed in other parts of England.[82] As a consequence the local population was much less dependent on grain imports. Furthermore, many of the major centres in the north were often located near the coast and large ports, therefore supply routes were easily established and maintained in those rare periods of dearth.[83] Additionally, it appears that magistrates and other local officials were very pro-active in ensuring the supply of grain through limiting exports and guaranteeing prices.[84] These factors help to explain why, with the exception of 1740 and 1756, it appears as if the north was relatively well insulated from the widespread disturbances that engulfed large parts of England during 1727-9, 1734-40, 1756-7, 1760, 1766-8, 1772-3 and 1783.[85] Even the unrest that blocked the Tyne in 1765 was largely isolated from the causes of the extensive food rioting that gripped southern England in 1766. While there were some concerns over food prices, it was focused more on the labour politics of local keelmen.

Another major difference between unrest in the North East and that found in other parts of the country, and in particular London, was the lack of religious or political rioting. This is even more surprising when one considers the religious mix of the region and its role in the Jacobite conflagrations of 1715 and 1745. In many cities, and again especially in London, it was not unusual for crowds to take to the streets over 'political' or 'religious' issues. The extreme nature of this political strife can be clearly observed in the support that the Duke of Newcastle gave to loyalist societies during the turmoil of 1715.[86] Northern population centres experienced nothing similar to this. Even election riots, which were not uncommon in many larger towns,

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[82] For more on this subject please see Chapter 2 and: D.J. Rowe, 'The North East.' In: F.M.L. Thompson (ed.) The Cambridge Social History of Britain 1750-1950. Volume I: Regions and Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[83] John Stevenson, Popular Disturbances in England 1700-1870 (London: Longman Publishing, 1979) 98.

[84] Walter James Shelton, English Hunger and Industrial Disorders (London: The Macmillan Press, 1973) 57.

[85] For an excellent analysis of the distribution of rioting of all types in the eighteenth century see: Andrew Charlesworth (ed.) An Atlas of Rural Protest in Britain 1584-1900 (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1983).

[86] James L. Fitts, 'Newcastle's Mob.' Albion 5 (1973) 41-9.

were all but non-existent in the region.[87] It could be argued that the 1689 Sandhill riot in Newcastle was a political or even religiously motivated riot, as it was a clear expression of loyalty to the new Protestant monarchy.[88] While in some senses this is correct, it is debatable whether this disorder was either overtly religious or political in nature. Despite this, it still remains the only case of unrest that can be interpreted as being linked, although only marginally, to non-parochial issues of polity or religious dogma.

One area in which the north resembled other parts of the country was in the sheer numbers of people who could come together to protest. In 1710 a crowd of more than 1,600 striking keelmen took to the streets in Newcastle, and thirty years later 'very great numbers' attacked and destroyed the city's Guildhall.[89] In 1761 as many as 5,000 were involved in the bloody affray in Hexham, while four years later 4,000 pitmen were reported to be committing various outrages during their strike.[90] The size of these crowds can be attributed, in many ways, to the fact that much of the region's economy was primarily focused on coal. Newcastle's population of keelmen numbered nearly 1,500 at the beginning of the century and formed a close-knit community living mainly in the cramped Sandhill district of the city.[91] As the century progressed this sector of the town's society grew considerably. Added to this was the large population of colliers and coal hauliers, who like the keelmen were actively and widely involved in many of the region's disturbances. Almost all those involved in the sacking of the Guildhall in 1740 and the strike of 1710 were keelmen or members of their families. Similarly, the mob at Hexham was in large part from the same professions, and many of the troubles later in the century were led by keelmen and colliers. The size and inter-relation of the coal industry's workforce meant that it

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[87] This arises much from the fact that in the eighteenth century elections for many of the seats in this region were infrequent. For example, in Newcastle there were no contested parliamentary elections from 1741 until 1774, helping to maintain a form of electoral peace: W.A. Speck, 'Northumberland Elections in the Eighteenth Century.' Northern History 28 (1992) 164-175.

[88] This incident will be discussed in Section V below.

[89] PRO SP 34/12/141, Nicholas Ridley to Secretary of State, 23 June 1710; PRO SP 36/51/127, Cuthbert Fenwick to Duke of Newcastle, 20 June 1740.

[90] Ibid., 36/51/28-/9. William Williamson to Lord Bishop of Durham, 10 June 1740; Robert Bell Turton, The History of the North York Militia (Stockton on Tees: Patrick & Shotton, 1973) 44; CSPD, 1760-5, 599, J.B. Ridley to the Earl of Northumberland, 13 September 1765.

[91] P.M. Horsley, Eighteenth Century Newcastle (Newcastle upon Tyne: Oriel Press Ltd., 1971) 228. For a more detailed discussion of North-East society in this period please refer to chapter 2.

often behaved as a large and united force that actively engaged in public protest and direct action.

V. Street Fighting Men: Military Intervention in North-East Rioting.

It is important to distinguish between riots that impacted on associations between the army and society, and those that did not. For this reason only those incidents of unrest in which military forces and civilian crowds came into contact will be analysed in this section. Incidents in which the magistrates and their assistants managed to mollify the anger of the crowd, or disperse them without assistance of troops, are surplus to this study. In addition, riots involving the military will be analysed by category (food, industrial, etc.) rather than by the order in which they occurred. This approach has been taken so that the characteristics of various types of riots, and how the army and militia interacted with the civilian population and local political and legal officials, can be better understood. The first of these categories is food rioting.

Although food rioting was not as widespread in the north as it was in other parts of the country, its desperate nature meant that it was not always possible for provincial powers to deal with it unilaterally. Because of this the army, or related forces such as the militia and invalids, were called in to deal with crowds in all but one incident of disorder directly related to the shortage or price of foodstuffs.[92] As discussed earlier, food rioting could often be very serious and violent because of the distressed and determined mindset of the people involved. Furthermore, many civilians judged the goals of food riots to be just. For this reason the local justices and town leaders were often quick to make sure that provision was made for foodstuffs, and to ensure that military forces were in place to prevent any escalation or expansion of crowd action. Unfortunately, these attempts failed in 1740, leading to the worst food rioting seen in the region during the eighteenth century.

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[92] The exception is the above-mentioned riot of 1791, which was ended by magistrates creating a subscription for the poor.

In many ways this event typified the eighteenth-century riot. It involved widespread urban unrest directed at achieving specific objectives, as well as the destruction of the symbols of local authority. This time the objective was affordable prices for grain and the symbol was the town's Guildhall. It came during a period of heavy rains in the autumn and summer of 1739, combined with an unusually harsh winter. In Newcastle's case this situation was further exacerbated by long frosts that brought the North East's economic life to a series of abrupt standstills. Additional complications arose when abnormal spring winds pinned much of Newcastle's vital colliery fleet in the harbour at Tynemouth.[93] As a result many workers in the coal trade, especially the keelmen, became temporarily unemployed at a time when food prices rose by about 100% within the first six months of 1740.[94] Such a rise was unusual for the local population. The productive agricultural terrain in the city's hinterland helped to keep grain prices relatively stable for much of the century. Such a dramatic rise may have created additional panic and concern because of its rarity, thus adding to the desperation and determination of the crowd.[95]

On 20 June 1740 the mayor, Cuthbert Fenwick, reported to the Duke of Newcastle that

> The pitmen employed in the neighbouring collieries, on pretence of the high price of corn, assembled there yesterday in a very great numbers and behaved in a most riotous manner breaking open the granaries of several corn merchants, forcing into the houses of private other persons, stopping the corn carriages passing through the streets and carrying off great quantities of corn.[96]

Similar events were being played out in neighbouring communities. In Sunderland a mob broke into a malt loft on the rumour of grain being stored there, and in Stockton

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93 Joyce Ellis, 'The Guildhall Riots of 1740,' 333. The outbreak of war with Spain in December of 1739 also effected trade through embargoes, the threat of the naval press and the presence of privateers.

94 David Levine & Keith Wrightson, The Making of an Industrial Society, Whickham 1500-1765 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) 382-3. In particular it is noted that the price of rye and oats, a local staple grain, doubled in this period.

95 Ellis, 'The Guildhall Riots of 1740,' 335.

96 PRO SP 36/51/127, Cuthbert Fenwick to Duke of Newcastle, 20 June 1740.

on Tees, crowds rampaged through the streets in protest against the price and continued exportation of corn.[97] The situation in Sunderland remained ungovernable despite attempts by the local magistrates to placate the mob. This led to magistrates asking for a formal petition to be drawn up requesting troops to help suppress the rioters.[98] Similarly, in Newcastle local magistrates were making efforts to negotiate with the crowd, actively attempting to guarantee the protesters an affordable and stable supply of grain. However, this came to no avail and every day larger numbers quit their work and joined in the protests.[99] Then on 26 June an official went out from the Guildhall, where the mayor and aldermen were meeting, to announce that the poor would be supplied with grain from a ship tied up on the quayside. Notwithstanding, the swelling crowd reacted negatively to this entreat, attacking the messenger and severely wounding him.

In response to this unexpected and unfolding crisis a detachment of armed gentlemen from the city's trained band opened fire, killing one protester and wounding several others.[100] The enraged crowd recovered quickly from this assault and gave chase to the armed men, who fled for the safety of the Guildhall. The riotous mob surrounded the building and subsequently launched a furious attack against it. The level of damage to the building was considerable. Doors were forced open, windows smashed, furniture broken, town records thrown out of windows and the guns of the town guard seized and wrecked.[101] This in itself demonstrates how rioting crowds were not attempting any revolutionary action, but rather the satisfaction of limited and definable goals. A rebellious crowd would surely welcome the opportunity to obtain weapons, yet these rioters destroyed those held by the town. During this orgy of destruction some of the attackers managed to liberate between £1,400 and £1,600 from the town's chest, possibly with the intention of distributing it to the crowd

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[97] For the Sunderland incident see: PRO SP 36/51/132, Fairless Smith to John Hedworth, 20 June 1740; In the case of Stockton refer to: PRO SP 36/50/425-432 and PRO SP 36/51/28-9,61-92; For more on the Stockton riot see: Sowler, A History of Stockton on Tees.

[98] The actual request was for 2 companies of foot: PRO SP 36/51/140, Petition of the Inhabitants of Sunderland, 23 June 1740.

[99] This included pitmen from Heaton and colliers from Whickham. Levine & Wrightson, Making of an Industrial Society, 383.

[100] John Sykes, Local Records of Northumberland and Durham, Newcastle upon Tyne, and Berwick upon Tweed Vol.I (Stockton on Tees: Patrick & Shotton, 1973) 162-3.

outside.[102] It has been estimated that the entire cost of the damage to the corporation, including the theft of the money, may have been in excess of £4,000.[103]

One might ask why the crowd was able to perform such enormities against the town's authority, and why the army was not in a position to help before the crowd got out of control. The reason was that no troops were on hand to help suppress the crowds as coincidentally, the regiment of dragoons stationed in Newcastle had been ordered to march from the city on the eve of the unrest to perform riot duty elsewhere.[104] This meant that the closest military support the local magistrates could count on was based in Berwick. Unfortunately for Newcastle's authorities, three companies of Major General Howard's Regiment of Dragoons marched into town at eight o'clock in the evening, only hours after the building had been sacked.[105] The soldiers may have been too late to prevent the violence on the quayside but they did manage to curb the continuing violence of small bands of armed rioters who wandered about the streets threatening local inhabitants and breaking into houses. The men of Howard's regiment also managed to disperse a smaller hostile crowd and arrest 40 of its members.[106] It appears as if the very presence of the soldiery was enough to cause a cessation of the tumult. From this point there is no further mention of conflict between the soldiers and civilians, nor a resurgence of serious unrest in Newcastle.

Such was the relief of the authorities for the timely intervention of the armed forces that gifts were given to the officers and men of Howard's dragoons who had attended the unrest. After the riot had ended the members of the city's governing council motioned to present Captain Marmaduke Sowle, the commander of the three companies, with a gold box worth 50 guineas 'for his ready and speedy march to the

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[101] TWAS 394/13/69-70,81,89; PRO SP 36/51/198, Cuthbert Fenwick to Secretary of State, 27 June 1740.
[102] PRO SP 36/51/198, Cuthbert Fenwick to Secretary of State, 27 June 1740; PRO SP 36/51/200, James Bell to the Postmaster General, 27 June 1740.
[103] Sykes, Local Records. 163. This does not include the immeasurable damage done to the city's historical records.
[104] Detachments of Howard's regiment were being sent to Stockton as early as 29 May 1740 and marching orders continued until the end of June. PRO WO 5/34/93, 125, 29 May 1740.
[105] Ibid., 5/34/123-4, 19 June 1740. These units had been issued marching orders on 19 June in order to assist parts of County Durham where unrest had already broken out, but were later directed to assist in Newcastle as well.
[106] Horsley, Eighteenth-Century Newcastle, 10.

relief of this town on the 26th June last.'[107] Even the regular soldiers of Sowle's detachment were not immune from the generosity of Newcastle's administrators. It was ordered that each dragoon present at the riot should receive an equal share of a 30 guinea cash prize.[108] The council's altruism may have been due to the belief that without the army the innocent inhabitants would 'have been plundered and their houses destroyed by the rioters.'[109] Certainly the level of violence displayed by the rioters before the arrival of the troops adds weight to this observation. The presentation of such awards demonstrates how members of the local elite appreciated the crucial role the army played in protecting them from outbreaks of rebellion that might threaten their interests. It also further illustrates the level to which these forces supported the interests of both regional and national governments, while also protecting the personal and property rights of a wide cross-section of civilian society.

The only other incidents of food rioting came in 1756 and 1765. In late December 1756 it was reported that there had been riots 'in Berwick and northern parts of the County of Durham, called Norham and Island Shires which border Berwick.'[110] These disturbances were clearly related to issues of food supply and prices. However, the local authorities said that they could not understand such a reaction as the price of corn and meal was the same as in most places in England.[111] They also stressed the fact that the town's corporation had done much to provide the poor with oatmeal at an 'easy-rate'.[112] Fear over inflated prices may have arisen due to the large bounties being offered for the exportation of grains to Holland during this period. Petitions from Newcastle, Liverpool and Bristol all called for a halt to such a practice in case the continued outward movement of grain from the region resulted in a price rise that put foodstuffs out of reach of the regular people.[113]

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[107] TWAS MD/NC/2/4/532, Lt. Charles Fielding and Ensign Hewitt, who served with Sowle, were awarded silver plates of 40 and 30 guineas respectively.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Ibid.
[110] PRO SP 36/136/162-3, Justices and Mayor of Berwick upon Tweed to William Pitt, 28 December 1756.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Ibid.
[113] PRO PC 1/6/62/1, 24 November 1756.

Despite the pleas of the local councils and guilds for an end to the export, the unrest intensified. This led to a detachment from the four invalid companies stationed in Berwick being ordered to Tweedmouth to deal with riots that had spread there on 27 December.[114] Magistrates attempted to calm the situation and negotiate with the angry civilians. However, the intensity of the disquiet increased to the point where they were forced to read the riot act and call for the assistance of the invalids. Three of the infantry and one of the justices were injured by a shower of rocks thrown by the increasingly agitated crowd.[115] The mob became so threatening that the troops and civilian officials were forced to retreat, temporarily turning and presenting their guns to hold off the crowd.[116] This failed to have the desired effect and the invalids were forced to fire three volleys over the heads of the rioters, and finally directly into them, wounding one of the agitators.[117]

Even with such vigorous action by the authorities the rioting continued and even intensified, to the horror of Berwick's leaders. Regardless of fact that the invalids were proving ineffective in suppressing the rioters, many in Berwick felt the regular troops in the garrison should be kept within the walls of the town to keep order there.[118] For this reason the mayor and justices requested assistance from the government in London in the form of additional regular troops. The War Office responded by issuing marching orders to two companies of Lord Charles Manners' Regiment of Foot at Newcastle to assist the justices at Tweedmouth, Spittal and Ord.[119] It appears that eventually the riots subsided. Nevertheless, the whole incident illustrates the extent to which civilians would go to protect their interests, as well as the reliance of local governing bodies on military forces to keep order. It also reinforces the fact that the auxiliary forces were rarely able or willing to combat rioters as effectively as the regular army.

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114 PRO WO 5/44/102, Barrington to Major Brown at Berwick, 1 February 1757.
115 PRO SP 36/136/162-3, Justices and Mayor of Berwick upon Tweed to William Pitt, 28 December 1756.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 PRO WO 5/44/58-9, To the Commanding Officer of Colonel Lord Manner's Regiment of Foot at Newcastle, 31December 1756.
119 Ibid.

The latent fear of many leaders, that disorder would escalate if army units were not immediately present, was justified in the late summer and early autumn of 1765. At this time the Tyne was gripped by violent strikes led by colliers who refused to work while the price of corn and other costs of living remained high.[120] Like much violence during industrial strikes, the men began breaking equipment at their mines and issuing threats of further damage should the authorities not meet their demands.[121] Once again the leaders of Newcastle feared that unless the military were quickly called in, the crowd's action could evolve to a point where it would be impossible to control the situation peacefully. The requests for troops to be sent to the town were quickly acknowledged by the War Office. By late August three troops of the 1st Dragoon Guards were marching to the district to join the several companies of foot and invalids already stationed in Newcastle.[122] Again it appears as though the arrival of such a substantial body of armed soldiers was enough to dampen the ambition of the mob. While substantial violence and damage had been directed at the collier's places of employment, and large numbers of rioters had been arrested by the justices, there appears to have been no serious conflicts between the soldiers sent to restore order and the striking colliers.

The most consistent and frequent form of rioting was related to issues directly or indirectly affecting working conditions in the coal industry. It was not unusual for strikes and protests by workers, mainly of the coal and maritime trades, to escalate into civil unrest. Such disorder occurred several times over the century, the most serious being in 1710, 1738, 1765, 1783 and 1793. On many occasions the army was called into quell such unrest as the critical flow of coal to London could be all but stopped if coal miners or keelmen decided on long-term work stoppages.
Unfortunately for the soldiers, the local labour force, and especially the keelmen, proved to be more vociferous in the defence of their rights than many other sectors of society. As mentioned previously, the sheer numbers of men employed in the trade and the close-knit nature of these communities, meant striking crowds could be large,

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120 PRO WO 4/77/289, C.D. Oyly to Sir Walter Blackett, 6 August 1765.
121 PRO SP 37/4/210-12, Matthew Ridley (Mayor of Newcastle) to Duke of Newcastle, 12 September 1765.
122 PRO WO 4/77/379-81, Barrington to Matthew Ridley, William Lambe and Sir Walter Blackett, 26 August 1765.

organised and daunting. For this reason many of these tumults involved active aggression by the civilians against the military. However, this resistance and violence was not aimed at the institution of the army. Rather it manifested itself as a defence of the keelmen's collective rights against wider economic issues, as well as the coercive power of local business interests. The army was the unfortunate instrument of this power.

In late June and early July 1710 the army and local militia were called upon to face such a strike, led by a large body of keelmen. These disturbances were part of a wider period of industrial action by the same constituency dating back to 1709. However, they were now exacerbated by a period of nation-wide convulsions over food prices and shortages brought about by a harsh winter.[123] Despite the influence of these factors, this riot was not primarily concerned with such issues. The keelmen had walked away from their boats over their employer's misappropriation of funds that had specifically been set aside for the new Keelman's Hospital.[124] They exacted the maximum pressure possible on their employers and the local authorities by stopping all keels from navigating the river. This effectively brought the shipment of coal to a halt and severely hindered river trade.[125] If the men on these vessels would not volunteer to stop and join the protest, the strikers were not beyond physically seizing the boats and forcing them to the shore.[126] Such actions became a regular fixture of keelmen's strikes throughout the eighteenth century. The sudden halt of the coal trade bit deep, not only with the colliery owners in and around Newcastle, but in fuel-hungry London. This threat to the city's economic life-blood and the capital's supply of coal ensured the regular and active involvement of military forces.

As early as 23 June the city authorities had raised their militia in a desperate attempt to break the blockade of the river and force the keelmen back to work. Though the mayor and justices could count on the support of eight companies of men, they complained that not only was this insufficient to face the estimated 1,600 keelmen,

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123 John Sykes, Local Records, 130.
124 T.S. Ashton & J. Sykes, The Coal Industry of the Eighteenth Century (London: Methuen & Company Ltd., 1955) 116.
125 TWAS 394/3, 2 November 1711.

but the troops were 'in the whole new and undisciplined.'[127] Additionally, the authorities soon realised that their initial concessions over casual wage demands were not going to keep the crowds from the street. Beyond this, the mayor believed that the militia would have no real effect upon the large number of Scots present in the Newcastle coal trade, and that only the 'sight of the regular forces' would compel them to end their disruptive influence and leave the region.[128] The situation was such that on the evening of 23 June Nicholas Ridley, Newcastle's deputy mayor, informed the Secretary of State that he and the town's officers believed that the assistance of 'eight companies of regular troops with our own horse may be able to disperse and suppress the rioters and free the navigation.'[129]

From the early part of July soldiers were pouring into the town and by 21 July the whole of the Earl of Ilay's regiment had entered Newcastle.[130] Not coincidentally, this marked the time when the troubles ended and the keelmen returned to work, lifting their blockade of the river.[131] Once again, although the army was employed directly in the suppression of the riot and the arresting of rioters, there is little real evidence to point towards violent conflict between the two sides. It appears that the keelmen were determined to remain on strike in the face of the county's trained bands and militia, whose ability to enforce order was questionable. However with the arrival of the greater part of an infantry regiment the rioters became much more open to negotiation with the justices and city authorities. As was the case with the unrest of 1740, the appearance of well-trained regular forces on the streets of Newcastle caused the unity and conviction of the mob to waver, eventually leading to its relatively peaceful dispersal. Unfortunately, the militia was unable to command the same level of respect during the tragic events of 1761.

During March 1761 the small town of Hexham was the scene of a violent confrontation between a mob of nearly 5,000 civilians and units of the North

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[126] Such was the case with the keel of John Grant who was by 'force and violence' compelled to surrender the boat after being stopped and boarded by about 30 men. TWAS 394/3, 10 July 1710.
[127] PRO SP 34/12/141, Nicholas Ridley to Secretary of State, 23 June 1710.
[128] Ibid., 34/12/162, Johnathan Rodham to Sir John Delaval, 6 July 1710.
[129] Ibid., 34/12/141, Nicholas Ridley to Secretary of State, 23 June 1710
[130] PRO WO 5/16/173, 27 June 1710.
[131] PRO SP 34/12/192, From Johnathan Rodham, 21 July 1710.

Yorkshire militia. The majority of the mob once again consisted of employees from the North East's coal industry. Unlike 1710 or 1740, this would prove to be the bloodiest incident of rioting in the region during the eighteenth century. Ironically this battle with the militia was actually the result of public hostility to the implementation of the new Militia Act.[132] There were a wide range of issues behind this opposition including the compulsive nature of the balloting process, trepidation at the prospect of mass conscription for long-term service, and an erroneous fear of being subjected to dreaded military law. Others misconstrued that they would be required to spend long periods outside of their counties, or would even be sent to stations overseas. Some simply did not favour serving in the militia or objected to the system whereby those with access to money could purchase a substitute to do their duty.[133] Many of these grievances were founded on rumour, confusion and ignorance about the provisions of the Militia Act.

The battle that erupted on 9 March 1761 was not a unilateral uprising by the local population. Rather it was the culmination of a series of disturbances, led primarily by a large crowd of Tyneside's colliers and keelmen. The initial impetus for opposition came when notices were published in February 1761 requesting that petty constables in Northumberland and Durham counties draw up lists of any men between the ages of 18 and 50 eligible to serve in the militia.[134] It was not long before disturbances broke out all over County Durham. The most serious of these occurred on 28 February when a collection of nearly 1,000 angry, unruly and well organised protesters gathered in Gateshead after drawing up a petition opposing any new balloting for the militia.[135] The gentlemen of the town succumbed to the pressure from the crowd and agreed not to ballot there, principally due to the fact that they actually required very few men from that area to complete their quotas.[136]

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[132] There was widespread dissent and rioting throughout the country over the Act from its inception in 1757.

[133] Duty was two years for those over 35 and three years for those under 35. Robert Bell Turnton, A History of the North York Militia (Stockton on Tees, Patrick and Shotton, 1973) 38.

[134] H.T. Dickinson, 'The Hexham Militia Riot.' 4.

[135] Ibid.

[136] Ibid.

Misinterpreting their success at Gateshead as a commitment by the county gentlemen not to ballot for the militia anywhere, the population were enraged by attempts to hold similar ballots in Northumberland the following month. On 2 March another large crowd, consisting mainly of Tyneside colliers, seized and destroyed all the lists and books concerning the militia from constables at Morpeth. The next day this was repeated in the village of Willingham 20 miles away.[137] At this point the county authorities had become extremely alarmed by what appeared to be a growing state of unrest amongst the labouring classes in the region. They legitimately feared a recurrence of the general disorder that gripped Yorkshire in 1757. Wary that this opposition might continue during the balloting scheduled for Hexham on 9 March, local leaders ordered two companies of the North Yorkshire Militia, then stationed at Newcastle, 'to march...for Hexham, in order to put a stop to riotous assemblies intended to be held there on Monday, to obstruct the deputy-lieutenants balloting for the militia.'[138] Permission was also given by the Secretary at War to allow additional military units to be marched from York to assist the authorities of Durham, Newcastle and Northumberland.[139]

Despite the overt military presence, scores of people flowed into Hexham and by mid-day there were nearly 5,000 civilians gathered in the square outside the Sessions House. Within the next hour the situation deteriorated considerably as a magistrate read the Riot Act to no effect. At approximately one o'clock in the afternoon the growing tension spilled over. The crowd launched an attack on the militia drawn up in lines in front of the building where the balloting was taking place.[140] At some point in the confusion rioters shot two soldiers, most likely with guns that they had seized from other troops during the fighting.[141] It was at this time that justices realised the seriousness of the situation and ordered the militiamen to shoot. The fire from the massed ranks of militiamen into the tightly packed civilians proved devastating. At

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137 Ibid.

138 Quoted from the diary of William Allen in: Sykes, Local Records, 232.

139 PRO WO 5/48/275-7, 13 March 1761. These orders are good examples of the new freedom given to magistrates to order military forces to help quash rioting. The Secretary at War ordered that the commander 'cause such detachments to be made from time to time...on application made to you by the Civil Magistrates.'

140 Turnton, North York Militia, 45.

141 Ibid., 45.

least 18 rioters were killed in the first few volleys. The actual number of deaths is still open to debate, however it is likely that as many as 40 to 50 people may have been slaughtered, with many more wounded.[142]

The incident had a devastating effect upon the relationship between the North York Militia and the civilians of the entire region. Such a violent response, despite being instigated by the crowd, became a byword for the evils of policing with soldiers. Such was the legacy of the events in 1761 that 33 years later, when the troops from the regiment were ordered from Newcastle to help suppress a serious mutiny in Glasgow, the North Yorkshire Militia still held the nickname 'the Hexham Butchers.'[143] Like 'Kirke's Lambs' of 1710, the presence of these units at the scenes of violent unrest had a lasting impact on public perceptions. There is little doubt that the militia's involvement in the unfortunate incident at Hexham did much to taint, not only the North Yorkshire regiment's reputation, but that of all military forces in the region. It is also possible that this negative image was entrenched by the continued association of the North Yorkshire Militia with attempts by the authorities in Newcastle and Sunderland to quell violent uprisings by keelmen and sailors, especially in 1783 and 1793.

The uprisings of 1793, while more prolonged in origin and less bloody than the Hexham incident, shared some similar characteristics. The most important similarity was the direct and violent conflict between soldiers and crowds of angry civilians. Tension and unrest had been building from November 1792, when workers on the Tyne went on strike to protest the rising cost of living and the decline in the real value of their wages. In late winter and early spring a number of separate but somewhat related disturbances erupted amongst the keelmen, pitmen and sailors of Shields, Sunderland and Newcastle. Carrying on from this, in late January and early February 1793 a striking force of nearly 1,000 keelmen and their families gathered at Newcastle

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[142] Gentleman's Magazine reported 42 dead and 48 wounded: Gentleman's Magazine 31, 138; A lawyer from Hexham named Armstrong claimed 101 casualties including 52 dead: H.T. Dickinson, 'Hexham Militia Riot' 5; A letter from the Earl of Holdernesse to Lord Ligioner reports the deaths of 21 rioters with 'a great many wounded': CSPD 1760-5, Earl of Holdernesse to Lord Ligioner, 12 March 1761; Turton admits that many more than 21 could have died as there are reports of dead people being found in the fields after the riot was over. Turton, North York Militia, 43-5.

[143] Turton, North York Militia, 59-60.

in order to protect themselves from the naval press. Despite what Norman McCord refers to as a fairly mild tradition of pressing in the region before 1793, the impress service hit the North East with a vengeance at the outbreak of war in that year.[144] This, coupled with the dislocating economic effects of war with France and the related rise in commodity prices, helped to elevate local antagonism to the impress service to dangerous levels.[145] This resentment and frustration was best described in a threatening letter delivered to the lieutenant of the impress service at Sunderland. It warned that, 'your gang had better take care of themselves for if they do not we will take care of them and very soon. We fully design that we will destroy them and very soon.'[146]

At the same time, keelmen from Shields and Sunderland had walked out of their jobs, complaining about their pay conditions. Relations in the area were further strained in the face of claims by local authorities that this group was already earning enough money.[147] With the threat of a blockaded Tyne and an inactive port, the leaders and magistrates of Newcastle began a build-up of military forces in the region. Two companies of the 6th Regiment of Dragoons based at York were ordered to Sunderland, while the remainder of the regiment was instructed to march from Whitby to Newcastle.[148] The authorities had learned much from a century of strikes and riots by the same elements of North-East society. It was hoped that a quick show of overwhelming force would cause the strikers to waver, and even force them back to work without the outbreak of rioting.[149] Unfortunately, this time the presence of soldiers and the impress service did little to assuage the crowd's anger. In fact it possibly agitated them to even greater action.

Many in authority began to believe that by using the press gangs to deal with the rioters they could quickly force the mob to disperse and return to work. Initially it

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[144] McCord & Brewster, 'Some Labour Troubles,' 367, 377.
[145] Ibid.
[146] Copy of a letter to the Lieutenant of the Impress service in Sunderland contained in: HO 42/24/351-4, James Rudman to Henry Dundas, 4 February 1793.
[147] Ibid., 42/24/328-9, Thomas Sanderson to William Burdon, 1 February 1793.
[148] PRO WO 5/68/367, 383, 11 February 1793 & 15 February 1793.
[149] This included the arrival, on 15 November, of the frigate H.M.S. Hind. McCord, 'Some Labour Troubles,' 370.

appeared as though this method would meet with some success.[150] However, since many had originally struck in opposition to the press, its employment against the workers eventually helped to galvanise resistance. A further problem was now preoccupying the authorities, as it had done in previous riots in the region. There was growing concern about the ability and motivation of the Durham and Northumberland militias to deal with the expanding crisis. Some suggested that it would be best to withdraw these units and bring in those from counties 'not so easy attached.'[151]

Such trepidation surrounding the reliability of the militia was well founded as throughout the century regional leaders around Britain had discovered that very often militiamen would refuse to act against people they could easily associate and sympathise with. It was hoped that a regiment from another county would be less easily swayed and thus more prepared to act, as had been illustrated during the 1761 Hexham riots. By 13 February the dreaded North Yorkshire Militia had arrived in Newcastle but the authorities were still concerned that they did not have sufficient forces to control the situation.[152] Further, it appears that the new troops were little better than the other militiamen as 'four-fifths of them [were] so undisciplined as not to be much depended upon.'[153]

From that time the rioting increased in intensity, driven on by the mob's resistance to the press gangs and determination to make employers meet their wage demands. On 18 February the situation reached its worst and most violent point during an incident at Sunderland. Constables from that town, backed by three troops of dragoons, attempted to arrest seven keelmen suspected of assaulting several people during earlier disturbances there. The men were seized, handcuffed and sent off to the gaol with the dragoons and a complement of foot soldiers acting as an escort.[154] On the way the troops were subjected to a shower of bricks, stones and tiles as a large gang of keelmen attempted to free their comrades from captivity.[155] One soldier was seriously

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[150] PRO HO 42/24/365-6, Charles Brandling to Rowland Burton, 5 February 1793.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Ibid., 42/23/756-7, John Runciman to Henry Dundas, 14 February 1793.
[153] Ibid., The outbreak of war meant that by this time many of the new militiamen brought in to augment the existing regiments had not been fully trained
[154] Ibid., 42/24/538, Thomas Sanderson to an unknown person, 18 February 1793.
[155] Ibid.

hurt when his horse fell on him, and the flying debris injured more. The magistrate read the Riot Act but the assault continued and eventually the soldiers came under such pressure that they were forced to fire their weapons. Using a traditional tactic, aimed at minimising casualties, the troops fired over the heads of the rioters.[156]

The unrest around the Tyne and the Wear continued for several more days, as the keelmen on both rivers continued to resist the press and demand the release of their colleagues. However, with the persistent use of the press gangs and the support of a large contingent of regular forces, the strikes and riots began to slowly abate. Patrols of horse and foot soldiers were moving about the riverside and the collieries scaring keelmen and pitmen back to work.[157] Backed by the protection of regular troops, the magistrates were now finding it much easier to negotiate with small groups of workers, and were convincing growing numbers to return to their places of employment. They even managed to get the keelmen on the Tyne to remove a blockade of keels that they had set up on 23 February.[158] By the following day it was being reported that many of the keels and their crews that had been part of the blockade were loading up and sailing. The atmosphere was described as 'now joy and gladness except those families who have relatives in the gaol.'[159] Despite their determination and fierce opposition to the authorities, the entire workforce returned to their employment without any serious gains in their wages. Although this did not mark a complete end to the labour troubles in this region, and resistance to the press continued throughout the remainder of the eighteenth century, the worst was over.

The 1793 riots stand as the clearest example of how important the military was to the maintenance of public order and how powerless the justices were to stop serious unrest without them. As with many cases during the eighteenth century, the militia proved to be largely ineffective, and it fell on regular troops to restore order. The presence of the soldiers helped to undermine the resolve of the crowd. Having the army in support also afforded the magistrates an opportunity to negotiate with crowds that might otherwise have been unruly. Furthermore, the army patrolled the region

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156 McCord, 'Some Labour Troubles.' 375; PRO HO 42/24/538.
157 PRO HO 42/23/772-4, 23 February 1793.
158 Ibid., 42/24/700, Mr. Cooper to Richard Burton, 24 February 1793.

and saw to it that the established peace was maintained while ensuring that those who had agreed to return to work did so. There is little doubt that without the involvement of the army the situation on Tyneside would have deteriorated further and eventually escalated out of the local authority's control.

It is important to be cautious about seeing soldiers simply as the instruments of state sponsored repression. They could also take an active part in civil unrest. There are two separate incidents of disorder in which soldiers played a leading role. Again, unlike much of the remainder of the country, these incidents reveal a uniqueness inherent in the military experience of the area. Both of these uprisings occurred immediately after the Glorious Revolution, which affected their characteristics as well as the impact they had on civil-military relations. For the army, the period immediately after the revolution of 1688 was one of uncertainty, shortages and divided loyalties. Turmoil and dislocation in the administration led to long periods in which the army's pay was not forthcoming, especially to units located in England's peripheral regions. From this sprang the inability of officers to obtain the funds necessary to pay soldiers and keep accounts for housing and food. Such a situation was bound to cause high levels of tension between the civilian and military populations, and this is exactly what occurred in Berwick in 1688 and 1689.

In mid-December 1688 the town's authorities reported on a disturbance in which

> several soldiers and other inhabitants of this town having in a riotous and tumultuous manner assembled themselves together appeared in the public marketplace about two of the clock this afternoon, where they behaved themselves very insolently committing several enormities...[160]

Unpaid soldiers quartered in the town had seized free quarter from the inhabitants.[161] This incident created fears amongst Berwick's burgesses that continued 'quarrelling of the soldiers and townsmen with one another' could have serious negative

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[159] Ibid.
[160] BTRO GB 1/13, 14 December 1688.
[161] John Childs, The British Army of William III, 9.

repercussions for the town.[162] Anxiety became so pronounced that the authorities ordered constables to enforce a form of curfew where civilians and soldiers were to be kept off the streets after dark on pain of arrest.[163] Further outrages were prevented by Berwick's mayor who agreed to support the garrison until funds could be secured from London to meet the troop's outstanding pay.[164] This was done partly out of fear of what might happen if these circumstances were repeated, and out of a communal empathy for the conditions experienced by the men.[165] It is clear that regardless of the solution civil-military relations were strained by these events, if only in the medium term. However, the continued problem that began in 1689 carried on into the eighteenth century and helped to galvanise the town's leadership in pressing for the construction of new barracks.

The disturbance in Newcastle during 1689, while also directly related to the events of the Glorious Revolution, was entirely different from what was happening in Berwick. There was no protest over lack of pay, nor any fighting between civilians and the soldiery. It was unique in the fact that it represented the only riot in the north of England, up to the French Revolution, that was political in nature and contained no strong connection with parochial interests. Rather, the disturbance was a clear attempt by local army officers to express their support for the new regime in London, while also stirring up pro-Protestant and pro-Williamite sympathies in the town. The incident erupted when an angry crowd gathered in the Sandhill district of the city on the evening of 11 May 1689. Once in place, the crowd proceeded to pull down a large equestrian statue of James II that had been recently erected there.[166] The mob then dragged the figure of the deposed king across the quay and tipped it unceremoniously into the Tyne.[167]

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[162] BTRO GB 1/13, 14 December 1688.
[163] Ibid.
[164] Childs, The British Army of William III, 9.
[165] BTRO GB 1/13, 20 May 1689. This whole issue of the financial and logistical pressure placed on local communities through the quartering of soldiers is discussed in more depth in Chapter 4.
[166] R.J Charleston, A History of Newcastle on Tyne From the Earliest Records to Its Formation as a City (Newcastle upon Tyne, 1894) 78; John Sykes, Local Records, 121.
[167] Sykes, Local Records, 121.

Some historical accounts have portrayed this event as being perpetrated and led by civilians, however archival evidence discredits this view.[168] Entries in the Calendar of State Papers Domestic for this period point to the officers and soldiers of Colonel Heyford's Regiment of Royal Dragoons as the actual culprits.[169] Seven witnesses giving depositions before the mayor of Newcastle attest to the fact that members of the army had played a key role in the destruction of James' statue, and the disturbances that ensued. Thomas Bowles stated that Colonel Heyford, an army conspirator from the previous year, announced in a Sandhill coffee-house that he had ordered the removal of James' effigy.[170] Bowles further testified that later on in the evening two soldiers entered the coffee-house and informed Heyford that the deed had been done. At that point the colonel paid the two soldiers some money.[171] Other witnesses described how Captain Killigrew, one of Heyford's deputies, climbed up on the base of the statue and inflamed the growing crowd with anti-Stuart rhetoric and the distribution of money. Next, several soldiers placed a rope around the neck of the statue, and with the assistance of some civilians, pulled it down. The mob then proceeded to beat it with sticks and hurl stones as it was dragged to its watery grave.

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As has been mentioned above, this whole series of events was a clear attempt by the officers of the Royal Dragoons to express and reinforce their claims of loyalty to the new monarch, to whom they had defected only a year earlier. Further, by gaining the support of the crowd through rhetoric and monetary incentives, both Colonel Heyford and Captain Killigrew had legitimated their actions by transforming the disturbance into a popular civilian movement. They also helped to firmly establish Newcastle as a pro-Williamite centre.[173] Most importantly for this study, however, is the fact that this riot presents an incident where soldiers and civilians worked together. Such riotous

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[168] In particular, Sykes and Charlton make no mention of the role of the army. However, the participation of the army is noted in John Childs, The British Army of William III, 23.
[169] CSPD, 1689-90, 23 May 1689, 115.
[170] Ibid.
[171] Ibid.
[172] Ibid.
[173] Newcastle's leadership and population had declared for the new regime in November 1688, but many still felt it was vulnerable to pro-Jacobite sympathies because of its large catholic population and proximity to Scotland.

co-operation would not happen again in the North East for the remainder of the period.

VI. Conclusion.

The maintenance of public order in the eighteenth century was an intensely unpopular, and at times, violent business for both the army and militia. Many officers and civilian political leaders saw riot control as a particularly repulsive duty. Nevertheless, in the absence of a proper police force the army, and later the militia, evolved into the state's principal instrument for the enforcement of central and local authority. Smuggling threatened government excise revenue and trade while rioting in the North East endangered the vital supply of coal and the flow of other trade goods. There was a contiguous anxiety related to the possibility of rebellious activity within society, whether it was the threat of popish Jacobites or the challenge of French revolutionary radicalism. Reinforcing this were local leaders in the North East who had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo in the face of stern and organised opposition.[174] Therefore, as the century progressed, the use of the military to suppress civil unrest, control criminal activity, and guarantee the flow of goods and revenues, had become an integral part of government policy and a common feature of life in the North East.

While soldiers undertook duties aimed at opposing smuggling in the North East it never took on the same significance, intensity or ferocity as that experienced in other parts of the country. On the other hand the effect of rioting on the relationship between the army and society was not as limited, nor as ambiguous. In their role as maintainers of public order soldiers came face to face with angry, dispossessed and determined civilians. The foundations of this protest lay in the public's reactions to sharp changes to the region's socio-economic status quo or opposition to perceived interference in civilian's lives by local and national governments. This is especially true of issues focusing on wages, work conditions, impressment into military service and the availability of reasonably priced food. The importance of such issues meant

that those involved felt that their actions were justified and essential for personal and public wellbeing.

In many ways the army and militia were acting as extensions of the magistrate's legal authority to ensure continued peace and order within society. The armed forces represented a barrier that the crowds had to overcome if they were to achieve the objectives of their protest. Therefore, the resistance of civilians to the intervention of soldiers does not appear to have been grounded in a public endeavour to engage in civic combat with the military. Rather, it represented an attempt by civilians to achieve their goals by pushing past the barrier posed by the troops.[175] Even the violence of the 1761 militia riots was not focused against the militia itself, but towards the selection process and terms of service. It is more than likely that the mobs were attacking the symbols of authority, not the individual soldier. Despite such intense antagonism being characteristic in the region's unrest, riots were relatively bloodless. This is particularly apparent when one considers similar events in other parts of the country. With the exception of the deadly confrontation in Hexham during 1761, the army or militia shot or killed very few protesters. Similarly, the arrival of regular troops often quietened the mobs, while militia and other irregular units normally struggled to maintain order.

Even though the army was not the target of protestors, their involvement in riot control often influenced the course of local civil-military relations. The intensity of local protest and the cohesiveness of the region's labour force meant that units present at serious rioting could be branded for their role. Stephen Brumwell has noted that while the idea of a standing army gained acceptance amongst the elite, its involvement in riot duty further undermined the army's popularity with the general population.[176] As late as the 1790s the 'Hexham Butchers' of the North Yorkshire Militia were still enjoying the notoriety of their actions in 1761. Nevertheless, the role of the militia and the army in the maintenance of public order does not appear to have had a wholly negative impact on civil-military relations. This is most noticeable when one

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[174] Most local leaders and magistrates had interests in the coal trade. For more on this see Chapter 2.
[175] This perception is shared by J.M. Brereton, The British Soldier, A Social History From 1661 to the Present Day (London: The Bodley Head, 1986) 43.

considers the way in which the army supported the interests of local political leaders and businessmen. This group was all too aware of the important role the troops played and were often very grateful for their assistance, to the point where their regular employment of the army came to the attention of the Secretary at War. On one occasion this 'most odious service' even resulted in rare public platitudes and generous gifts being directed towards the soldiers and their officers.[177]

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[176] Brumwell, Redcoats, 55-6.

[177] PRO WO 4/83/316-17, Barrington to Lord Weymouth (Secretary of State), 18 April 1768. In particular I refer to the gifts given to soldiers for helping to suppress the 1740 riot in Newcastle.

Chapter 7

The Crucible of the '45

'All the regiments were encamped on Newcastle Town-moor where they were visited by many thousands of people from various parts of the country.'

Anon. 1745[1]

I. Introduction

It would be remiss to conduct a study of civil-military relations in North-East England during the eighteenth century without dealing directly with the momentous events that swept Britain in 1745. The extraordinary nature of this episode and the sheer scale of the military presence in the region dictates that the Jacobite rebellion of 1745 should be dealt with separately. Additionally, it provides an excellent opportunity to assess how the army was received by North-East society in times of great crisis, utilising the various themes dealt with previously in this study. Chapter 6 illustrated that in times of local crisis and unrest the presence of the army was openly encouraged, welcomed and even rewarded by civic leaders and some residents. At the same time the army faced opposition, from parts of the general population, towards its role in operations to combat these crises. This was true not just of rioting, but also of anti-smuggling and assistance with impressment activities. It is important to assess whether the unique threat posed by the 1745 rebellion changed people's attitudes. Did all sectors of society accept and honour the presence of these forces, or was the reaction similar to that described in previous chapters? Were local leaders keen to secure and accommodate troops whose presence would help ensure the maintenance of the socio-political status quo?

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[1] As quoted in: John Sykes, Local Records, Volume 1 (Stockton on Tees: Patrick & Shotton, 1973) 175.

II. Preparing for Invasion: North-East Papists and the Military Build-up

In Chapter 2 it was stated that the North East was an important element in the domestic security of England in the eighteenth century. This is clearly illustrated by the role that the region played in 1745 rebellion. The events of this year placed Newcastle and Berwick at the centre of the struggle between the Protestant crown and Charles Edward Stuart, the Jacobite pretender. It was feared that the rebel army would make its way down the east coast and secure the important bases of Berwick and Newcastle, where a French army allied to the Jacobites could land. The Pretender saw the reduction of Newcastle as key to dominance over northern England and to the success of his plans.[2] This perception of the region's place within the rebel's grand strategy influenced the events that were to follow. The eventual decision to march on Carlisle was not an attempt to avoid the North East, but rather an attempt to draw the forces amassed at Newcastle out into the open where they could be engaged in battle.

The belief that the Jacobites would choose this part of the country to make their entry into England was not just based on military analysis. A remnant of Jacobite sympathies remained present in the region after the Glorious Revolution and the defeat of the earlier rebellions in 1715 and 1718. Previous to this there appears to have been a specific vein of pro-Jacobite sympathy amongst some of the North East's aristocracy and gentry. This involved some of the region's most popular and prestigious families including those of Sir James Fenwick, Lord Derwentwater and Edward Clavering, who were all to be executed for their involvement in papist intrigues against the throne.[3] Similarly, there was a fear that the large and tempestuous population of keelmen resident on Tyneside, many of whom were Scots, would be favourable to a restoration of the Stuart monarchy. In fact, during the rebellion a conspiracy was uncovered involving a number of keelmen who were plotting to help recruit local people for the Jacobite army and seize money and weapons.[4] This in itself is surprising as during the 1715 rebellion the keelmen expressed great amounts of zeal for the Protestant cause, raising nearly 700 volunteers

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[2] Frank McLynn, The Jacobite Army in England 1745 (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1983) 11.
[3] Norman McCord & Richard Thompson, The Northern Counties From 1000 AD (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1998) 157-8.
[4] F.J. McLynn, 'Newcastle and the Jacobite Rising of 1745.' Journal of Local Studies. 2 (1) (1982) 62.

for armed service.[5] Thus it was both a fear and a hope on both sides that the many Catholics would rise up and assist the invaders.

As it turned out, this proved to be unrealistic due in part to the fact that the scattered supporters of the rebellion were unlikely to act with the region swarming with troops, and the invading army changing direction to Carlisle. Furthermore, the threat of a mass rising by disaffected Catholics proved to be a misplaced anxiety, not just in the North East, but throughout England. It has been estimated that during the period in which the Jacobite army was south of the Scottish border only 300 Englishmen joined its ranks from all counties.[6] One author estimates that just three men from Northumberland joined the invaders.[7]

Following the humiliating defeat at Prestonpans the government imminently expected the arrival of the Jacobite army in the North East. For the reasons mentioned above, Newcastle was chosen as the place to make a stand. It was hoped that by sending an army to the city, reinforced by units from Flanders, and backed up by a small force at Berwick, they could deter a direct assault on Tyneside. Similarly, it would allow the government time to arrange their forces before the Jacobites penetrated too far into England. To facilitate these plans General Wade was ordered to march northward in late September with an army that would eventually consist of more than 10,000 men. Additionally, the Duke of Cumberland was ordered to immediately dispatch eight regiments of foot and three regiments of dragoons to England from Flanders, which were to 'proceed directly by sea to Newcastle.'[8]

Just over one week later, in early October, the Duke of Newcastle was reporting that eight regiments from Flanders were soon to land in England and make their way to Newcastle.[9] Similarly, Colonel Huske reported in early October that Newcastle had

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[5] Sykes, Local Records, 135.
[6] Linda Colley, Britons, Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (London: Vintage Books, 1996) 86.
[7] Ian Gilmour, Riot, Risings and Revolutions. Governance and Violence in Eighteenth-Century England (London: Hutchinson Publications, 1992) 110.
[8] Duke of Newcastle to Viscount Irwin at Whitehall, September 28 1745, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Reports on MSS. in Various Collections, Vol.8, pg.107.
[9] Ibid., 110. Duke of Newcastle to Viscount Irwin, October 7 1745.

received ten additional companies totalling 500 men and he was expecting the imminent arrival of a Dutch regiment under the command of Colonel La Rocque.[10] There they would hopefully link up with the army that was assembling in the region. Unfortunately, General Wade's march north was not progressing as quickly as had been hoped. By 18 October, almost 20 days after orders were first issued, General Wade had managed to march his forces up to Doncaster, where they camped for two days. At this point the army was anything but imposing, having only 4,955 men from three British and five Dutch regiments.[11] It was hoped that the march from Doncaster would proceed more quickly.

The force planned to leave Doncaster on 21 and 22 October in two columns and arrive in Newcastle on 29 and 31 October respectively. On its route to the north the army would process through a number of small towns and villages including Ferry Bridge, Wetherby, Borough Bridge, Northallerton, Darlington, Perry Hill, and Chester-le-Street.[12] On the same day that Wade made it to Doncaster, Lieutenant-Colonel Howard arrived at Tynemouth Barracks on board a transport with five companies of his regiment. They had sailed from Williamstadt, but unfortunately a large number of the men had contracted a severe illness during the journey over.[13] Just two days later an additional force of five companies from Lord Ligioner's Regiment of Foot, along with an additional seven battalions of invalids and 12 gunners, had arrived by transports at Holy Island.[14]

By the time that the various elements of the army had gathered in the North East it numbered some 11,300 men, many of whom were to be quartered in and around the major towns of the region.[15] The list of troops under Wade's command during late 1745 included four squadrons of cavalry, three regiments of dragoons, eight regiments of foot, fourteen additional companies of foot, four Dutch regiments, fifteen battalions

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[10] PRO SP 36/70/110-2, Colonel John Huske to Secretary of State, 4 October 1745.
[11] Ibid., 36/72/40, 25-31 October 1745.
[12] Ibid., 36/72/39, 25-31 October 1745; F. J. McLynn, The Jacobite Army in England 1745. The Final Campaign (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1983) 6. He states that by late October Wade had arrived at Newcastle with 8,000 of these men.
[13] PRO SP 36/72/103, Lt. Colonel Howard to Secretary of State, 20 October 1745.
[14] Ibid., 36/72/103, Handasyde to Secretary of State, 22 October 1745.
[15] Entire regiments were stationed at Alnwick, Morpeth, Berwick, Newcastle and Tynemouth. Richard Milnes to Viscount Irwin, December 27 1745, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on MSS. in Various Collections, Vol 8, pg.159

from Flanders and four companies of Brockle's Regiment of Foot.[16] These forces were stationed in Newcastle, Alnwick, Berwick, Sunderland, Tynemouth and South Shields.

III. With Open Arms? The Civilian Response

In Chapter 2 it has been shown that the region regularly played host to sizeable numbers of soldiers. However, nothing throughout the century would compare to the size of the army that descended on the North East in 1745. Within a few weeks the military presence went from a few companies of soldiers to an army that was equivalent to about 45% of the entire population of Newcastle.[17] British, Dutch and German troops swarmed about major towns and their hinterlands, filling public houses and barns and covering the immediate countryside with tents. There had rarely been such a concentrated interaction between civilians and the military in the North East. Even the number of soldiers sent to combat the relatively low-key rebellion of 1715 could not compete with those witnessed thirty years later.[18] Despite the potential for trouble during the autumn and winter of 1745, these two contrasting populations appear to have co-existed peacefully and co-operated with each other. Civilians volunteered to help patrol and defend their towns, provided the troops with accommodation, food and money, and assisted in improving defences.

Much of this co-operation may have been due to the fact that the seriousness of the situation in 1745 was not lost on the population. The locals knew that the British army had been defeated in Scotland and that the Jacobites were expected to march south. Any remaining doubts would have been erased by the arrival of thousands of battle-hardened troops in October. This may have provoked the welling-up of civic pride that led to hundreds of men volunteering to join armed groups to assist in the patrol and defence of their towns. Such activity was undertaken quickly in Berwick, which expected to be the first settlement attacked by any army invading the North

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[16] PRO SP 36/70/215, 6 October 1745.

[17] This is estimating the population of Newcastle to be 24-25,000 in 1745. In 1750 it is listed as 25,000. Jeremy Gregory & John Stevenson, The Longman Companion to Britain in the Eighteenth Century 1688-1820 (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 2000) 290.

East. As early as September the Mayor of Berwick reported to the Secretary of State that he had taken 750 local men and organised them into parties of 50 men each. These were not conscripts but rather those who had 'voluntarily associated themselves for the defence of their civil and religious rights.'[19] Even with the region facing such a crisis, previous experience shows that conscription and impressment into the army would not have been tolerated. Eventually, the number of volunteers in Berwick would total 1,000 men organised into 15 companies.[20] This is a considerable proportion of the town's male population when one considers that at the end of the eighteenth century there were just 8,000 inhabitants there.

The situation in Newcastle was much the same. When Colonel Huske arrived in the town in early October local magistrates and civil leaders were embroiled in improving the defences of the town. As many as 300 local men had been armed and ordered to mount a guard. So many men had come forward to volunteer for these groups that Colonel Huske believed the town would soon run out of firearms and informed London that he required a great deal more to form all of the volunteers into units.[21] Smaller towns such as Morpeth did their best to contribute to the defence of their localities. On 30 October the 180 volunteers that had been raised and paid for by the town and local gentlemen formed up with their weapons in the marketplace.[22] There appears to have been a history of support against the threat of Jacobite forces. During the 1715 rebellion, when a small force of local and Scottish insurgents terrorised the towns of Northumberland, over 700 men had volunteered to be armed for the defence of Newcastle. Additionally, the Tyneside keelmen offered another 700 men to be ready at 30 minutes notice.[23] This last fact was of particular comfort to the authorities of Newcastle, who feared the large Scottish presence within the keelmen's community.

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[18] Sykes lists the forces that arrived under General Carpenter as consisting of two regiments of foot and slightly more than three full regiments of dragoons: Sykes, Local Records, 135.
[19] PRO SP 36/68/124, John Watson to Secretary of State, 18 September 1745.
[20] Sykes, Local Records, 173.
[21] PRO SP 36/70/110-2, Col. John Huske to Secretary of State, 4 October 1745; Sykes believes that the number of volunteers may have been in the thousands, Sykes, Local Records, 171.
[22] Sykes, Local Records, 174; For the same in County Durham please see: I.A. Carson Ritchie, "The Durham Association Regiment, 1745." JSAHR, 34 (1956) 106-119.
[23] Sykes, Local Records, 135.

Unfortunately, the eagerness of the local population to enter into temporary military service was not matched by the quality of the defences that protected the towns. In Newcastle initial surveys of the town's walls and gates proved that they were in a serious state of decay and that repairs would be needed to shore them up. With help from local craftsmen and workers, the ages of decay were partially reversed while the gates of the town were sealed up to await the arrival of Bonnie Prince Charlie and his forces.[24] As was the case with Newcastle, the physical defences of Berwick were less than impressive. Upon inspection Colonel Handasyde described the town's formidable but ageing walls and outer casements as a 'heap of ruins'.[25] However, he did compliment the garrison's commander, Colonel Cope, for having the foresight to gather together soldiers and local inhabitants to begin vital repairs on the town's defences. But the physical fortifications were not the only problem. The colonel also found fault with the number of soldiers present in the town. He believed that it was essential to reinforce the garrison with at least a full regiment of foot soldiers, as the garrison present in Berwick at that time was not sufficient by half.[26] This was despite the aforementioned efforts of many local men to arrange themselves into volunteer units. The enthusiasm of the civilian population to participate in defending their homes was no substitute for well-armed and well-trained regulars.

The public response to the actual arrival of the troops does not appear to have been negative. In fact, the townspeople seem to have welcomed the soldiers. John Wesley stated how the 'inhabitants greeted their deliverers with joy.'[27] This warm reception may have been the result of a number of factors. Wesley's observation indicates that the presence of Wade's army boosted the town's morale and added to a general sense of security and liberation from fear. Considering the perceived threat the Jacobite army posed to Newcastle, the soldiers and their officers would have been widely popular. Related to this is the fact that the presence of the army, despite its size, did not create a sudden surge in the prices of foodstuffs. In other times during the century, large concentrations of military manpower within a small geographical area

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[24] TWAS MD/NC/2/5/45, 7 September 1745.
[25] PRO SP 36/72/27, Colonel Handasyde to Secretary of State, 19 October 1745.
[26] Ibid.
[27] McLynn, 'Newcastle and the Jacobite Rising.' 62-3.

caused food prices to rise dramatically.[28] This often caused tension between soldiers and civilians, and could even lead to rioting by one or both groups. Luckily the North East's agricultural capacity was sufficient to cope with most demands, to the point that it exported large amounts of grain to other regions of England and even to the Baltic.

In terms of accommodation it would appear that the local authorities attempted as best as possible to house all of the soldiers stationed within their jurisdictions. There is no mention in the archival sources of officers complaining about a lack of housing. It is not surprising that Berwick was able to billet the few regiments that were based within the town's walls. The neighbourhood had a history of military occupancy, and after 1719, had purpose built barracks to house large numbers of troops. This did not stop eager entrepreneurs trying to take advantage of the flood of potential business. A local man named James Hood was brought before the town's quarter sessions charged with taking it upon himself to billet troops without the permission of the town magistrates.[29] Whether he did this out of a willingness to help or simply to make some extra money is hard to determine.

Newcastle, home to the vast majority of troops, had no facilities similar to that at Berwick until the very end of the eighteenth century. There were barracks at Tynemouth but these would not be in a sufficient condition until a programme of repairs and expansion was undertaken later in the century. This made the effort to provide shelter for the troops camped in and near the town all the more impressive. While Newcastle was a relatively large town it did not have enough rooms in public houses for the thousands of soldiers who needed them. In an unusual show of solidarity and good will, the magistrates and inhabitants allowed men to be quartered in public halls, malting houses, empty buildings and even private residences. During this period of crisis civilians were willing to temporarily restrict their rights in order to assist their own protection. At other times in the century attempts to house soldiers in private buildings created firestorms of protest.[30]

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[28] Frank McLynn, Crime and Punishment in Eighteenth-Century England (London: Routledge, 1989) 334.
[29] BTRO C/8/2, 13 January 1745.
[30] In 1757 magistrates in Berwick faced lawsuits from several butchers, bakers and other store owners for billeting soldiers in their properties: BTRO GB 1/17/265, 26 September 1759.

The succour that towns provided in this time of crisis included capital in addition to housing and food. In Chapter 3 it was shown that supporting populations of soldiers could, and often did, cause financial pressures on local communities. This was especially true earlier in the century when the monetary crisis within the army left many towns such as Berwick supplying their resident soldiers with large sums of money and credit. The money was often used to pay soldiers' wages and purchase provisions for regiments whose allowances had not arrived from London. While this problem tended to be concentrated in the late part of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, times of extreme crisis could see regiments fall severely short of money. Such was the case in 1745 when Lieutenant Colonel La Rocque's regiment found itself in dire financial straits 'being disappointed of money to pay the regiment.'[31] In response to this problem the corporation of Newcastle very generously agreed to supply the substantial sum of £600 to the regiment for subsistence and pay until such time as London could supply them with their backdated pay.[32] While this was partly motivated by goodwill, there is little doubt that the corporation would have been concerned at having large numbers of hungry and disaffected soldiers within its midst at such a crucial time.

The role of the local authorities in supplying funds to assist the military went beyond making up the shortfalls of money from London for food and shelter. The councils of Berwick and Newcastle placed considerable sums of money in the hands of army and militia officers to assist in mounting guards and patrols of the towns. The corporation governing Newcastle ordered 40 shillings be paid every day to any Captain on duty to facilitate and defray the costs of mounting a guard.[33] Beyond this the council also made 15 shillings per day available 'to each Captain of His Majesty's forces upon duty for a Captain's guard towards their refreshment.'[34] The political authorities were not only attempting to raise men but to ensure that they took some responsibility for the proper functioning of the units that would protect them from the Jacobite army.

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[31] TWAS MD/NC/2/5/52, 14 October 1745.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid., 2/5/47-8, 7 October 1745.
[34] Ibid.

IV. The Reaction of the Army

Civilians and political leaders of the various towns in the region appear to have reacted in a positive fashion to the presence of such large concentrations of soldiers. However, as has been shown in previous chapters, the soldiers themselves had a very important role in developing relationships between themselves and civilians. It could be assumed that the general goodwill and assistance afforded the various regiments was proof enough of the tractable behaviour of the troops. However, one must remember the unusual atmosphere present during this period. The population of the North East was genuinely afraid of the possibility of an assault by the Jacobite army. Therefore, the need for security may have made civilians more tolerant towards crimes and other outrages committed by soldiers. It has been clearly illustrated that the army was not at the root of all local problems. Despite this, with such large numbers of troops present, it is necessary to look at their actual conduct within the contexts of themes discussed in earlier sections of this study. This will show whether the civilians' kind disposition to the soldiers was genuine, resulted simply from fear of the invading Jacobite army, or was an attempt to placate the large numbers of soldiers from committing criminal and violent acts against the local population.

One of the few areas in which obvious tensions and ill feelings emerged was over the presence of foreign troops. This phenomenon was focused in Newcastle where the vast majority of the non-English forces were based under General Wade. Almost half of the soldiers stationed there consisted of troops from Holland and the German states. Their insolence and general unwillingness to co-operate with local civilians and community leaders led to widespread condemnation.[35] This was not the first time that Dutch soldiers based in the region had been the cause of tension with civilians. Troops from Holland had been stationed in Newcastle during the first Jacobite rebellion in 1715, and they were present on and off until the conclusion of the next uprising in 1718. In October 1715 a group of Dutch dragoons in Newcastle hatched a plan to plunder the town. It was only the actions of the English garrison that

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[35] McLynn, The Jacobite Army, 47.

prevented this from occurring.[36] The existence of continued ambivalence between foreign soldiers and local civilians is supported by the fact that not long after the 1745 rebellion Dutch troops were the subject of similar accusations in nearby Stockton on Tees. So bad was the public feeling against these men that upon their departure in early 1746 one local commentator stated how the town had got 'happily rid of their nauseous company.'[37]

Despite the huge swelling in the number of soldiers in Newcastle, Berwick and the surrounding region, the soldiery's participation in crimes against civilians does not appear to have increased to the level that one would expect. Just three soldiers were brought before the justices of the Northern Circuit Assizes in that year and none appeared before quarter sessions. All the men were charged with the armed robbery of local civilians in the area of Newcastle.[38] This is extraordinary considering the sheer numbers of soldiers present. What is very unusual is that in one case, that of Corporal Joseph Franklin, an individual perpetrated the robbery.[39] It was quite rare for soldiers to commit such offences without the assistance of others. Similar unaccompanied acts were perpetrated on only two previous occasions in the century. Fortunately for Franklin, he was eventually acquitted of his crime. The other incident, which involved two private soldiers from General Handasyde's regiment, reinforces the characteristics of robbery committed by soldiers as discussed in Chapter 5. It was an opportunist attack, with a small element of pre-meditation, upon an unsuspecting male victim.[40] Furthermore, the incident involved the administration of some limited violence to achieve its goals. The man who actually committed the act, George Dowdy, was sentenced to death for his actions, while his accomplice James Holmes was found not guilty.[41] Luckily for Dowdy his sentence was eventually commuted to transportation to America for 14 years.

There is a fourth soldier, John Board, who may have been involved in criminal activities. A number of depositions from the period record his name and the fact that

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[36] The troops are said to have been Swiss but it is very likely that they are actually Dutch: Sykes, Local Records, 138.
[37] Tom Sowler (ed.), A History of the Town and Borough of Stockton on Tees (Teesside: Museums and Art Galleries Department, 1972) 117.
[38] PRO ASSI 45/23/1/19h-m.
[39] Ibid., 45/23/1/25b-d.
[40] Ibid., 45/23/1/19h-m.

he was a private from Handasyde's regiment which was stationed in Newcastle at the time of the rebellion.[42] Two civilians attested to the fact that John Board had been billeted at the inn of one William Jersey on 22 December, but neither could confirm his whereabouts between 3 p.m. and 10 p.m. on that day.[43] While there is no actual description of the soldier committing a crime, his appearance in the records in this manner indicates this to be very likely. In most other cases where soldiers and civilians are tried for crimes their whereabouts during the time of the offence are often key to a conviction or acquittal. Unfortunately, little of this case remains so there is no indication of what crime John Board was accused of and whether he was guilty or not. Since there is no mention of an execution around this date it is very possible that the soldier was acquitted, or that it was a less serious crime for which transportation or gaol was the usual punishment.

While there were only three criminal cases in the entire region, involving four soldiers, there were surprisingly no cases of bastardy that can be directly attributed to soldiers. There is one case in Berwick during 1745 but it is recorded that the birth took place on 16 January, almost ten months before troops began massing in the region.[44] This is particularly surprising considering how the town had struggled with this phenomenon in the early part of the century. The completion of the barracks in 1719 helped to lessen the rate of soldier related bastardy, but with the influx of soldiers into all towns one would have expected an increase in cases. Once again this trend may point to the limitations that the army's war footing placed on the freedom of soldiers to cavort with local women. Beyond this there appears to have been little in the way of negative or positive incidents occurring between civilians and soldiers quartered in the region. There are no cases of fighting between soldiers and civilians, no incidents of drunken rowdiness, and no other apparent forms of conflict or tension.

In terms of the topics discussed in this thesis it could be said that the behaviour of soldiers in the region during 1745 was uneventful. Apart from the isolated incidents mentioned above the attitude of the soldiers towards the local population seems to have been largely benign. In part, much of this good comportment can be attributed

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[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid., 45/23/1/3f-g, 31 December 1745.
[43] Ibid., The civilians were James Burdon and William Jersey.

to the circumstances the country found itself in. This was not simply a large garrison force residing in a town before marching out of the region to another station. In all respects it was an army constituted to fight a war on British soil against an aggressive invading enemy. Due to its 'war footing' this force was subject to the same laws as those units fighting on the continent or in the colonies. The strict laws governing the army, and to a lesser extent the civilian population, assisted in regulating the massive number of armed men in the camps about the towns and in the surrounding countryside. It helped to enforce discipline and ensured that officers were present with their units. This in turn fostered an atmosphere of control in which soldier's actions were restricted to a certain extent.

At the same time the camps themselves played a key role in lessening the possible impact that Wade's forces would have on the region's towns. Despite the fact that many regiments were sent to population centres, it was important to ensure that the force did not become too dispersed. This could undermine discipline as well as affect the army's ability to march at short notice to meet a concerted Jacobite invasion. For this reason the largest portion of the army was encamped in and around Newcastle, the region's largest defensible town with easy access to the sea. However, Newcastle could never be expected to accommodate the numbers of troops that were marching into Tyneside in September and October 1745. For this reason, the main body of Wade's army was camped in field tents on the town moor. At the time of the 1745 rebellion this area of the town lay directly outside the confines of the town walls. Camp life, combined with the observance of military discipline, prevented most military personnel from entering the walls of the town. Therefore, the actual number of troops stationed in the city, while large, was probably not vast. This meant that the opportunities for theft and robbery were limited, and the contact between soldier and civilian was constrained.

V. Conclusion

The peculiar events of 1745 necessitated one of the largest military build-ups the North East had ever witnessed. Thousands of soldiers poured into Newcastle and the surrounding region, filling all of the available accommodation. Similarly, a huge

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[44] BTRO C15/14, 23 January 1745.

component of General Wade's force was encamped on Newcastle's town moor. This unique concentration of military forces affords an opportunity to test some of the theories set out in other chapters, albeit under extreme conditions. The reaction of the local population to the arrival of such large numbers of soldiers allows some insight into the way in which the armed forces were perceived in this period. Similarly, the behaviour of the soldiers, assembled in the numbers they were, would expose whether the conclusions of previous chapters are accurate. If this is the case then negative incidents such as crimes, the birth of bastards and confrontations would not increase substantially.

The British units present in the region appear to have been well disciplined and there were no major confrontations between soldiers and civilians. Similarly, the number of crimes committed by members of the army against civilians was completely disproportionate to the number of troops within the region. The only major problem appears to have been the relative dislike that existed between the inhabitants of Newcastle and the foreign soldiers based there. Nevertheless, this appears to have been a relatively unimportant conflict in which the civilian population's suffering and loss was limited. If any major incidents arose out of this tension they have not survived in local records beyond a few anecdotal remarks.

It is certain that the manner in which the army was managed on this occasion influenced its conduct. Despite this, the lack of major incidents reinforces the belief that the army was not universally despised in the North East. It also illustrates the fact that soldiers did not regularly take part in actions that would damage relations with the civilian population. Nevertheless, it is misleading to give the impression that all was well in the relationship between the army and civilians. As has been shown in previous chapters, tensions existed, crimes were committed and civilians expressed resistance to the military. What this chapter has reinforced is the fact that such occurrences were quite rare, even at times when vast numbers of soldiers were present in the region.

The civilian population appears to have greeted soldiers arriving in the region with enthusiasm, and even some level of affection. Many immersed themselves in assisting the army and local authorities in preparing their towns for a possible assault

by the rebels. Large numbers of men volunteered to take up arms, and council members freely offered money to help support soldiers and fund patrols. Additionally, private houses and public buildings were opened without resistance to house the legions of infantrymen flooding into the towns. If one considers the widespread opposition to the pressures of billeting during much of the century, the almost complete absence of complaints by civilians against these unparalleled pressures is remarkable.

While it may appear cynical, it is almost certain that the exceptional tolerance and kindness shown by the local population during 1745 was due in part to the unusual events of that year. It seems that civilian society was somewhat selfish in their attitude towards the army. In times of crisis, such as major riots, support from local officials was always high. On the other hand, the actions of the army in such situations engendered varying levels of support and obstruction within the general population. Such action often caused a decline in civil-military relations as the army clashed, actively or passively, with members of the local population. The major difference in 1745 was that the Jacobite rebels were perceived as threatening all elements of society who supported the existing Protestant political establishment. The danger posed to the region by the imminent invasion may have mitigated the reaction of the local civilian population to the presence of such numbers of troops.[45] The whole region was consumed with the fear that the rebel army to the north might attempt to seize Newcastle, Berwick and other parts of the North East. This fact helped to unite society while at the same time elevated the rank and file of the gathering army to the status of saviours. The local inhabitants knew that if they were to repel the Jacobites it would be crucial to have a large body of troops who were well disposed to the civilian population. However, these factors should not diminish the extraordinarily positive state of civil-military relations in the North East during 1745.

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[45] Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats. The British Soldier and War in the Americas 1755-1763 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 54. He notes that a similar rise in public esteem of the army and soldiers occurs in the wake of military victories. However, this rarely lasted much beyond the outbreak of peace.

Chapter 8

Conclusions

This thesis has investigated the nature of civil-military relations in north-east England during the eighteenth century. I have chosen not to focus on the study of civil-military relations as a construct of regional and national political, economic and administrative structures. Rather, this study is more interested in the daily interactions that existed between local civilian society and the military. The aim of this approach is to observe the way in which soldiers and members of the public co-existed. In doing so, a picture can be formed of how civil-military relations were developed and maintained in this region. One can also gauge how the army's duties, and the actions of individual soldiers, influenced public perceptions of, and attitudes towards, the land forces. Additionally, it is possible to analyse whether local public resistance to the army and its duties was the result of a popular undercurrent of hatred for the military, or the product of other socio-economic and political concerns.

The eighteenth-century British army was an increasingly representative institution. Despite this, and the growing acceptance of a standing army, it was never truly popular or widely appreciated. Even the notoriety afforded the armed forces after its great victories was short lived.[1] Soldiers may have lived amongst the population, and there may have been growing familiarity with the military as the century progressed, but they were always one step apart from society. On the one hand the army was feared for its potential to assist ambitious monarchs in establishing authoritarian rule. On the other hand the rank and file were publicised as the insolent and drunken sweepings of British society, poorly paid and subject to brutal discipline. It is no wonder that soldiering remained a low-caste, unpopular and marginal occupation in eighteenth-century Britain.

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[1] Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats. The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 54. On the other hand the popularity of the navy grew throughout the century.

The North East has proved to be an interesting locality in which to investigate the issue of civil-military relations. A sparsely populated area of Britain, far away from the political nexus of London, it was strategically important to the whole country. For the first half of the century it stood as a buffer against the Jacobite threat from Scotland. However, its defences protected Britain from foreign invasion throughout the period. At the same time Newcastle and its environs were economically significant, not least because the region supplied much of London's requirements for coal. In addition, the region's close links to the sea meant it was a key location for shipbuilding and related industries. Equally important was the role it played as a 'nursery' for the sailors who manned Britain's navy. The tightly knit communities of keelmen and colliers contributed notably to the character of the North East. They were highly organised and vociferous defendants of their communal rights. As such, this segment of North-East society contributed disproportionately to public unrest in the region. Similarly, the leadership of the region had a direct interest in the coal trade. Many of the large families who dominated local political and economic life were involved in the production and shipping of coal. These factors combined to influence the role of the army in the region, and particularly in Newcastle.

What the previous chapters have shown is that the interactions between the army and civilian society were diverse and complex, both in their origins and their effects on civil-military relations. Additionally, it has been illustrated that in the eighteenth century the army played an important role in the daily life of the general population. This was particularly true in towns like Berwick that supported permanent garrisons. What becomes apparent is that the army was not simply a mechanism that ensured the state's monopoly over the means of employing large-scale violence against foreign competitors. It was also an instrument that the central government in London, in co-operation with regional leaders, utilised to support state policy and revenue collection, as well as maintain order amongst the population. In an era when organised police forces were non-existent, rioting was endemic, and threats to internal security were rife, the army and the militia were the only true institutions that the government could employ to secure the British state.

The role of the army as policeman and protector, and the preponderance of billeting and garrisoning, ensured that officers and men spent a great deal of their time

amongst their civilian counterparts. This greatly influenced the course and development of civil-military relations on a number of levels. While these interactions impacted upon local and central government relationships, their consequences were also felt at a much more basic level. The political elite in London could order troops to combat riots, enforce customs laws, or impress idle men into the army, but it was the rank-and-file that carried out these orders. They faced the angry crowds, confronted dangerous smugglers and carried away reluctant recruits. For this reason the private soldier was at the sharp end of government policy and law enforcement.

The opposition these duties generated amongst the general population was most acute when soldiers confronted rioters. In this role both the army and militia were acting as the representatives of the authority and interests of central and local government. The troops recognised how odious and unpopular their duties were, often exercising great care to ensure that violence and bloodshed was kept to a minimum. The violence that occasionally erupted between soldiers and the local population was a consequence of the fact that anti-rioting forces represented a barrier that needed to be overcome if the crowd was to achieve its goals. Likewise, public resistance to impressment was not directed specifically at soldiers, or necessarily the institution they represented. It was aimed mainly at the incredibly unpopular practice and process of compulsory enlistment. Unfortunately, military personnel sometimes endured the wrath of local civilians who were trying to protect friends and family from enlistment or recapture.

Rarely in these situations could the individual infantryman or dragoon do much to deflect or cause this collective anger. However, through their daily conduct soldiers could influence the course of civil-military relations and public perceptions of the army. Despite a reputation for violence, crime and misbehaviour there is little evidence to suggest that soldiers based in the region contributed more than their 'fair share' of crime. Less favourable is evidence suggesting that soldiers were disproportionately represented in very violent and brash crimes such as highway robbery, murder and manslaughter. However, it must be recognised that these incidents were infrequent in the context of the entire eighteenth century. Equally interesting is the fact that surviving evidence suggests that many of the civilian deaths caused by soldiers' criminal actions were accidental and unpremeditated. Often they

were the result of drink-fuelled brawls between civilians and soldiers. While it is difficult to apportion blame in every incident it is apparent that both sides were responsible for instigating such confrontations. Nevertheless, it has been observed that in such circumstances soldiers tended to react to civilian antagonism with a disproportionate level of ferocity and violence.

While there were difficulties in the relationship between soldiers, civilians and local officials within the North East it is inaccurate to say all interactions were characterised by tension, hatred and fractiousness. With the exception of quashing unrest, and soldier's involvement in bastardy, much of the strain on civil-military relations in the region resulted from other factors. Mainly these were jurisdictional misunderstandings and tensions arising from procedures that governed major military processes such as impressment and billeting. In the case of Berwick this stress was a product of two factors. The most significant of these was the population's frustration with the financial burdens that billeting imposed on the community. Rarely did local publicans or political leaders complain specifically about the behaviour of soldiers. More often than not their anger was focused upon unpaid bills and the costs of supporting soldiers in garrison.

These anxieties were mirrored in other regional towns but the situation was never on a par with that experienced in Berwick. Nevertheless, local government and civilians did much to assist the soldiers in their time of need. Some may have feared the presence of large numbers of disaffected and unpaid soldiers in their midst but empathy, as much as trepidation, motivated people to help. Fortunately, the construction of purpose-built barracks in 1719 eased tensions and lowered the rate of bastardy. Regardless, this tension was replaced by repeated conflicts focused on the actions of military officials trying to make improvements to the region's military infrastructure.

The problems mentioned above never became unmanageable because the region's civic leaders, aware of their rights, were prepared to forward their complaints to the central government in London. At the same time the administrators at the War Office tended to listen to grievances from civic leaders, and if necessary, took action against offending officers. Officials were conscious of the effect that such differences of

opinion could have on local communities and that good relations were essential in facilitating the maintenance of garrison populations. Such necessities helped to increase the chances that civilian complaints were listened to and dealt with in a reasonable manner. At the same time the War Office, by exercising its role as arbitrator between the army and society, was enforcing the supremacy of civilian government over the army. This was particularly important in Britain where the very existence of a standing army was the subject of so much public debate and anger.

One problem with covering any wide-ranging historical topic over a long chronological period is getting an idea for how things changed over time. Therefore, it is necessary to briefly discuss how civil-military relations changed between the Glorious Revolution and the start of the French Revolutionary Wars.[2] Importantly, civilian control over the army became more entrenched during the century, helping to ease fears over the existence of a standing army. In the regions this was increasingly embodied in the power exercised by the magistracy over the armed forces. This evolution impacted on almost every aspect of military life in the North East, from recruitment and impressment to billeting and riot control. It was also part of a wider devolution of power from the centre to the regions in relation to local social and welfare issues. In parallel there was a direct attempt to bring the army more under the control of the common law in cases where soldiers committed offences against civilians and private property. By the early part of the century this had largely succeeded and civilian checks on the army had been widely entrenched.

In terms of recruitment, the widespread employment of vagrants, criminals and debtors as soldiers eased as the century progressed. At the same time the utilisation of army impressment declined in importance until it finally disappeared after 1779. Nevertheless, poor pay and the poor public image of soldiering did little to improve the perception of army service. Recruits were hard to find and desertion from the ranks continued to be endemic throughout the period. After 1757 the reformed militia made a noticeable change to the military presence in the North East. While the regular army still played a major role in the region the militia was increasingly employed on many duties including rioting and anti-smuggling. Unfortunately, their

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[2] A discussion of the changes inherent in the army during this period can be found in Chapter 2.

competence in these tasks was often lacking. In fact, throughout the century it proved necessary to call on the assistance of regular troops to combat the unrest caused by an increasingly defiant and organised labour force. By the end of the period strikes and riots on Tyneside and Wearside had become a regular occurrence. This intensification of anti-riot duty probably helped to undermine the army and militia's relationship with the civilian population.

The criminal activity of soldiers continued unabated throughout the century. As mentioned in Chapter 5 determining any long-term trends in the rates of crime is hard due to gaps in the source material. The indication that crime amongst the soldiery increased as the century progressed can be attributed to an improvement in the survivability of archival sources and more detailed record keeping. In addition, the increase in invalids and militiamen in accounts of trials does not necessarily prove an expansion of military criminality in the second half of the century. Rather, it relates directly to the increased and more regular presence of these forces within the North East.

In many ways this work has asked as many questions as it has answered. However, what it has shown is the complexity of civil-military relations and the way that interactions of soldiers and civilians influenced associations at many levels within eighteenth-century Britain. Despite a voluminous body of historiography it is surprising that there have been few attempts to analyse the place held by the army in eighteenth-century British society, let alone construct a comprehensive social history of this remarkable institution. I hope that this study has gone some way to addressing this situation while adding to the social and military history of the British army and North-East England.

Appendix A

Establishments of Land Forces in Britain and the Plantations 1689-1793.[1]

Year	Establishment	Notes
1686-88	20,970	WO 24/8
1689	13,615	WO 24/9
1690	22,848	WO 24/13 Includes General and Staff Officers[2]
1691-3	N/A	N/A
1694	65,220	WO 24/21 End of Nine Years War.
1695-8	N/A	N/A
1699	8,082	WO 24/22 Reduction of army by parliament.[3]
1700	7,878	WO 24/23
1701	39,470	WO 24/26 Includes general & staff officers[4]
1702	18,072	WO 24/28[5]
1703	13,396	WO 24/33 Includes garrisons and invalids
1704	6,723	Does not include garrisons, invalids etc.[6]
1705	10,406	WO 24/38 Excludes a regiment for sea service.
1706	N/A	N/A
1707	N/A	N/A
1708	12,365	WO 24/45
1709	12,375	WO 24/49
1710	15,727	WO 24/55 Excludes 12 companies of invalids (59-122 each)[7]
1711	N/A	N/A

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[1] Sources: PRO WO 24/26-316. Establishments of Guards, Garrisons and Land Forces 1701-1756; PRO SP 41/7/353 (1732) and PRO SP 41/3-29 (1702-1782); BL Add.MSS 33,046/23 Duke of Newcastle's Military Papers (17th Century-1755).

[2] PRO WO 24/13. General and Staff Officers include men such as the Captain General, Paymaster & Quartermaster Generals, as well as aides and staffs.

[3] On 9 December 1698 Parliament decided "That all land forces of England, in English pay exceeding 7,000 (and those consisting of His Majesty's natural-born subjects) be forthwith paid and disbanded." This also included sending William's beloved Dutch guards back to the continent. Cobbett's Parliamentary History of England, Vol.5 (1688-1702) 1191-2.

[4] Up to 1707 Scotland is on a different military establishment so its troops do not appear in the totals.

[5] The large disparity between the numbers for 1702-3 and 1701-2 (21,668 men) could be due, in part, to the 16 foot regiments of 859 (13,744) and 2 foot regiments of 835 (1670) men that appear on the 1701-2 establishment but do not appear in the next year. It is possible that these regiments were raised in 1701 and then sent over to Flanders in the next year, thus not appearing on the home establishment: PRO WO 24/26, 28.

[6] PRO SP 41/3/14. This is only an abstract of effective men (5,542 privates, 1,181 commissioned officers & N.C.O.'s) according to a muster commencing 25 April and ending 24 June 1704. However, there are 558 men "wanting to complete", bringing the total to 7,281. The vast majority of British troops were in Holland at this point (three regiments of horse, three regiments of dragoons & 15 regiments of foot). Troops in England made up of four troops and one regiment of Horse Guards and Grenadier Guards, two regiments of dragoons and five regiments of foot: PRO SP 41/3/25.

[7] If one is to average the size on these companies at 90 men each (59+122/2) and multiply it by the 12 companies, this accounts for 1,086 men. Added to the establishment it would total 16,813 men.

1712	N/A	N/A
1713	8,892	WO 24/68
1714	11,285	WO 24/70,73 Inc. 12 company's invalids (South Britain)
1715	37,947	WO 24/79[8]
1716	33,380	WO 24/82[9]
1717	16,814	WO 24/86 4 regiments dragoons + 8 foot disbanded[10]
1718	12,828	WO 24/92 6 regiments dragoons, 6 foot disband[11]
1719	12,435	WO 24/95
1720	15,019	WO 24/97
1721	14,904	WO 24/101
1722	14,872	WO 24/104
1723	18,876	WO 24/109
1724	18,876	WO 24/112
1725	18,515	WO 24/115
1726	18,515	WO 24/121
1727	26,441	WO 24/127
1728	23,055	WO 24/133
1729	23,055	WO 24/140
1730	18,374	WO 24/145
1731	18,364	WO 24/149
1732	18,004	WO 24/153
1733	18,317	WO 24/157
1734	18,367	WO 24/161
1735	26,105	WO 24/167
1736	18,351	WO 24/171
1737	18,360	WO 24/175
1738	18,368	WO 24/178
1739	18,312	WO 24/181
1740	29,696	WO 24/190 War of Austrian Succession commences, to 1748.
1741	35,401	WO 24/195 Raising new regiments for war
1742	36,216	WO 24/204 " " "
1743	24,264	WO 24/215
1744	19,839	WO 24/223 New raised regiments to Flanders etc.
1745	16,403	WO 24/233
1746	49,531	WO 24/246 Regiments in to Fight Jacobites.[12]

[8] Sudden increase of establishment in England probably caused by return of regiments from theatres of war after the cessation of hostilities, who have yet to be reduced or disbanded. There are in fact 25 foot regiments listed on the establishment accounting for 17,645 men: PRO WO 24/79.

[9] There are still the 25 regiments of foot mentioned above but it appears as if the 19 regiments of dragoons have been reduced from 9,443 to 5,643 men. There are further reductions in the Royal Regiment of Horse Guards (781 to 445) and H.M.'s Own Regiment of Horse (747 to 427). Total reduction of 4,852: PRO WO 24/ 79,82.

[10] PRO WO 24/86. Establishments, 25th December 1717.

[11] Ibid., 24/92, 25th December 1718.

1747	33,690	WO 24/259 Units back to theatre of war
1748	50,599	WO 24/271 War ends & regiments return to England.
1749	19,522	WO 24/279 Mass discharge of soldiers
1750	19,648	WO 24/287 Inc. general officers & garrison staffs
1751	19,670	WO 24/291
1752	19,648	WO 24/295
1753	19,670	WO 24/299
1754	19,670	WO 24/303
1755	21,125	WO 24/309
1756	39,715	WO 24/316 Commencement of Seven Years War
1757	50,606	WO 24/328
1758	54,639	WO 24/339
1759	29,652/50,332	WO 24/351
1760	57,292	WO 24/363
1761	55,392	WO 24/380 Excludes Scotland.[13]
1762	64,659	WO 24/394
1763	59,724/18,079	25/12/1762 to 24/4/1763 & 25/4/1763 to 24/12/63
1764	17,085	WO 24/423
1765	14,964	WO 24/429
1766	17,704	WO 24/434
1767	16,918	WO 24/439
1768	17,226	WO 24/444
1769	17,649	WO 24/450
1770	18,183	WO 24/455
1771	18,175	WO 24/460
1772	18,044	WO 24/464
1773	17,592	WO 24/468
1774	18,563	WO 24/473
1775	18,086	WO 24/478 1 regiment of foot less than 1774
1776	21,294	WO 24/482
1777	21,276	WO 24/487
1778	21,800	WO 24/491
1779	32,651	WO 24/496
1780	35,656	WO 24/501
1781	40,317	WO 24/506
1782	41,440	WO 24/513
1783	51,741	WO 24/520 From 24/4 many regiments disbanded or reduced

[12] This force consists of 34 battalions of infantry and 22 squadrons of cavalry and dragoons, including Hessian (6 battalions, 8 squadrons) and Dutch (8 battalions) troops. Many of these units were brought over from Flanders as the seriousness of the rebellion in Scotland became apparent in October and November 1745: PRO SP 41/16, 24 December 1745.

[13] Of this total there are still 7,098 men wanting to complete the establishment. 6,488 are from the regiments & companies of foot who lost 3,174 men in draughts for foreign service the previous year, and of this a further 2,040 are required by the Independent Companies of Foot: BL Add.MSS 33,048/26-7, 79.

1784	18,062	WO 24/529
1785	18,334	WO 24/534
1786	17,925	WO 24/539
1787	17,849	WO 24/544
1788	18,368	WO 24/549
1789	17,654	WO 24/554
1790	17,654	WO 24/558
1791	17,219	WO 24/563
1792	23,603	WO 24/568
1793	18,049	WO 24/574

Appendix B

Military Service As Substitute for Criminal Punishment: 1747-62[1]

		Branch of Service			
Year	Total Pardoned	Army	Navy	Marines	Not Specified[2]
1747-55	2	0	2	0	0
1756	14	11	0	1	2
1757	2	0	1	0	1
1758	16	5	8	0	3
1759	8	4	2	2	0
1760	2	1	0	1[3]	0
1761	127	107	12	0	8[4]
1762	63	59	4	0	0
Totals:	234	187	29	4	14
% Total	100%	79.9	12.4	1.7	5.9

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[1] Sources: PRO SP 44/85-8, State Papers Domestic-Criminal: Correspondence and Warrants. SP 44/85 (1747-56); SP 44/86 (Jan.1757-Aug.1760); SP 44/87 (Feb.1761-Apr.1766); SP 44/88 (1761-67).

[2] This includes men given the opportunity to serve in either the navy or the army.

[3] It is possible that after 1760 criminals were still enrolled in the marine regiments however from this date there are no orders directing them to specifically do so.

[4] Of these, six were specifically told that if they joined the army it must be with an overseas regiment otherwise they would have to enlist in the navy.

Appendix C

Location of Service for Criminals in the Army: 1747-62[5]

Year	Any Regiment Abroad	49th Regiment Jamaica	Other Specific Regiments	Not Specified	Totals By Year
1756	0	1	8[6]	2	11
1757	0	0	0	0	0
1758	1[7]	0	0	4	5
1759	0	0	3	1	4
1760	0	0	0	1	1
1761	43	36	2	26	107
1762	7	49	1	2	59
Totals	51	86	14	36	187
% Total	27.3%	45.9%	7.5%	19.2%	99.9%

[5] Sources: PRO SP 44/85-8. State Papers Domestic, Criminal: Correspondence and Warrants. SP 44/85 (1747-56); SP 44/86 (Jan.1757-Aug.1760); SP 44/87 (Feb.1761-Apr.1766); SP 44/88 (1761-1767).

[6] Six of these men were enlisted in Charles Ottway's 35th Regiment of Foot. SP 44/85/481,483.

[7] Specifically, this was listed as any regiment presently serving in North America.

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